"Bonaparte by Corelli Barnett" Topic

This subject was brought up obliquely by another poster in a thread on the Discussion Board.

Since it is a book I decided two things: to bring it to the Media Board and to answer the idea that this is a valid reference work on Napoleon, which it is not.

The following are some of the unsupported statements regarding Napoleon's character and errors in fact in the volume:

Page 11: ‘fervent Jacobin' (pages 14, 26 ‘notoriously Jacobin', 28, 89):

The definition of Jacobin during the period was ‘fanatic.' Not only was Napoleon not a fanatic, he was not a Jacobin.

Page 11: Napoleon a ‘hater of religion.'

This was a statement made by the author without any evidence to back him up. If Napoleon was such a ‘hater of religion' why did he then restore the Church during the Consulate?

Page 15: ‘even less of a Frenchman than a contemporary American or Irishman was English.'

Again, this statement is also made without any corroborating evidence. The fact is, Napoleon was born in Corsica after it was gained by France, making him by birth a Frenchman.

Page 21: ‘…perhaps they offer an early example of his ability to assume different roles, different personalities, according to the occasion.'

Psychobabble with no reference to back up the statement.

Page 22: ‘They reveal indeed not one character, but two, and those discordant to the point of paradox.'
Again, psychobabble with no reference to back up the statement.

Page 25: ‘mob leader.'

Napoleon was never a ‘mob leader' and during the mob's assault on the Tuileries and the ensuing massacre of the Swiss Guard, Napoleon not only did not participate in the mob action, he rescued a wounded Swiss Guard. Napoleon was for law and order, not mob violence.

Page 30: Napoleon acquired ‘a lifelong digust with and contempt for the common man in action.'

There is no evidence for this and is nothing more than repeating erroneous information based on allied and British propaganda attempting to make Napoleon into some type of monster.

Page 43: ‘Like the Schlieffen Plan of 1914, the Italian offensive of 1796 was, in terms of overall national interest, a seductive folly.'

It was the campaign, leading up to Napoleon invading Austria in 1797, that led to the collapse of the First Coalition and the Treaty of Campo Formio. All of the allies quit except for Britain. What type of ‘folly' was it actually a part of?

Regarding the Battle of Rivoli on pages 50 and 51: ‘Once more the French concentration was a last-minute, pell-mell, touch-and-go affair. In fact some of Bonaparte's formations only arrived in the course of the battle itself.'

There is little or no understanding demonstrated of how the French fought or how they were organized.

Page 66: ‘the Italian gamble of 1796-1797 had in due time landed France in a fresh war of an incalculable more dangerous nature.'

What gamble? France won the war of the First Coalition. That war again erupted was at least as much fault of the allies as it was of France.

Page 67: Refers to Napoleon as a ‘toady' and a ‘rootless wanderer.'

Napoleon was hardly a ‘toady.' Further, the ‘rootless wanderer' comment is nothing but bias against the subject of the book which colors the entire narrative and contributes to the badly-researched nature of the volume with myriad errors and odd conclusions, the greater majority of which cannot be supported.

Page 68: Reference compares Napoleon to the Nazis: ‘The coup d'etat was prepared with a cunning as skilled as Nazi management of the Reichstag fire.'

Comparing Napoleon or his actions with those of the Nazis cheapens the narrative and is not historically accurate. See JC Herold, The Mind of Napoleon.

Page 70: Another comparison to the Nazis and Hitler: ‘French intellectuals, with that special gullibility of the clever, were as readily taken in by this pose of devotion to republican ideals of liberty as British intellectuals by Hitler's pose as a peace lover in the 1930s.'

See the comment and reference above.

Page 71: Comparison of Napoleon to the communists: ‘Anticipating a 20th century Communist strategy…'

Another attempt to vilify Napoleon with invalid analogies.

Page 79: ‘This psychological insight did not move him to look upon humanity with compassion and charity, but rather with contempt.'

More psychobabble and a complete misunderstanding of Napoleon's character.

Page 81: ‘Domination was then more of a lifelong urge with Bonaparte; it was, like action, an essential therapy. Whereas the philosopher Descartes had sought to prove his individual existence by arguing ‘I think; therefore I am', Bonaparte in his own quest for identity might rather have said: ‘I order everybody about; therefore I am.'
Presumptuous psychobabble.

Page 81: ‘…social and national misfit…'

I would like to see documentation where it clearly demonstrates that Napoleon was a ‘social and national misfit.'

Page 81: ‘Domination was then more than a lifelong urge with Bonaparte; it was, like action, an essential therapy.'
More psychobabble.

Page 84: ‘But [Napoleon] himself only took part personally in the discussions on the articles relating to the law of the family…strongly reflected…his low opinion of women.'
That is incorrect. A demonstration with factual references might have helped here.

Page 88: refers to the Brumaire coup d'etat as a ‘boardroom takeover.'

Interesting analogy but inaccurate.

Page 89: reference to Napoleon's coronation as ‘a further coup d'etat.'

The attempt is to vilify Napoleon and not to present facts through solid research.

Page 96: on the Boulogne camps…'The land forces were to be concentrated in four great camps, each to hold an army corps and its artillery, at Utrecht, Bruges, St. Omer and Montreuil, with a fifth at Brest as a diversionary threat to the restless English colony of Ireland.'

The camps along the channel were Brest, Montreuil, Boulogne, St, Omer, Bruges, and Utrecht.

Page 98: ‘On 2 December 1803 he resoundingly dubbed the invasion forces ‘The Army of England.'

In June 1803 the army assembled on the Channel coast was named the Armee des Cotes de l'Ocean. In August 1805 it became the Grande Armee. It was never named The Army of England.

Page 104: ‘Yet this advance to the Danube constituted at the same time the retreat from Boulogne; the aftermath of the greatest strategic reverse Bonaparte had so far suffered. More, it was the consequence of the crassest blunders he had so far committed. For in addition to provoking England's renewed belligerence and then failing in his foredoomed attempt to crush her by invasion, he had needlessly stirred up Russia's enmity again-and finally Austria's as well.'

What ‘retreat' from Boulogne? Austria, financed and encouraged by the British who desperately wanted the Grande Armee off the Channel, had invaded Napoleon's ally Bavaria. War was started by the Austrians.

Page 106: ‘The coming campaign against Austria was therefore even more needless in terms of the real interest of the French people than those of 1796-1797 and 1800.'

That the campaign of 1805 was ‘needless' is one of the most ridiculous statements I have ever seen in what is supposed to be a factual account of Napoleon's life and campaigns (which it isn't).

Page 107: ‘Bonaparte himself was not much of a military innovator, but content instead to make war with this hybrid army as he found it.'

The army was formed into homogenous divisions of infantry and cavalry; the corps system was implemented from 1800; the artillery train was created by Napoleon in 1800; the cavalry reserve was created-just a few of the military innovations made by Napoleon.

Page 107: ‘After 1800, however, Marmont, whom he appointed Inspector-General of Artillery, had set about creating the artillery arm which was to dominate Bonaparte's later battles. For the first time civilian drivers of gun teams were replaced by military personnel. Mechanical parts such as wheels were standardized. The enormous task of recasting all France's artillery from four calibers…into three…demanding the use of Italian as well as French arsenals, was well on the way to completion by the opening of the 1805 campaign.'

The footnote to this passage reads: ‘It is often stated that Bonaparte greatly benefitted from the artillery reforms of the Comte de Gribeauval under Louis XVI, but this has been exaggerated. See Ragusa, II, p. 150.'

