"Goumier Platoon Organization?" Topic
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Achtung Minen | 03 Dec 2015 10:40 p.m. PST |
I know this may be hopeless, but does anyone know what a Goumier platoon looked like, at least in theory? They were irregular troops (more like mercenaries than anything else), but there do seem to be some numbers that exist (for instance, the approximate size of a Tabor). The only publication that I have found which gives the Goumiers hard numbers is Flames of War, which supposes a platoon was made up by three squads of twelve, led by a command team of three. Are there any sources which verify these numbers? A while back, Iron Ivan Games put out a supplement for the Rif War where they assumed somewhat similar numbers, but again… I'd prefer to follow a historical record or account over a game. |
lou passejaire | 04 Dec 2015 8:37 a.m. PST |
so goums during WW2 : a goum is around 200 moroccan goumiers, 12 french NCO's; 2 french officers in 3 sections of around 60 men, each section with 3 combat groups of around 20 men + a command section of 2 french officers and some men, and 2 MG teams, and a light mortar team … |
Achtung Minen | 04 Dec 2015 3:15 p.m. PST |
That's interesting, I'd be curious where you found those numbers. Pretty close to that, Isobel Williams gives the organization of a company (goum) as "2 French officers, 12 French NCOs, 208 natives, including 16 NCOs, 14 horses and 21 pack mules" and deduces that this can be divided into three combat platoons, each made up of three squads of about 21 men per squad. I think these numbers are sort of strange, though. Firstly, they differ from the 210 men number you see elsewhere. Secondly, why 16 Goumier NCOs if there are only 9 squads? If one man in each squad was a moquaddem (sergeant), then what did the other 7 Goumier NCOs do? Perhaps we can assume each platoon had 4 moquaddemin (one for each squad and one to assist the platoon HQ) and the remaining 4 moquaddemin were placed in the company HQ (one in each heavy weapon team and one serving directly under the Company CO (probably a capitaine or lieutenant). I don't have any evidence for this conclusion, other than it seems likely to me that the all-French staff would have needed a Goumier NCO to act as liason to the troops to bridge the linguistic, cultural and religious barriers between the all-French staff and the all-Moroccan troops. In this way, the moquaddem under the Company CO could have served as something of a sergeant major (sergent-chef-major), although I doubt he would have officially had this rank. That makes each platoon (section) 64 Moroccan men (three squads, each consisting in 20+1 men and NCOs, with a final Moroccan NCO in the Platoon HQ). Three platoons would account for 192 Moroccans, leaving 16 for the Company HQ (12 men and 4 NCOs). Unless we remove some men to be mule-drivers and messengers, that makes each of the three company heavy weapons served by 4 Moroccan men and 1 Moroccan NCO (again, assuming the fourth NCO is serving directly under the company commander). Leading the heavy weapon crew was a job probably left for the maoun (Goumier corporal) instead of the higher ranking moquaddem. We can probably assume the 12 French NCOs (probably sergents and caporals) were assigned to supervise the Goumier platoons (1 French NCO in each of the 3 Platoon HQs and 1 French NCO in each of the 9 rifle squads), although anecdotal evidence suggests that, in practice, the Goumiers were not very well supervised at all. That leaves no direct supervision of the company heavy weapons, though (although perhaps this was the job of the company's 2iC), and strangely leaves the heavy weapons teams a man short (assuming the size of weapon teams was based on the technical requirements of the weapon, then we should expect an MMG or mortar to be crewed by 1 NCO, 1 corporal and 4 men, as in earlier French formations). So that makes: Commandant de compagnie (Company