"Sir John Moore and Light Infantry Training NEW BOOK" Topic

SIR JOHN MOORE AND THE UNIVERSAL SOLDIER
Volume 1: The Man, the Commander and the Shorncliffe System of Training.
Published by Ken Trotman Publishing.

See Extract
link

Launched at the Shorncliffe Lectures 2015 on 14 November 2015.

Sir John Moore is considered the father of the modern British Army and the creator of the elite universal soldier that would later become the famous Light Division of the 43rd, 52nd and 95th Rifles. His reform of the British Army was enabled by the support of the Duke of York, Sir David Dundas and William Pitt. His brilliant legacy is clearly shown by the Epilogue by General Sir Nick Parker on "The Characteristics of the 21st Century Rifleman."

This third book in the successful Shorncliffe Lecture Series sets out to put into context Moore's moral compass, principals and experiences that created his philosophy and internal discipline that was key to the "Shorncliffe System of Training." Moore's own diary entries, letters, recollections of his family, friends, newspapers, and those who served with him have been used. It also includes, Moore's Instructions to the Battalions of Irish Militia Light Infantry of 1798 and a discussion of contemporary light infantry manuals.

Probably the most neglected developments of British light infantry connections are Corsica, West Indies, Ireland, and Egypt. The chronology shows the global reach of the British Army and the large number of theatres in which Sir John Moore served . The Index has been divided into a General, Name and Regimental Index. There are over 90 mostly contemporary illustrations including 24 Maps and 20 portraits as well as 14 OOBs and 25 Tables.

Volume 2, will explore Sir John Moore's expeditions to the Mediterranean, Sweden and the Peninsular (1806-09).

Dear All
The inspitation of this being written came from the decade of discussion and misunderstandings upon the training of Light Infantry let alone the position of the various important characters in the improvement of the British Army.

To understand the changes, you need to understand the character of the men and particularly Sir John Moore.
Stephen

Many thanks for share dear Dr.!!

Amicalement
Armand

You say this is the third book in the series, can you post the titles (and availability) of the first two, please?

Thanks.

Coote Manningham's Shorncliffe Lectures of 1803, and the Origins of the 95th Rifles from Contemporary Sources SHORNCLIFFE LECTURES, VOLUME 1

See Extract
link

Available from
link

Using original sources and the first lectures at Shorncliffe in 1803 by Colonel Coote Manningham of the 95th Rifles (44 pages), this volume explores the development of light infantry from 1755 in both Europe, America and West Indies to the eve of the Peninsular War in 1808. In addition there are biographical notes on 46 military officers, chronology of the Light Division Infantry Regiments (43rd, 52nd, and 95th Rifles) and the 60th Rifles that became famous in the Peninsular War (1808-14) and in America (1812-15).

The origins of the 95th Rifles is traced through the biographies of their original officers including Colonel Coote Manningham and Lt-Col Sir William Stewart, Rifleman Education and Regulations, early British Rifles and the Ezekiel Baker Tests.
Publisher: Ken Trotman Publishing
Publication Date: Nov 15, 2014

PRELUDE TO WATERLOO
Adam's Light Brigade (52nd, 71st & 95th Rifles) in the Netherlands (1813-15),
Craufurd's System for the Light Brigade,
SHORNCLIFFE LECTURES VOLUME 2
By Susan Law and Stephen Summerfield

See Extract
link

Available from
link

Using original sources, this second volume of the Shorncliffe Lectures follows the experiences of the Light Brigade (52nd and 95th) in Sir Thomas Graham's British Army in Holland (1813 – 1814). These famous light regiments trained at Shorncliffe Camp were a mixture of Peninsula veterans from the famous Light Division under the likes of Craufurd and new recruits.

In 1815, these were joined by the 71st to form Sir Frederick Adams's Light Brigade in 2nd (Clinton) Division who formed the Wellington's Reserve at Waterloo and were among the most seasoned British Regiments on the field that day.

