"In Nelson's Wake: The Navy and the Napoleonic Wars" Topic

"Horatio Nelson's celebrated victory over the French at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 presented Britain with an unprecedented command of the seas. Yet the Royal Navy's role in the struggle against Napoleonic France was far from over. This groundbreaking book asserts that, contrary to the accepted notion that the Battle of Trafalgar essentially completed the Navy's task, the war at sea actually intensified over the next decade, ceasing only with Napoleon's final surrender. In this dramatic account of naval contributions between 1803 and 1815, James Davey offers original and exciting insights into the Napoleonic wars and Britain's maritime history. Encompassing Trafalgar, the Peninsular War, the War of 1812, the final campaign against Napoleon, and many lesser known but likewise crucial moments, the book sheds light on the experiences of individuals high and low, from admiral and captain to sailor and cabin boy. The cast of characters also includes others from across Britain-dockyard workers, politicians, civilians-who made fundamental contributions to the war effort and in so doing, both saved the nation and shaped Britain's history."

See here
link

Amicalement
Armand

This groundbreaking book asserts that, contrary to the accepted notion that the Battle of Trafalgar essentially completed the Navy's task, the war at sea actually intensified over the next decade, ceasing only with Napoleon's final surrender.

To be fair, Richard Glover was writing about this in the early 1970s, but his work seems to have been ignored in recent years:-

link

Many at the Admiralty heaved a huge sigh of relief after the First Abdication, as it brought an end to a ship-building race that the Royal Navy could never have won, even though the French had lost all their major naval allies by 1812.

Thanks for the link!.

Amicalement
Armand

The French building program is overrated. Building ships is one thing. Competently manning and commanding them is another matter.

Agree!.

Amicalement
Armand

Don't forget that the French had large maritime communities that they could conscript, both in France and elsewhere (via compliant rulers). And there were already large units of trained men within the French army, with naval experience, who had been mobilised for land duties in order to release genuine troops for land campaigns. A third option was marching crews from remoter or blockaded ports overland to take over newer and bigger vessels.

If you look at the quotes in Glover's book, many of them from private documents (so not necessarily scaremongering for bigger budgets), the Royal Navy took this very seriously.

France still didn't have the depth of merchant marine the British had. Furthermore you not only need sailors, but you need to develop them into cohesive crews. That is hard to do when under blockade. There are other factors as well. NAM Rodgers book is good at describing this. Some knock it here on TMP but it is well referenced at least.

I tend to agree with SM here. Trafalgar occurred in 1805. The power of France under Napoleon nevertheless continued to grow to an unprecedented degree until the Russian debacle seven years later. Until the invasion of Russia, no one could be totally certain where Napoleon would choose to deploy his resources. Rif Winfield's recent book, "French Warships in the Age of Sail, 1786-1861" provides a good overview of Napoleon's ambitious post-Trafalgar naval construction program.

At the same time, Great Britain had embarked upon a vast post-Trafalgar expansion in its numbers of 5th rate and lesser warships that pushed her manning (and probably more important – officer) resources to the point that crew quality across the fleet became progressively spottier over time. Reading RN tactical accounts of the post-Trafalgar period is quite interesting.

Great Britain's maritime personnel assets indeed exceeded those of France by a decided margin. But I wonder what the numbers looked like when Holland, Denmark, Spain, and the Italian city-states were added to France's side of the ledger.

B

And the Russian fleet, briefly, in the 1807-11 period.

Plus there would have been some expectation of Swedish (and Norwegian) support after Bernadotte was elected Crown Prince; albeit that never materialised.

I guess we have to agree to disagree. NAM Rodgers notes Glovers book and other modern writings regarding this issue and asserts the claims overrated. Though impressive on paper, ships built by Napoleon were poorly made for several reasons. As a result, at most 1/5 were truly sea and battle worthy.

Furthermore, except for Denmark, none of the nations noted above were enthusiastic naval allies for Napoleon. Holland was a shadow of what it was only 30 years earlier. Spain didn't have enough seaman or naval stores to maintain their own navy before Trafalgar. The Italian states built a few line of battle ships with the one or two making it to sea getting promptly captured. Finally Russian squadrons made some visible forays outside of territorial waters but was really far more invested in its constant war with Turkey.

Even within France naval morale was poor and the existence of naval battalions in the army, as noted above, was actually a source of resentment, at least as much as it was a paper asset.

Even if fleets were assembled after overcoming all the reservations above, they still had to get to sea and gel as crews and as a fleet. The French couldn't effectively do that before Trafalgar when they still had a navy and French crews. Think of how much harder it would be with several reluctant allies making up your fleet. The never ending blockade assured that.

The very fact noted above, regarding Britiains expansion in lower rates ships, attests to where she saw the real naval threat, notwithstanding its impact in stretching resources. It clearly wasn't Napoleon's building program.

Was the naval race a threat? Sure it was. But not nearly to the degree suggested above.

Napoleon never really understood naval he should have done anything to partner with the Americans and used american crews on French built ships

I do not think that would have worked.
Numbers and Language. Most Americans spoke English. Had no experience of fleet action in larger ships. 300 plus crew per ship!!!!! 600 or more for a 3rd rate plus!!!!!!! I think not. Come on this is not cloud-cuckoo-land. You are talking of 13 States only and sparsely populated.
Be safe
Rory

French – American alliance seemed to work well in the AWI despite the language barrier

US had a population of 7.5 million in 1812 against French of what, 28 million and a lot of the French army/navy aged were in the army at that point, or hiding from it.

Plus a large percentage of US population was seafaring at that point. If the French had crewed some ships (officers and men) completely with Americans it wouldn't have hurt. The Americans didn't do all that bad in the war of 1812 in naval actions and probably could have overloaded a few 74's with volunteers looking for prize money if the US could get them

I don't think it would have tipped the balance against the English but it would have made it harder for them. They were having trouble crewing their ships by 1812

Did the US Navy have a system of Prize Money ?

I was under the impression it was hard enough for the US government to raise the money to run the navy.

French – American alliance seemed to work well in the AWI despite the language barrier.

Actually, it really didn't until the Yorktown campaign – see the fiascos at Savannah, Rhode Island, the aborted attack on NYC (due to the French navy's refusal to approach Sandy Hook), and Lincoln's/Lauzun's botched assault on Ft Knyphausen.

Prior to the alliance in 1778, the sheer number French "advisors" who turned out to be not what they claimed to be (not to mention the Conway Cabal) almost led Congress to refuse to allow any more of them into the country. And at one point, Whigs in the South were discussing neutrality in order to let the British fight the French instead.

Sandy Hook would have been a very tough nut to crack. Howe, although inferior in force, was set up in a very strong position and was ready for any French attempt.

B