Page 108: ‘In Berthier, his chief of staff, Bonaparte possessed the perfect instrument for his style of command: a kind of super chief-clerk, untiring at routine work, but in no sense the equivalent of a modern chief of staff who proffers strategic advice or takes decisions on his own responsibility.'

This is a continued inaccurate slight against Berthier, Napoleon's chief of staff and originates from Jomini's personal malice against Berthier. In short, Napoleon and Berthier formed one of the greatest operational partnerships in military history and Berthier was one of the great chiefs of staff of modern military history. His pioneering work in staff organization and functioning is still felt today.

Page 116 refers to Napoleon's personal appearance as having a ‘squat body.'

Napoleon did not begin to put on weight until after his marriage to Marie Louise. The continual derogatory personal comments by the author against Napoleon do not illuminate anything historically and are not a logical historical argument.

Page 118: ‘the purely technical brilliance of Austerlitz has obscured the fact that but for the ineptitude of Bonaparte's conduct of foreign affairs, it need never have been fought.'

The actual situation is that Great Britain hired Austria and Russia to fight France in 1805 in order to get the Grande Armee off the Channel.

Page 121: ‘The heads of grander German states, like Wurttemberg, Bavaria and, later, Saxony were promoted to the rank of king, though naturally denied the enjoyment of full sovereignty.'

Napoleon seldom, if ever, interfered in the internal government of his allies in the Confederation.
Page 125: refers to Napoleon as ‘the most illustrious squatter in Europe.'

Nothing but a derogatory, ad hominem attack on the character of Napoleon. How would the traditional reigning monarchs be characterized historically?

Page 129: ‘The campaigns against the Russians between November 1806 and February 1807 mark Bonaparte's second great strategic reverse in three years.'

How? It can be argued to be a check because of the conditions in eastern Europe, but it was not a ‘strategic reverse.'

Page 138: ‘In the dank shadow of such a domination neither talent nor initiative could flourish; only the fungus growth of bureaucratic mediocrity. One of his first acts on returning from Tilsit was to sack his Foreign Minister, Talleyrand, a man too independent in ideas and behavior, and replace him with a dutiful chief clerk, Champagny; the diplomatic equivalent of Berthier.'

Talleyrand was sacked for rapacity and he was committing treason to boot.

The idea that Berthier was nothing more than a ‘chief clerk' is absolute nonsense which a little close study on the French staff system will support. Usually, authors who make that comment about Berthier don't understand what an army chief of staff is supposed to do.

The idea that under Napoleon ‘neither talent nor initiative could flourish' is complete nonsense. That says more about the author of that statement than Napoleon's civil administration or his command of the Grande Armee.

Page 150: ‘So fragile was France's true financial condition that Bonaparte took care to conceal it by cooking the public national accounts like a smart company accountant.'
Interestingly, Napoleon always balanced his budgets and France had practically no national debt, even in 1814.

Page 151: ‘The makeshift ‘Army of the Rhine' could as a whole only manage crude tactics in clumsy mass formations; it depended on massed cannon to blast a path for it. By a paradox the very decline of Bonaparte's army was to breed another Napoleonic legend; that of the master of artillery.'

First, Napoleon was a master of his profession regarding his training and qualifications as an artillery officer. That is easily demonstrated by a little careful research which Barnett's book does not demonstrate at all.

The Army of Germany was hastily organized and was initially short of much material, including artillery. However, it was built around Davout's excellent command in central Germany which included his III Corps and the heavy cavalry (12 regiments of cuirassiers and two of carabineers).
The Guard and naval units also were part of the Army of Germany.

Oudinot's II Corps and Massena's IV Corps were organized for the campaign and the contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine made up the difference. The Saxons had problems, not the least was having Bernadotte in command of them. The Wurttembergers, Badeners, Hessians, and Bavarians were excellent troops, and were well-trained and well-led. To understand the tactics used it might be worth it to study the battles around Ratisbon in the first half of the campaign where the Austrian offensive was stopped and then defeated badly.

The employment of large formations in the campaign is somewhat overblown and taken out of context. The two instances that come immediately to mind were Lannes' formation in his attack on the second day of Essling where he had to get out of the French bridgehead first and then deploy and Macdonald's formation at Wagram. It wasn't a ‘column' as is usually stated but a large hollow oblong formed in that manner because he would have to fight in three directions as he penetrated the Austrian line, which he did.

Page 151: ‘And in any case, of all the forces mobilized against Austria in Italy and Germany only half were native Frenchmen; the rest more or less unenthusiastic satellite troops.'

The Confederation of the Rhine contingents that fought in the Army of Germany did well and Napoleon was very pleased with their performance. ‘Unenthusiastic' is a very inaccurate assessment of their contributions. The Italian units in Eugene's Army of Italy were equally excellent and did good service. Again, terming them ‘unenthusiastic' is historically inaccurate and shows a unique ignorance of the situation in 1809.

Page 151: ‘On 9 April the Archduke [Charles] took Bonaparte by surprise by invading Bavaria, France's ally, six days earlier than Bonaparte expected, so catching the Army of Germany still far from concentrated, the Guard still en route from Spain and the cavalry corps still being assembled. It did not help that Bonaparte had left Berthier, a man unfitted for command, in temporary charge.'
Berthier was never left in charge of the Army of Germany. He was sent to the theater of operations before Napoleon did but was never assigned as the commander of the Army of Germany. He was in his usual position as Major General and chief of staff and Napoleon attempted, not too successfully, to command from Paris, which caused much confusion that Berthier has been inaccurately blamed for. It was Berthier who finally bluntly told Napoleon to get in theater as it was becoming a mess.

Page 152: ‘Under cover of a bombardment by 250 guns, 100,000 Austrians smashed into the French and drove them out of the villages of Aspern and Essling back towards their bridge.'

The French retained or retook Aspern and Essling and held them at the end of the battle. The Austrians did not drive the French back to their bridgehead. The French withdrew after the fighting had ended.

Page 152: ‘And neither Bonaparte nor his soldiers had ever experienced so bloody a struggle.'

Yes, they did-at Eylau over two years previously.

Page 153: ‘With his defeat at Aspern Bonaparte had got himself into the most gruesome plight of his career, with half his army marooned on Lobau and the Danube repeatedly in flood.'

The French on Lobau were not ‘marooned.' The bridge to the east bank of the Danube was taken up after the French withdrawal and Lobau was turned into a fortified camp. New bridges were built to the west bank and preparations, based on Lobau were made for the second Danube crossing which took place at the beginning of July.

Page 154: ‘Inexplicably Bonaparte selected this strong sector as the object of his opening attack, by Davout's and Oudinot's corps. They were thrown back with bloody loss. Bonaparte tried again, this time with Bernadotte's Saxon corps in the center of the Austrian ring at Wagram.'

Davout was not engaged along with Oudinot. Oudinot, Bernadotte, and Macdonald were attacking the Austrian center. Davout was on the French right flank and his attack on 6 July was the battle-winner.

Page 154: [At Wagram] ‘the Archduke came close to one of the great victories of history.'

How? Charles stood on the defensive, did not oppose the second Danube crossing, and was outflanked by Davout.
Page 155: ‘Bonaparte did not pursue; the French army was too shattered for that.'

The French were ‘too weary and disorganized' for an immediate pursuit, but they were not ‘shattered.' The French pursuit began the next day and was undoubtedly energetic and aggressive, though not ‘quite able to bring Charles to bay.' It did, however, wear down the Austrians and they requested an armistice on 10 July 1809 (Wagram having been fought on 5-6 July).

