"Elite Companies--Good Idea?" Topic

A lot of armies had "elite" companies as part of their line infantry (and line cavalry, too, for that matter). The French had grenadier and voltiguer companies to go along with the fusilier companies. Light battalions had carabiniers and voltiguers. Many other armies had similar arrangements.

But was it a good idea? What effect did it have on the morale of the fusiliers? Grenadiers were selected by height, so a short fusilier could never aspire to be a grenadier. Voltiguers supposedly were good marksmen. So an average fusilier couldn't hope to become a voltiguer. Aside from the fancier uniforms, did the elite companies get any other bonuses? More pay, better rations? First choice of the girls? Seems like that could create some real resentment among the line troops. On the battlefield everyone was taking pretty much the same risks. Grenadiers were sometimes used for special assaults, but most of the time they were just there same as the fusiliers.

So were there any benefits in having these elite companies?

The French used elite companies during the Republic to stiffen their shaky and inexperienced infantry battalions. So at least for the revolutionary period, it was a good idea. Probably less so for the Empire.

The Prussians, for instance seemed to strip away their elite companies and form converged battalions out of those in tried and true fashion.

The fact they kept them so long says "good idea." In part, it could give you semi-promotion opportunities. Distinguish yourself and get "promoted" to the flank company. And at least at one time they had different functions. Eventually most every company was trained in skirmishing, but at first that was the province of the lights.

Elites are more controversial than we realise, amongst the military hierachy. Politicians love special forces and, if I was ever held as guest of some dodgy folk, I would be only too glad to see guys in black leap through the window. They create something for us all to aspire to and can raise morale.

and yet……..the argument has always been that they are at the cost of stripping the best NCOs (and maybe junior officers) from the "bog standard" line, who have to do the everyday dirty work and win wars.

For all the SAS, LRDG, Popski's Private Army, the Chindits, Marauders, etc it is notable that the German Army of WWII did well with far less emphasis on elites, but a superb cadre of NCOs in Wehrmacht or Waffen SS units. OK, Brandenbergers maybe………

Good point Deadhead. I recall reading a quote by General Slim saying quite proudly that his army in Burma didn't have any commandos or rangers or paratroopers and he wouldn't have wanted them. The presence of elite troops made the line troops feel that any difficult or special mission ought to be turned over to them. But if there weren't any elites, the line troops learned to do whatever job was asked of them.

I don't recall where I read this,in an 18th century context I think it was,but the author stated that height was less of an absolute requirement for entry into the grenadiers than commonly thought,as discipline and aggressiveness could get you in,too. I'm sure this would vary by nation and period also. And I'm also sure there are people here who know a lot more about it than I do.

I differ on the WWII Germans:
Brandenburgers,
Grossdeutchland
All paratroop units
The entire Waffen SS
Alpine units

But it was at divisional level, not company level like Napoleonics. Considering the quality of Napoleonic fodder, it was probably best that they had a few "real" soldiers around to set an example.

But wouldn't the "real" soldiers prove a better example if they were in your own company? Separated as they were, I could see a "Let the grenadiers do it!" mentality developing.

Maybe but units rarely broke down into companies in that sense. If you sent in the 47th to take the village the whole battalion went…

Hardly separated, more likely leading by example at the head of the column or taking the most casualties breaking down the gate. The trade-off for the elite companies was relief from manual labor and forage parties, but having to serve a lot more guard duty (why they had no forage caps) and of course, they had to lead the attack in dangers way

Now if you are talking about stripping off all the elites into grenadier battalions, then that was a bad idea. In some cases like the British in the American Revolution, the hat companies served as training & replacement units, constantly pulling men off to keep the converged grenadier & light battalions that did most of the fighting at full strength

Maybe but units rarely broke down into companies in that sense. If you sent in the 47th to take the village the whole battalion went…

Not sure what period you are referring to, but certainly in the American Revolution, the British army detached the light companies to form combined light infantry units and the grenadiers to form combined grenadier units.