In addition the Standing Orders of Major General Sir Frederick Adam in the important months between the formation of his Light Brigade and the start of the Waterloo Campaign. He also instructed that all his officers would memorise the first three sections of General Robert Craufurd's Standing Orders for the Light Division. For completeness, the complete instructions by Craufurd are reproduced in full. The chronology from 1812-15 demonstrates clearly the strategic overstretch of the British Army.

SIR JOHN MOORE AND THE UNIVERSAL SOLDIER
Volume 1: The Man, the Commander and the Shorncliffe System of Training.
Published by Ken Trotman Publishing.
By Dr Stephen Summerfield and Susan Law
Ken Trotman Publishing

Available from
link

Thanks for the heads-up Stephen.

I've just ordered all three. They should look good beside what I see as the best modern tomes on the subject (the 95th side of things that is) by Caldwell and Cooper. I have all their books, including their rare 'Rifle Green at Waterloo' which I purchased from one of the authors, Robert Cooper himself, (a very nice chap) who also threw in a large number of musket balls they had found at the various research sites in the peninsula. All neatly bagged up and labelled.

Paul :)

An incredibility interesting concept that deserves wider study and appreciation. I think many take for granted the up hill battle Moore faced in bringing light infantry tactics and dedicated light infantry units to the British army. Other armies of the SYW period had dedicated light infantry like jagers and grenzers but it was the lessons learned by the British in the AWI that gave Moore the inertia to move the extremely conservative military minds of the times. Consider that it took a state revolution to change military tactics in France. What would Wellington's reverse slope tactics been like without light infantry?

Agree!

Amicalement
Armand

Dear Paul
The Caldwell and Cooper books are superb. The second volume were alas written before I finally obtained a copy of Rifles in Waterloo. I was facinated that they also showed that you needed to understand the Netherlands 1813-14 campaign to comprehend the Waterloo Campaign.

The British had light infantry integral with their line regiments from the 7YW. These were officially disbanded but many colonels still kept then. Then reinstated again in the 1770s. The problem the British had like many of the continental powers was a lack of a centralised drill book.

What Moore brough to the table was not how to operate as light infantry but when to use them by use of the various manuals of instruction mainly written by Germans. There has been an attempt to bring this together in the 3rd volume of the series.

Moore could not have acheived what he did without the partonage of the Duke of York and Dundas. Remember Dundas produced the first drill for light infantry that was followed throughout the period. Giving rate of march, working in pairs etc.. This was enhanced by later writings.

We have tried to put the evidence together and let the reader decide. It was a vaste subject but there is logic there.

The other half of the book is looking at the themes and character of Sir John Moore. His ability to empower the people who he commanded. He was an excellent just of officers and men. They were his legacy that Wellington used for victory.

Stephen

Lets not forget David Gates' (though I have never been enamoured with his 'Spanish Ulcer' tome) 'The British Light Infantry Arm c 1790-1815'. That book too is an excellent tome on the subject

As for Caldwell and Coopers books. Let's not forget the excellent artwork of James Dann, who as you know, has his illustrations running throughout the books with colour full page images depicting famous moments. His style may be naive, but nevertheless all tell a story including the ones in the text pages.

There is a revised addition available (this time with a dust-cover which wasn't included with the original)From their website.

link

And just one more thing.

It was Robert Cooper who brought to my attention, the fact that in J.P. Beadle's famous painting 'The Rearguard' the Baker Rifles were painted back to front, showing the patch box on the left of the rifle rather than the right.

Paul :)

Gates is very good although some of his conclusions I would differ about. The 90th Foot was always a light infantry regiment although not offiially designated until 1815. Gates misunderstands the difference of practice and being official. A great tradition in the British Army.

Fuller's Light Infantry and Sir John Moore System of Training still stand out well. The author fell out of favour in WWII as he was accused of being a Nazi sympathiser. Much critised for this but politics are absent in the work if someone had thought to read it.

Yes James Dann work is excellent. He does not show some of the strange changes to uniforms in 1812 as purported by some re-enactors.