The plethora of inaccurate material in this volume tends to fulfill the criteria for inaccurate work on Napoleon as described by Col Elting in The Superstrategists, page 139-improper or inaccurate use of available source material and national bias.

I thought it was a good read.

Too many errors to my mind and too much 'psychoanalyzing' to be of much use.

The biographies of Thompson, Cronin, Broers, and England are much better and much more accurate.

Barnett's, unfortunately, is as bad as Schom's. Barnett has written some excellent material which is valuable and worth reading and keeping. He missed the mark with this one.

The book is a good read if you believe Napoleon was evil and the bad guy of the period. It fits the bill there.

He wasn't?

The book is a good read if you believe Napoleon was evil and the bad guy of the period. It fits the bill there.

And that it should be consumed in the fires of hell if you think Napoleon was a god of peace, love and tranquility.

Barnett and Schom. The anathema of the Napoleon fawners

And all that above op stuff has been answered in previous posts.

Paul :)

Barnett and Schom. The anathema of the Napoleon fawners

I've read Barnett, and although I am not a "Napoleon fawner" I agree with Kevin: Barnett's biography of Napoleon is weak, and his attempts at profiling Napoleon are clumsy, being generous.

The only thing I agree with Barnett is that Berthier was not a true Chief of Staff.

Kevin,

If you scream and bang your fists on the carpet for long enough, maybe you will even believe it yourself.

Page 11: ‘fervent Jacobin' (pages 14, 26 ‘notoriously Jacobin', 28, 89):

The definition of Jacobin during the period was ‘fanatic.'

Wrong. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacobin

Not only was Napoleon not a fanatic, he was not a Jacobin.

Fundamentally this sentence is just your opinion, and thus of no interest. Well the man at this time was in a Jacobin club and wrote a Jacobin tract and tried to carry out an uprising for the revolutionaries. But I guess you could make an argument he was just an opportunistic hypocrite, if you liked.

Page 11: Napoleon a ‘hater of religion.'

This was a statement made by the author without any evidence to back him up. If Napoleon was such a ‘hater of religion' why did he then restore the Church during the Consulate?

By extension from his Jacobin views and the stance he took in Corsica. And because he didn't have the same view of the situation in the late 1790s as he did at the beginning.

Page 15: ‘even less of a Frenchman than a contemporary American or Irishman was English.'

Again, this statement is also made without any corroborating evidence. The fact is, Napoleon was born in Corsica after it was gained by France, making him by birth a Frenchman.

Your sentence here is an outright lie. Barnett gives his corroborating evidence immediately after. For shame…

Page 21: ‘…perhaps they offer an early example of his ability to assume different roles, different personalities, according to the occasion.'

Psychobabble with no reference to back up the statement.

"Psychobabble" doesn't mean what you seem to think it means: link .You just disagree with Barnett beacuse in your opinion, Napoleon was a very straightforward, consistent category – but it is just your opinion, and thus of no interest.

Page 22: ‘They reveal indeed not one character, but two, and those discordant to the point of paradox.'
Again, psychobabble with no reference to back up the statement.

Already refuted.

Page 25: ‘mob leader.'

Napoleon was never a ‘mob leader' and during the mob's assault on the Tuileries and the ensuing massacre of the Swiss Guard, Napoleon not only did not participate in the mob action, he rescued a wounded Swiss Guard. Napoleon was for law and order, not mob violence.

Barnett shows where, in his opinion, he was a mob leader at length: in Corsica.

Page 30: Napoleon acquired ‘a lifelong digust with and contempt for the common man in action.'

There is no evidence for this and is nothing more than repeating erroneous information based on allied and British propaganda attempting to make Napoleon into some type of monster.

You have misunderstood p.30 somehow, though goodness knows how, he makes it clear enough that Barnett believes that the mob violence at the Tuileries changed Napoleon's opinion of revolutionary violence. You know, changing his mind as a result of experience and new information. Actually, I understand fully why you don't understand what he is talking about.

Page 43: ‘Like the Schlieffen Plan of 1914, the Italian offensive of 1796 was, in terms of overall national interest, a seductive folly.'

It was the campaign, leading up to Napoleon invading Austria in 1797, that led to the collapse of the First Coalition and the Treaty of Campo Formio. All of the allies quit except for Britain. What type of ‘folly' was it actually a part of?

Barnett explains in detail why he says this in the actual paragraph. But the basic point is that sometimes a successful gamble is too much of a risk and it is better not to take it, even if it ends up being successful. This is why Napoleon's great disasters Spain, 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815 are the flip-side of the incredibly bold victories. Because they were incredible.

Regarding the Battle of Rivoli on pages 50 and 51: ‘Once more the French concentration was a last-minute, pell-mell, touch-and-go affair. In fact some of Bonaparte's formations only arrived in the course of the battle itself.'

There is little or no understanding demonstrated of how the French fought or how they were organized.

Your opinion, thus of no value. Getting caught separated was the inherent risk in much Napoleonic strategy.

Page 66: ‘the Italian gamble of 1796-1797 had in due time landed France in a fresh war of an incalculable more dangerous nature.'

What gamble? France won the war of the First Coalition. That war again erupted was at least as much fault of the allies as it was of France.

Already refuted.

Page 67: Refers to Napoleon as a ‘toady' and a ‘rootless wanderer.'

Napoleon was hardly a ‘toady.' Further, the ‘rootless wanderer' comment is nothing but bias against the subject of the book which colors the entire narrative and contributes to the badly-researched nature of the volume with myriad errors and odd conclusions, the greater majority of which cannot be supported.

He says that Napoleon toadied to certain politicians at the beginning of his career who he would later have no time for. The rootless wanderer comment ties in with Napoleon's early status as an outsider, and between Corsican and Frenchman. It is not even a criticism.

Page 68: Reference compares Napoleon to the Nazis: ‘The coup d'etat was prepared with a cunning as skilled as Nazi management of the Reichstag fire.'

Comparing Napoleon or his actions with those of the Nazis cheapens the narrative and is not historically accurate. See JC Herold, The Mind of Napoleon.

I think you undermine your own argument here. For goodness sake, Bertrand Russell on one level admired the Reichstag fire as an exercise in statecraft.

Page 70: Another comparison to the Nazis and Hitler: ‘French intellectuals, with that special gullibility of the clever, were as readily taken in by this pose of devotion to republican ideals of liberty as British intellectuals by Hitler's pose as a peace lover in the 1930s.'

See the comment and reference above.

Already refuted, but this one doesn't even make sense even on your own terms. The comparison is between the French Republican intelligensia and British inter-war intelligensia.

Page 71: Comparison of Napoleon to the communists: ‘Anticipating a 20th century Communist strategy…'

Another attempt to vilify Napoleon with invalid analogies.

You are getting yourself in a muddle here. Obviously the sentence could equally read that "C20 communists adopted a Napoleonic strategy…". The strategy itself – to combine war and negotiation, is hardly a "vilification".

Page 79: ‘This psychological insight did not move him to look upon humanity with compassion and charity, but rather with contempt.'

More psychobabble and a complete misunderstanding of Napoleon's character.

Already refuted. The second part of the sentence implies that you have a sufficient understanding of his character to pass judgement: this is your opinion, and thus of no value.

Page 81: ‘Domination was then more of a lifelong urge with Bonaparte; it was, like action, an essential therapy. Whereas the philosopher Descartes had sought to prove his individual existence by arguing ‘I think; therefore I am', Bonaparte in his own quest for identity might rather have said: ‘I order everybody about; therefore I am.'
Presumptuous psychobabble.

Already refuted.