The height requirement was a French thing. In Frederick's army, according to the surviving records, the average grenadier was actually about half an inch shorter than his fusilier/musketeer counterparts. And in Napoleon's army voltiguers were supposedly select primarily for their agility and "activity" rather than marksmanship.

The fact is, the elites were trained for duties that were beyond those called for in the line. In the 18th Century, skirmishing and outpost duties were performed by the grenadiers, which is why Braddock had an extra company in each of his battalions trained and designated as a second grenadier company.

The business about stripping out all the NCO material misses the point that the primary requirement for NCO's was literacy. How do you reward the good, trustworthy soldier who can't read or write, and for that matter may not even be bright enough to fully understand why the battalion performs certain evolutions? You keep him a private, but make him a grenadier.

And remember that companies were administrative units, they didn't become tactical units until well into the 19th Century.

Re Slim: I'll try to dig out the quote, but I think it was more along the lines of 'regular units and formations performed equally well to elite units' and aside from some small raiding and intelligence-gathering special forces units, large formations of special forces were not worth the resources and manpower expended on them.

Slim certainly had Commandos (3rd Commando Brigade), Paras (50th Indian Para Brigade, then 44th Indian Airborne Division) and large numbers of Special Forces (seven brigades of Chindits), but these were by and large, forced upon him. In the event the XIVth Army performed all these duties perfectly well, without the need for special selection and the excessively large quantities of resources expended on most of the units mentioned above.

For example: 5th, 7th and 17th Indian Divisions were moved by air at very short notice without being Airborne. 25th & 26th Indian Divisions mounted several seaborne and riverine assaults without being Commandos. 81st West African Division operated well behind enemy lines, survived purely on air-supply and did more to support the main Army effort than the Chindits ever achieved.

Just look where they came from, storming parties and "Enfants Perdus" usually hand-picked men who were considered tough and reliable enough (or expendable in some cases) to lead the way in an assault, be expected to tackle strong resistance or form a core of resistance on the field.

Didn't take long before they started to assign men to those jobs on a permanent basis. They emerged from practical experience.

Also the idea was that having troops like grenadiers in your line would "beef up" the rest of the troops, providing an anchor point for the line to stand and fight.

These were not special forces as we know them today, they were specialists or better motivated soldiers with higher pay and status who knew they had an example to uphold.

There was also a bit of voodoo involved, it makes sense that a bunch of guys who are a full head taller than you are going to make quite an impression, but there is no real guarantee they will make better soldiers. Many of the men in Frederick William's grenadier units were picked to be as tall as possible, but many men with gigantism and other ailments tend to have very poor constitutions and reduced physical abilities.

Picked troops/guard units etc are used in almost all armies from the beginning of time. Think of the sacred band, in marian Roman legions there were picked troops etc.When this practice is used that long, it must fullfill a role in warfare.
Of couse sometimes it conflicts with the interest of the "normal" line but mostly it is felt as an honour to belong to this special unit and other troops try to qualify to belong to this special troops. It must be something in the military mind.

"Who asked this joker": I suppose you don't mean that companies were used to stiffen but that in the embrigadement 2 new battalions were combined with a battalion of an old regiment (which was definitely ordered in the amalgame of 1794 and 1796)

The British examples quoted here are interesting, as – more than anyone else, it seems – the British questioned the wisdom of converged flank battalions for precisely the reasons given: the removal of a good influence from the line battalions, and the absence of any specialists.

During the AWI, first Gage and then Howe followed convention (both had commanded flank battalions in the F&IW) and formed both types of elite battalion (grenadiers and light infantry). They not only used them as their principal strike force – eventually using line infantry as "feeder" units as much as anything else – but even interchangeably as time went on; notably, the Continental Army never formed grenadier companies, but used light infantry in all specialist operations). Clinton, however, did not agree with them and removed these battalions almost immediately after the Monmouth campaign – albeit only for a brief time, as so many officers complained about it and demanded they be re-instated. The primary reason for this objection seems to have been the opportunity to shine, which was not going to happen very often in a line battalion. (That said, the British also developed the use of certain experienced line regiments as quasi-light infantry – the 23rd, 33rd, 63rd and 71st in the South, and the 24th in the Saratoga campaign – when there were no, or few, established elite forces present.)