Stephen

Just had a complimentary e-mail from Prof Escdaile over the book. I look forward to his review of the book.
Stephen

Having read the first three chapters of Gates, I have had to go back to the beginning. I have to say that so far I find it muddled and superficial- and quite annoying. He seems to be selecting material to suit a thesis. He doesn't appear to have studied the campaigns he summarises in the years running up to the formation of the Rifle and Light infantry battalions in the British army. He quotes from distinguished commentators such as Cornwallis and Scharnhorst, Simcoe and Ewald, but relies rather too much on one source, John Money, who he quotes promiscuously. To be honest, I'm finding it really, annoying!

Yes there is much in Gates that he has misunderstood. He states that 90th Foot were not light infantry after 1800 when they always operated as such. They received the official title in 1815.

These areas have been convered by Shorncliffe Lectures Volume 1 dealing with the origins of the 95th Rifles and the predecesors in the 7YW and AWI. This current volume takes the story forward and shows what the Shorncliffe System of Training was and looks at the various manuals. In addition the influences of Sir John Moore from his wide experience in the West Indies, Mediterannean and Egypt.

The book is not a straight biography but tries to show the connections.
Stephen

Seems to me that Gates is correct about the 90th Foot. If they were not designated a light infantry regiment, regardless of how they operated, then officially they were not, by your own admission until 1815.

French line regiments of the period frequently, if not regularly, operated as light infantry but were not designated as such. So, they were not light infantry, but line infantry.

Dear Sir
That is not how things work in the British Army. They were trained as light infantry by the same person as Sir John Moore chose to train the 52nd.

1794 they were established as the 90th Perthshire Volunteers. Thomas Graham (who became Wellington's most trusted lieutenant) obtained the King's leave to train the battalion as light infantry in 1794. Operated at Marines in 1796. In 1801, they fought as light infantry in Egypt as part of Moore's Division. In 1805, they left for the West Indies where they partiticipated in the capture of Martinique and Guardeloupe. On when they returned, they were named the 90th Perthahire Volunteer Light Infantry in 1815.

Quoted on page 216-217 of the book are Graham's instructions for the 90th to operate as Light Infantry.

Like much in the British Army tradition is there before it is officially recognised.
Stephen

What did you do with/think of Captain Verner's volumes on the First British Rifle Corps?

Verners volumes on the British Rifle Corps is where everybody who has written upon the rifles has started and often done no more research.

There is a very interesting story behind what was written in just a few pages. These were teased out on Volume 1 of the Shorncliffe Lectures and further still in the new book.

The British had Light Infantry since at least 1755. Remember the order to have one company as light infantry. This was abolished after the 7YW only to be officially re-instated in the 1770s. Most colonels ignored the order to disband the light infantry.

The 95th Rifles were not meant to become a permanent regiment. They were supposed to be used to form a platoon of riflemen in each light company of Line Battalions. Only because they aquitted themselves well at the attack on Ferol was the Regiment formed of all riflemen.

It should be noted only a fraction of the men and officers were used for this new regiment as those who were part of the British Army in Malta for the invasion of Egypt returned to their regiments.

The objection to rifle only regiments was the fact that Riflemen were very vulnerable to cavalry. The Prussian Jager Corps was wipped out three times in the 7YW. They did not have sword bayonets and could not fire fast enough.

The innovation by Ezekiel Baker was to produce a weapon that could fire as a rifle with a matched ball yet could be loaded and fired with un-patched cartridge as fast as musket. OK not likely to hit much but was as accurate as a carbine. Good for distances of 50 yards.

The officers who devised the Rifles were experienced leaders of light infantry who had lead them in West Indies against the French.

All this has been written about in the books produced for the Shorncliffe Trust and to raise money for their noble cause in saving as much of Shorncliffe Camp and Redoubt for posterity.

Stephen

Summerfield wrote:

The innovation by Ezekiel Baker was to produce a weapon that could fire as a rifle with a patched ball yet could be loaded and fired with un-patched cartridge as fast as musket. OK not likely to hit much but was as accurate as a carbine. Good for distances of 50 yards.

