"the last reserve" Topic

A goal of many designers is to encourage keeping reserves. But many players cram stuff in from the start. Why? Because a unit that isn't rolling dice and causing damage is wasted. Because who knows how many turns we'll get to play before time is called?

I'm reading Timothy Smith's "Champion Hill". The fight for that hill in particular is as follows: Hovey's veteran Union division (~4,000 strong) charges and routs Cumming's green brigade (3,000) and takes the hill. Bowen's elite Confederate division (4,500) attacks while Hovey is disordered and routs them in turn. Crocker's Union division (4,000) stops Bowen's troops but is slowly bested and on the verge of giving way. Crocker's last two regiments, some 550 troops arrive and stabilize the situation, even starting to slowly push back the other way.

These last 550 troops change the fight. How often do our rules allow fresh troops to raise the morale of engaged units? Our rules often model weapon effects but gloss over human response to extreme stress.

Mine do. Cavalry long move as they should be fast; fatigue; disorder…
I played a lot against a former club/ championship player who learned the hard way not to cram all infantry up front.
Depth is also important, recoiling a bit if the end of the world is further away allows for re taking the initiative and positioning meaningful reserves.
Talking about 1700-1900.
Even more so ww2 but them hardly can we have the " historical depth" as should be.

Napoleonic command addresses this quite well from a fast play 20000' foot view of grand-tactical/brigade elements.
Otherwise you are correct.
More the "beer and pretzel" they are the more the focus on only the shooting or charge.

Another view from… in regards to tactical play ( and covered by rules such as Empire, Carnage and Glory etc) is fresh troops coming in to relieve tired troops and the opponent is not able too.

MG

A goal of many designers is to encourage keeping reserves.

They don't seem to be successful if that is really a goal! IMHO the reason is that very few rules even attempt to model fatigue, which of course is one of the primary reasons that you need to keep resrves.

Grande Armee does this. Fresh troops can save the day.

Same with Fire and Fury and Age of Eagles. Having a body of Fresh troops can clean up on troops that have been worn in battle. Holding back a Division or Corps can Slow you opponent down through in-decision

Reserves are indeed a part of our games. Fatigued troops and troops that have taken some losses, even good ones, are in for a tough time facing fresh enemy regiments. Thanks, John Miller

General de Brigade envisions the concept of reserves if only because an army needs unbroken brigades to stay on the field. We often have reserve brigades.

Some game scenerios force the players to have reserves by keeping them off the table, arriving on a schedule or by random dice throw. Needless to say once they arrive on the table they are thrown into action!

Altar of Freedom has a nice system of allowing brigades to remove fatigue (the "damage" of the game) if they are a certain distance from an enemy. This encourages you to withdraw fatigued units and replace them with fresh reserves, as well as keep reserves ready to exploit a battered enemy.

The real trick in most games, however, is scenario design and fog of war. When I can see all your units and know you OOB, there is little reason not to unrealistically mass everything to maximize the number of dice I can throw at you.

I think there is a question of whether the player or the rules are the ones who use reserves and use them well. It isn't one or the other, but there is the question of what battlefield dynamics existed that generals did or didn't take advantage of.

However, that 550 men that come in and 'stabilize' the situation, or even turn the tables is a common event. Clausewitz discusses what a small unit of fresh troops can accomplish against a disordered or worn enemy, even though they are 3-6 6 times larger than the fresh troops.

If Napoleon's equation that morale is 3:1 to raw numbers is true to some extent [he also said that battles are won by the biggest battalions…], that is a complex dynamic.

500 Old Guard Grenadiers regain Plancenoit. Next 500 stabilise the situation completely.

Most players adopt the "charge" mentality – everything forward. I am looking all the time at how I can "encourage" reserves (or even a supported line)

Great thread – really interested to see what ideas come up

And to kick off, a I have just been having this conversation with Bro re Black Powder:

Support – either only allow rear support (something Fire and Fury does so well), or only allow unengaged side support

Hi Vincent,

I've also been thinking about this perennial problem recently, as I write up my ACW house rules. I think it comes down to three different challenges:

1. Players just want to get everything in! This might be something you can't really do anything about, although addressing points 2 # 3 (especially) might mitigate it.