Page 81: ‘…social and national misfit…'

I would like to see documentation where it clearly demonstrates that Napoleon was a ‘social and national misfit.'

This is weak stuff. This is obviously the author's opinion, although he does reference why he believes it.

Page 81: ‘Domination was then more than a lifelong urge with Bonaparte; it was, like action, an essential therapy.'
More psychobabble.

Already refuted.

Page 84: ‘But [Napoleon] himself only took part personally in the discussions on the articles relating to the law of the family…strongly reflected…his low opinion of women.'
That is incorrect. A demonstration with factual references might have helped here.

The remainder of the paragraph explains why the author believes this.

Page 88: refers to the Brumaire coup d'etat as a ‘boardroom takeover.'

Interesting analogy but inaccurate.

Your opinion, thus valueless.

Page 89: reference to Napoleon's coronation as ‘a further coup d'etat.'

The attempt is to vilify Napoleon and not to present facts through solid research.

Your opinion, thus valueless.

Page 96: on the Boulogne camps…'The land forces were to be concentrated in four great camps, each to hold an army corps and its artillery, at Utrecht, Bruges, St. Omer and Montreuil, with a fifth at Brest as a diversionary threat to the restless English colony of Ireland.'

The camps along the channel were Brest, Montreuil, Boulogne, St, Omer, Bruges, and Utrecht.

Barnett says in the same paragraph that Boulogne was the principle port.

Page 98: ‘On 2 December 1803 he resoundingly dubbed the invasion forces ‘The Army of England.'

In June 1803 the army assembled on the Channel coast was named the Armee des Cotes de l'Ocean. In August 1805 it became the Grande Armee. It was never named The Army of England.

The wiki entry: link has it variously named. Have you done an exahustive check to make sure it was never used, or have you merely copied Elting and presumed it wasn't?

Page 104: ‘Yet this advance to the Danube constituted at the same time the retreat from Boulogne; the aftermath of the greatest strategic reverse Bonaparte had so far suffered. More, it was the consequence of the crassest blunders he had so far committed. For in addition to provoking England's renewed belligerence and then failing in his foredoomed attempt to crush her by invasion, he had needlessly stirred up Russia's enmity again-and finally Austria's as well.'

What ‘retreat' from Boulogne? Austria, financed and encouraged by the British who desperately wanted the Grande Armee off the Channel, had invaded Napoleon's ally Bavaria. War was started by the Austrians.

You are agreeing with Barnett without realizing it. Barnett thinks in terms of grand strategy: Napoleon was targetting England in 1805, not Austria. That he then was forced to fight the Austrians and Russians was a dreadful setback for his strategy. Luckily for him, his tactical military skills overcame his dreadful diplomatic ones. That is Barnett's point.

Page 106: ‘The coming campaign against Austria was therefore even more needless in terms of the real interest of the French people than those of 1796-1797 and 1800.'

That the campaign of 1805 was ‘needless' is one of the most ridiculous statements I have ever seen in what is supposed to be a factual account of Napoleon's life and campaigns (which it isn't).

As explained above. But Barnett himself puts it better:

"This time (the 1805 campaign) Bonaparte was not resorting to force, as on earlier occasions, to fulfill extravagant territorial ambitions, but simply to repair the calamitous consequences of mistaken and mishandled foreign policy…the campaign against Austria was therefore even more needless in terms of the real interests of the French people than those of 1796-7 or 1800"

Page 107: ‘Bonaparte himself was not much of a military innovator, but content instead to make war with this hybrid army as he found it.'

The army was formed into homogenous divisions of infantry and cavalry; the corps system was implemented from 1800; the artillery train was created by Napoleon in 1800; the cavalry reserve was created-just a few of the military innovations made by Napoleon.

Well, it rather depends on what you think of as "much" I suppose.

Page 107: ‘After 1800, however, Marmont, whom he appointed Inspector-General of Artillery, had set about creating the artillery arm which was to dominate Bonaparte's later battles. For the first time civilian drivers of gun teams were replaced by military personnel. Mechanical parts such as wheels were standardized. The enormous task of recasting all France's artillery from four calibers…into three…demanding the use of Italian as well as French arsenals, was well on the way to completion by the opening of the 1805 campaign.'

The footnote to this passage reads: ‘It is often stated that Bonaparte greatly benefitted from the artillery reforms of the Comte de Gribeauval under Louis XVI, but this has been exaggerated. See Ragusa, II, p. 150.'

Page 108: ‘In Berthier, his chief of staff, Bonaparte possessed the perfect instrument for his style of command: a kind of super chief-clerk, untiring at routine work, but in no sense the equivalent of a modern chief of staff who proffers strategic advice or takes decisions on his own responsibility.'

This is a continued inaccurate slight against Berthier, Napoleon's chief of staff and originates from Jomini's personal malice against Berthier. In short, Napoleon and Berthier formed one of the greatest operational partnerships in military history and Berthier was one of the great chiefs of staff of modern military history. His pioneering work in staff organization and functioning is still felt today.

Your opinion, and thus of no import. Plenty of other writers have written this about Berthier, that you disagree is fine, but hardly a substantive point against the book.

Page 116 refers to Napoleon's personal appearance as having a ‘squat body.'

Napoleon did not begin to put on weight until after his marriage to Marie Louise. The continual derogatory personal comments by the author against Napoleon do not illuminate anything historically and are not a logical historical argument.

Do you know in detail Napoleon's weight loss and gain over this period? It would be no surprise if he had put on a few pounds before 1805 but then lost them again over the winter of 1806-7. But who knows? Anyway, this is really trivial stuff here.

Page 118: ‘the purely technical brilliance of Austerlitz has obscured the fact that but for the ineptitude of Bonaparte's conduct of foreign affairs, it need never have been fought.'

The actual situation is that Great Britain hired Austria and Russia to fight France in 1805 in order to get the Grande Armee off the Channel.

And since it succeeded, then that rather proves Barnett's point.

Page 121: ‘The heads of grander German states, like Wurttemberg, Bavaria and, later, Saxony were promoted to the rank of king, though naturally denied the enjoyment of full sovereignty.'

Napoleon seldom, if ever, interfered in the internal government of his allies in the Confederation.

Oh my goodness. Well we have had thread after thread on TMP where you have made this assertion and then been made to look very silly by the actual experts on German history.

Page 125: refers to Napoleon as ‘the most illustrious squatter in Europe.'

Nothing but a derogatory, ad hominem attack on the character of Napoleon. How would the traditional reigning monarchs be characterized historically?

He is describing Napoleon moving into the King of Prussia's deserted palace isn't he? I thought this was quite witty.

Page 129: ‘The campaigns against the Russians between November 1806 and February 1807 mark Bonaparte's second great strategic reverse in three years.'

How? It can be argued to be a check because of the conditions in eastern Europe, but it was not a ‘strategic reverse.'

Because it was: Bonaparte had failed to achieve the task he set himself, thus it was a reverse to his strategy.

Page 138: ‘In the dank shadow of such a domination neither talent nor initiative could flourish; only the fungus growth of bureaucratic mediocrity. One of his first acts on returning from Tilsit was to sack his Foreign Minister, Talleyrand, a man too independent in ideas and behavior, and replace him with a dutiful chief clerk, Champagny; the diplomatic equivalent of Berthier.'

Talleyrand was sacked for rapacity and he was committing treason to boot.

You are saying the same thing in different language. Napoleon didn't normally care about rapacity!

The idea that Berthier was nothing more than a ‘chief clerk' is absolute nonsense which a little close study on the French staff system will support. Usually, authors who make that comment about Berthier don't understand what an army chief of staff is supposed to do.