HQ): Capitaine (F CO) Lieutenant or sous-lieutenant (F 2iC) Moquaddem (M NCO) FM 24/29 (LMG, unassigned) 2x Équipes de mitrailleuse (MMG team): Maoun (M NCO) 4x Goumiers Mitrailleuse Hotchkiss de 13,2 mm modèle 1929 (tripod mounted MMG) Équipes de mortier (Mortar team): Maoun (M NCO) 4x Goumiers Mortier de 60 mm Mle 1935 (60mm light mortar) 3x Sections de goumiers (Goumier platoons), each: Commandant de section (Platoon HQ): Sergent (F PL) Moquaddem (M NCO) 2x FM 24/29 (LMG, probably assigned to two of the three squads) 3x Groupes de combat (Rifle squads): Caporal (F NCO) Moquaddem (M NCO) 10x Goumiers (demi-groupe) 10x Goumiers (demi-groupe) Does that seem reasonable? |
raylev3 | 04 Dec 2015 11:22 p.m. PST |
you may want to take a look at this book, too: link It's a historical narrative that reviews how the Goums were created as a colonial force to pacify the mountain tribes of Morocco, and then, out of necessity, were retrained and equipped to fight against Axis forces in North Africa, Italy, France, and Germany. What makes the book interesting is that it covers a little-known force that fought for France and that was able to use its irregular fighting skills to great success in mountainous terrain. Although when used as a conventional force in conventional terrain it fared poorly, allied decision makers recognized the Goums strengths and the troops often were able to infiltrate and out flank their German enemy through difficult terrain, or terrain that was thought of as impassable. The only drawback to the book is that it is really an overview. It doesn't discuss the Goums' tactical battles in any conventional sense, nor did the author access first person accounts to flesh out his account. Having said that it does a good job of following how the Goums were used within the larger operational context of the allied advances in Italy and France. Definitely worth a read as long as you recognize this is an overview |
lou passejaire | 05 Dec 2015 7:14 a.m. PST |
if in the french infantry the basic organisation is the "groupe de combat", for the goums basic organisation is the section … from the section were created ad hoc combat teams of various size . you have to think the goum as a private army . your organisation will work, but is not "historicaly accurate", as there is no régulation … and the Native NCO's are more an honorary title than anything else … ( based on age, tribal hierarchy, years of service etc ) . and caporal are not NCO :) it's quite difficult to study the goums and nomad groups organisation, as there is no regulation, each commanding officer was in charge … |
Rudysnelson | 05 Dec 2015 12:02 p.m. PST |
Extra NCOs would likely come from admin attached to th HQ section. The 1960s US Army companies had NCOs you might called extra as you had an operations Sgt. A sgt. In charge of the mess section, an armory Sgt. In infantry and cavalry companies. Tank companies had a lot f NCOs with many tanks having two Sgt. Each. Then you had even more Sgts attached to battalion sections. So in WW2 toes would have similar extras . |
Achtung Minen | 29 Nov 2016 6:13 p.m. PST |
Well I haven't given up on figuring this out. The latest information I have suggests the 1943 Italy campaign organization at around 220 men, outfitted with mostly American weapons. You can find that information here: link According to this information, the Goum company would be organized as follows (for simplicity, I am using English military terms): The Company HQ would be led by two French officers (the CO and 2iC). Each platoon would be led by two French NCOs and would consist of three squads (2x LMG squads, 1x SMG Assault squad). The company would be equipped with 9x LMGs (mostly FM 24/29, but some BAR and bipod-mounted M1917 .30 cals), 1x 60mm mortar, 4x bazookas (I think this is what is meant by "rocketgun"), 2x MMGs (probably M1917 water-cooled Brownings), 21x SMGs, 9x rifle grenade devices, 14x horses, 28x mules, 1x jeep, 1x 2.5 