2. If there is no system of gradual strength loss or fatigue accumulated for all units in combat (even winners), then there is less of a reason to keep reserves – after all, your units can keep fighting and be as "fresh" as reserves. This doesn't really address the goal of using reserves in precise places, but that scope of planning is often lost, due to …

3. If your movement system is so slow, and your use of interpenetration is so cumbersome, that players can't envision their reserves ever getting to the front and doing anything useful, then why hold them back?

So – at a minimum – you need rules that show combat fatigue for all front line units in some way (even winners), and you also *crucially* need movement and maneuver rules that allow reserves to actually come into play.

One thing I think should *not* be done – but which is a popular "gamist" method – is to abstractly limit the amount of troops a player can move in any one turn, through pips or command points or some such system. Frankly, I think it's a cheap shortcut to actually figuring out why commanders didn't always (but sometimes in fact did) commit or maneuver all of their troops.

Cheers,

Christopher

Certainly an interesting question and I expect we will get many interesting answers. I know that when I play a game I am interested in maximising the impact of the units I have available so why hold anything back in reserve. I suspect I am not alone in this line of thinking. Also does the game have victory conditions that negate holding reserves as the game may be determined as lost even if I hold uncommitted reserves.

Another game design consideration is the "cascade" rout where units held in reserve, fresh and high status may run away because some regular troops started a rout. This concept may be reasonable but the statistics and dice results sometimes have unintended consequences.

I am only considering reserves to mean a high level "battlefield" or army level reserve as I would expect the lower tactical commanders to manage their own reserves within their first and second lines etc. and not have me as player involved in decisions "two-down".

Perhaps we need to understand the purpose of reserves and see how to make them relevant.

Foremost the reserve is the potential rearguard should everything else collapse, able to respond to new orders even though the rest of the army is out of control.

Secondmost it is the formation that remains under control as the rest of the battle develops. It is able to respond to new orders and can add impetus to various parts of the battle. Remember that reserve forces out of artillery range can be packed densely and can bring significant extra force to bear on a part of the battlefield rapidly.

I think the responsiveness to orders is the key issue when considering reserves. At the start of the battle all units will be fully in command. It is only the combat and actions of the enemy that reduces the ability of units to respond (at all levels of the command hierarchy).

If the rules take into account command friction increasing due to combat then keeping reserves will make sense for the player.

Support – either only allow rear support (something Fire and Fury does so well), or only allow unengaged side support

How would that help encourage the use of reserves?

I think the key to persuadng gamers to keep and use resrves is to impose fatigue rules on the troops doing the fighting. If they wear themselves out and thus become ineffective, you need to have fresh reserves available.

There are a few practical factors that contribute as well.

If you only have an evening to play, having reserves on both sides will lengthen the game. The 59th routs opening the door and the battle is hastily concluded. However, if the Valiant 44th plugs the hole, and the 59th can recover, the game will go later into the night.

The point about movement rates applies as well. Allowing a "strategic move" or a high column rate will get reserves into play.

Games without reserves have their own problem. Essentially, if Side A can crack Side B's line just a little bit, it leads to a rout as they roll up both flanks, precisely because there is no reserve to fill in the gap. I see this a lot especially in convention games.

Also, for gamers there is no "tomorrow" so might as well die on the hill tonight…

I can make no better contribution to this discussion than to urge interested parties to carefully read the book "Battle Studies" by Ardant du Picq.