Fast-forward to the Revolutionary (French) and Napoleonic era, and the same arguments arise. At Maida, Stuart fights with a grenadier and a light battalion, and uses "picked men" from his line battalions as other specialists. From observing early-war British operations, it seems to be that "elite" battalions are formed where a force consists of nothing but line infantry – maybe one or two brigades – and there is no obvious unit to use as a reserve; Graham's force at Barossa is another example, although the flank battalion came from a smaller force that joined him.

When you get larger formations with divisions and so forth, certain brigades start to be allocated as a reserve – or, in the case of the Light Division, for a special function. You then get Wellington forming small "battalions" of light infantry from the light companies of each brigade plus some attached riflemen; it is interesting, though, that they go back to their parent unit at the end of each day. Some of the larger line battalions even form a second light company to keep on hand for special tasks – eg storming villages etc.

I may have confused things, in two ways, for which apologies.

Elite units acting independently, often as Special Forces vs Elite subsections of a battalion.

Also Elite (better trained, better equipped) vs "irregular" units, acting nowhere near the battlefield.

It is one thing to create elite whole units, selected from the Line infantry. There is clearly both advantage and disadvantage. It may result in an Imperial Guard that is too precious to actually be used, except in a last resort. It will strip the best potential NCOs and weaken the Line, but it is a carrot to encourage excellence amongst potential candidates. It is your reserve and "secret weapon".

Companies of Elite amongst a battalion, working in union with the rest, can only be of benefit. Very different and that was the original topic.

I will not comment on whether Fallschirmjager or Waffen SS units were always the supermen sometimes suggested…..on occasion, yes……..depending on the unit.

I tend to confuse "Elite" with "irregular"……… ie SFs designed for off the battlefield conflict (raiding, rescue, kidnap, intelligence gathering, Resistance co-operation, counter insurgency etc)…something the WWII Germans hardly did.

You might also consider that there were a limited number of people to act as trainers for the specialist units. This would limit the amount of men that could be trained.

Yes good idea, creates competition within a unit, one could also form indipendent units from the elite companies to create more tactical units and / or asign special duties.

In the French Revolution, to become a grenadier was usually a reward for actions in battle – also small soldiers were promoted.

As long as it is balanced a good idea, however a development like in the French Army – increasing the Young Guard immensley – not such a good sign for the quality of the usual line and light infantry.

I recall participating in a similar discussion with regards to commissioning from the ranks. The argument in the British Army at that time being to limit such activity to avoid diluting the quality of candidates for warrant officer. As always, there is a balance to be struck between individual opportunity for advancement and unit effectiveness.

"I differ on the WWII Germans:"
I would also differ on WW2 Germans, their entire military and political apparatus was founded on the distinction of a hierearchy of elites.

It was partly racial/social darwinist ideology, partly propaganda to inspire National Socialist Ardour (particulary the focus fighter/panzer/u-boat aces), but also from specifically designing and designating certain types of units for certain types of tasks. They did exactly the same thing in WW1, differentiating attack divisions from line holding ones (and a leavening of uber-wonder-boy Stormtoops on top).

The Allies may have had various random collections of private armies run by wierdos and oddballs, but their infantry, armoured and airborne divisions were all pretty standardised. As Captain Mainwaring might have put it, the difference between Nazi automatons and cheery happy-go-lucky Thomas Atkins.

Anyway, back to the OP. If Flank Companies were good enough for Wellington and Napoleon, they are good enough for me. That Sharpe though….

Scott, my old brain cant remember where I read it, but french grenadiers and Voltigers got paid more. Not a lot as I recall, but enough that there was something to shoot for besides the prestige. I will see if I can drag it out into the light of day.