ton truck and 5 radios (1x heavy type SCR-284 and 4x walkie talkies). Furthermore, this 1942 organization (which mentions the "rocketguns," so I am guessing it is post-Operation Torch) describes the Company HQ in more detail: PDF link It claims the HQ had an 11-man mounted reconnaissance section (Osprey also mentions this unit in their French Army 2 book), a mortar team, two MMG teams, a bazooka squad and a company train with 28 pack mules (a few more than Isobel Williams mentions). It also specifically calls the assault squad an SMG assault squad. So now the confusing part… There are enough LMGs and rifle grenade devices to equip each squad with one of each. Yet, if two of the three squads in each platoon were dedicated LMG squads and the third was a dedicated Assault squad, how do we divvy up the LMGs in practice? If each platoon did indeed have three LMGs, can we assume one LMG squad got two and one LMG squad got one? Did the rifle grenades get split up like this, or did they stay (presumably) one per squad? Also, 21 SMGs is enough for seven per platoon. I think we can assume the platoon leaders (the two NCOs) each got one… do the remaining five SMGs all go to the SMG squad? Then there is a question of numbers. If we say Isobel Williams is right and there are 21 Moroccan men per squad. That accounts for 189 Moroccans in the company, with 20 left over (if we accept the 209 number in the first link). But that is not enough men to crew the company heavy weapons. Not counting the French NCO leaders, the four bazookas would require at least 8 men, the mortar requires at least 2 crew, the MMGs would need 5 each… we are already at 20 Moroccans, and haven't even covered the 10-man recon squadron, the 4 or 5 men needed to handle the pack mules and any radio operators (I assume the company HQ and platoon HQs each had one walkie talkie, and the heavier SCR-284 was kept in the CO's jeep for regimental communication). If we assume 20-man squads, this only gives us 9 more men, which isn't enough for even the mounted recon. 19-man squads would give 18 men, which seems like it would be just enough (10 men for the recon squadron, 9 men to bulk out the various company HQ roles). 19 strikes me as a weird number for a squad, but if we reintroduce the Moquaddem, then perhaps it is two demi-groups (fireteams) of 9 men each, led by the Moquaddem. The 1943 organization was clearly more evolved than earlier Goumier formations. What do you make of these numbers? |
Achtung Minen | 29 Nov 2016 7:02 p.m. PST |
And just a shot in the dark, that could look something like this: Company HQ HQ Section (2 French Officers as company commander and 2iC, 1 French NCO driver/radioman) MMG Team (6-man crew, 1 French NCO) MMG Team (6-man crew, 1 French NCO) Mortar Team (3-man crew, 1 French NCO) 4x Bazooka Teams (2-man crews, 1 French NCO in charge of all four teams) Mounted Recon Squadron (10-man Rifle Team, 1 French NCO, possibly with LMG) Company Train (5 men as muleteers and drivers, possibly with extra LMGs) 38 men, 6 NCOs and 2 Officers in the Company HQ 3x Platoons HQ Section (2 French NCOs: platoon leader and 2iC/radioman) Assault Section (11-man Rifle Team, 11-man Rifle/SMG Team, 1 Moquaddem) LMG Section (11-man Rifle Team, 5-man LMG team, 1 Moquaddem) LMG Section (11-man Rifle Team, 5-man LMG team, 1 Moquaddem) 57 men and 2 NCOs per platoon, 171 men and 6 NCOs per company Total: 209 men, 12 NCOs and 2 Officers |
Mark 1 | 29 Nov 2016 7:23 p.m. PST |
Well I haven't given up on figuring this out. If Lou is to be believed (and in my experience he has been an EXCELLENT source of well researched information on WW2 French formations), then you are not "figuring this out", you are "making this up". Which is fine. Because it seems that each CO made up his own sub-unit organization. So you might as well, too. …from the section were created ad hoc combat teams of various size . … there is no regulation, each commanding officer was in charge.