IMO, the failure of most wargaming rules to adequately represent the value of reserves stems from an over-reliance upon insufficiently detailed/honest accounts of historical battles. Most wargame rules assume that the net combat value of any given unit is equivalent to the number of soldiers remaining after physical casualties are accounted for until some arbitrary trigger point (30pct casualties, for example) causes the other 70pct to test their morale or fall back or whatever. Du Picq's argues a different case. Here is his description of McDonald's great column attack upon the Austrians at Wagram -

"Out of twenty-two thousand men, three thousand to fifteen hundred reached the position. Certainly the position was not carried by them, but by the materiel and moral effect of a battery of one hundred pieces, cavalry, etc., etc. Were the nineteen thousand missing men disabled? No. Seven out of twenty-two, a third, an enormous proportion may have been hit. What became of the twelve thousand unaccounted for? They had lain down on the road, had played dummy in order not to go on to the end. In the confused mass of a column of deployed battalions, surveillance, difficult enough in a column at normal distances, is impossible. Nothing is easier than dropping out through inertia; nothing more common."

To put it another way, wargame rules tend to view morale effects as discreet phenomena affecting the unit as a whole: the unit halts, the unit falls back, the unit routs. Du Picq argues that, over and above this unit-based morale, the effects of battle also impose a continuous moral strain upon the individual soldiers who make up the unit; even though the unit per se may remain more or less functional, a steady drain of soldiers who choose to drop out as a result of individual "morale failures" will materially sap the effective strength of a unit over the course of a battle. It is arguably the case that, when a line unit has suffered a typical 30 pct physical casualties, the other 70 pct have perhaps individually withdrawn from the fight over the course of the battle and no one beyond a small minority of die-hards and officers remains in the line to carry on the fight. It would explain a great deal if that line unit which has suffered 10 pct physical combat casualties has also suffered an additional 20 pct individual psychological casualties and is really down to 70 pct effective strength instead of 90 pct. Troops held in reserve, away from the psychological pressures of combat, will remain intact pose a powerful relative opposing force in such a case.

Why do better disciplined/motivated units tend to endure higher casualty rates than troops of lesser quality? Perhaps because more of their individual soldiers are psychologically willing to remain in the ranks and expose themselves to physical danger.

FWIW.

B

Give 'em lines, go after flanks, and have a reserve. I have been playing Johnny Reb for 40 years with this practice. It is not a design problem, it is a command problem. If you play for only the next turn, put all you can into the fray and fire all those muskets. This is the end the game, so charge with everything you have. Gamer think vs commander think. I did not really appreciate this until I played in a campaign game where there is a tomorrow. I just accepted the command think as my way to play. Have I been beaten? Oh yes and there are folks on here that can attest to that. But at the end of most games, I have troops left and still accomplish my mission. After the war I want to pursue a career in politics and I will need soldiers left alive to vote. I would encourage folks to play in some campaign games and appreciate tomorrow.

American Kriegspiel says that each casualty a unit takes reduces the firepower by three men, so those numbers agree.

MacDonalds column is a great example of the difficulty of war-games design. With most rules it simply doesn't make any sense why you'd use that formation. The lack of the unknown is a huge factor here. If you don't have to worry about the security of your flanks or rear areas then the entire rational for reserves dwindles. It's really an inherent flaw in war-games. There are ways to fix it, but they'd change the basic nature of war-games as they exist.

To solve all of these issues there are only really two solutions. Fortunately they are both fairly easy and even elegant, especially compared to some of the more cumbersome fog-of-war rules you see out there.

1) Red v. Blue. Blue team/player represents the "active" side. Red team/player is a hybrid player and umpire. He has the power to speed up and slow down time, he sees where Blue team has placed his units but must play Red side in accordance with a set of conditions that Blue player is not aware of. Red team is effectively a game master.

2) Full role play. One game master/dungeon master who has total control as in the above v. a group of players, each of who has a specific officer they play at a specific level of command and physically located in a specific spot on the battlefield. This is almost a kriegspiel, and there may be difficulty in keeping the players from coordinating more than what they normally could do. In this case the game master would have to have total control over the scenario like in D&D. He would have to create the scenario or run a pre-designed one.

Either of these methods could solve the problems we're taking about. They would not resemble the sort of war-games that people are used to playing though, nor would they neccesarily deliver the sort of pageantry that people want to see on the table-top. I think the first one has some real promise, but even there, people would have to get used to the idea that the game isn't competitive the way a regular war-game is. Expectation of what a game is supposed to deliver is a big part of the issue at had here.