This is not true. Any rifle of the period could be fired with unpatched ball if required and this cannot be credited to Baker. If anything can be credited to him, it is the rifling twist-rate, which was only one quarter of a turn in the 30" barrel, which was much less than other rifles of the time. This, he claimed, reduced the amount of fouling. This slow twist-rate also resulted in less accuracy compared to rifles with a faster turn.

Loose ball and patch ammunition was not used after c1809 by British riflemen due to the time taken to load and the danger of pouring powder into the muzzle out of a flask.

Ammunition was all issued in cartridge form after this date. Some of these cartridges contained a ball that was pre-wrapped in a cloth patch, while others didn't.

Some battalions preferred the unpatched ball cartridge and others preferred the patched version. The artillery, who had to distribute this ammunition, complained about the two different cartridges and suggested that the officers of the Rifles should decide which one should be used as standard.

Whether the ball cartridge was patched or unpatched, the accuracy was much better than a musket, and was good for distances far in excess of 50 yards.

"The innovation by Ezekiel Baker was to produce a weapon that could fire as a rifle with a matched ball yet could be loaded and fired with un-patched cartridge as fast as musket. OK not likely to hit much but was as accurate as a carbine. Good for distances of 50 yards. "

I agree with Major Snort, that was common practise with all rifled units, to have patched ball and also pre fabricated cartridges both either with patch or without.

Colonel Amos Norcott of the 2nd battalion tells of his battalion using loose powder flask and also paper cartridge. He had a leather pouch made for the flask

link

To get more an insight you should consult ‘Rifle Green in the Peninsula Volume IV and ‘Rifle Green at Waterloo. Both by Caldwell and Cooper.

Paul :)

Well I suggest you read what I have written in my books. I was pointing out that the Baker Rifle could be fired at 3 rounds per minute with unpatched ball. This is something that has been ignored by historians.

The nature of the rifling permited this to a greater extent than the previous rifling due to the shallower twist. A carbine ball would just drop to the bottom.

There were two types of cartidges supplied with the baker. Those with the patch and those without.

Why could the 95th Rifles and the 5/60th operate as rifle only where most European Rifle Bns had 50% Rifle and 50% Carbine/Musket?

The use of Rifles within light companies in the British Army was more prevelant than is commonly considered.
Stephen

The rifles were not loaded by dropping loose balls down the barrel when using ball cartridge. The ball was rammed down the bore still wrapped in paper, empty tail first. Whether there was a patch or not, this load still required ramming and was a tight fit compared to a ball in a Brown Bess.

The paper around the ball took up the windage and the empty tail of the cartridge that had contained the powder was compressed into the breech of the barrel and rifling by the ramrod and functioned as a wad. This paper and ball combination did engage the rifling and although it was not as effective as a cloth patch to be sure, it was still far more effective than a smoothbore.

When Norcott claims that rifles used in this manner were less effective than muskets, we have to consider that he was probably exaggerating in order to get what he wanted (the return of loose patched balls).

"Well I suggest you read what I have written in my books. I was pointing out that the Baker Rifle could be fired at 3 rounds per minute with unpatched ball. This is something that has been ignored by historians. "

What sense does that make for a rifleman? His task was to hit and not put up rapid unaimed fire, other than emergencies – being attacked by cavalry, with three shots a minute the grooves would pretty much foul and become a smooth bore barrel.

Sort of that kind of rifles did exist already on various armies, like the Prussian one, the so called Scharfschützengewehr – which was also loaded with a tighter fitting ball but with a cartridge.

Why could the rifle brigade operate as rifels only? I was under the impression that they were fighting along other light infantry units or line units supporting them tactically on the battle field – when in need.

It is much easier to demonstrate that put into words. I was talking about the windage difference and not the procedure of firing.
Stephen

I was referring to the battalion of rifles that was all rifle armed. Most contental rifle bns had one rank of rifles and another rank of carbines/muskets

Stephen

Von Winterfeldt
The problem is that the 95th Rifles were used as storming troops and not to pick of men at range at sieges by Wellington. The 95th fought often in close order in the Peninsular and during the Waterloo campaign.