The idea that under Napoleon ‘neither talent nor initiative could flourish' is complete nonsense. That says more about the author of that statement than Napoleon's civil administration or his command of the Grande Armee.

Already refuted.

Page 150: ‘So fragile was France's true financial condition that Bonaparte took care to conceal it by cooking the public national accounts like a smart company accountant.'
Interestingly, Napoleon always balanced his budgets and France had practically no national debt, even in 1814.

Well, it appears that at least one person was taken in…

Page 151: ‘The makeshift ‘Army of the Rhine' could as a whole only manage crude tactics in clumsy mass formations; it depended on massed cannon to blast a path for it. By a paradox the very decline of Bonaparte's army was to breed another Napoleonic legend; that of the master of artillery.'

First, Napoleon was a master of his profession regarding his training and qualifications as an artillery officer. That is easily demonstrated by a little careful research which Barnett's book does not demonstrate at all.

Your opinion, so of no importance.

The Army of Germany was hastily organized and was initially short of much material, including artillery. However, it was built around Davout's excellent command in central Germany which included his III Corps and the heavy cavalry (12 regiments of cuirassiers and two of carabineers).
The Guard and naval units also were part of the Army of Germany.

He says "built around".

Oudinot's II Corps and Massena's IV Corps were organized for the campaign and the contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine made up the difference. The Saxons had problems, not the least was having Bernadotte in command of them. The Wurttembergers, Badeners, Hessians, and Bavarians were excellent troops, and were well-trained and well-led. To understand the tactics used it might be worth it to study the battles around Ratisbon in the first half of the campaign where the Austrian offensive was stopped and then defeated badly.

The employment of large formations in the campaign is somewhat overblown and taken out of context. The two instances that come immediately to mind were Lannes' formation in his attack on the second day of Essling where he had to get out of the French bridgehead first and then deploy and Macdonald's formation at Wagram. It wasn't a ‘column' as is usually stated but a large hollow oblong formed in that manner because he would have to fight in three directions as he penetrated the Austrian line, which he did.

Page 151: ‘And in any case, of all the forces mobilized against Austria in Italy and Germany only half were native Frenchmen; the rest more or less unenthusiastic satellite troops.'

The Confederation of the Rhine contingents that fought in the Army of Germany did well and Napoleon was very pleased with their performance. ‘Unenthusiastic' is a very inaccurate assessment of their contributions. The Italian units in Eugene's Army of Italy were equally excellent and did good service. Again, terming them ‘unenthusiastic' is historically inaccurate and shows a unique ignorance of the situation in 1809.

Your opinion, copying Elting.

Page 151: ‘On 9 April the Archduke [Charles] took Bonaparte by surprise by invading Bavaria, France's ally, six days earlier than Bonaparte expected, so catching the Army of Germany still far from concentrated, the Guard still en route from Spain and the cavalry corps still being assembled. It did not help that Bonaparte had left Berthier, a man unfitted for command, in temporary charge.'
Berthier was never left in charge of the Army of Germany. He was sent to the theater of operations before Napoleon did but was never assigned as the commander of the Army of Germany. He was in his usual position as Major General and chief of staff and Napoleon attempted, not too successfully, to command from Paris, which caused much confusion that Berthier has been inaccurately blamed for. It was Berthier who finally bluntly told Napoleon to get in theater as it was becoming a mess.

More bleating about Berthier. At least recognize that many historians have disagreed with you.

Page 152: ‘Under cover of a bombardment by 250 guns, 100,000 Austrians smashed into the French and drove them out of the villages of Aspern and Essling back towards their bridge.'

The French retained or retook Aspern and Essling and held them at the end of the battle. The Austrians did not drive the French back to their bridgehead. The French withdrew after the fighting had ended.

Pointless quibbling.

Page 152: ‘And neither Bonaparte nor his soldiers had ever experienced so bloody a struggle.'

Yes, they did-at Eylau over two years previously.

It rather depends on what you think the casualties were at Eylau. I'm not sure there has ever been an accepted figure, but presumably you reckon that the French casualty figures are at the higher end of those estimates.

Page 153: ‘With his defeat at Aspern Bonaparte had got himself into the most gruesome plight of his career, with half his army marooned on Lobau and the Danube repeatedly in flood.'

The French on Lobau were not ‘marooned.' The bridge to the east bank of the Danube was taken up after the French withdrawal and Lobau was turned into a fortified camp. New bridges were built to the west bank and preparations, based on Lobau were made for the second Danube crossing which took place at the beginning of July.

Barnett makes clear this was on the occasions when the pontoons were washed away by flooding and destroyed by austrian boats.

Page 154: ‘Inexplicably Bonaparte selected this strong sector as the object of his opening attack, by Davout's and Oudinot's corps. They were thrown back with bloody loss. Bonaparte tried again, this time with Bernadotte's Saxon corps in the center of the Austrian ring at Wagram.'

Davout was not engaged along with Oudinot. Oudinot, Bernadotte, and Macdonald were attacking the Austrian center. Davout was on the French right flank and his attack on 6 July was the battle-winner.

Page 154: [At Wagram] ‘the Archduke came close to one of the great victories of history.'

How? Charles stood on the defensive, did not oppose the second Danube crossing, and was outflanked by Davout.

Just more opinion…

Page 155: ‘Bonaparte did not pursue; the French army was too shattered for that.'

The French were ‘too weary and disorganized' for an immediate pursuit, but they were not ‘shattered.' The French pursuit began the next day and was undoubtedly energetic and aggressive, though not ‘quite able to bring Charles to bay.' It did, however, wear down the Austrians and they requested an armistice on 10 July 1809 (Wagram having been fought on 5-6 July).

So your whinge is that he should have written "too weary and disorganised" but not "shattered"…my goodness

The plethora of inaccurate material in this volume tends to fulfill the criteria for inaccurate work on Napoleon as described by Col Elting in The Superstrategists, page 139-improper or inaccurate use of available source material and national bias.

It has been tedious but it is clear that the inaccurate use of material and national bias is…yours. Again.

TMP link

TMP link

I would yawn but I'm not going to waste one here.

Paul :)

Actually, damn this for a pointless game of soldiers. Stifle.

The only thing I agree with Barnett is that Berthier was not a true Chief of Staff.

What's your definition of 'a true chief of staff'?

If you scream and bang your fists on the carpet for long enough, maybe you will even believe it yourself.

Seems like the only people here engaging in that activity are you and dibble.

Bretchel198

There are great books, there are good books and then there are, well, books like Correlli Barnett's.

The foreword is also quite revealing. Instead of writing 'I have sought' when describing the reason he wrote the book, Barnett writes 'the author has sought'. A pretentious, if not disturbing method to employ in a modern title, unless of course, Barnett was not really the author?

Brechtel

Seems like the only people here engaging in that activity are you and dibble.

Nah! It's you! In fact, you bang so hard that you have formed a hole so deep that you find it hard to climb out, so you just keep banging and still are!

Bang on old bean,

All the best,

Paul :)

World renowned historian or bitter self deluding eagle worshipper? Not difficult…

I thought it was complete rubbish and my copy will go out to the next School Used-Books-by-Weight Fundraising sale. I only keep useful stuff in my library.

I keep some of the suspect volumes as they are referred to from time to time as they were in another thread which prompted me to start this one.

Suspect 'literature' should be discussed as it helps others in being able to discern between books that are credible and those that are not.

But I do sympathize with your viewpoint.

What's your definition of 'a true chief of staff'?