'Charge!" very much encourages use of reserves…it just doesn't say so in the rule book!

That's why you hear stories like "we marched our armies across the table and the game was over in three turns".

Combat is bloody and units both decrease in fighting and staying power as soon as they start exchanging fire/melee attacks.

Keeping a reserve is key to mopping up a worn down enemy.

It's the players not the game.

Same is true of Paddy Griffith's Napoleonic Wargaming for Fun. Units get worn down, fresh units are needed to succeed.

In my "Musket and Shakos" I focused only on one division's frontage in the battle. Both deploy three lines deep. There just isn't room to cram everything on the table at once and were one to do so their troops would just get in each other's way. That is one way to force historical behavior.

Bob

I would encourage folks to play in some campaign games and appreciate tomorrow.

I totally agree in principle, but in practice I have two big problems with campaigns:

• no participants
  
• the gamer habit of fighting without regard to the future means there is no force left to fight the next campaign battle

The only game I've ever played that worked well for campaigns was DBA, because that game has a built-in army break point which guarantees there is still quite a bit of an army left for the next battle. There are arguably many cases in history where this is totally anachronistic, but the point is that the rules did fix the "no tomorrow" problem in gamer behavior. Most of us playing a horse & musket period would object to such an artificial limit in tactical games, but I notice this kind of thing does crop up in very high level games occasionally.

I agree with many comments here that the real problem is usually the gamers. I have a very hard time getting a group of gamers together for a second or third game using the same rules. Most of them just want to move on to the next shiny thing.

Worse, there is a very common attitude that shooting or melee is the "fun" part of gaming. Such players actually feel punished for using sound but circumspect military tactics like keeping reserves or maneuvering to concentrate/outflank, because in retrospect a game spent maneuvering is summarized as "I didn't get to do anything".

So, most games I play in are two long lines of troops, facing each other across a table, lined up edge to edge, with no opportunity for maneuver, and nothing to do but move forward and play Yahtzee with whatever units I find to my front. The only "reserves" in such a game are those units that for one reason or another are late getting into contact.

- Ix

What Yellow Admiral said. I played in two full blown campaigns, American Revolution and 1814 France, both back in the 70's and 80's. Aside from that I've played some DBA mini-campaigns. It is hard to get a group to play a continuing campaign and stick with when they have a reverse.

Oh yes, I played in an open-ended ancients campaign back in the early 70's that finally just wound down. It had Assyrians and Vikings in the same world, three different sets of Romans, two Byzantines, etc.

Campaigns – easy say, hard do.

That's why you hear stories like "we marched our armies across the table and the game was over in three turns".

Yes, a bunch of rank amateurs we are, needing enlightenment from our betters.

Eh? You asked:

"These last 550 troops change the fight. How often do our rules allow fresh troops to raise the morale of engaged units? Our rules often model weapon effects but gloss over human response to extreme stress."

Any game that has units wear down as opposed to all present/removed from play, will give the effect you asked after.

Have I missed something?

Howdy,

The fact is wargamers are just more aggressive and bloody-minded than their historical counter-parts. Part of this stems from the lack of uncertainty inherent in the game. Another part, is there is no downside, no consequences, from their behavior. … and I'm sure there is a yet unstated third part.

Ponder on,

JAS

I think he was probably referring to the oft-stated effect that the arrival of reserves had on weary front line troops: "The timely arrival of the 45th raised the spirits of the weary brigade, which rallied forward with them …" sort of thing.

One thing I have done to mirror this – with rules that use the fairly common mechanic of a percentage damage threshold for formation morale checks – is to allow reserve units to be added to the base number of units in a formation. This can have the effect of bringing a worn formation out of the danger zone, so to speak.

General de Brigade envisions the concept of reserves if only because an army needs unbroken brigades to stay on the field. We often have reserve brigades.

The GdB C3 system really punishes players without reserves because it is nearly impossible to shift a brigade left or right in a timely manner (or at all!). If a gap opens up, the only practical solution is to have a battalion already deployed behind the gap ready to step in.

