"What do you think of Napoleon as strategist?" Topic
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basileus66 | 09 May 2016 4:54 a.m. PST |
There are few doubts that Napoleon was excepcional at the operational and tactical levels. He knew how to plan a successful campaign; how to maneuver his armies and how to "read" a battle. He was a mediocre strategist, though. Maybe "mediocre" is too harsh, but bear with me for a while before going straight for my jugular! I'll try to avoid hindsight as much as possible. I think that Napoleonic system had three problems. First, his Empire broke with a political system of international relationships based upon balance of power, where not a single state could become so powerful as to be hegemonic inside Europe. Napoleon didn't care for the fears of other rulers. He didn't pay attention to the need for reassurance. For him, French Empire hegemony was paramount, regardless the interests and worries of other states. That guaranteed, as Tayllerand warned him repeatedly, the animosity and mistrust of other monarchs. That attitude provoked important errors in judgement, particularly in 1810-1812, when Napoleon proved unable to understand the difficult position in which Tsar Alexander was and didn't take any step to ease his difficulties at dealing with his nobility. When Napoleon took the field in 1812 against Russia, he did it under the false assumption that Tsar Alexander could -or want- be able to negotiate with him as freely as himself was able to negotiate with other monarchs. Second, his Empire was predatory in nature. Between 1806 and 1811, France grew out of proportion. The Netherlands, Catalonia or Hamburg, regions that never had been French, were swallowed by France as new French departments. The French Army was perceived in Europe as a Moloch whose thirst for money and men couldn't be satiated ever. In Spain one of the most effective tools of the Patriot propaganda was, precisely, the fear that Spanish peasantry had that the French would use their control of the Spanish throne to impose a tithe in blood -men- for the armies of the Empire. The constant fear of dispossession by European monarchs and the neverending demands of money, supplies and men guaranteed a growing opposition to French hegemony. It is not like Napoleon wasn't aware of those fears. He did know them, but, as his correspondence makes abundantly clear, he chose to disregard them as irrelevant. Finally, by all his superficial attempts to displaying the pomp and circumstance of royalty and empire, he was at the end of the day a petite burgeois that understood his role not just as a head of state but as the head of a family, mostly. Those three problems caused him to make griveous strategic mistakes, like his stubborness at imposing upon Europe the Continental System -while giving exemptions to French firms-, the invasion of Spain and the illegitimate deposition of the Spanish Bourbons, the half-measures he took after 1807 against Prussia -he should have been either more lenient with the Prussians or destroy the Prussian state- or the invasion of Russia. As a strategist Napoleon wasn't perhaps "mediocre", but he wasn't "brilliant" either. |
Frederick | 09 May 2016 5:19 a.m. PST |
Interesting considerations – I think that Napoleon was blinded a bit by his success; plus he was more than a little too generous to his family (like giving his no-account brother the Spanish throne) |
vtsaogames | 09 May 2016 5:28 a.m. PST |
Usurping the Spanish throne was a mistake before the resulting rebellion is considered. This sent a chill through the other royal houses. If this was how he treated an ally, what did he have planned for them? It was a major reason the Habsburgs went to war in 1809, which cut short Napoleon's campaign to re-conquer Spain. When you consider the Spanish rebellion too, he got rid of an inept ally and replaced it with an implacable foe. He was brilliant at operational strategy. His grand strategy left a lot to be desired. And then there's the invasion of Russia… |
Winston Smith | 09 May 2016 5:46 a.m. PST |
In the end, all these wounds were self inflicted. |
Esquire | 09 May 2016 6:31 a.m. PST |
I think that many fail to judge him within the context of the times. Many of his peers ended up without their heads. How many amongst us could have figured out how to rule/manage/govern/control (pick your verb) France during the Revolutionary period? Quite the challenge -- even if then his course became seriously flawed. |
Patrick R | 09 May 2016 6:33 a.m. PST |
