"Using guns as a battery? " Topic

I have been reading a new book on the Boer War (Kruger Kommandos & Kak) which explodes a lot of the myths of the conflict.

One line which I do not understand, and which I am hoping any gunnery experts on here might be able to explain, is this:

The Boer guns "were usually deployed individually. They were seldom organised in batteries and, more often than not, they were simply used as long range rifles. There was little co-ordination between guns, and this made the concentration of fire on specific targets very nearly impossible"

What other use did an artillery piece of the period have, other than that of 'a long range rifle'? How was the British usage of artillery different? How did their use of organised batteries help – I guess just because they could ensure all six hammered the same target? (the concentration of fire which the author mentions)

The important thing is that the Boer guns were not only deployed individually but targeted individually as well. There was no higher artillery command and control as such and thus concentrating fire was difficult if not impossible. Their use was more akin to the 'regimental guns' of the 18th Century or machine guns in later years i.e. they were fought individually in support of the infantry they were supporting.

As stated, British guns deployed by battery thus increasing the firepower available against individual targets. Furthermore, with a higher command structure, batteries could be concentrated as well and could be used against targets not directly involved with the infantry fight.

The Boers had fewer guns and an unsophisticated artillery command. They made the best of what they had both equipment- and ability-wise.

There were times when it was good and others when it wasn't. A single gun firing from a concealed position could drive off a battery if it deployed in the open – it happened.

It took a while for the British to appreciate the power of artillery standing off, their training allowed them to do it but their doctrine called for rapid approach and open sights engagement at 'effective' ranges. It didn't work against the Boers who failed to provide the type of target that would have worked against – they just shot down the crews from cover and called in their own guns when available.

If the batteries of guns kept out of rifle range then they could concentrate fire and drive even the most stubborn Boers from their defences. They did need to be safe from the Boers' rifles to do that though.

So assuming the same number of guns in a given geographic location (and yes, I am aware that the Boers had less gear overall), from a gaming perspective it seems the Boers will usually have a gun but rarely more, while the British either get no guns or all of them.

Very roughly speaking of course :-)

Though we call two guns a section and a battery of 6 or 8 guns. I have eread comments that any number of guns over one would be a battery. So battery fire may include 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 7, or 8 guns. A two and four gun battery fire happened a lot. In large multi-unit squares with guns at the corner, these were often 2 gun sections.
Exploding shrapnel rounds were common so the impact zone was more than a specific target. Almost all Colonial ammo was a style of shell or shrapnel rather than solid shot.

GildasFacit

Many thanks for your interesting post. I have to confess that, although I have read extensively on the war, and visited most of the major battle sites, I have never heard of an incident when a British battery was ‘driven off' by the fire of a single Boer gun – please can you give examples of where this happened, with references? Indeed, my research suggests that British batteries generally managed to ‘silence' Boer guns or make them switch position, but struggled to knock them out.

There were certainly battles when the RA was unable to silence the Boer guns (eg. Magersfontein and Spion Kop), and there were battles when the artillery withdrew as part of a general retreat after an attack failed (eg. Nicholson's Nek and Magersfontein again – indeed, the way the RA covered the withdrawal at the latter drew praise: "There are few pleasanter sights for an Englishman than that of our artillery moving under fire. Nearly everybody gets cool when ‘the guns begun to shoot', but I know of nothing that conveys by its manner such an utter disregard for the enemy's efforts as a British battery quietly trotting along under a heavy shower of shells") but I cannot think of one when a British battery was ‘driven off' by the fire of a single well-hidden Boer gun.

Likewise, you suggest that British batteries routinely deployed well within rifle range and that the Boers simply shot the crew down. I can only think of one example of this – Long's batteries at Colenso – and that was due to a mistake, rather than being part of the plan. Pre-war RA doctrine called for batteries to be deployed outside of rifle range, so I would be interested if you can provide other example of when this situation occurred?

So Green Leader, you already know the answer to your question – why bother to ask us ?

My knowledge of the war isn't that comprehensive and the instances I have in mind may come from other conflicts but I do seem to remember an attempted river crossing where guns had to be abandoned when the were enfiladed by artillery firing from between buildings – which surely implies single guns in action.

The problem with a clash between what the gunners thought sensible (and safe) and what their generals wanted continued to happen right up to 1914.

Even your anecdote shows the 'heroic' attitude. A battery under shellfire (probably shrapnel) should be getting OUT not going in.

Not in the least – I am still interested to know what the author might have meant by saying the Boer guns were used as 'long range rifles', as opposed to… what?

I genuinely thought you would provide some examples to support the rather bold claims you made, so am disappointed that you are unable to.

I imagine the 'attempted river crossing' you refer to was Colenso – where Col Long's batteries were rashly / mistakenly deployed too far forward, and thus well within rifle range. The batteries were not enfiladed by 'artillery firing from between buildings'.

As I mentioned, the anecdote was a description of the RA covering the retreat at Magersfontein – so they were 'getting out' and doing so bravely and coolly, covering the withdrawal of the infantry.

"What other use did an artillery piece of the period have, other than that of 'a long range rifle'?"

In this specific instance he probably means using a single gun to snipe at a single point target (ie 'as a rifle') in the same manner as e.g. an infantry gun, rather than laying down full battery concentrations, which has significant suppressive and area denial effects, as well as destruction.

Coordination of fires is at an even higher level ie being able to lay down coordinated barrages involving multiple batteries/regiments.

Martin Rapier

Many thanks for this – makes sense. I guess it comes down to being able to coordinate firing and deliver a weight of fire at a given target. Interesting point on area denial – I had thought about that too, but wondered if it was a more modern use of artillery.

Seems the RA quickly got pretty good at laying down barrages in support of assaulting infantry assaults – I guess that required guns working as a battery too, to ensure that the enemy positions were kept under constant fire.