"General Baron Friedrich von Steuben and his ‘Blue Book’" Topic

From The Continental Army by Robert K Wright, Jr, 140-142:
‘…After inspecting the troops and conferring with senior officers, Steuben told Washington that the continentals were the finest raw material for an army he had ever seen. Washington promptly assigned Steuben to prepare a system of ‘discipline, maneuvers, evolutions, [and] regulations for guards.'
‘Steuben analyzed existing practices, based primarily on the 1764 British manual, and compared them to European systems. As he later wrote Franklin, ‘circumstances…obliged me to deviate from the principles adopted in the European armies…Young as we are, we have already our prejudices as the most ancient nations, [and] the prepossession in favor of the British service, has obliged me to comply with many things, which are against my principles.' Steuben's genius led him to develop a new system rather than to modify an existing one. He simplified the British manual of arms and slowed its prescribed tempo to improve execution. Marching in a column four abreast instead of in single file allowed more compact formations and dramatically improved battlefield deployment. He increased the marching pace from the English 60 two-foot steps per minute to 75 (the Prussian norm). He set doubletime at 120. To complement the Continental Army's excellent musketry, Steuben also emphasized bayonet training. He and Washington made officers responsible for drilling the troops. Steuben drew on many precedents, including Prussian, English, and American practices. Foreign officers recognized the uniqueness of the mixture and noted its efficiency.'
‘Steuben produced a simple but efficient method for maneuvering on the battlefield. Like Guibert and other French theoriticians, he used by column and line to achieve tactical flexibility. Divisions and brigades marched in closed columns for speed and control and rapidly deployed into line for musket fire or bayonet charge. Skirmishers, either light infantry or details from the line units, covered the columns during advance or withdrawal. They kept one hundred yards (the effective range of a musket) from the column to prevent enemy harassment of the main body. As soon as the column deployed into line, the skirmishers withdrew through gaps and reformed. The men maintained silence when marching.'
‘In the fall of 1778 a board of generals reviewed Steuben's drill and suggested only one improvement: replacing the traditional command ‘Present!' with ‘Take Sight!' as the order immediately preceding ‘Fire!' Washington agreed and made the change. This emphasis indicated the Continental Army's continued reliance on marksmanship…'
‘Steuben's Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, Part I (better known as the ‘Blue Book') covered all aspects of infantry service…'

Brechtel, thanks for highlighting these exerpts.

Here's the link to Wright's tome:

link

The use of skirmishers IMO is undervalued and lacking implementation in many period rule sets.

"Divisions and brigades marched in closed columns for speed and control and rapidly deployed into line for musket fire or bayonet charge. Skirmishers, either light infantry or details from the line units, covered the columns during advance or withdrawal. They kept one hundred yards (the effective range of a musket) from the column to prevent enemy harassment of the main body. As soon as the column deployed into line, the skirmishers withdrew through gaps and reformed."

Many figure mounting conventions make these tactics difficult or near impossible to utilize on the tabletop.

>To complement the Continental Army's excellent musketry,

Seriously?

>‘In the fall of 1778 a board of generals reviewed Steuben's >drill and suggested only one improvement: replacing the >traditional command ‘Present!' with ‘Take Sight!' as the >order immediately preceding ‘Fire!' Washington agreed and >made the change. This emphasis indicated the Continental >Army's continued reliance on marksmanship…'

I really wonder what difference that made, given that marksmanship was already taught in the British formations and I find it hard to believe the Colonials hadn't figured it out before then.

The board had to leave its fingerprints on the book. It's human nature. I've seen that tendency over and over with software specifications.

Yes. Jefferson had to let a committee rewrite the Declaration of Independence too.

Ah yes, and now we might have discovered the smoking gun so to speak.

"He simplified the British manual of arms and slowed its prescribed tempo to improve execution."

By streamlining further the British manual of arms, Stueben could allow the Continentals more time to "take sight" during volley firing.

Nonsense. There is in fact very little difference in the actual manual of exercise between the Stueben and 1764 manuals. Neither is faster, quicker better. They are in fact almost the same. Arm chair researchers count the number of evaluations a cry out the 1764 has more steeps. Yes the parade ground version. In the field the rapid fire as mentioned in the manual and as mentioned in Ltd. Aanbury's journal shortens it. One is to teach recruits the other is for in the field.

At the National Park Services black powder trading schools we would have benefactor standing side by side and actual demonstated the 1764, von Stueben and Pickering manuals. All took the same time, all sighted and verify little difference could be detected between them.

As for American superior firepower….

No claim made in the text of superior American firepower.

"…the Continental Army's excellent musketry" was a bit of an overstatement.

There's also no evidence that the different drill manual had any effect on accuracy. Steuben's main contribution was to standardize drill and maneuvering in the army--something they were not doing coherently (let alone cohesively) prior to his reforms.

You could make a reasonable argument that the English fire power was superior since they were professional soldiers, whereas the Continentals had to recruit a new army just about every year.

The Continental Army did not have to 'recruit a new army just about every year.' Many of the troops were long-serving, as were their officers and units such as the Maryland and Delaware regiments of the Maryland Division, among others, were both veterans and long-serving. For all practical purposes, they were professionals from long service.

The Continentals of 1776 were enlisted for only one year, but subsequently Congress changed the terms of enlistment to three years 'or the duration of the war.'

The two main problems with recruiting were the militia and the State Lines, or state regulars. Both were maintained by the states separately from the Continental Lines and the service was many times easier than in the Continental regiments and the bounties were higher. Interestinly, the Continentals referred to the militia as 'long faces' because of their demeanor when on active service.

'Although there were never enough men, the Continental regiments of the last years of the war were composed of hardened professionals, generally the equals of any European troops.'-John Elting.

What I think Steuben was doing was using what he'd done during the seven years war when he was the adjutant of the Prussian Frei battalion von Mayr.

>'Although there were never enough men, the Continental regiments of the last years of the war were composed of hardened professionals, generally the equals of any European troops.'-John Elting.

Oh, agreed. In time, the army that eventually jelled from 77 onward became very similar to their opponents in terms of professionalism.

But the idea that Steuben made them better shots? I think that's very unlikely.