"Frontal Cavalry Attacks On British & French Infantry" Topic

Could anyone point me to first-hand accounts of successful cavalry attack by British or French cavalry on their opponents' infantry that fit the following criteria:

1. There was no surprise (i.e no cases in which the infantry saw the cavalry very late, so ruling out Albuera, the KGL at Waterloo (I think) and Salamanca, for instance; I think the successful attacks at Quatre Bras may also fall largely into this category; also the attack on D'Erlon's infantry at Waterloo).

2. The infantry wasn't attacked in the flank or rear.

3. The example itself isn't highly contentious (I'm thinking of a couple of examples from Waterloo, those who know will know what I am on about!)

The KGL dragoons defeating French squares at Garcia Hernandez?

(That said, I believe there is one French account that claims the broken units were all foraging at the time.)

No first hand accounts but a guide to what might be less well known cavalry successes in an unfashionable campaign:

Villers en Cauchies April 24th 1794
Beaumont, or Le Cateau April 26th 1794
Willems May 10th 1794

link

link

G'Day Gents,

The KGL dragoons defeating two French squares at Garcia Hernandez is another myth.

The first unit was charged when it was foraging and the second unit was charged when it was already disordered, by routing French Soldiers from the first battalion which was caught off guard.

Best Regards
Art

When saying something is a myth, it is more interesting IMHO if you say why you think it is a myth and how you know the true answer.

Regards

A source for the foraging story would be helpful.

Perhaps by not explaining why something is or is not a myth, IMHO it is my way of hoping that someone will do their own research.

The myth was started by the same person who described the French in column at Maida, and the French in a 'T Formation' at the Battle of Albuera.

What were his sources…well he used the sources from the KGLs after action report (which is understandable that he got the incident confused -e.g. of misunderstanding military terms, just like the confusing report of the Old Guard assaulting in square at Waterloo, the actual members who were in the assaulting formations tell us precisely what these formations were). But he never bothered to use the French first hand sources which clearly stated the formation they were in.

Regards

I thought the whole point of this site was to share information, not say "I know the truth but I'm not telling you why". Perhaps you'd like to share the identity of the French primary source which contradicts the Germans and say why you believe the French version is preferable?

Strange…

I do not recall stating this "I know the truth but I'm not telling you why".

Of course you are quite right, the point of this site is to share information. Perhaps I got off on a wrong start…but it was never my intent to destroy the subject of your thread…thus I apologize for interrupting…

Best Regards
Art

Source is here.

Campagnes du Capitaine Marcel

link

In French, no time at the moment to find the relevant pages.

I think I posted a summary translation in an earlier post some time ago

@Art,

I paraphrased. You said that one commonly known story was a myth and gave an alternative but without saying where the alternative was from or why the alternative is to be preferred.

I am honestly puzzled why this had to become hard work. If you don't want to share, then don't. If you want to, then please do.

The claim that an entire battalion of the 76e Ligne dispersed to forage whilst overwatching the ford east of Garcihernandez as the rearmost infantry unit in the Foy's rearguard lacks credibility and does not match other eyewitness accounts of that day. The majority of French sources are either silent or claim that the square held firm, which is more than a little awkward given the number taken prisoner from 76e that day and duly added to British prisoner records, as well as recorded in French unit strength returns

German and British accounts are clear that the French battalion was found to be already in square, having responded to the withdrawal of Curto's light cavalry in the face of British pursuit. However, first engaging the 1st KGL Dragoons at c.80yrds, the French held their second volley too long, i.e. 20yds.

Wounded horses can continue forward for some distance before falling to their wounds. In this case, at least one of them (that of Pte Post) collapsed on the face of the square to create a breach at least two ranks deep, which was exploited by the follow-on ranks.