- Ix

Any game that has units wear down as opposed to all present/removed from play, will give the effect you asked after.

Yes, except if three red units engage two blue units while blue keeps a third in reserve, if dice are equal then blue will suffer 50% more losses than red. Unless blue's reserve outfit gets a big bonus for coming in later or the rules put red's units in disorder (with a severe penalty), red will have the advantage. And so it is with many games.

Twilight of the Sun King (simple rules) make supported lines the norm. Units without rear support get -1 on their morale rolls. Everyone doubles up. BBB has units in combat very hard to pull out, so you want reserves to plug gaps and replace units low on ammo. But neither of these would have a small fresh force (550 in a 4,000+ per side brawl) make much difference. I'm talking about the morale boost from being reinforced – cavalry to the rescue and all that.

Add in the length of many games and folks want to try to end it before time's up and a tie is declared again.

Not quite the same effect, but giving a unit with a friendly deployed in support a saving throw, or better saving throw if the rules already have them,would give a tangible advantage for keeping a reserve. The presence of the second line in effect bolsters the resolve of the first.

Now given equal dice your supported blue line will suffer proportionally fewer casualties than the unsupported red line.

The cavalry to the rescue effect can be as simple as raising an army's break point, if you use those or a sliding unit morale scale that takes friendly successes/failures into account would work but perhaps take more time than it is worth…unless this boost/penalty were assessed in terms of figures returned/straggling g from the unit in question. Not to exceed full strength of course.

wargamers are just more aggressive and bloody-minded than their historical counter-parts

Most of us think we are Davout, but we are Ney or Custer.

Just to add an advantage of seemingly simple, bloody rules is that you can reach a conclusion in a reasonable time.

With that in mind any additions should focus on being easy to implement.

Experience players know, if possible, to keep at least 1/3 in reserve. If the battle have roads to use as interior lines I park my best unit on one of the road, so the unit can go to either flank. I make sure my opponent sees it.

What I don't like is not having enough time to let a battle development. It seems more often than not, guys only want to paly for a couple of hours. Which discourages reserves and prepping a target with artillery. It skews the scenario.

"Keeping a reserve is key to mopping up a worn down enemy.

It's the players not the game."

Well said Bob, that's all there is to it.

I've played a lot of rule sets and read plenty more. I don't recall any of them discouraging the use of reserves. I've lost track of the number of people I've played against, but very few of them seem to understand the true value of reserves and of course very few of them use them properly. Most simply see them as more troops to cram into action asap, as soon as the game starts their off.

I've been clobbering people for decades simply by using my reserves at the right time and place. This even applies to the use of local reserves within a Division. Some I've done it to for years and the only thing that they have observed is "Glenn is a lucky player".

"Yes, except if three red units engage two blue units while blue keeps a third in reserve, if dice are equal then blue will suffer 50% more losses than red. Unless blue's reserve outfit gets a big bonus for coming in later or the rules put red's units in disorder (with a severe penalty), red will have the advantage. And so it is with many games."

I think your mixing up the value of reserves with the number of troops committed to an action. If red has a 50% advantage in numbers in a combat then it probably should win, unless other factors are in play like quality, morale, etc.

After red has won the first combat the reserves will only have value if red has some lingering effects that will impede it's combat effectiveness. If your rules don't provide that possibility then yes of course the reserves are basically fighting fresh troops which greatly reduces their chances of success.

@vtsaogames
"Twilight of the Sun King (simple rules) make supported lines the norm. Units without rear support get -1 on their morale rolls. Everyone doubles up."

To me, this is not reserves. This just serves to make each 'unit' in effect twice as deep.

No. not reserves but it does give one a reason to use supported lines, as someone noted above.

the reserves are basically fighting fresh troops which greatly reduces their chances of success.

My point exactly. See original post.

As for the red/blue example, both sides are equal in strength. But most rules punish the side keeping a reserve.

"As for the red/blue example, both sides are equal in strength. But most rules punish the side keeping a reserve"

If that happens more often then not, then the rules are pretty shallow. It should be difficult for two sides to match up equally. Reserves generally work best if they are facing an inferior opponent. Either in quality or in numbers or both. If your not giving any consideration to the previous combat or to fresh troops, etc., it's the rules. It's not the use of reserves that's the problem.