They were acting as the universal soldier. Grenadier and Light Infantryman combined like the other light infantry regiments. This is what has come across clearly looking at the training and ethos behind Sir John Moore's training at Shorncliffe.

This seems distinct from the continental Chasseur, Jager or Grenzer.

Sorry I was unable to explain but I think it is clear where I am coming from in our books. There is still some way to go.

The experiences of amphibious warfare of the mediteranean and West Indies had a considerable influence upon the thinking behind British light infantry as distinct to Austrian, Prussian, Russian and French.
Stephen

"Most contental rifle bns had one rank of rifles and another rank of carbines/muskets"

Yes and no, the Prussian Jäger could well fight as the 95th – which they demonstrated in the 1806 campaign.

Yes that is an area that I need to look at more carefully. The Prussian Jager were it seems the other exception. The Bavarian, KGL Light and Austrian had mixed weapons. Need to look at the Westphalian and Wurtemberg. Alas English landguage sources are vague.

Sorry I was being vague.
Stephen

Here is a modern-day experiment showing the effectiveness of the three types of ammunition used in the Baker Rifle. The unpatched ball cartridge holds its own against the others, at least at 100 yards, showing that the paper and ball combination must be quite effective at engaging the rifling.

YouTube link

The 90th Regiment of Foot

From the British Light Infantry Arm by David Gates, 94:

‘There can be little doubt that from its formation in 1794 until the Peace of Amiens the 90th was a light infantry corps in all but name. According to [Colonel Thomas] Graham himself, the unit was ‘considered as a light infantry battalion' as early as 1795 and was trained accordingly, whilst the regiment's later practice of Rottenburg's skirmisher drill has already been noted. Siilarly in the Egyptian campaign of 1801 we find the regiment serving as the army's vanguard-a duty invariably performed by light formations-where, on at least one occasion, it drove off French cavalry with ‘it's well directed fire, in light infantry style.'

‘After the signing of the Peace of Amiens in 1802, however, the status of the 90th became that of an ordinary regiment of foot. Like ‘Campbell's Highlanders' and ‘Keith's Highlanders' in 1763, this corps of light infantry volunteers was ‘standardized' by being assimilated into the ordinary infantry of the line. Predictably unhappy about this decision and having seen the formation of the 52 and 43d Light Infantry Regiments, Graham petitioned Lord Moira in September 1803 to ‘recommend to His Royal Highness to restore the 90th to what it was originally was, a light infantry battalion….Moira's reply, Graham told Lord Cathcart, was that:

‘'…The system of making a particular regiment a light infantry battalion was one which he in his own mind had strong objections to…but that as it had been adopted in England in the case of the 52d, he would certainly recommend the 90th, satisfied that none of his general objections referred to it. He did so accordingly, and in course of post received an answer from Clinton, to say that HRH would take His Majesty's pleasure on it. This is considerably more than two months ago and no further notice has been taken.''

‘Indeed, it would seem that Graham never did receive the answer from the Commander-in-Chief that he hoped for. Certainly, the 90th was never returned to the light infantry arm during the Napoleonic period and, as the official inspection returns confirm, continued to be known quite simply as the 90th Regiment of Foot.'

Major Snort

When Norcott claims that rifles used in this manner were less effective than muskets, we have to consider that he was probably exaggerating in order to get what he wanted (the return of loose patched balls).

Any evidence for this?

Paul :)

Don't foget that the Austrians formed out of the Grenzscharfschützen 2 permanent battalions in the French Revolutionary Wars, again units fully armed wih rifles and double barreled rifles (one rifled the other smooth bore)

I am quite suprised to see the 95th employed as shock troops in assaults, I always considered this a prerogative of the grenadiers.

Paul,

From the interesting link that you provided, Norcott apparently:

regrets the decision to adopt solely cartridge as opposed to using mainly the horn, but he repeatedly urges the re-introduction of the horn, making it clear than up until the point he is writing (1816), the horn has not been re-introduced. Pointedly he remarks that an Infantry Rifle using cartridge is less effective than an ordinary musket

So he seems to be in favour of re-introducing loose balls. The statement that the rifle is less effective than a Brown Bess when used with cartridges doesn't stand up based upon trials carried out with original weapons and the response by the Duke of York below.