Clearly, the KGL squadron commander was ill-advised to launch such an attack and its success was a fluke, but a single unsubstantiated source that is even contradicted by ever other French source, including Foy's own account, does not make it a myth

Whirlwind
There are quite a few accounts of successful cavalry attacks
on squares. See the Napoleonistyka site (about halfway down:
link

As for the Waterloo examples:
I believe the 5th KGL., 8th KGL and Luneburg Light bns. were all caught in line and overwhelmed by nearby or flanking Cuirassier sqns. while advancing to relieve La Haye Saint. From the accounts I've read they all seem to have been aware of the nearby Cavalry but were caught before they could form square or were ordered back into line by the Prince of Orange.

At Quatre Bras the 69th Ft. and a few others were attacked while changing formation by Cavalry that had been hidden by the high crops on the battlefield. The Prince of Orange seems to have ordered the 69th to change back into line formation at that moment.

At Gilly on the 15 June 1815 a couple of Prussian Bns. were caught and overwhelmed by French Cavalry. The Fusilier Bn./28th Regt. were in the midst of a formation change, some companies forming square and others trying to retreat into a nearby wood.

None of the Waterloo examples quite fit your criteria, but Cavalry was always maneuverable enough to quickly outflank an unprotected line or take advantage of a bad formation.

Albuera 1811: deployed Portuguese infantry (with secure flanks) held against French cavalry.

That Napoleonistyka site is rather inaccurate for Quatre Bras.

What that site says:

In 1815 at Quatre Bras, 2 British squares were broken by
the French lancers. Peter Hofschroer writes, "… squares of
British infantry held off the French cavalry at first, but the
square of the 42nd was broken and the 44th was thrown
into disorder, the colour of the 44th being fought over."
Sergeant Anton of the 42nd Highland writes, " … they
[French lancers] were approaching our right flank … We
instantly formed a rallying square; no time for particularity:
every man's musket was loaded, and our enemies approached
at full charge … our brave Colonel [Sir Robert Macara] fell
at this time, pierced through the chin until the point reached
his brain. Captain Menzies fell covered with wounds. … The
grenadiers [of 42nd], whom he commanded, pressed round
to save or avenge him, but fell beneath the enemies lances."
Marshal Ney sent for Guiton's Cuirassier Brigade in one
last attempt to win the battle. The 69th Foot was formed in
square and delivered a volley at 30 paces.
French cuirassier with captured British color The 8th Cuirassiers however charged and broke the square.
Private Henry with the help of Maréchal-des-logis Massiet
jumped to the ground and picked up the king's color of the
II Battalion from the arms of ensign Clarke who had been
hacked down by 23 saber cuts. For this, Massiet received
the Legion of Honour.
The French cuirassiers also scattered the British I/33rd Foot.
"The 73rd were panicked by the fate of the 69th, and they too
broke and ran for the wood. The 33rd Foot formed on a knoll,
became the target of horse battery, which cut them up with
canister, causing them to follow the others who had broken."
(Williams – "Waterloo …" p 220)
The II/30th Regiment of Foot however held their ground.

None of those Regiments had formed squares broken by cavalry so that site isn't really a good source for these incidents.

Best source would be Mike Robinson: The Battle of Quatre Bras 1815. And Carole Divall: Redcoats Against Napoleon

S'funny though that that blatantly biased site didn't mention that the 33rd lost their colour too at Quatre Bras.

The 33rd were 'forced' to change from square to line because of accurate French artillery fire and were scattered by Cuirassiers and headed for Bossu wood where they reformed. 33rd also lost their regimental Colour but was recovered after the brave Cpl William Holdsworth, shot the Cuirassier, who was riding back with it in triumph, Holdsworth tore the colour from its pole, wrapped it around his body and made his way back to his Regiment.

Paul :)

Another square-breaking episode was at Göhdre 1813, when the KGL Hussars broke a French square.

The KGL account suggests a similar story to that of Fernando Garcia (a fallen horse disrupting the square), as I recollect. A separate account (Sgt Morris) suggests that the square had been hit by a rocket.

The accounts that I know of are in the KGL official history, and Sgt Morris's memoirs.

In wargaming terms both these accounts suggest that there can be a "double-six" moment, though surely at a lower probability than a double-six for a formed square.