I've come to think of Napoleon as the victim of that great tradition that lasted over 1500 years, the intense nostalgia for the Roman Empire and the ancient era as a whole. Many monarchs over the centuries had co-opted bits of that lost world, but Napoleon believed he could resurrect it. It's not an accident that this was the period of Neo Classicism, Gibbon and a huge interest in the ancient world as well as his little trip to Egypt to plunder as many art treasures as possible. In Napoleon's mind the old monarchies suffered from a lack of ambition, clinging to their own territories, preferring a "balance of power" rather than see the strongest rise to dominate. In his mind it was Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon … The problem is that Napoleon would have made a superlative Roman Emperor, but he lived in a very different world where new factors played a considerable role like colonial empires, modern banking etc. He was an intelligent man, skilled in battle, a good administrator, but a piddling politician and unable to grasp the nuances that would have allowed him to outmanoeuvre his enemies politically like he did on the battlefield. His inability to lay down stable relations with the other nations and his own ambition and arrogance meant that he blundered into consecutive wars with no real long-term gain. He never secured his position and proved to be an unreliable talking partner. When he crowned himself emperor, he simply didn't have someone to whisper in his ear that all glory is fleeing … |
JimDuncanUK | 09 May 2016 6:44 a.m. PST |
Well, he's dead now so I try to think nicely of him as I do with everyone else. |
Gazzola | 09 May 2016 7:14 a.m. PST |
I think all empires are predatory in nature. That's how they become empires. But the problem is that we are all looking at things with the luxury of hindsight. We know what happened so it all so easy to say he wasn't good at this or that because this or that failed. You could do that with any historical character or campaign if one really wanted to. In terms of taking over Spain. His only mistake as far as I can see, is in not placing a Spaniard on the throne. Things may well have panned out quite differently had he done so. But that doesn't mean I agree with him taking over the country, before people start having fits. And as for taking over control of Spain, Napoleon was not the first to do so or decide who should rule that nation. Before Napoleon's time there was the little matter of The War of the Spanish Succession, involving most of the allied nations fighting each other over who should rule the country. Then there is Poland and the many partitions of Poland, by the allies, resulting in the almost non-existence of that country. So those in glass houses should perhaps think first before throwing stones. You cant go around accusing someone of something when you've been doing it yourself and for some time. And no one had any idea that the Spanish people would rise up and rebel, which they did, stubborn lot that they were. They just didn't know a good thing when they saw it. LOL As for Russia, yes, we all know what happened. Ho hum. But had the campaign been a success we would have all been saying how clever Napoleon was and describing the brilliance of his campaign. By the way, I'm not saying I agree with his invading Russia. But again, no one was aware that the Russians would do a runner for so long, even after Napoleon's victory at Borodino. Yes, Napoleon made the mistake of staying there too long, and with such a severe winter, the army suffered for it on the retreat back. But it wasn't his planning that failed, it was the staying there too long that cause the failure. After all, it wasn't his intention to conquer Russia or rule it, he just wanted the Russians to stick to their agreement, which they were not doing. Had Napoleon broken an agreement people would be up in arms about it. And, if like some people, you only concentrate on anyone's failures, then no one would be considered brilliant. Everyone would be a failure. It is a bit like looking at a football team and basing how good or bad they are just on the games they lose, while ignoring the games they won and how they won. |
Brechtel198 | 09 May 2016 7:23 a.m. PST |
I think all empires are predatory in nature. That's how they become empires. That is exactly correct. The empires of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia were all expansionist during the period as well as France. And what also has to be taken into consideration is that France was expansionist before Napoleon took power and was still expansionist after he was gone. As you said, that's how empires are built. The difference is that Napoleon is condemned for it and the other four powers are not. |
foxweasel | 09 May 2016 8:20 a.m. PST |
He was better than anyone on this website. |
Martin Rapier | 09 May 2016 8:44 a.m. PST |
I'm not sure Napoleon was a strategist at all, he was a romantic adventurer and an opportunist. He was extremely good at winning wars, but a strategy implies he had some sort of coherent set of aims outside of ruling France, being glorious and having a seat at the table with the other great powers. I rather think none of the other combatant powers had anything approaching a 'strategy' outside those considerations either. These weren't nation states, but states in transition from late medieval feudalism and early modern absolutism. The Holy Roman Empire wasn't dissolved until 1806, and many of the absolutist empires persisted until 1918. As Louis XIV observed, L'etat c'est moi, and state interests (and 'strategy') were much more personal and dynastic than national. |
