Jozis Tin Man | 19 May 2016 8:21 a.m. PST |
I was reading and article on the 1918 British Infantry Platoon by Richard Clarke, and he made a comment to the effect that platoon leaders in WW1 actually had to exercise more initiative than they do today, as they were not in constant radio contact with higher ups to ask "What now?" nor have those higher ups meddle in their tactical decisions. This makes sense to me, but I'd like to ask the group what they think of this. Was a 1918 platoon leader more or less autonomous than his peer today? What about WW2? |
Weasel | 19 May 2016 8:32 a.m. PST |
I haven't read anything that discusses a direct comparison, but the rationale given makes a reasonable sense. You have your orders sure, but if you need a clarification, you have to send a runner back and he may never make it. On the flipside, it seems that over the years, smaller and smaller units have been expected to operate independently, so maybe we actually need to talk about two different types of initiative? Adaptation/reaction vs independent action? |
Ascent | 19 May 2016 8:50 a.m. PST |
Something to bear in mind is that in 1914 the smallest viable tactical unit was probably the Company, by 1918 it was probably the Section. I would say there was a greate change between 1914-1918 then there has been between 1918-now.
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Random Die Roll | 19 May 2016 9:31 a.m. PST |
The term "Platoon Leader" is a bit dated in the reference. I think you also need to compare what the rank of the men in the field was. I would think that in WWI you would have very few "lifer" NCO types that would take charge. Also remember that in 1914 a horse charge was still in use…until full auto weapons took their toll…so it was still more important to line up and do what everyone else was doing---not just grab initiative |
Jozis Tin Man | 19 May 2016 9:59 a.m. PST |
I am looking to compare a 1918 level rifle platoon not a 1914 company. A platoon commanded by the equivalent to a LT or Captain (or senior NCO) So a British rifle platoon with 2 Lewis Sections or A German platoon with one or two MG-08/15 sections and bombers versus a modern infantry platoon. Both are 30-40 men, have integral automatic weapons, use fire and movement tactics. But the modern platoon can break in to fire teams and is heavily networked via radio within the platoon and to the Company commander, support weapons etc. What effect does this have on the independent action of the junior officer? I like your breakdown Weasel. And Ascent I think you hit the nail on the head about the rate of change. So a Platoon leader in 1918 faced with unexpected opposition while attacking will start using his weapons to fire and maneuver against the enemy. Today, would the LT just call a halt, and call in for instructions / fire support? |
Mike Target | 19 May 2016 10:28 a.m. PST |
I was wondering something along the same sort of lines- I was reading a ww1 officers manual/guide book thing and comparing it to what little I knew of its ww2 counterparts and thinking it seemed a lot more in depth. Its almost like one is required to win the fight in his locality and given the information/tools for the job, the other is simply required to do what he's told. "I would think that in WWI you would have very few "lifer" NCO types that would take charge." I dunno, in the BEF they must have been pretty common. perhaps a little diluted by mass mobilisation later on of course, but I get the impression that a lot of the regulars in the BEF became NCO's as the the army expanded. |
BlackJoke | 19 May 2016 11:26 a.m. PST |
Excerpt from link About preperation for Vimy ridge. New platoon tactics were also introduced: Keep moving, the troops were told, follow your lieutenant (and if he goes down, follow your corporal), prepare to outflank enemy machine gunners who might survive the initial artillery barrage, use grenades and follow-up with bayonets. Don't lose contact with the platoon or company next to you. Such tactics were the expression of new, innovative thinking percolating at that time through the British army — aimed at solving the riddle of the trenches — based on three years of observed successes and failures in the war so far. Seems to show high level of expectation of independant decision making at all levels. |
ColCampbell | 19 May 2016 11:47 a.m. PST |
Jozis wrote:
So a Platoon leader in 1918 faced with unexpected opposition while attacking will start using his weapons to fire and maneuver against the enemy. Today, would the LT just call a halt, and call in for instructions / fire support? In my somewhat dated experience (1970s through early 1990s), the answer would probably be "No." At least in the US Army, the platoon leaders would have a fairly detailed knowledge of what was expected to them as part of the overall company mission and a general knowledge of the battalion mission. Therefore they would know what needed to be done if unexpected opposition was encountered. He would inform the company commander what was happening and what he was doing to counter it. Only if that opposition was throwing a severe crimp in the company mission plans or of the company commander didn't like what the the platoon leader was doing would the platoon leader ask for or receive new directions. Of course I've been out of the Army for 23 years and away from tactical operations for 25 years so things may have changed with the advent of more reliable, secure low-level communications. Just my nickel's worth. Jim |
Gaz0045 | 19 May 2016 1:58 p.m. PST |
I understood that the idea of overall mission picture and 'your' part in was born on the Western Front, at the company level and lower officers and NCO's were briefed about their role and objectives etc, once the whistle went they were left and expected to get on with it……… With a greater reliance on communications ( when they work as expected) I could understand a 'reluctance' to do/deal with' without approval from the next level or higher…..or indeed the need to pass on a location to avoid 'blue on blue' incidents. In relation to the WW1 German platoons, many memoirs mention the reassignment of experienced leaders to the new storm troop formations, leaving a vacuum with a lot fewer experienced leaders……..leading to lower levels of initiative? 'Ordinary' line units would suffer accordingly, equally the reliance and over use of the storm troopers led to high casualty rates and the severe weakening of such formations. Edit-just recalled too the expectance of initiative in the platoon leaders of the troops on the North-West Frontier, in dealing with a variety of incidents both before and after the Great War. |
