Old… but still interesting to read…
"Most of what is written on Greek and Roman naval warfare of the Classical period is concerned with technology, personnel and tactics, with little regard for the strategic employment of naval forces. Typical of this is an entry from the Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare on naval warfare with the comment that no ancient state ever attempted to deploy naval forces without a land objective; a comment that betrays a lack of understanding of the employment of naval forces: sea power is of course always aimed at influencing events ashore, either directly or indirectly.[1]
This is further demonstrated by the comment that ‘ancient naval warfare was never about the control of the open ocean' – naval warfare is not generally concerned with control of the open ocean; there is little there. As Geoffrey Till has said, the sea is unique in that it is largely unowned and unownable, that possession of the sea is not generally an object of maritime operations – there has never been a maritime ‘front line'. Though this concept can be potentially challenged by the rise in conflicts over maritime boundaries and the subsequent use of navies to patrol sections of open ocean, it is a recent trend and a debatable one. Primarily, naval forces are used to control harbours, landing spots and sea lines of communication. While the latter is a modern term, it is nevertheless readily transferable to the ancient world in the form of trade routes and, given the technology of the time, sailing routes that would allow warships to safety land as required for crew rest.[2]
Similarly, modern scholars of maritime warfare are generally dismissive of classical naval warfare as worthy of study. An example is James Cable's treatment of Classical naval warfare in his The Political Influence of Naval Force in History, where he covers naval warfare before 16th century in a mere four pages. Overlooked is the use of the ancient Greek trireme as a weapon in itself, rather than just a platform for soldiers, as well as Athenian use of sea power for coercive diplomacy; bullying the island city-states of the Ionian region with her navy so that they might join the Delian League. It is clear that although technology, social and environmental pressures and priorities may change, the strategic uses of sea power endure. Though requiring caution, the study of the employment of classical naval forces reveals the longevity of sea power and maritime strategy…"
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Amicalement
Armand