If at the end of the day you are going to pick up your soldiers and go home, what is the incentive not to throw all of your troops in to try and overwhelm your opponent? Or to use your elite troops and get the die roll bump? Or to send some worn out unit on a suicide charge? The problem isn't really with the rules that we are using. It is with the nature of the game.

If you want to alter it, perhaps look at some incentive outside the confines of the game itself. Perhaps if the loser loses more than half his troops, he has to buy the beer.

I got tired of rules that penalized the use of reserves and so I set out to create some that rewarded their use, and for the same reasons they are used in real life, including fatigue and the power of fresh troops. I guess the easiest way of describing it would be just to link to them.

link (scroll down a bit)

Everyone is invited to take a look.

Napoleon always attempted to have the enemy commit their reserves, tying up all their troops before he landed his knockout with his reserve that couldn't be countered. Having reserves tomorrow didn't have much to do with his battle strategy today unless he was 2000 miles deep in Russia.

I think there is a mixing of 'supports' and reserves. Tactically, they were different things. Supports, second lines etc. were tied to particular units to their front or flank. Reserves were self-contained forces that the commander committed where he wanted them.

The idea that a unit with 'supports' behind or to a flank should get a +1 or avoid a -1 in combat I think misses the whole reason for supports. They had no impact on combat in the front lines unless they DID something. The notion that there happens to be a line standing someplace close, the front line fights better doesn't have any basis in reality/history that I have seen.

Those tired troops that had their morale raised by the reserves showing up were responding to the reserves' involvement in combat, their influence on the battle, not because they happened to be standing someplace.

We all know why reserves were important in combat historically and today. It's just a matter of whether they are in the game play. Supporting lines is another issue and not as well represented, particularly when confused with the use of reserves.

Fields of Blue and Gray is a neat little system! I'm going to have to try it out. Is there a cheat sheet with all the tables and charts?

- Ix

Mcladdie the second line, rear support bonus might, depending on scale ( e.g. In AOE) mean they do something inside the glogal fighting line(s) represented, such as replacing locally ( not shown in scale) a broken unit..
And Marbot I think, others too, stressed the morale effect ( expectations?) for the first line toknow they can fall back on others to reform, those can cover their flanks, can plug a hole etc.
A lot is about morale, confidence and expectations.
So in games it is a tool to
Push players to deploy the right way
Give a simplified effect for the above. True maybe no need if turn time is very short but mostly for batles vs skirmish we get 15-30 minutes per turn so " things happen" we don't show.

Hello Bill N!

"what is the incentive"

Great question, none if you enjoy losing. All strategies can work. The problem with your three is if they don't work then what? A reserve usually only works if your main force has managed to somehow weaken the enemy. Once they are off balance the reserve goes in for the kill. If you can't knock the enemy off balance then a reserve will probably not be of much value to you.

I've played a lot of games where I won and never even had to use my reserve. My main attack took them out or I just crushed their assault on me.

Keep in mind that just having a reserve is not a guarantee of victory. It generally also requires a certain skill level to use it effectively. That means you have a plan to weaken the enemy and then can time and execute your attack to realize it's maximum potential. People who often find that they are being punished for having a reserve don't follow these principles very well, or just have very bad rules.

I have to correct my previous statement as I do now recall playing some rule sets where you could not use a reserve effectively. These were generally home grown rules that are designed by people who don't really understand battlefield dynamics. So if your confident that you have skills to use a reserve but can't then have a close look at your rules. I've played against lots of players who even after years of playing have no skills in planning or executing a reserve attack.

Best regards,

Glenn

Mike the Analysit: ",,,,,,,Secondly, it is the formation that remains under control as the rest of the battle develops. It is able to respond to new orders and can add impetus to various parts of the battle.,,,,,,,,,"

Excellent idea. Also realistic. Units that are engaged have a practice problem with getting the word out for a change in position or task, as well as possible embarrassment when they are trying to execute an action in the face of the enemy. Reserve units, should be in control and respond quickly.