Martin Rapier | 19 May 2016 11:19 p.m. PST |
I wouldn't get too over excited about late WW1 platoons. They were much larger and operating on a much denser battlefield than even WW2, let alone now. Yes, they didn't have tactical radios and GPS, but they had lots of visual contact and their fire and movement tactics were pretty cumbersome by later standards. |
Martin Rapier | 20 May 2016 7:12 a.m. PST |
I suppose I would also add that, do senior commanders micro manage battles now? It has certainly happened in e.g. Vietnam (helicopter generals etc), but I thought the procedure was generally "Contact. Wait. Out" and let them get on with it. |
Mike Target | 20 May 2016 7:29 a.m. PST |
The ww1 officers manuals instructed that everybody in the platoon should know their job, and each others jobs, so that if the officer was out of action anyone down to the rank of "platoon mascot" could take over and get the job done. (In Flames of War we'd probably call this "mission tactics"…) I dont recall anything like it in ww2, except on the german side… |
Dye4minis | 20 May 2016 8:32 a.m. PST |
PDF link This should answer most of your questions. It includes examples throughout the war from firsthand experiences, after-action reports and with hindsight. Very well done and is really worth the read if you are serious about examining the WWI tactical environment. It's free! You also wrote: "I am looking to compare a 1918 level rifle platoon not a 1914 company. A platoon commanded by the equivalent to a LT or Captain (or senior NCO) So a British rifle platoon with 2 Lewis Sections or A German platoon with one or two MG-08/15 sections and bombers versus a modern infantry platoon." There is a vast difference in the early war and late war availability, distribution and use of MGs in all countries. Coordination was extremely difficult as infantry attacks often depended upon maintaining contact with units on your flanks. Once the order to move out was given, this often became impossible due to enemy resistance and units simply getting lost, disorientated and surprise terrain features not previously known or realised until encountered. I cannot recommend the knowledge contained in this book too much! It's really a gold mine of information for what you are seeking. Hope this helps. v/r Tom |
monk2002uk | 22 May 2016 5:40 a.m. PST |
I'm with Martin Rapier on this. While there was limited opportunity for two-way communication on the WW1 battlefield, the higher level commanders placed enormous restrictions on what was possible. This was done before the battle. Each unit had its designated zone of operations, with a clearly laid down objective line. There were physical constraints imposed by the much closer proximity of flank units (as Martin pointed out, units were much more densely packed on the WW1 battlefield by comparison to WW2, let alone today) and the barrages (by 1918 there were multiple lines of barrages that formed the furthest extent that a unit could attempt to get forward to. Within these narrow confines and objectives, junior commanders and NCOs could exercise some initiative, e.g. in how a specific pillbox might be captured. Much of the role of a platoon commander was taken up in figuring out where the flanking units were and in attempting to get messages back to indicate where the unit was. It is not the case that the platoon commanders of 1914 had less flexibility of command. If anything it was greater in those heady first weeks of the war. Pre-war training emphasised movement by company until the beaten zone from enemy rifle fire meant that movement (supported by covering fire) was by platoon then section then sub-section. |
GreenLeader | 23 May 2016 7:39 a.m. PST |
While I tend to agree with Martin Rapier, it is nonetheless an interesting point. I know that in the last 15 years in my industry (oil exploration), vastly improved communications have essentially killed off any sort of decision making at the actual rigsite. Now, everything is referred 'to town' and it is very rare for anyone to make any sort of decision whatsoever at the rig. It is almost 20 years since I left the army, but it wouldn't totally surprise me if things have changed in a similar-ish fashion – though hopefully not to quite the same extent. Though not on a tactical level as such, due to the lack of comms, I am sure that Generals in Colonial wars, High Commissioners, Royal Navy Captains of the era etc had far, far greater decision making powers than their modern-day equivalents could ever dream of. |
Lion in the Stars | 23 May 2016 9:01 p.m. PST |
Of course I've been out of the Army for 23 years and away from tactical operations for 25 years so things may have changed with the advent of more reliable, secure low-level communications. My impression from a friend that is a currently serving US Army officer usually happy to talk shop and theory with me is that low-level comms have mostly increased the amount of support available to lower levels. "Contact. Wait. Out." seems to get followed by "wounded man at position X, request medevac. Taking fire from ridgetop Y, request mortar/arty strike." There's still the "Strategic Corporal" on the ground making the immediate tactical decisions for that fireteam. The platoon leader is the one calling orders to flank or support the point of contact, and usually the one calling for fire support. Now, at higher levels, I have no doubt that Field and Flag officers have far less freedom to fight their battles than in decades past. |
PHGamer | 25 May 2016 6:40 a.m. PST |
Patton's book on the Gallipoli campaign was brutal about the British methods of doing things. Basically, follow the plan, even if it didn't make sense, else halt, and ask for instructions. I thought Patton just hated Monty, but I found out he had been studying the British system since WWI and hated almost everything about it. |
PHGamer | 25 May 2016 6:42 a.m. PST |
There is nothing wrong with a Platoon leader stopping and calling in for support. That is how the US Army has been taught to fight since WWII. Marshals idea was to fight with the most ammunition and the least casualties. Faith in firepower and schools. |