basileus66 | 09 May 2016 8:44 a.m. PST |
And no one had any idea that the Spanish people would rise up and rebel This statement is not totally correct, actually. The Emperor himself warned his subordinates in Spain that civil disorder, mutinies and even open rebellion could be expected, and should be dealt accordingly. He sent letters to Murat, to his brother and to his ambassador in Madrid in that regard. He ordered Murat to quell any rebellion with extreme prejudice. He expected that the rebellion would collapse after some "examples" had been made, as it had happened with the "unpleasantness" in Italy in 1806. What he didn't expect was the extension of the rebellion, nor that a significant part of the Spanish Army would be able to side with the rebels, nor control the fortresses, nor that the British would commit to the Peninsula in force. While the commitment of British troops caught by surprise to almost everybody, Napoleon had received numerous letters from his ambassador in Madrid warning him that the Spaniards wouldn't take lightly a change of dinasty that would involve the enthronement of a Bonaparte. He chose to disregard that information as inconsequential, though. Spain was just one of his many errors in judgement. |
basileus66 | 09 May 2016 8:49 a.m. PST |
The difference is that Napoleon is condemned for it and the other four powers are not Besides that he lost at the end, he was more blatant and less restrained than the others. While Austria or Russia restrained themselves to their natural areas of influence (Italy, Poland and the Balkans), France under Napoleon tried to extend her frontiers way beyond what was felt as "natural". Contrary to what she did under Louis XIV, Napoleonic France expansion wasn't caused by dinastic ambitions -at least, not ONLY for dinastic ambitions- but mostly to enforce a strategy (I disagree here with you, Martin), the Continental System that was counterproductive in the long term. |
1968billsfan | 09 May 2016 10:29 a.m. PST |
My take is that Napoleon had grand dreams and wound up having to live beyond his means to achieve them. To keep his large pet army (part of his power base) and grand national policies within France, he had to repeatedly make war to strip resources from nearby countries. His military genus made this "easy" to do, but the resource confiscation from enemies and his client states lead to his undoing. |
Brechtel198 | 09 May 2016 11:08 a.m. PST |
he was more blatant and less restrained than the others. While Austria or Russia restrained themselves to their natural areas of influence (Italy, Poland and the Balkans)… What, pray, are 'natural areas of influence'? Great Britain profited through the wars with the continuing acquisition of colonies. Russia launched wars of aggression against France, Sweden, and Turkey. Austria was the aggressor against France in 1805 and 1809 and was vying with Prussia to be the leading power in Germany. Prussia launched a war of aggression against France in 1806. And at Vienna in 1814-1815 the allies were grabbing as much loot as they could from the remains of Napoleon's empire. I would not consider those actions as 'natural areas of influence.' That's just an excuse for what the allies did and an accusation against Napoleon not based on research but only bias. |
Brechtel198 | 09 May 2016 11:09 a.m. PST |
…he had to repeatedly make war to strip resources from nearby countries… That he was not the aggressor in 1805, 1806, 1807, and 1809 makes that statement inaccurate. |
42flanker | 09 May 2016 11:43 a.m. PST |
There is a difference between assessing NB's record and the stategic decisions behind that, and "giving him a hard time." It doesn't matter whether the other powers were hypocritical regarding dynastic meddling and annexation of territory, or not. If -if- Napoleon's policies provoked a hostile reaction (or defensive- take your pick) and undermined a 'live and let live' accomodation, then, arguably, his strategic thinking was self-defeating. |
Rudysnelson | 09 May 2016 11:45 a.m. PST |
Better at strategy than tactics. He had many faults but every leader does. He was able at the economic production level to repeatedly field new and capable forces. |
Dogged | 09 May 2016 11:55 a.m. PST |