Norcott wasn't alone in suggesting or requesting the return of loose ball and patch ammunition. A similar request was sent to Horse Guards in 1826 by an officer of the Rifles, including the claim that the rifle was no more effective than a musket when used with the issued cartridges. The Duke of York's reply explains why this could not be accepted, firstly explaining why patched balls had been discontinued:

In the first place it has appeared from the oldest practical soldiers in the Rifle Brigade that the copper flasks were discontinued on service in the peninsular in consequence of the accidents, and the personal injuries thereby sustained, from their constant liability to blow up in action.

Secondly it appears that after the barrel of the rifle has been soiled by fouling, it becomes almost impractical to drive home the loose ball with the greased rag

He then goes on to challenge the claim of inaccuracy:

His Royal Highness is quite aware that the accuracy of Rifle firing is in some measure lost by balls being made up in cartridges which are much smaller than the calibre of the rifle – though he cannot concur in the notion generally and erroneously entertained, that in such a case, a rifle is no more effective for accuracy of firing than a common musket.

As a concession, the Duke of York recommended that the size of the ball in the cartridge was to be increased.

In my opinion these two officers were exaggerating the detrimental effect of cartridge ammunition.

Dear von Winterfeldt
If you wish to contact me offline then I will share with you what I have written. Again there is still much for me to learn as I seem to be the only person writing on British light infantry that is interested in continental practice.

I know it is unfair to discuss subjects where I am writing from what I had compiled into a book.
Stephen

Major Snort

Err! I am not questioning the powder horn magazine's habit of breaking at the Irish measure part at all! Even Norcott mentions its unsuitability himself.

It was he who had leather pouches made up for the powder flask (to be paid for by his men) and issued to the two companies of the 2nd at Cadiz and later, taken up by the rest of the battalion. The leather container was fixed to the waist belt by loops.

What I am highlighting is the point that Norcott "probably exaggerating in order to get what he wanted". How about he thought he was doing what he saw was right from his experience with his battalion in some of the hardest fighting of the war.

It also shows that cartridge ball didn't entirely supercede the charge and patched ball

Major Snort:

Loose ball and patch ammunition was not used after c1809 by British riflemen due to the time taken to load and the danger of pouring powder into the muzzle out of a flask.

Paul :)

Dear von Winterfeldt
Sent you pdf of my book and the draft of the Westphalian Guard Book. Comments welcome.
Stephen

Paul,

Calm down, I didn't mention anything about horns breaking.

I don't have access to Norcott's entire reports, but would be interested to see them.

However, it is a fact that patched ball ammunition was phased out and disappeared completely from use. This is believed to have been from 1809. It is quite possible that riflemen could have continued to cast their own balls and find cloth to make their own patches, and continued to use the copper flasks while they lasted, but it can be seen that there wasn't one flask left per man by 1813 from your link, meaning that the remainder could only use cartridges. There is no record of cloth being supplied for loose patch material after c1809

Whatever Norcott believed was right, it had no effect on the end result and his statement about the accuracy of rifles with cartridge ammunition is simply not true.

I am not going to comment on a modern youtube video.

In Norcott's own words and as published in Rifle Greeen at Waterloo (first edition, pages 132-133) revised edition Page 116.

"The two Companies that I commanded at the siege of Cadiz furnished these leather cases at their own expense, for the copper flask. They were always in service order, and the powder complete and in perfect good order. They were highly approved of by all the Corps when these companies joined the army near Madrid in 1812."

I don't wish to highlight what you originally posted as I have almost always agreed with most of what you post on this site but you stated that: "Loose ball and patch ammunition was not used after c1809 by British riflemen" and then your last post states:"However, it is a fact that patched ball ammunition was phased out and disappeared completely from use. This is believed to have been from 1809" Which seems to be a slight change of position from you. Still, the last statement is still not accurate as it is not in-fact 'fact' as Norcott testifies.