We have had this debate before, Kevin. You know that in my opinion Napoleon was his own Chief of Staff.

The Corelli book is a poor , biased effort IMO.
Feel free to differ but I don't think I can be persuaded otherwise.

We have had this debate before, Kevin. You know that in my opinion Napoleon was his own Chief of Staff.

Then why bring it up again?

It can be argued that Napoleon was his own operations officer, but he was not, nor did he act as, his own chief of staff.

The chief of staff is in charge of the staff, staff organization and planning, as well as staff functioning. That is by definition and that was Berthier's job as Major-General and chief of staff of the Grande Armee. He was the premier chief of staff of his day.

For reference as to the duties and responsibilities of a chief of staff, see Thiebault's 1800 staff manual.

Thiebault defines a General Etat-Major as' the central point of the grand operation of armies' and it is the chief of staff that directs it. That is very far from being a 'chief clerk.'

Ferdinand von Funck, the Saxon liaison officer at Imperial Headquarters remarked on Berthier that

'All the problems connected with the needs of the army and their transport were thrown at him…The armies were scattered from Bayonne to the Bug, from Calabria to the Helder, and as far as Stralsund; they were shifting their positions incessantly, had to be supplied and directed, and the whole of it passed through [Berthier's] hands…He always was the clearing house through which all business was transacted…the infallible day book to which Napoleon was referring every minute of the day to make sure how his balance stood. For this reason he had to be in attendance on him on every battlefield, on reconnaissance, at every review…without fail on every study of terrain.'

That is not the definition of a 'chief clerk.' That misconception is the result of Jomini's defamation of Berthier's character because Berthier found Jomini to be wanting as a staff officer and chief of staff himself.

Berthier was responsible for the movement of the Grande Armee from the English Channel to Germany in 1805, for the massive undertaking of getting the Army of Germany across the Danube in July 1809 and for the immense concentration before the invasion of Russia in 1812. Napoleon ordered it, Berthier planned and executed it.

To dub Berthier merely a 'chief clerk' is not only grossly incorrect, but it reveals an ignorance of what a chief of staff is, how a staff is organized and run, and the abundant evidence that contradicts the snub of 'chief
clerk.'

And looking for and finding that evidence is not that difficult.

Then why bring it up again?

I didn't. I agreed with your original post, with the caveat about Berthier' status, in which I felt more convinced by Barnett's, even if not by the rest of his narrative.

Whirlwind

Shame on you to make such a long post, which might have led to some interesting debate, but then run away to the protection of the stifle. How some people love the stifle escape route, eh/ Shame indeed.

Bretchel198

I can't believe what Whirlwind posted and what he did afterwards.

His post, and a long one at that, is just a joke. And to support an author who uses the expression 'perhaps' twice, in two sentences one after another, suggests the author really hasn't a clue what he is talking about. An obvious and comical case of the author shooting himself in the foot. LOL

But such a long and detailed post and then he ran to the stifle to escape a response. As I said in my post to him, he should indeed feel ashamed.

dibble

Books and topics have always been brought up again and again, so what is the problem?

And no titles should be burned, not even pathetic efforts like Barnett and Schom's. It is always interesting to read the viewpoints of other people, especially when 'some' people tend to throw them up in support of their debates.

But you have to respect that other people might have different viewpoints. That is why I own the work of both authors.

I didn't. I agreed with your original post, with the caveat about Berthier' status, in which I felt more convinced by Barnett's, even if not by the rest of his narrative.

The 'caveat' brought the subject itself up, apart from Barnett's comment.

I would, though, be interested in what you actually believe a chief of staff's job/duties were/are.

Were, being the operative word, Kevin.

A chief of staff was the individual charged with expressing in military terms the will of the State, with assigning the resources and preparing the timetable. That job was taken by Napoleon himself, most of the time. See his Correspondence, if you have any doubt.

Berthier acted not like a glorified clerk, but as a military secretary, which is way over a clerk but not exactly a chief of staff. For starters, he hadn't any lassitude to implement routes of march that wouldn't have first decided by Napoleon, now he could assign units to one or other task without Napoleon having ordered in the first place; and so on and so forth. In other words, he couldn't act like a real Chief of Staff because his master had taken all those decisions first. What Berthier did, and did better than anyone else, was to interpret Napoleon orders and explain them to the other Marshals in the most effective way possible, i.e. fast and clear.

I don't deny that in Berthier Napoleon had a potential true Chief of Staff, and if Napoleon would have been able to defeat Russia in 1812 and stabilise his throne, I can see Berthier acting like a real Chief of Staff while Napoleon concentrated in other tasks. I simply don't think that is true for the actual timeline.

Regarding the Jacobin was-he-or-wasn't-he debate, does it matter one way or the other anyway? The Jacobins weren't exactly all of one mind, so even knowing someone was a card-carrying member doesn't necessarily tell you everything you need to know about their politics.

Isn't it also possible that the author was using the term as a description of political leanings rather than membership of an organisation? We do this today. If someone in the UK, for example, is described as being conservative, it's not necessarily being claimed that they're a member of the Tory Party. Don't people use "democrat" and "republican" in the US in a similar way?

Holdit

Napoleon joined a Jacobin Club in 1793, when he was a young officer without a post in Paris. Probably, it was a mix of young idealism, mixed with opportunism. One thing that we tend to forget is that in Napoleon's era patronage was more important to get a post than talent, even during the Revolution. In any case, it didn't last. When it matters, when Napoleon was head of State, there is no evidence to suggest that he had retained any Jacobin sympathies, nor that he applied any policy that can be considered as Jacobin. To say that Napoleon was a "fervent Jacobin" is to stretch the evidence to the break point.

Neither he was a "hater of religion". He didn't care for Catholicism or any other organized religion. He used the Catholic church when it was convenient to his interests. However, he was too clever, too rational, to actually "hate" religion.

Not to mention that "fervent Jacobin" would seem to put him in the same category as the likes of Robespierre and St. Just, which would surely be going too far.

Regarding religion, didn't he say that "The people must have their religion and the state must have control of it." (or something similar)? I would imagine that Napoleon was too pragmatic to be a fanatic.

he hadn't any lassitude

Latitude. I meant "latitude".

A chief of staff was the individual charged with expressing in military terms the will of the State, with assigning the resources and preparing the timetable. That job was taken by Napoleon himself, most of the time. See his Correspondence, if you have any doubt.

Berthier acted not like a glorified clerk, but as a military secretary, which is way over a clerk but not exactly a chief of staff. For starters, he hadn't any lassitude to implement routes of march that wouldn't have first decided by Napoleon, now he could assign units to one or other task without Napoleon having ordered in the first place; and so on and so forth. In other words, he couldn't act like a real Chief of Staff because his master had taken all those decisions first. What Berthier did, and did better than anyone else, was to interpret Napoleon orders and explain them to the other Marshals in the most effective way possible, i.e. fast and clear.

I don't deny that in Berthier Napoleon had a potential true Chief of Staff, and if Napoleon would have been able to defeat Russia in 1812 and stabilise his throne, I can see Berthier acting like a real Chief of Staff while Napoleon concentrated in other tasks. I simply don't think that is true for the actual timeline.

Your description and opinions of Berthier as chief of staff are wrong.

It seems to me that you have no understanding what an army chief of staff was supposed to do or what his duties were. He was not the commander or a commander, but the commanders principal assistant. What you have described belongs to the Minister of War or a modern Defense Secretary, not an army chief of staff (and it should be noted that Berthier was also French Minister of War from 1800-1807 with a short break in 1800 when he commanded and organized the Army of the Reserve and moved it across the Alps and into northern Italy before Napoleon took over. Carnot served as Minister of War while Berthier was on campaign). Napoleon's secretaries (Bourrienne, Meneval, Fain) went on campaign and were his ‘military' secretaries. And it should be noted that considerable planning was done by Berthier and the general staff as previously posted.