Not every military lives under the unbending strictures of formal doctrine and TOEs. -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
Achtung Minen | 29 Nov 2016 7:57 p.m. PST |
What a load of rubbish. I've cited my sources. If you have a problem with what I've posted, then take it up with those sources, some of them academically peer-reviewed by scholars with a doctoral degree in the matter. If you have the credentials to debate with them, then by all means, you are free to do so. I freely admitted that my last post was "making it up" and guesswork. I am trying to move around the numbers in the cited sources to find something that clicks… nothing more. My last post is not a definitive statement, but a good natured guess. And the idea that Goumiers are especially unorganized is nonsense. What is your point? Exactly which army in the long annals of history ever lived under "the unbending strictures of formal doctrines and TOEs" anyway? For all their fastidiousness, there wasn't a single German regiment that was identical to another at any point in WW2. I've seen the TO&Es: their equipment and personnel varied wildly. Does that mean we throw out the Kriegsstärkenachweisungen? No, they are a useful document for gamers. Even though every formation varied, they varied from a common base. They may all be outliers, but there is a mathematical median that is useful to gamers. Rejecting a quantitative approach to WW2 studies out of hand makes absolutely no sense and is plainly unreasonable. It was even useful to military commanders during WW2: why else would FEC Commander Alphonse Juin publish a brief describing the organization of a Goum in detail? Did he think that every Goum under his command actually looked like that? Preposterous. I continue to get a sinking feeling that the "Goumiers were irregular troops, mercenaries" is actually the product of long-enduring racism from the war and afterwards. It seems like a script that we readily accept, in order to make the Goumiers ultimately not responsible for their own actions (good or bad). |
Mark 1 | 30 Nov 2016 2:55 p.m. PST |
What a load of rubbish. Ouch. I freely admitted that my last post was "making it up" and guesswork. All I suggested was that you are making it up, which I freely admitted was a perfectly fine thing to do. So if you freely admit that you are making this up, why are you barking at me? If you have a problem with what I've posted, then take it up with those sources… I did. As in, I read them. And thank you very much for providing them. I had not seen several of them before. They are quite interesting. What I found in those sources was very consistent with what Lou had described above. The impression I get from all of those lovely sources was that the Ghoumiers were a paramilitary force, originally raised as a paramilitary police force for internal enforement of French rule. They were organized and equipped on a largely ad hoc basis. They were fiercely loyal to their individual Tabor (or even Ghoum) commanding officers, who treated them as essentially private armies. After the Tunisian campaign they were re-equipped by the US to the levels of other French Armee d'Afrique forces. So yes, standards had to be set for how many men, how many rifles of which types, how many MGs of which type, etc. That kind of stuff is necessary for a US Army Quartermaster to provide materials. And there may well be information describing how individual Tabors organized themselves for particular campaigns or missions. But there was nothing in the sources you provided, at least nothing that I saw, that indicated there was a standard TOE with platoon and squad level detail and doctrine. Pretty much just "XXX men, with YYY rifles and ZZ MGs" level of information at the level of the Tabor (battalion equivalent), the Ghoum (company equivalent), and the Section (platoon equivalent), with limited information on the Groupe de Combat (squad equivalent). I continue to get a sinking feeling that the "Goumiers were irregular troops, mercenaries" is actually the product of long-enduring racism from the war and afterwards. It seems like a script that we readily accept, in order to make the Goumiers ultimately not responsible for their own actions (good or bad). The sources you provided gave a significantly more information on this perspective than on small unit organization or equipment. The sources clearly and repeatedly