Paul :)

Paul,

I admit that the snippets of Norcott's reports cast doubt on the belief that patched ball completely fell out of use, hence the change in terminology. However, in the link he is credited as regretting the sole use of ball cartridges. Do you know what Norcott's own words were on this issue?

The trials with original weapons referred to are not what is seen in the YouTube video, although I agree entirely with the results. I have been working, when time allows, on researching British infantry weapons and their tactical use and capabilities during the Napoleonic Wars, and this has included considerable testing of original India Pattern muskets and Baker Rifle, for what it is worth.

Gates might have been overstating his case regarding the change in the 90th's function as Light Infantry

Rather than being restored, it was presumably more a case of asking to be added to the list of regiments that were being formed officially as Light Infantry, seeing as there had not previously been a 'Light Infantry arm' in the British infantry, which is the reason why the 90th Regiment were not designated formally as Light Infantry during the early years of the French War.

Why the 90th was not included as Graham hoped is an interesting question. By the time the 90th returned from the Mediterranean in April 1802 the 52nd and 43rd had already been selected for training at Shorncliffe. Neither Clinton nor Lord Moira were enthusiasts for specialised corps in the infantry. Moreover, the very existence of the 90th was in question at that time and when the Regiment marched to Scotland later that summer it was suspected to be a preliminary to disbandment. Instead they recruited up to strength after which they were shipped to Ireland.

Nonetheless, it is clear that Graham, who shortly after their arrival in Belfast had relinquished command of the 90th following his promotion to Brigadier (while remaining Colonel), was determined that the LI skills built up in his regiment during the previous ten years should not be lost.

"Regimental Orders Tuam. 29th Jan, 1804

…the Regiment ought not only be perfect in Light Infantry movements which are so peculiarly adapted to the circumstances of service in this country (Ireland)bu .. the soliders must learn ho most to annoy the enemy with the least risk to themselves.// and the important exercise of Light Infantry movements across the inclosures.

[THOS. GRAHAM]

There was ample scope for such skills to be employed in the West Indies 1805-14. Lucky them.

Less successful was the declared policy in 1801 of continuing to recruit the regiment from "North Britons". Losses from disease were so high that in 1812, of the 2144 men in the two battalions of the 90th, 1697 were English, 538 were Scots, 485 Irish and 24 'foreigners.'

P.S. – and I don't know what Gates was on about in his comparison with Keith's and Cambell's Highlanders being "'standardized' by being assimilated into the ordinary infantry of the line." As far as I know, at the end of the 7YW they were marched north and disbanded.

From what I understand, Norcott didn't dismiss the cartridge system.

He states this in his observations of the cartridge pouch itself (1816):

" The pouch at present in use with the corps, although exactly similar to the old one, as 'to the interior' is yet very deficient to it in other respects. The pouch cannot contain, without the risk of bruising the cartridges in the paper packages as now made up, more more than four parcels off ten each, and the wooden holes, twelve, thus making the whole, fifty-two rounds, a number infinitely too small for riflemen to have in their possession. Should the magazine horn and copper flask be again introduced into the Corps, with loose balls, the very best pouch it can have is the original one the Regiment was furnished with. However, if the Corps is destined to use ball cartridge only, neither of the pouches treated of, are calculated for the preservation of that sort of ammunition, in as much as relates to its being contained in tin compartments. I would therefore suggest under this latter supposition, that the pouches be furnished with two wooden frames containing holes for thirty rounds each and placed above the other in the pouch."

There is a report of using an original, 1809 dated Baker Rifle in excellent condition with a near perfect bore in the American 'Guns and Ammo' Magazine of November 1983:

From Rifle Green at Waterloo (First addition)

Paul :)

Good old C.E Franklin says on page 277:

90th Regiment of Foot (Light Infantry)
This regiment was raised on 10th February 1794. In 1802 it absorbed the Perthshire Volunteers and was retitled to become:
90th (or Perthshire Volunteers) (Light Infantry) regiment of foot.
Personnel served as Marines in 1797.
The Title was changed in 1815 to:
90th (Light Infantry) Regiment of foot (or Perthshire Volunteers)

He also states that the other ranks all sported light infantry wings and Bugle horn turn-back badges.