Owen

Hah, not so feeblemined after all. it is mentioned in Elting Swords around a throne. It is called haute-paye. When I went searching for that I mostly got a bunch of french, but at least it is high pay, basically an extra allowance. Originally the lights did not get it, but after time they did.

Actually the German staff of the 1930's was very wary of elite troops. The Landser of 1914 had a fairly basic, but not extraordinary traning, most of it was marching and how to keep in formation. Shooting practice was again adequate, but produce little more than average riflemen, volume was considered more important than skill.

This made for an army that had excellent tactical mobility and quite decent mid-range firepower.

Of course this lead to massive losses and the gradual introduction of new tactics, culminating in the Stormtroops.

By concentrating the best and brightest in the Stormtroops they gained powerful units, but attrition hollowed out these formations and what was left were the ordinary infantry, completely bereft of capable men who would keep them going.

So the emphasis by 1939 had shifted on giving all troops a thorough training, up to the regimental cooks and clerks. This allowed the Germans to muster a reasonable fighting force at critical moments. This helped the German army to get excellent results right until 1944 where the reserves of capable men were pretty much used up.

But the Nazi party started to build their own private armies (SS and Luftwaffe) and gave them priority. These units had the luxury of taking only the very best men. This usually resulted in units with very high morale, very gung-ho. As the war went on they were able to draw more resources, but even they couldn't escape the fact that while the lower-numbered units were the most prestigious and the more effective, higher numbers had to be filled up with anyone they could find at some point.

By going through separate routes, the nazis hollowed out their own regular army much to the chagrin of some staff who saw the WWI scenario once again unfold despite all they had tried to do to prevent it.

again makes the point that I may have confused here.

Elites on a small scale work well. We all seem agreed that the answer to the Napoleonic question is that Grenadier and Light Companies added to any battalion. We are less convinced that Guard regiments were necessarily such a good idea. Invaluable to monarchs and autocrats, who were always looking over their shoulders.

On a larger scale they may just weaken the regular army, on which countries and alliance rely for victory. That is inevitable. The argument, then, is whether commandos, rangers, marauders, green, red, sand coloured berets contribute enough to compensate for that. They would have been the NCOs in line regiments. I really do not know the answer.

I can only say that WWII Germany managed to produce a uniformly remarkable army, irrespective of designation as SS, Fallschirmjager, Panzer Lehr, GD etc……..

Wasn't the Slim quote something like "what decides battles is not your elite units, but the average quality of your line divisions"?

By labelling the flank companies "Elite" we are getting confused and missing the point.

Think of them as "veteran" compared to an "experienced" for the centre companies. For instance a voltigeur didn't have to be an exceptional marksman, just more steady under fire (which is going to make you more accurate of course. They are on the flanks to give physical and moral support to the whole batallion

In general, think of "light infantry" as more veteran line infantry

True "Elite" units were rare (usually guard). If you look at the average age and length of service you will see a major difference.

In some organisations of course, light or guard units merely had fancier uniforms and deeper pockets, particularly when it came to cavalry.

Parallels between WWII and Napoleonic organisation don't make sense if you ask me

what decides battles is not your elite units, but the average quality of your line divisions

I think this is relevant to my points above. Napoleon's real innovation with the Imperial Guard was to have a very mobile force that could be brought in from reserve rapidly to decide a battle. They were very rarely used.

John

The Army of the Princess of Saxe Burlap und Schleswig Beersein has no elite companies, battalions, or regiments. The Prince of Zweibak, General in chief of the armies would rather give the guys a raise in pay than a useless busby, miter, or cap. Light and skirmishing duty is performed by swarms of SCUM. Think Pandours and Croats, also the Mackattack Indians and Babus.

What is curious, is that while in my game all line infantry is equal side to side, my Saxe Burlap und Schleswig Beersteinians always seem to do better than the army of Bad Zu Wurst which has a lot of guys in miters.

In a napoleonic context, doesn't Elite tend to mean "Has fired their musket more than twice a year, before entering battle", rather than "Jumping through windows with squirrel-tail hats while yelling hut hut hut" ?