Found the brief translation of Marcel here

TMP link

last posting at the end of page 3.

The question as ever with historical sources is testing the evidence and coming to a conclusion

Whirlwind, it's an interesting question. As well as the perennial question about squares, I'd like to know if anyone can give a confirmed case of cavalry breaking a formed, steady line with a frontal charge- not just in the Napoleonic period, but at any time between 1740 and 1815. The 33rd at Quatre Bras doesn't count, as the line wasn't steady and broke before the cuirassiers reached them.

I'm not contending that it didn't happen, it's just that finding examples has been a problem.

Medellin: French dragoons couldn't even break a recently reconstituted Spanish Army of Extremadura in line (okay doubled line so 6 deep), even though at least half these troops were very recent recruits, many units with no uniforms. I think the dragoons tried twice.

I thought, also, that in the mid 18thc it was standard practice to receive cavalry in line, with well trained infantry.

I can't think of any steady lines of well trained troops being broken by a frontal cavalry charge. Would be very interesting to have some examples, because with many rules (including my own) this is very possible if the cavalry are not stopped by fire.

So the typical result- and hopefully the sources back it up is the the line simply waivers and breaks then the cav go or continue forward with success and saber/disperse the unit.
Would this be most correct of the situations and does this agree with most of all your direct sources?

MG

As for the Waterloo examples:
I believe the 5th KGL., 8th KGL and Luneburg Light bns. were all caught in line and overwhelmed by nearby or flanking Cuirassier sqns. while advancing to relieve La Haye Saint. From the accounts I've read they all seem to have been aware of the nearby Cavalry but were caught before they could form square or were ordered back into line by the Prince of Orange.

I'd be very interested in hearing more about this. In Peter Hofschroer's book, his remarks about the Luneberg Light Bn are very odd (well, not him, he is quoting Maj Baring, head of the KGL garrison in Lay Haye Sainte). So:

The Hanoverian Light Battalion Luneberg moved down from the main battle line to assist us (fighting off a column of French infantry). A mass of 600 men, they had not kept the best order when moving up. Both [the (KGL) skirmishers and the Light Battalion Luneberg] now attacked the enemy, driving him back out of the orchard. Now, however, a strong line of enemy cuirassiers drew up to the right, forward of the garden. The sight of them caused the young, inexperienced soldiers to depart from the orchard in great disorder and return to the main position Attempts to prevent men from the 2nd (KGL) Light Battalion in the farm from joining this mass were fruitless. Even less successful were the attempts to bring it to a halt for its own salvation. Cavalry rode it down with severe loss…

And OTOH, the accounts I'd read seemed firmly to indicate that the KGL Battalions were hit by French Cavalry, the 8th also from the flank, from cavalry which it had not seen. SIborne summarizes this view here: link

Dale Gavin

Whirlwind, it's an interesting question. As well as the perennial question about squares, I'd like to know if anyone can give a confirmed case of cavalry breaking a formed, steady line with a frontal charge- not just in the Napoleonic period, but at any time between 1740 and 1815. The 33rd at Quatre Bras doesn't count, as the line wasn't steady and broke before the cuirassiers reached them.

I'm not contending that it didn't happen, it's just that finding examples has been a problem.

Old 'Hoffi' is incorrect too about the 42nd and 44th. Neither had their squares broken and the 42nd managed to form theirs around some of the attacking Lancers and kill those trapped within. And as for the 44th, their casualty returns for the battle wasn't very severe compared with that of most of the other British regiments.

Paul :)

Teodoro, Not just Medellin, mate, though it is unusual in that the Spanish were also hit in the flank, from memory (or was it took [skirmisher?] fire on their flank?) and still held. There's plenty of examples where the cavalry have been held off or repulsed by lines, but getting a clear example of the cavalry breaking the line is another matter. Even the vaunted charge of the Beyreuth Dragoons at Hohenfriedberg involves several regiments which were disrupted by their own cavalry routing through them.

I thought, also, that in the mid 18thc it was standard practice to receive cavalry in line, with well trained infantry.