describe a non-conventional force, with women and children participating in the campaigns, and with individual Ghoumiers (soldiers) bringing their sheep along with them as their units progressed into combat zones. You may view these assertions as racist, but I view them as recounting of facts. If they did happen, and are described accurately as having happened, then there is no racism in the description. If they didn't happen, and these stories are all made up, that's a different issue altogether. But then, you were the one touting the credibility of the sources. Other sources I have seen, English language sources, from the first-hand experiences of US Army personnel in Tunisia, describe the Ghoumiers as a fairly frightening force. At least to US farmboys-come-soldiers. I have seen first hand accounts of Ghoumiers entering US Army unit encampments and offering to barter for, or perhaps just bragging about, their collections of ears. I have seen first hand accounts of US commanders enduring the entreaties of German officers about how captives were treated by Ghoum units ostensibly operating under US command, not dis-similar to accounts of British commanders who endured the entreaties of German officers about the behavior of Gurkhas. I have had personal discussions with a co-worker who grew up in the French-occupied sector of post-war Germany, (spurred by my going to work for a company with a French North-African CEO), about the stories in his home town of how terrifying the colonial troops were, although not specifically naming Ghoumiers in this case. (I did not share with him the irony I perceived in someone of German heritage bemoaning issues of a harsh occupier, to someone of Russian Jewish heritage…). The picture is reasonably consistent. Not to say the Ghoumiers were bad, or evil, or inferior, or any such thing. But they were not a conventional European-style military formation. To understand them, one is best advised not to try to fit them in to European-style military molds, but rather to see what information there is on what they actually were, and just try to build the picture from that. -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
Achtung Minen | 01 Dec 2016 9:35 p.m. PST |
Apologies, Mark, for jumping down your throat. I do think this work might eventually produce a framework (even if it is a loose framework) that is useful for wargamers. As I said, I believe every unit, whether American, German or any other nation, was more or less ad hoc in the field, so I don't agree that the Goums present much more of a challenge in this respect than anybody else. And as long as wargamers can organize their little pewter men in a way that has at least a "satisfactory" basis in history, then I think that is all we are really going after here. You bring up a good point that made me realize something. The quartermaster issuing supply to the Tabors would have been a sergeant in the US Army. Bimberg talks about this briefly in Mountain Warriors (page 57-58 in my copy). The realization I had then was rather obvious: the Goums were trained (however so briefly, immediately after Tunisia but before Sicily) to use US equipment by American trainers according to US Army organization. Which is to say, the Goums not only had to roughly conform in personnel and organizational standards of the US infantry companies to receive their gear. More importantly, their heavy weapon crews would have (at least initially) occupied American-style crew positions. I had previously based the heavy weapon teams on older French specifications, but this is probably quite wrong. I think it is more likely that the MMG and mortar teams were 5 men (like the Americans). This is not to say the Goums ultimately organized their men like the US. Rather, we know that the French officers perfectly ignored US organization and formed each platoon into two LMG squads and one assault squad (which does not resemble any US formation). But if we let the technical requirements of the weapons be any indication, then we can assume the heavy weapon assets remained around the US personnel specifications. On that note, after more research, I feel fairly confident that the FM 24/29 was the "LMG" of the company (the two machine guns at company level are the M1919s on tripod, judging by photographic evidence). One for each of the two assault squads per platoon, with a seventh weapon most likely