Napoleon was not a good strategist and he had not a good eye for politics, nationalities or social issues. Regarding Spain, he could have given the crown to Ferdinand making him his pawn; the heir could not have been happier and, while the Spanish armada and armies were in bad shape they were more than enough as to keep the Spanish territory and Portugal safe from British interference. In fact Napoleon could have safely extract some Spanish territories and make them autonomous (projects from the last Franco-Spanish war back in 1794-5). That, apart from the Spanish contribution to imperial armies which in 1808 was a full division of its better troops (which were actually good). Regarding Prussia and Austria, it was lame not to simply erase the first from history and distribute its territories into Polish or Saxon hands. Separating Hungary and Bohemia from the second would have split his major enemy power apart from Britain and created more partners to the French who alongside Polish would have had an interest into not allowing an Austrian (or Prussian) resurgence. Regarding the Netherlands etc. it was a mistake not to keep it independent just as it was a mistake to undo the Italian republics. Much better to build an Italian league a la Rhine Confederation to deal with Bourbon Sicily. In the end the French empire could have been the safeguard for independence of a good many new nations which would have been happy to keep an eye on their old masters. In all these places (Italy, the Netherlands-Belgium, Spain, Austria, Bohemia, etc) there was social unrest which would lead to revolutions and wars shortly after. Napoleon did cut the revolutionary inertia and built a national resistance against his rule and hsi family's. Maybe the big deal with Napoleon is that he wanted to be one more of the European despots instead of being the European liberator. His will to get into the absolutist club while keeping some revolutionary derived assets demonstrates a lack of vision and comprehension of both his environment and its people. Finally, his thrust into Russia is a proof that he was not a good strategist |
Old Contemptibles | 09 May 2016 12:30 p.m. PST |
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Winston Smith | 09 May 2016 1:11 p.m. PST |
What's the Vegas over/under line on the number of posts before the DHings start? We have some of the Usual Suspects participating already, but they have sadly stayed civil. |
basileus66 | 09 May 2016 1:52 p.m. PST |
Great Britain profited through the wars with the continuing acquisition of colonies. Not really. Britain obtained more benefits from the destruction by the Continental System of the markets in Continental Europe than from any colony she acquired during the wars. If memory doesn't fail me, Britain acquired during the Napoleonic Wars some islands in the Caribbean, Cape Colony and Mauritius Island. The Cape Colony would become profitable in the long run, but not until well into the XIXth Century. So no, Britain didn't acquire colonies as much as she became the economic center of Europe thanks in part to the devastation that the wars brought upon her main competitors. Russia launched wars of aggression against France, Sweden, and Turkey. Against Sweden, she did. Against Turkey, well, given that the Turks had allied themselves with France and were using their irregulars to annoy Russia' southern frontier it is debatable that making the war an open affair can be regarded as "aggression", but, hey! whatever floats your boat, mate. I don't mind. But not, against France Russia's wasn't the aggressor. She became involved in the war in support of Austria, which had been forced into the war by Napoleon's policies in Italy. That he didn't declare war was a formality. Prussia launched a war of aggression against France in 1806. Of course, because having French troops violating her neutrality by crossing through Prussian lands without the consent of the Prussian government was such a peaceful movement by the part of the Emperor. I don't know what kind of International Law you have studied, but the rest of the world apparently thinks that violating other' state neutrality is a casus belli by the book. and an accusation against Napoleon not based on research but only bias. It would be an accusation if he would have been in a court of law, or if we would be in a playground looking for someone to blame for taking Billy's lunch money. As we are not, what it is is an (informed, I daresay) opinion regarding his perception of how international relationships should be carried, and how it reflects on his ability as strategist. |
Ottoathome | 09 May 2016 2:19 p.m. PST |
Basilius 66 Your post merits serious discussion. The definition of "strategy" is critical and I see that you are talking about that part of interstate relations above the campaign. That is, a strategy not for the movements of armies and fleets but of attainin a "modus vivendi" with the other states of Europe, and I will add, you seem to be aiming at a modus vivendi that does not necessitate constant war. That is, a strategy to END the Napoleonic Wars as to continue with them as the nominal way of life, is unsustainable-- for France. Of your first reason, a rejection of "the balance of power" as a modus vivendi – well it's highly problematic. It's now pretty much recognized that the idea of a "balance of power" was not something the statesmen and leaders of the time worked towards as a goal but more term we ourselves have reflectively imposed on the international relations of the age as to their eventual or "net effect." I have seen no evidence of that at the time, and each state in each "crisis" or danger point which flared into wars during the 18th century in effect provoked the "flashpoint" by a purposeful attempt to upset the apple cart and redefine the blance of power more to their own balance. Perhaps one of the greatest examples of this might be the first partition of Poland, and reading Kaplan's excellent book on this shows that no one wanted to partition it, only to gain more power within the UNDIVIDED commonwealth, but that this became slowly impossible. Indeed, all of the wars of the 18th century are "Wars of Succession" either being so in fact in direct name and as a consequence of the extirpation of dynasties and the re-arrangements to be made (or not.). Even the French Wars of Napoleon could be seen (facilely I admit) as a "discussion" as a war of succession, namely will France be ruled by a King or an Emperor. Napoleon's "strategy" in this manner was in many cases forced upon him because to win peace in Europe, he would have to "go along to get along" and the triumphs of Revolutionary France, and of Napoleon himself had largely altered the map of Europe, and he would NOT be able to give back the West Bank of the Rhine, grant independence to Holland and Belgium, and "un-amalgamate" the changes in the map of Italy, not because the allies would not let him, but because the French nation itself was not going to let him. To give him his due, Napoleon tried, he really tried to play the dynastic game and might have done it, but his own ego and worse, the ego of France was not going to let him do it. In a precursor echo of Churchillian grandiloquence he probably would have said "I did not become head of the French Empire to preside over it's dissolution." I do not think playing the power game of balance of power, even if it was the nominal way of Europe, could be played by Napoleon. He had a tiger by the tail and dared not let it go. But I have no sympathy for him, he largely had created the tiger. That tiger, moreover was going to become more enormous and ravenous every year. Besides, to have played the balance of power game would have mean't that if you are going to respect the institutions and crowns of Europe you are not going to break up the Holy Roman Empire or start erasing borders and states willy-nilly for crowns for your own relations or to organize areas for war. The problem is that once you do that game you've tossed any idea of "balance of power" out the window and basically tossed your own state into the sausage maker as well. Napoleon's infirmity as a strategist was that he could no vision or means of attaining a stable existence, and the status quo could not even have been done through a balance of power. It required war. This requirement necessitated the prosecution of war even during the few times of peace and the greatest disturber of Europe was his continental system which was not going to just be irksome and burdensome to the soveriegns of Europe, a constant reminder of their subordination, but to everyone everywhere and down to the meanest peasant in particular as it made him unable to getthe products he wanted and needed, and gave each person a nice little lump of misery he had to live with each and every way each and every day. As to his empire being predatory- well yes it was, and Yes-- all empires are in some sense "predatory" but then look at their neighbors and you can't blame them toomuch Matter of fact, look at civil society in each and every state, then, in the past, now and today and you will see there are huge numbers of people who are are "predatory" against each other so it's best not to be calling the kettle black. While France was admittedly a past master of predatoryness and pretty much hit the apogee of predatory not seen since Wallenstein and the thirty years war, it's hard to label it as a particular vice of France or any other empire. As for the pomp and circumstance and more or less "putting on airs" I don't see that as enraging "the crowned heads of Europe" to the degree that it would be a significant causal factor. The crowned heads of Euorpe had been used to people putting on airs" for centuries and if you carefully look at the genealogies of the nobility of all lands in all of Europe you don't have to look (or for that matter far) from the crowned heads of Europe to find minor nobles, bourgoise, grand or petite, or for that matter Jews, gypsies, horse thieves and s. The key to the difference of how these ummm let's call them "arriviste" elements did not upset the state was that they proudly and ferevently embraced and accepted the rules and prejudices of the classes they were arriving into. Nevertheless Napoleon for all his genius DID prove a less than mediocre strategist in that he seemed completely incapable of finding a way to ingratiate post revolutionary France into the European state system. I think this failure was entirely personal. From what I have read Napoleon was entirely and always obviously a bully. He was bombastic, brutal, bullying, but a the same time obsequious, and obviously insincere, and NEVER friendly or gentle. He did NOT put people at their ease, and always acted and spoke in