True, but the battalion lines were much more closely spaced, with as little as six paces between battalions- no flanks for the cavalry to exploit, so no need for square most of the time.

because with many rules (including my own) this is very possible if the cavalry are not stopped by fire.

The same here. I'm thinking that infantry should do a morale check before they fire at charging cavalry. If they pass, they stand, fire and the cavalry charge is stopped. If they fail, they fire as disordered and the cavalry hits them as disordered defenders.

Of course I'll keep the charge rules from The War Game as written for my SYW stuff- the rare occasions when the cavalry live to charge home are too much fun to sacrifice to reality.

MG, pretty much what you've said, mate. Formed, steady troops seem to be able to see off cavalry that charges their front. Having said that, there has to be an contradictory example showing my statement to be BS. That message will be posted in 5, 4, 3….

Paul, the mistake the lancers made with the 42nd was that they got into the square, thereby threatening the regimental whisky wagon. The poor lancers had no chance once they'd done that, whether they meant to or not.

As for PH's calling the square broken, at least four of us read the manuscript before it was published and we all thought it said "broken into". Whether my memory was faulty , PH changed the manuscript after proof reading or the text was changed during printing, I honestly don't know (this has been debated on so many fora over the last 20 years)- despite the innumerable electrons sacrificed to the flame wars. Once we'd read the manuscript the editors had their go, and there were a few changes and some text cut when they got it ready for print. Unfortunately my copies of the first two books (signed and dedicated- just unimpressive bragging yer know) were borrowed by a former friend, and have never been returned.

Cheers.

Dal.

David Dundas in his 1788 drill book was remarkably phlegmatic about penetration of an infantry line by cavalry, as long as units were in a position to cover each other. Indeed, he advocated leaving gaps so as to give the horses somewhere to go. This would absorb the energy of the charge with space rather than the bodies of the infantry formations they were attacking and still expose the cavalry to defensive fire. In his view, all relied on "steadiness, supporting corps, and a heavy constant well directed fire of musketry and artillery."

"There are various opinions as to the comparative advantages of Cavalry and Infantry, when opposed to each other and as to the manner in which the latter should resist and repel the attack of the former.

Experience has often shown that our thin lines of infantry are unequal to the situation, and when once that order is broken, on which a soldier has been habituated to repose his confidence and security, it is in vain to appeal to the reason or spirit of the individual; resistance is generally given up, panic prevails, and flight however unavailing universally takes place.

Fire alone certainly ought not to stop the progress of a determined cavalry, and it is hardly credible how few men and horses are at the instant brought to the ground, by the most steady and well directed fire; therefore it seems eligible in some situations to prepare openings, towards which the cavalry will naturally swerve, and through which perhaps the whole will find their Way.

But undoubtedly, there is much danger in allowing the line to be pierced, or in altering a disposition at the instant of being threatned by cavalry: and therefore in line of battle, where the flanks of the army are covered, where the getting round them would be a considerable and critical operation, and where the uniform front is to be maintained, the attack of the cavalry is at any rate to be opposed by steadiness, supporting corps, and a heavy constant well directed fire of musketry and artillery—

Notwithstanding these, should a part of the enemy break through the line, it is an event that ought by all to be expected, but not without its remedy— When the troops are thus prepared, they will be the less surprised to see cavalry in their rear, who cannot long remain to advantage between the lines, under a fire in all directions (if the infantry are steady) and who also are liable to be attacked when in disorder by the supporting cavalry."

Colonel David Dundas. Principles of Military Movements (1788) pp. 180-181

link

The question as ever with historical sources is testing the evidence and coming to a conclusion

Thanks for coming back with this Mike

Thanks, flanker, that puts much in perspective.

Despite not finding specific examples of it happening to formed, steady infantry, the expectation of contemporary authorities that cavalry would ride down infantry means that someone was convinced it could be done. And those writers know more of combat mechanisms in their periods than anyone living today.