Finally, Berthier was superior as a chief of staff to Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Radetzky and the plethora of Austrian officers who performed in that billet during the wars. And his staff organization and functioning was also superior.

Having served on several general staffs, including two joint staffs, the duties and functions of the chief of staff were clearly analogous to those performed by Berthier during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period. The duties have not changed that much in 200 years as shown below from the current US Army field manual.

From US Army Field Manual 6-0, page 2-5: Commander and Staff Organization and Operations-Chapter 2 Staff Duties and Responsibilities, paragraph 2-32:

Chief of Staff (Executive Officer): The Chief of Staff (Executive Officer) (COS [XO]) is the commander's principal assistant. Commanders normally delegate executive management authority to the COS (XO). As the key staff integrator, the COS (XO) frees the commander from routine details of staff operations and the management of the headquarters. Division and higher units are assigned a COS. Brigade and battalions are assigned an XO. The COS (XO) ensures efficient and prompt staff actions. The COS (XO) duties include, but are not limited to:

-Coordinating and directing the work of the staff.

-Establishing and monitoring the headquarters battle rhythm and nesting with higher and subordinate headquarters battle rhythms for effective planning support, decisionmaking, and other critical functions.

-Representing the commander when authorized.

-Formulating and disseminating staff policies.

-Ensuring effective liaison exchanges with higher, lower, and adjacent units and other organizations as required.

-Supervising the sustainment of the headquarters and activities of the headquarters and headquarters battalion or company.

-Supervising staff training.

-Supervising the special staff sections in division through Army Service component command headquarters.

Compare the above modern definition with what Berthier believed a chief of staff was supposed to do and be able to do, along with the general staff:

‘Berthier's operational instructions were simple and should be engraved inside every modern staff officer's skull. The chief of staff is the headquarters pivot. He must see everything that comes in and sign (or at least approve) everything that goes out. The assistant chiefs of staff must keep abreast of the situation in addition to running their own sections. Speed and accuracy are the most important factors in staff work. The staff exists only for the good of the army and so has no regular office hours. It works as long as may be necessary, rests when it has nothing left to do, takes care of the troops before consulting its own comfort, and is always ready to move out, regardless of the hour or ‘pain' involved. Up-to-the-minute intelligence on enemy forces and actions must always be available; therefore reconnaissance must be continuous to the front and flanks, and the results reported promptly…Finally, the commander-in-chief must always be told the truth, the whole truth, and nothing else-no matter how unpleasant the results may be.'-John Elting, Swords Around A Throne, 83.

The following primary source evidence as to Berthier's qualifications, performance, and knowledge as the premier chief of staff of the period:

‘There are few places in the army, the duties of which have been less examined, determined, and developed than those of the station of chief of the Etat-major-general. Yet nevertheless, this chief is really next to the commander-in-chief, the first man of the army, the person who can do the most good or most mischief.'-Paul Thiebault.

‘A general Etat-major is, as we have already observed, the central point of the grand operations of armies.'-Paul Thiebault

‘Quite apart from his specialist training as a topographical engineer, he had knowledge and experience of staff work and furthermore a remarkable grasp of everything to do with war. He had also, above all else, the gift of writing a complete order and transmitting it with the utmost speed and clarity…No one could have better suited General Bonaparte, who wanted a man capable of relieving him of all detailed work, to understand him instantly and to foresee what he would need.'-Paul Thiebault

Berthier had ‘incredible talent…hard and irascible…amendable to reasonable representations.'-Ferdinand von Funck

‘I can speak of him with more knowledge than anyone else, for it was I who formed him in America…I know of no one who has more skill or a better eye for reconnoitering a locality, who accomplishes this more correctly, and to whom all details are more familiar. I shall perhaps find someone who can replace Berthier, but I have not yet discovered him…'-General Custine

[Berthier] ‘has all the necessary qualifications for making an excellent chief of staff.' –Duc de Lauzan

Scherer to the Directory, 6 January 1796:

‘General Berthier, now employed as Chief of Staff with the Army of the Alps, seems to me by his knowledge of the country and by his military qualifications very suitable to meet this requirement [army command]. I would make him commander of the reserve. He would be incomparably more useful to this army than to the Army of the Alps.'
‘Be so kind, citizen directors, as to accede to my request. It is entirely based on the benefits that will accrue to this army by transferring this general officer whose military talents I have come to know since the war.'

Gentlemen. We seem to have a case of déjà vu. If we're going to argue about the role of Berthier as CoS, then what's changed in our understanding since this thread a little over 3 years ago?

TMP link

Yes, it starts out on the Prussian staff but becomes an exercise in comparison very quickly with all of these arguments about Berthier/Napoleon.

Kevin

Now I have not time and am not at home. Tomorrow, I will address your post and try to explain why I think your portrait of Berthier's job is not accurate. My disagreement comes from reading the Emperor's Correspondence and how I understand it. However, I want to provide you with what I believe are relevant documents, and that is something that I can't do now. So, please, be patience. I'll try to explain my arguments as soon as possible.

138SquadronRAF

I think it has always been the trend here to bring up the same topics again and again, although sadly, often with the same old arguments from both sides. This may be, to some extent, due to some members not being aware that the topic had already been discussed at some point. But I imagine there may be those who just want to go over the same stuff, which is fine, providing they provide new sources or information. Sadly that does not always happen and we just get a repeat of what went before.

However, I guess, annoying as it can be at times, since I am sure we would all prefer new topics, debates and information, it is all part of the fun of being on TMP, and, after all, we must remember that no one is forced to read the posts or join in, well, not yet anyway. LOL

Kevin

Just a quick note to inform you that I haven't forgot about my promised replica. I hoped to be able to do it today, but it has been impossible. Work is being crazy. As soon as I have some free time, I'll try to write the post. Sorry for the delay.

Not a problem. And don't be in a hurry-I'm retired and am not going anywhere.

I do look forward to your input, as always.

Kevin

A couple of points first, just we know what we are debating and which is the common ground.

I've been looking at Napoleon's Correspondence -the new edition, the one published by Tulard and the Fondation Napoleon-. I have not all the tomes, just those for the years 1806-1808 and 1810 (four volumes). Most of my vision regarding Berthier comes from this source.

Second point, is regarding the definition you give about what are the responsabilities of a Chief of Staff. I must say that I don't like to use present-day documents and extrapolate them to the past. Regardless of what a modern US Chief of Staff function's are you can't compare him with those of Napoleon's period. Culturally are too different.

However, if we accept your definition:

The Chief of Staff (Executive Officer) (COS [XO]) is the commander's principal assistant. Commanders normally delegate executive management authority to the COS (XO). As the key staff integrator, the COS (XO) frees the commander from routine details of staff operations and the management of the headquarters.

Here we have a problem. Although you might not share my perception of the Emperor, his Correspondence strongly suggest that he was a micromanager. He was such an exceptional workaholic that he got a pass most of the time; other commanders, less able than him (I can think of Bazaine in the French-Prussian War, for instance) utterly failed when tried to do the same.