a way that you KNEW he just wanted to take advantage of you and that his sincerity when he tried it, was dismissed merely as the blandishments of a con man. He was nice to you only when he thought he could get something out of you. He was obsequious even fawning not solicitous, never polite, and on the whole an awful person personally and everyone was much more at ease when he wasn't there. He was like the person who at the family get to gether on Thanksgiving would make you weird crazy "Unka Mort,"(who always smelled a little) the center of attention because you delighted to hear Mort's tales of how if Wendel Wilke had won instead of Roosevelt. Sitting listen to Napoleon he would always talk about himself, what he had done, his great plans, how mom and Pop should have listened to him, and how if he had run the family everything would be better and you would all be filthy rich and famous by now… He spoke in sententious, pompous, overblown tones about the most staggeringly huge things when all you wanted to do was sit by the fire with a nice wine and reminisce about how nice Aunt Agness was to you were a kid. Imagine a Mrs. Buckett (It's Bouquette) who had escaped from an institution for the criminally insane. Napoleon's problem was no one wanted him around because he was a completely unpleasant and tiresome fellow |
dibble | 09 May 2016 2:20 p.m. PST |
Brechtel That he was not the aggressor in 1805, 1806, 1807, and 1809 makes that statement inaccurate. Spain aside. What of 1808 and 1812? With the invasions of Portugal and Russia? I suppose you will say that he was provoked into war and invasion of Russia, but then you could say that Prussia was provoked too in 1806. What, pray, are 'natural areas of influence'? Great Britain profited through the wars with the continuing acquisition of colonies. And who did many of those colonies belong to? And what of the threat to any country that tried to have relations with Britain? Invading friendly and allied countries, threatening and dictating to others, refused peace before is first abdication on much better terms than those he clambered for before his second, shows just how much of a strategic benchmark he set. Paul :) |
von Winterfeldt | 09 May 2016 11:47 p.m. PST |
It is a joke to say that Boney was no aggressor in 1805, for what reason did he have his army concentrated at the coast -as no other than to invade England? In case one is seriously studying the diplomatic events leading up to 1805 one sees that both sides had their share in leading to military conflict and that Boney estimated peace nothing other than an armistic to prepare for another war. |
Trajanus | 10 May 2016 2:00 a.m. PST |
As already mentioned "strategy" probably isn't the right word here. To me Basilius's original post is a very accurate summary of Napoleon's short comings in 'political' or 'grand' strategy which the follow on posts seem to have picked up on. Napoleon based his 'World View' on an attitude of 'I've changed the rules, deal with it' and then resolutely went along a path that ignored the fact others refused to accept his premiss. For those who have not read it, I would seriously recommend hunting down a copy of Charles Esdaile's – "Napoleon's Wars An International History 1803 – 1815" which is an excellent and readable study of all the stuff that went on in what Battle/Campaign history buffs would normally consider "the background". It's a really good study of the whys and wherefores of both Napoleon and of those whose world he crashed in upon, how he couldn't let go and why they wouldn't either. |
ScottWashburn | 10 May 2016 4:47 a.m. PST |
His tremendous success led him into unknown territory. No other empire had ever expanded so far so quickly. He was blazing a new trail and it's not surprising he made some wrong turns along the way. |
Gazzola | 10 May 2016 7:43 a.m. PST |
basileus66 'natural areas of influence' THAT IS CLASSIC! I think you meant to say 'natural areas of conquest' Surely you would not be that naive or hypocritical to think otherwise. LOL |
Gazzola | 10 May 2016 7:46 a.m. PST |
As usual, people are coming out with ever so clever things that Napoleon should or should not have done, based on hindsight. It is a bit like saying Britain should not have kept funding the allies to wage war against Napoleon and the French, and we could have had years and years of peace and countless lives saved. Think about it! |
HANS GRUBER | 10 May 2016 9:10 a.m. PST |
It is a joke to say that Boney was no aggressor in 1805, for what reason did he have his army concentrated at the coast -as no other than to invade England? Quite right. Clearly the proper reaction of France after England declared war in 1803 should have been to surrender. |
42flanker | 10 May 2016 10:43 a.m. PST |