Marmont (On Modern War) implies the same power to cavalry, though he doesn't give specific examples of it happening (or none that I remember-the books are not with me). How many cavalry memoirs mention the enemy being overthrown, only to have them turn out to be "remembering to advantage"?

Or was cavalry able to ride down infantry to the extent it was unremarkable to have them do so, and hence when it happened it is not noted in memoirs/dispatches?

Perhaps it's that cavalry officers then are like most air force officers (that I've met) today- promising a war winning capability in itself, but never actually able to deliver unless supported by other arms/forces?

Why couldn't someone at Mollwitz, Rossbach, Wagram or Leipzig have had a video camera with them? So many questions that may be answered!

@Mathew Green,

In wargaming terms both these accounts suggest that there can be a "double-six" moment, though surely at a lower probability than a double-six for a formed square.

The problem is that if an event is defined as a "double-six" moment, no-one would have ever done it for real and no-one will ever do it on the table.

Whirlwind

The problem is that if an event is defined as a "double-six" moment, no-one would have ever done it for real and no-one will ever do it on the table.

But there are enough accounts of them trying, but failing, to know that cavalry at least believed they had a (at least reasonable?) chance to break the infantry.

Or was it, perhaps, that they were knew the effect charging cavalry had on infantry and were relying on the infantry to fall into disorder/rout before first contact?

So many questions.

Lets just think for a minute or two about the difference between a line and a square. Both were usually 3 ranks of troops. In both cases, when receiving cavalry the first rank knelt and formed the bayonet wall and the back two ranks loaded and shot. I may be stating the obvious, but sometimes the obvious is not considered.

There is no difference between cavalry attacking the center of a line and cavalry attacking the center of one face of a square.

The difference is what happens when cavalry attacks the end of the "line" in either case. If the cavalry attacks the end of a line of battle, and that end is not anchored with terrain, a gun or the next battalion in line, then
the cavalry can lap around the edge and attack the foot soldiers from the side or from the rear. This is a bad situation for the infantry.

When cavalry attacks the end of a "line" of a square, they find themselves changing direction towards the new face and, once again, attacking a line. Not too much difference and the cavalry attack usually fails just like the attack on the center of the line of battle. The weakest position of the square is a corner of the square. Since the lines are closely packed the two perpendicular lines can only fire almost directly outwards, with only a few degrees (+/- 3, 5, 10 degrees? thats a whole another discussion) deviation. Therefore, when approaching the corner on the line of the square's diagonal, they come in thu a dead sone, where they can only be fired on by a few files of defenders and come into contact with most of the defenders of the corner from an almost-flank orientation. That is how you attack a square and start to unravel it. Still its not a done-deal because a lot of the fire/bayonets, except at the point, is effective and the local concentration of troops at the corner is higher than the middle of the line.

I have always looked at cavalry as an opportunistic predator. The may test their prey to see if they waiver or run, and if they do, then they attack. The natural prey of light and medium cavalry is the flank or rear of formed lines or unformed or fleeing infantry. Infantry squares are worth a testing, but not worth a determined attack if they stay strong. The natural prey of the expensive cuirssaier and heavy cavalry is the light and medium cavalry because their big horses, armor, and long straight swords give them a superiority.

Anyway, I shade and interpret rules in light of the above discussion.

But it also must be remembered that there were two documented 'there may well have been more' of units fighting back-to-back and successfully driving off cavalry attacks.

Paul :)

@Dal Gavan,

Yes you are right of course. The question seems to be where the balance of risk should lie.

Beersheba 1917

1968, I though that where possible adjacent squares would be rotated through 45 degrees so that the face of one square would not find its arc of fire falling direct on its neighbour, rather it would be able to sweep the space in front of the face of the adjacent square.

I take the view that cavalry are trained to believe they can overthrow infantry and that infantry are trained to believe they can fight off a cavalry attack so in some cases cavalry will succeed in closing with the infantry and again in some of these cases the infantry will fail to hold but that these cases are rare events and what matters is whether the second line or supporting cavalry can prevent a breakthrough of the line if an odd battalion in the front is rolled over.