Maybe we should rethink what the unit density of the front line (/column/formation) should be. What I usually see in our wargames is that there are more than enough figures to give at one continuous line of the densest formation, if not also a dense close-in support line. An uninteresting slugging match results. If the total troops available were an incomplete first line (with flanks and gaps), several things would result. First, maneuver to exploit these would become a part of the game. (Very interesting in its own right). Secondly, it would not take as many turns to make a break in the enemy (or your) line and reserves would come into play for plugging the gap. Hence, reserves would become necessary. (Historically, didn't every commander love the idea of overlapping and rolling up an enemy flank? Extending one's line is not a bad idea if it allows you to curl around the enemy's flank.)

Another train of thought is that perhaps our rules and practice allows way too much positional and movement fiddling of a line of battle which is both dense and in contact with the enemy. A change in the orders and purpose of a section of a densely packed part of your force, should take a long time to achieve. There were NOT radios, there were not dozens of couriers who could quickly go to every battalion level command to effect such changes. There was not an ability to co-ordinate several parts of a densely packed battleline over several moves to achieve the same. If these were made more clumsy, then the reserves (or units forwarded from the second line of battle) would become useful to reinforce any breakthroughs. (Comment: how often have you ever seen a wargame battle with several lines of battle set up?)

Later in the day, the commander of the other reserve unit near the center, the V Corps, Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, heard recommendations from Maj. Gen. George Sykes, commanding his 2nd Division, that another attack be made in the center, an idea that intrigued McClellan.

However, Porter is said to have told McClellan, "Remember, General, I command the last reserve of the last Army of the Republic." McClellan demurred and another opportunity was lost.

September 17, 1862, Battle of Antietam.

And Marbot I think, others too, stressed the morale effect ( expectations?) for the first line to know they can fall back on others to reform, those can cover their flanks, can plug a hole etc.

jcfrog:
Would you know where that is discussed in Marbot? The contemporary military men are the experts here.
I am trying to how that the first line of men would even know there were others 150 to 300 yards behind them, or knowing their location, believe that whatever the supporting line was going to do, it would save their collective frontline behinds the enemy, who inconveniently would be closer if not within bayonet range.

The only rules I am interested in are those that model the original reasons for having supports and reserves-- rather than any old rule forcing the players to 'act like' historical commanders. The idea is to have player decisions based on actual combat dynamics rather than game mechanic straight-jack.

Just to be contrary: I suggest there were many times in real battles when keeping a reserve was not the right thing to do, so our rules should not penalize the player who wisely commits everything he has.

I'm not disputing the fact that a well-timed commitment of small reserves can tip the balance in a big fight. But I am saying that it is often possible that they could have been even more use if committed earlier.

Consider these battles:
Inkerman
Montebello
Antietam
The Wilderness
Spicheren
Borny / Colombey
Mars-la-Tour
Gravelotte
Beaune-la-Rolande
Slivnitsa

What do they have in common? Victory was seized (or defeat denied) by the side that threw everything in as fast as it could; and/or defeat incurred (or chance of victory squandered) by the side that held too many troops back for too long.

Chris
Bloody Big BATTLES!
link
bloodybigbattles.blogspot.co.uk

Just start to place your units in at least two lines of battle, and then place a reserve behind this line (consisting of two lines of battle).

Then you have to think how to do passage of lines (very difficult before the battle column on the battle field) how first and second line are supporting each other, acolé or non accolé.

It is how to bring your units into action – so that they support each other – and to develop your units.

In the 7YW virtually the whole second battle line was the reserve and it was difficult to support each other.

In the Napoleonic wars – along with the ordre profond – this changed and highly felxible deployment right on the battle field as possible.

Keeping a reserve was the right thing to prevent a collapse of ones army, Jena – Prussians had no reserves, threw in all they had – piecemeal, end in utter rout.

Eylau, in case Ney would not have appeared just before nightfall – Lestoq may have rolled up the French flank.