'natural areas of influence'I think you meant to say 'natural areas of conquest' I would say that it was naive not to accept that the great powers had areas of influence where their security and other interests attracted a certain jealous attention. The declining influence of the Austrian Hapsburgs in Germany and the Low Countries had been the result mainly of dynastic marriage and other manouevres, rather than conquest. Their dominion in the Balkans resulted from the power vacuum in the wake of the Ottoman defeat in the Balkans. They represented the only power able to hold the frontier on the Danube and Adriatic. The Turks had been at the gates of Vienna only a hundred years before. The Austrian Hapsburg hegemony in Northern Italy derived from the Spanish Hapsburgs, whose possessions in Italy derived from the dynastic fortunes of the Kingdom of Aragon in the Middle Ages. The Spanish hegemony had been secured by the defeat of the Valois French kings who had decided in 1497 that they, not the Spanish, should be the dominant power in Italy, unleashing 70 years of war in the Italian peninsula. Poland was a curious entity, having emerged in the wake of the Lithuanian Commonwealth which was the dominant power before the rise of the Muscovite kingdom. Although the partition of Poland was an unedifying spectacle, its elected monarchy was a recipe for chaos and it's hardly surprising that Prussia, Austria and Russia acted to 'rationalize' their borders. France under Louis XIV started the push towards the Rhine as France's natural frontier, intending to absorb the Hapsburg Low Countries in the process. That was defeated. The Revolutionary French resumed the process and, when they succeeded, went one step further by creating a satellite in the Batavian Republic. The annexation of other states on the German side of the Rhine took place, as we know, under Napoleon. The Kingdom of Prussia's problem was that it had no natural constituency or hinterland, hence its role as a free radical between 1740-1763. No evolving state in the early modern era was an altruistic body. Most of the main wars in the C18th resulted from destabilization of the balance of power, often because of crises within dynasties, frequently Hapsburgs, with states attempting to take advantage when conflict arose, in order to have bargaining chips when peace broke out again. The classic being the French, Spanish and Dutch declaring war on Britain during the AWI. This opportunism didnt mean that the politicians didn't understand the principle of the balance of power, they just wanted it to work in their favour more than others'. |
Ben Avery | 10 May 2016 2:27 p.m. PST |
'No other empire had expanded so far, so quickly.' Alexander. Good points Basileus. Thanks for that recommendation Trajanus, I tend to prefer the 'background' these days. It improves the understanding no end. |
Brechtel198 | 10 May 2016 5:48 p.m. PST |
It is a joke to say that Boney was no aggressor in 1805, for what reason did he have his army concentrated at the coast -as no other than to invade England? Great Britain had sour grapes after Amiens and it was they who broke the peace. That is why the army was on the Channel. |
Brechtel198 | 10 May 2016 5:50 p.m. PST |
…and that [Napoleon] estimated peace nothing other than an armistic to prepare for another war. And what, then, was Britain's motivation along with Austria's? I'm sure they were shocked to go to war in 1803 and 1805 respectively. |
Gazzola | 11 May 2016 6:27 a.m. PST |
Hans Grubber Well said. Clearly for some, when it comes to Napoleon, they don't let the truth or facts get in the way of something negative being thrown at the great man. Britain declares war but Napoleon is criticized for reacting. LOL. You just can't help laughing at the reasoning of some of the people posting here. |
dibble | 11 May 2016 2:01 p.m. PST |
Britain declares war but Napoleon is criticized for reacting. Britain declares war but Wilhelm II is criticized for reacting. Britain declares war but Hitler is criticized for reacting. Paul :) |
Delbruck | 11 May 2016 2:58 p.m. PST |
Britain declares war but Wilhelm II is criticized for reacting. Britain declares war but Hitler is criticized for reacting. Paul :) Britain declared war on Germany because Germany attacked Belgium (WW1) and Poland (WW2). Who did France attack in 1803? |
Major Bloodnok | 12 May 2016 3:10 a.m. PST |
So Boney invaded Hannover, and promised it to Prussia, in 1803 after Britian declared war? ;>) |
von Winterfeldt | 12 May 2016 6:07 a.m. PST |
Boney concentrates an army to invande England, an invasion is scheduled for 1803, the Dutch had to consent that their fleet will be under Boney's direct rule, Portugal and Spain have to concede as well, Boney invades and occupates Hannover, French units invade Napels and occupy all harbours. No wonder that England has to react – and by the way, the mastermind behind the coalition against Boney was the Russian Emperor. In June 1805 Parma, Piczenca and ligurian Republic were annexed by France, what a peace loving dove Boney was. He was a strategist for war by using brute force and bullying potential opponents, the consequences of this strategy are well known. |
Gazzola | 12 May 2016 9:04 a.m. PST |
