"Best Strategy in the Napoleonic Wars" Topic

So, as the debate on Bonaparte's skill, or not, is turning relative, I'm wondering which countries and individuals displayed the best strategic thinking, particularly in the long term.

At the end of the wars, a bunch of monarchies are still in place and there for the next century. We know that things didn't turn out well for Napoleonic France, but what about the others. Should Prussia get credit for still being there at all? Could Russia have got more out of the wars? What about Austria? What other options would have been advantageous and at what cost?

I am thinking pragmatically here – not whether countries' were 'in the right' but whether their decisions were 'right' for their national interests.

I'd look at the long-term winners in the game of empires:

England, with their "contain Eurpoe, rule the rest of the world" plan.

Russia, looking to industrialize and put to use the largest land mass on the planet.

America, with the Louisiana Purchase and only a mountain range and the Mexican empire between them and the next ocean.

A unified Germany almost immediately began to think empirically. So did Italy, but all the good stuff the Romans used to have were now taken by stronger powers.

The Swiss always seem to do it right. No empire; no worries. And they hold onto a pretty good standard of living for their neutrality.

Russia got a few years breathing space to chip some more bits off the Ottoman Empire.
Britain's strategy was ill-conceived and came within a hairs breadth of coming unstuck.
Austria – able to put off the inevitable for another forty years or so.
Little popular support at this stage for German or Italian unification – may have stirred the idea in the minds of the odd idealist.
The French actually did alright out of it even though they lost…

The great winner of the Napoleonic Wars was Great Britain, without doubt. She assured for herself the alpha dog position, and while she never wielded the kind of power that the great superpowers did after WWII, no other country had the influence, both direct and indirect, that Great Britain had during most of the XIXth Century. It is more surprising if you think that it wasn't a single individual who through his force of character imposed a strategic worldview, but that such idea was shared, mostly, by the majority of the oligarchy that governed the UK back then.

Right after Great Britain, I think that Dominic Lieven's makes a good argument on the strategic vision of Tsar Alexander I. Apparently, he had a clear idea of what he wanted from Russia and while he couldn't get all of his goals accomplished, he managed to improve the political stance of Russia in Europe, making of her a major player in the international scene.

Of course, this is hindsight. For a while, between June 1807 and June 1808, it looked like Napoleon' strategy of Continental Blockade was about to succeed into forcing Great Britain into a peace negotiation that would have been favorable to France. Maybe if Napoleon would have been able to really create a coalition of powers to constitute a common market inside the Continent based upon shared interest and equal rights and duties instead trying to impose the Continental Blockade through force and too favorable to France, Great Britain would have failed and be defeated. He had a good opportunity, but his mindset was too prone to use his army to solve every international problem he faced.

[Napoleon] had a good opportunity, but his mindset was too prone to use his army to solve every international problem he faced.

Thank goodness, or we'd have a lot less Napoleonic Wars to game. :-)

Sweden. Exchanged Norway for Finland, got a hundred year dynasty and 200 years of peace.

You know, the Prussians did pretty well – they ended the war as a major player, but given their performance and fate in 1806 you would have thought they were at risk of disappearing

The nationalistic spirit that awakened in Prussia could be argued to be the start of the German nationalism that would create the German Empire on the Prussian model

Good for Prussia, bad for the world

Oh – and the Brits were certainly the unquestioned winners

Depends on the era and the level of analysis (Grand Strategy, Theater, Operational).From the point of view of Grand Strategy(note that as a Professor of Political Science, I generally consider this a chimera), and for the whole era, I would say the UK and Austria were the most consistent in their policy goals and succeeded well in attaining them.

On the Operational level The Austerlitz campaign by Napoleon, and the 1813 Liepzig Campaign by Schwarzenberg were and are still exemplary.

Britain and the Oprah Foreign Policy theory

"You get a subsidy and you get a subsidy and you…"

Hmmmm, I'm not sure Switzerland was able to do much in the way of strategy in this era, being overrun early doors.

KTravlos – I was thinking at the highest level of policy and strategic thinking long term. The operational aspect gets done to death.

France certainly did okay in that it wasn't at war with Britain again…

I think Austria probably did better in the short term at the end of the wars, although once German nationalism came through Prussia rather than Austria, the balance had shifted.

I suppose this came about as I wondered whether a constitutional monarchy or republic is likely to consider the longer term more so than an absolute monarch, particularly one who is recently 'in post' as it were. Bonaparte did well with the Code Napoleon and often on the battlefield, but less so in terms of the empire.

Actually the US got much out of the Napoleonic war. The Louisiana Purchase doubled the land area of the United States. The Spanish control of Florida was weakened and eventually the US got control of Florida. A Spanish Empire was replaced by a Mexican empire which was much weaker military wise. Even England had to acknowledge that the US had to be recognized (the war of 1812 was a result of England's dismissal of the US) and the US was treated with more respect.

The only way to evaluate this question is "What are the goals of the State at the start of the war" and compare that to what the State wound up with at the end of the war. Trying to decide who was better materially doesn't answer the question as to who had the best strategy, and in addition, war develops a logic all its own which can change the perceived interest of the state .

Strategy develops a life if its own too.

As with the earlier discussion about strategy, I am not convinced that governments and rulers in the late eighteenth and early ninteenth century were at the stage of political development to even allow for a 'strategy'.

Some of them had only just shaken off feudalism and were revelling in the joys of monarchical absolutism, dynasty and reputation were still paramount and the concept of the 'nation state' was alien to all but the wildest nationalist dreamers.

Britain probably had the closest thing to a modern national state, including a central bank with debt funded war finance and income taxes, so unsurprisingly had the closest thing to what approached war aims and associated 'strategy', however incoherent or flawed.

Napoleon was very good at winning campaigns, but he didn't appear to have any sort of war aims at all outside of:

1. 'be dashing and glorious'
2. 'establish a legacy'
3. 'establish a dynasty and be accepted by the other crowned heads of Europe'.

Two of which he achieved admirably, one rather less so. But there is little sign of a strategy to achieve these, just opportunism.

I think Bernadotte had the best strategy in the Napoleonic Wars: be charming to everyone; find yourself a pretty wife; avoid combat wherever possible; get big subsidies off the British (and then fail to deliver what you promised); get asked to become king.

It all seemed to work out rather well for him.