Read of it what you think!

link

Paul :)

The 90th Foot as I have stated were always a Light Infantry Regiment. This is clearly stated in my book. That includes the evidence that has been indepedently above.
Stephen

I would be reluctant to put much trust in C.E.Franklin's notes on the history of any infantry regiment.

Interestingly, neither Delavoye's 1880 Regimental history in the link (nor the later survey reproduced here: link make any reference to adjustments to the title of the 90th circa 1802.

Nor is there any mention of the absorption of men from 'Perthshire fencibles' or 'Perthshire volunteers', or any other corps, around that time although both authors touch on the rumour circulating in 1801 that men of the 90th were to be drafted to other regiments.

This subject is evidently something of a historical black hole.

Mills at the archived regiments.org (not infallible) link
for the 90th Regiment of Foot simply states:
1802 absorbed Perthshire Volunteers

The NAM (Chelsea) site (always good for a laugh) states the same: "It took part in the Egyptian Campaign (1801) before returning to England. From there it was sent to garrison Ireland. While there it absorbed the Perthshire Volunteers."

Steve Brown at Napoleon Series link
gives us: 1802 Fort George; absorbed Perthshire Volunteer Fencibles

Wiki FIBIS link
simply records: 1802 became the 90th Regiment of Foot (Perthshire Volunteers)

The identity and history of that elusive second corps is a source of equal confusion. There seems to be only one candidate. However, while Ron McGuigan in the Napoleon Series lists:
"Perth (Highland) Regiment of Fencibles (known as Perthshire Highlanders) 30 October 1794 – 1802", The Military History of Perthshire (1908) lists
'The Perthshire Regiment of Fencibles 1794-1799.'

So it seems this corps may have disbanded in 1799, three years before its alleged absorption by the 90th in 1802.

1802 marked the disbanding of all the Fencible Regts, thereby releasing a potential source of recruits for regular regiments in Scotland. This presumably has something to do with these garbled references to the 90th absorbing another regiment and changing its name in 1802. Clearer detail is hard to find.

It should be said that, closer to home the website dedicated to the Cameronians(Scottsh Rifles) hosted by South Lanarkshire council (yes, confusing) refers to the '90th Perthshire Volunteers' founded in 1794, but the 'beating order' of February 1794 in their possession, addressed to Lieutenant Colonel Graham, refers to the 90th Foot, as do soldiers' discharge papers in UK National Archives citing the Napoleonic period.

It is worth making the distinction between being embodied as a regiment of Light Infantry – a category that did not exist between 1794 and 1802- and operating as a light infantry unit.

Two additional details perhaps sum up the contradictions presented by the 90th. They wore leather Tarleton helmets, headgear that was associated with light troops in the British army- yet as a Regiment of the Line they carried a pair of colours.

very interesting about the performance of the Baker, Scharnhorst did also compare the effects of the rifle in his

Über die Wirkung des Feuergewehrs

on the quick for Prussian rifles

The Jäger did fire with a rifle
with patched ball – ball cast specific for each rifle and patch was chosen individually as also the amount of powder

and
cartridge with smaller ball size as for first ball, but the cartridge had the ball pre patched.

10 Jäger fired 10 shots

The fired onto a wooden wall on which a target of

4 Prussian Feet width
6 Prussian Feet height

1 Preußischer Zoll (inch) = 2.615 cm = 26.15 mm
1 Preußischer Fuß of 12 Zoll = 31.38 cm
1 Preußischer Schritt of 28 Zoll = 73.22 cm

was painted

at 150 Prussian paces

patched ball : 68 hits
cartridge : 51 hits

at 200 paces

patched ball : 49 hits
cartridge : 26 hits

Also of interest – the Jäger insisted to clean their rifles after the 20tiest shot and before they would carry on firing, therefore no more than 20 shots were fired from a rifle each day.

The 43rd, 52nd, 71st, 85th all carried a pair of colours.
Stephen