Delbruck Good post. But the problem is that people like dibble and VW don't care about facts and reality, especially those which might spoil their biased and blinkered views of Napoleon and anything he did. LOL And when they bring up Hitler, it just displays how desperate they are because they are losing the debate. Sad really, but not unexpected from those two. As for Britain declaring war, they saw it as more profitable being at war than at peace. Typical British mindset during the period. So they did not hesitate to break the peace and the Treaty of Amiens by not withdrawing from Malta which they had agreed to do. They broke the peace and started the war, not Napoleon. But try telling that to people like dibble and VW. They just won't have it. |
Gazzola | 12 May 2016 9:10 a.m. PST |
Taking over Spain is often thrown up as a mistake by Napoleon and disliked by the Spanish. But was it? Is it yet another negative myth thrown up by those ignoring the facts. It seems it wasn't such a bad thing in some areas, at least, for a time anyway and rebellion against the French was pout down by guess who, the Spanish. link |
basileus66 | 12 May 2016 9:36 a.m. PST |
Sorry to dissapoint you, Gazzola, but outside some small areas, particularly in the cities and towns with the presence of French garrisons, Spain was mostly rebellious against the French. Esdaile has been trying for years to prove that the rebellion wasn't that popular; regretfully, his analysis are too biased, too much based upon English-language sources and the relatively small amount of Spanish language sources he has used are not the best available. Much more interesting for the topic are Jean-Marc Lafon "L'Andalousie et Napoleón. Contre-insurrection, collaboration et resistences dans le Midi de l'Espagne (1808-1812)"; I would also recommend you my own book on the Spanish insurgency, but it is in Spanish and it would be inelegant for my part. |
basileus66 | 12 May 2016 9:36 a.m. PST |
Sorry to dissapoint you, Gazzola, but outside some small areas, particularly in the cities and towns with the presence of French garrisons, Spain was mostly rebellious against the French. Esdaile has been trying for years to prove that the rebellion wasn't that popular; regretfully, his analysis are too biased, too much based upon English-language sources and the relatively small amount of Spanish language sources he has used are not the best available. Much more interesting for the topic are Jean-Marc Lafon "L'Andalousie et Napoleón. Contre-insurrection, collaboration et resistences dans le Midi de l'Espagne (1808-1812)"; I would also recommend you my own book on the Spanish insurgency, but it is in Spanish and it would be inelegant for my part. |
Gazzola | 13 May 2016 5:04 a.m. PST |
basileus66 The point is, the whole of Spain was not rebellious as you admitted in your own post or an all over patriotic rebellion. And I disagree with you on Esdaile's work. |
basileus66 | 13 May 2016 6:25 a.m. PST |
Gazzola No, that's not the point, but whatever floats your boat mate. Perfect that you disagree with me regarding Esdaile's work. |
Ben Avery | 14 May 2016 2:37 a.m. PST |
Gazzola, your initial question was whether Spain was a mistake and you then used the question of rebellion to justify it. Regardless of how widespread the rebellion was, I'd suggest the answer is yes. As a result, Napoleon showed his willingness to attack allies, gave Britain a foothold on the Continent and wasted troops and time better spent elsewhere, for little return. He also gave his enemies numerous opportunities to prick holes in the myth of French invincibility, after years of swift, decisive victory. |
Ben Avery | 14 May 2016 3:16 a.m. PST |
Actually, I'll nominate his key failing strategically in underestimating Britain's power; both direct and indirect and its commitment and will in exerting it when it felt threatened. |
Gazzola | 14 May 2016 5:43 a.m. PST |
basileus66 I've read many of Professor Esdaile's work and it has never come over as biased in any way. The sources have always been numerous and varied. By the way, are we to assume that your book is not biased? LOL |
Gazzola | 14 May 2016 5:52 a.m. PST |
Ben Avery In hindsight, it is so obvious it was a mistake for Napoleon to replace the rulers of Spain, especially with a relative. But that is based on hindsight. We know what happened, so it far too easy to say what should and should not have been done or so and so was not good at this or that because this happened. But no one at the time knew what would happen or the level of rebellion by the Spanish people. And the fact the rebellion was actually put down in some areas, by the Spanish themselves, proves that point. In terms of attacking Allies. Never mind the allies, some nations, such as Britain, will even attack neutral nations as we saw in the attack against Denmark in 1807. |
basileus66 | 14 May 2016 6:27 a.m. PST |
By the way, are we to assume that your book is not biased? LOL Gazzola Allow me to insist: whatever floats your boat, mate. If you are happy that way, who am I to tell you otherwise? |
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