There are dozens of examples of Napoleon's micromanagement of his troops. See, for instance, his letter to general Clarke, from February 19, 1808, regarding the operations of the 13, 14, 15, 1, 17 and 18th Provisional Regiments (Correspondance, Letter 17239, T.8, pp. 178-180). Or check the letters to Berthier, from May 30th, 1808 (Correspondance. Letters 18163-18164, T.8. pp. 671-672). On letter 18164 he went so far to specify to Berthier the exact composition and maneuvers of every French division operating in Central and Eastern Spain:

"Le major général donnera l'ordre au grand-duc de Berg de faire partir le maréchal Moncey avec la 1re division, 12 pieces d'artillerie, 700 à 800 chevaux et 4 pièces servies par l'artillerie à cheval, formant un total de près de 9,000 français, un régiment espagnol de 400 hommes de cavalerie, deux bataillons d'infanterie espagnols formant un total de 1,500 hommes (…)" (Bayonne, 30 mai 1808)

The rest of the letter is in the same tone.

This kind of attention to minutiae detail goes far beyond a general operations order that then will be detailed by the Chief of Staff. Napoleon was acting as his own Chief of Staff, reducing Berthier to an assistant CoS at best.

Letters like this one are common in Napoleon's Correspondance. That is why I am not convinced by your evidence that Berthier acted as a Chief of Staff. Too much of the available documentantion suggest otherwise.

Best and sorry for the delay in answering,
Antonio

Almost forgot! You should compare the content of the letters he sent to Berthier with those he sent to Davout. While to Berthier he wrote in detail, almost saying where each company should be deployed, to Davout he was more generic, explaining intentions and projects rather than detailed instructions (see, for instance, Letter 25743, Paris January, 21 1811. Correspondance generale. T10. P.1135)

Even if we accept Berthier as Chief of Staff, the truth is that Napoleon reserved most of the functions of a chief of staff for himself, relegating Berthier to a go-between. I can only agree with you in one regard: that Berthier was a true chief of staff in relation with providing his boss with the intelligence reports, information and maps that the emperor needed to work; none else was so competent as he was.

There is no reason to apologize for any delay. People should expect to have to be patient and usually that means that a well-thought out posting is inbound.

I do have a question, though-what is your impression of what a division, corps, or army chief of staff's duties and responsibilities were?

He was a staff officer, not a commander, and his main function was to run the general staff.

"Even if we accept Berthier as Chief of Staff, the truth is that Napoleon reserved most of the functions of a chief of staff for himself, relegating Berthier to a go-between. I can only agree with you in one regard: that Berthier was a true chief of staff in relation with providing his boss with the intelligence reports, information and maps that the emperor needed to work; none else was so competent as he was."

All experts agree that the operational planning was the domain of Napoléon and he would not ask for a worked out operational plan – like Archduke Charles for 1809 – Berthier was an important chief clark however, usually his advice was ignored and he was rediculed on front of other officers, see for example the Russian campaign in 1812.
About information and maps, I am not so positive like you that Berthier was the only source of competence, Bacler d'Albe played a much more important role – than he is usually credited for.

And what about the planning Berthier and the general staff did to support Napoleon's objectives on campaign?

'Because he worked in the Emperor's shadow, Berthier's accomplishments seemed matters of routine. In 1800 he organized the Army of the Reserve and moved it across the St. Bernard Pass into Italy; in 1805 he planned the Grande Armee's march from the English Channel into Austria; in 1809 set up the assault crossing of the Danube before Wagram; and in 1812 handled the unprecedented concentration for the invasion of Russia.'
Swords, 129.

And Berthier's value and importance as Chief of Staff and Major General of the Grande Armee was definitely demonstrated by his absence in 1815:

'Napoleon, after Waterloo, uttered the fitting epitaph for the man he had once named his 'companion in arms'-'If Berthier had been there, I would not have met this misfortune.'
Swords, 130, taken from Le Marechal Berthier by Vicrot Derrecagaix, II, 604.

To characterize Berthier as either a 'chief clerk' or a mere assistant is to demonstrate a complete lack of understanding of what Berthier did accomplish as well as what staff work is and how it is conducted.

From By Command of the Emperor by SJ Watson:

‘…Frequently one hears that the successful commander is born and not made. Even more is this true of the ideal staff officer; for, to be content to work for another and to see fame and honor always falling to another, demands qualities of loyalty, self-effacement and strength of character which are very rare in human nature.' 8-9.
‘These are the very qualities that Berthier displayed throughout his long and adventurous career. Joining the army when he was scarcely twelve years old, he served in the infantry, in the cavalry, as a topographical engineer and a general staff officer. He fought on four continents. Yet his career was by no means an unbroken sequence of successes; for, during the French Revolution, he was in his fortieth year summarily demoted from general to private, and shortly afterwards dismissed from the army altogether. But within nine years of his reinstatement he became the first of Napoleon's marshals.'-9.

‘The Emperor employed Berthier not only as his trusted chief of staff, but also as a commander-in-chief, as minister of war, and as an ambassador extraordinary; and in every assignment he invariably demonstrated meticulous efficiency and prodigious capacity for work that made him indispensable and irreplaceable…Amid the sunlit vineyards of Italy, the burning sands of Egypt, the bleak plateaus of the Guadarrama and the icy wastes of Russia, he was always ready at any hour of the day or night to appear properly dressed in uniform to give advice to, or to take orders from, his master.'-9.

‘Transcending all his other qualities were Berthier's self-effacement and his loyalty. While in private he was Napoleon's confidant and often his outspoken advisor, he was always careful to appear as his deferential servant in public…So it is hardly surprising that Berthier has been eclipsed by the legend of Napoleon's infallibility; and in general military commentators have either scorned him as a pen-pushing nonentity, or have criticized him for not making decisions which in fact were the prerogative of his commander-in-chief, or have even reviled him for not countermanding, on one occasion in 1809, the explicit order of his Emperor.'-9

‘…if the study of Napoleon and Berthier does nothing else, it convincingly demonstrates that the strength of a successful partnership between a commander and his chief of staff is ever greater than the sum of their strengths as individuals.'-11.

‘Throughout 14 January there was a fierce ‘dog fight' on the plateau of Rivoli, where Berthier once more played the part of an assistant commander as well as a staff officer. He first of all took over the 14th demi-brigade of Joubert's division with its supporting arms, and later directed a cavalry charge supported by artillery against an Austrian counterattack: as Bonaparte wrote to the Directory four days later, ‘he displayed on this occasion the bravery that he has so often shown in this campaign.'-59

‘In this campaign, too, Berthier proved that he was a great chief of staff as Bonaparte was a great commander. In particular, during the final advance into Austria he successfully performed the most difficult task of maintaining communication with the three widely separated columns, and so coordinating their movements that, unlike Alvintzi's forces the previous year, they could not be defeated in detail. As in normal military practice, Bonaparte made the commander's decision and decide the concept of his operations; while Berthier unfailingly provided the information on which the decisions were based, and he then compiled, transmitted, and supervised the execution of the detailed orders for their implementation.'-63

About information and maps, I am not so positive like you that Berthier was the only source of competence, Bacler d'Albe played a much more important role – than he is usually credited for.

Bacler d'Albe was head of the Topographic Bureau was part of Napoleon's 'cabinet' and so was part of the Emperor's personal staff. He was a topographical engineer (as was Berthier by training as well as a staff officer) and was responsible for maintaining Napoleon's situation map on campaign.

As a staff officer 'a la suite' on Rochambeau's staff in North America in 1780-1783 Berthier left a valuable journal as well as expert sketches and maps done while in theater. They were published by Anne Brown and Howard Rick in a two-volume set-The American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army 1780, 1781, 1782, 1783. It is an excellent and valuable reference which does demonstrate Berthier's skill as a map-maker.