retained by the cavalry recon (Goum cavalry recon certainly had FM 24/29 at Tabor level, anyway). How they kept the Fusil Mitrailleuses firing with the odd 7.5mm French ammunition is anybody's guess—it couldn't have fired the 7.62mm US round without modification, I would think. If we go by French organizational standards for the FM, that would make the FM team 6 men: an NCO (probably a Goumier Maoun), a gunner, a loader and 3 ammo carriers (in mountain warfare, you certainly wouldn't want fewer ammo carriers… you might even want more). Perhaps then the squad size for an fire squad was, in theory, a 6-man FM team and a 12-man rifle team (with M1903 Springfields, one of which was fitted with the M1 grenade launcher). This is purely theoretical—every formation could adopt every organization depending on the needs of the mission. Along the same lines, if the assault squad were 24 men (perhaps two groups of 12, one of which had the seven M1A1 submachine guns), then that would make 60 men on the dot: a 24-man groupe d'assault and two 18-man groupes de fusil mitrailleuses. Given the constraints of 210 Moroccan men, 12 French NCOs and 2 French Officers, I would say 60 men is the maximum possible size of the Goum platoons before you start taking men off other weapons. Unfortunately, that also means, once again, we've lost the ancillary troops like muleteers and messengers. Bimberg says that the French felt these positions were a waste of personnel, so perhaps the Goum company actually did not have these roles (although it seems strange that you would assign someone to fire a weapon but not cook the food—both are needed to survive). With this maximum platoon size (and the US-style heavy weapon crews), this is the possible range of personnel: Groupe de commandement 2 French OfficersGroupe de mitrailleuses légères NCO Équipes de mitrailleuses légères NCO, Goumier NCO (Maoun), 3 Crew M1919A4 machine gun on tripod Équipes de mitrailleuses légères NCO, Goumier NCO (Maoun), 3 Crew M1919A4 machine gun on tripod Pièce de mortier de 60 NCO, Goumier NCO (Maoun), 3 Crew M2 60mm mortar Escouade rocketgun NCO, 8 Crew Groupe d'éclaireurs à cheval NCO, Goumier NCO (Maoun), 9 Men HQ Totals: 2 Officers 6 NCOs 4 Moroccan NCOs 26 Men 3x Sections de combat: Groupe de la commandement de la section 2 NCOs2x groupes F.M. Goumier NCO (Moquaddem) 11 Men with Rifles (1 Rifle Grenade Launcher) 6 Men serving FM 24/29 Groupe d'assaut Goumier NCO (Moquaddem) 11 Men with Rifles and SMGs Goumier NCO (Maoun) 11 Men with Rifles (1 Rifle Grenade Launcher) Platoon Totals: 2 NCOs 4 Moroccan NCOs 56 Men |
Achtung Minen | 01 Dec 2016 10:15 p.m. PST |
By the way, this website has a lot of good information: link And here is an interesting article about the Goums in Sicily: link |
lou passejaire | 02 Dec 2016 2:38 a.m. PST |
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Achtung Minen | 29 Oct 2021 7:11 p.m. PST |
I realized that some of these links are dying, so I wanted to copy this organization (from here: link ) to the text of this thread for those in the future who want to know about this subject. Tableau d'Effectifs et de Dotations théorique 1943:Goum d'infanterie - 1 Commandant de Goum, 1 officier adjoint. - 1 Groupe de Commandement: 1 escouade rocketgun, 1 pièce de mortier de 60, 1 groupe de mitrailleuses légères, 1 groupe d'éclaireurs à cheval (11 cavaliers), 1 train muletier de 28 animaux. - 3 Sections de combat avec chacune: 2 sous-officiers français, 2 groupes F.M., 1 groupe d'assaut. Effectif total: 2 officiers – 12 sous-officiers français, 209 Marocains. Equipment: 9 F.M. – 1 mortier de 60 – 4 rocketgun – 2 mitrailleuses légères – 21 P.M. – 9 lance-grenades – 14 chevaux – 28 mulets – 1 jeep – 1 camion 2,5 t – 1 poste radio S.C.R. 284 – 4 postes radio S.C.R. 536.Tabor marocain - 1 Commandant de tabor, 1 officier adjoint-major, 1 officier de renseignements, 1 médecin. - 3 goums d'Infanterie. - 1 goum de Commandement et d'Engins de Tabor comprenant : 1 groupe de commandement, 1 groupe de transmissions, 1 section de mortiers de 81 (4 pièces), un peloton de 50 cavaliers avec 3 F.M., 1 groupe du Train (ravitaillement et infirmiers) soit pour ce goum: 7 officiers – 11 sous-officiers français – 174 Marocains avec 70 chevaux – 40 mulets – 4 jeeps – 4 camions 2,5 t – 4 postes radio S.C.R. 284 – 1 poste radio 195. Effectif total: 14 officiers – 47 sous-officiers français – 807 Marocains. Equipement: 112 chevaux – 124 mulets – 7 jeeps – 7 camions 2,5 t. Groupe de Tabors marocains - 1 Colonel Commandant le G.T.M., 1 chef d'Etat-Major, 1 officier de renseignements, 1 officier de transmissions, 1 médecin, 1 vétérinaire, 1 officier de ravitaillement, 1 officier A.M.M. - 3 Tabors Marocains. - 1 Goum de Commandement et d'Engins de G.T.M. comprenant : 1 groupe de commandement, 1 groupe de transmissions, 1 section de protection et de pionniers, 1 peloton d'estafettes à cheval (25 cavaliers), 1 peloton d'engins (3 pièces antichars – 4 mortiers de 81), 1 groupe du Train (auto et muletier) soit pour ce goum : 11 officiers – 32 sous-officiers et gradés français – 245 Marocains – 39 chevaux – 38 mulets – 5 jeeps – 1 Command Car – 4 camions de 2,5 t – 3 camions 1,5 t – 3 sanitaires. Effectif total d'un G.T.M. – 50 officiers – 165 sous-officiers et gradés français – 2727 Marocains – 375 chevaux – 410 mulets. In retrospect, I think my assumption that all the extra "men" in the Goum Company should be tossed into the combat sections is wrong. The Tabor (essentially the Goum battalion) was about the same size as the Tirailleurs' battalion and nobody is saying that the Tirailleurs were running around with 20-man squads. The extra men must simply be reserves, non-combatants, muleskinners or sundry other roles in the company. This is especially likely when you compare the ratio of men to pack animals in the Tabor's supply column group… more than 3 men for every 2 animals. Granted they also had a small handful of vehicles, but the preponderance of the work clearly has to do with the animals and it seems remarkably unlikely that the Goumiers themselves actually knew how to drive vehicles anyway. If we apply this same ratio to the company's pack animals, there are around 66 men involved in the Goum supply train, slashing 7 men from each infantry sections and bringing the likely number of men in each combat squad down to a much more reasonable number. Mark Bevis (MicroMark) sells a TO&E of his own research called "List FF3A Free French Expeditionary Corps Support, 1944-1945 Europe" which includes a Goum organization and claims the Goumier platoon only had three 12-man squads and two LMGs in total (which supports the idea of there being two LMG sections and one "assault" section without an LMG). I don't know the sources Mark used, but in the final analysis I think his work is quite plausible. Pending new information, I am going to assume the squads were only 12-men and any "extra" men in the company organization are simply not involved directly in the fighting (at least until they were called upon to replace losses in the combat sections). A few more notes regarding the change over to American equipment in the French Expeditionary Corps… Paul Gaujac's Le Corps Expeditionnaire Français en Italie mentions that the French Expeditionary Corps began to adopt US weaponry and organizational standards around late March/early April of 1944. There is a photo in that book of Tirailleurs using a jeep. Other photos show Tirailleurs (4e RTM) using a 57mm M1 ATG in the Scapoli sector (i.e. for the Battle of Monte Cassino, which was from mid-January to mid-May '44) and other Tirailleurs (3e RTA) using an FM 24-29 on May 15, 1944, so presumably this rearmament process was gradual and left some room for overlap between old (French) and new (American) equipment. In any case, I haven't found any evidence that the Goumiers ever changed their organization so it's all a bit moot for them. They seemed to have used whatever weapons they could get their hands on and there are photos that can be found to this end. For the record, Gaujac gives the organization of the GTM (Goumier Regiment) as follows: Le groupe de tabors marocains Chaque groupe comprend un goum de commandement et d'engins et trois tabors. Le GCE dispose notamment d'une section de protection et de pionniers, d'un peloton d'estafettes à cheval, d'un peloton antichar et de mortiers et d'un groupe muletier. Le tabor compte un GCE – à une section de mortiers de 81, un peloton de cavaliers et und groupe du train – et trois goums type infanterie chacun à trois sections. He then gives the total manpower (officers, NCOs, men, vehicles and animals) as: Command and Equipment Company (11/32/249/16/77) Each of the three Tabors (14/51/826/14/236) For a total of all ranks being 2,865 |
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