"Horse & Musket era: The commanders' role in rallying units" Topic

I was thinking about how some games in the H&M era have commanders at various levels acting like goalies, diving to the left to stop the 33rd infantry battalion from running away, then diving to the right to rally the 5th hussars. While I've read about commanders rallying troops, should they really be spending time plugging holes in the dike? Did senior commanders do the majority of rallying, or did units tend to rally on their own (meaning NCOs and battalion commanders)? Should rallying units be an important role for upper-level commanders, and where should that rallying role stop or start (division? corps? army?) How should this be reflected in rules?

Apart from anything else, what role do our little plastic or metal commanders have in wargaming?

They provide an invisible umbrella under which the units in their command can function. They provide dubious + factors if they're attached to a unit in melee. They die & cause morale to plummet…..not that much really. Thank goodness they are 'rally goalies'. It gives them something to do.

Much like real life, it is up to the commander to decide if he is more valuable where he is at, or if he needs to go encourage a unit. One way to try and limit this is to not allow commanders to react to things they cannot see so, if a general does not know about/cannot seen the 5th Hussars running away, he can't do anything about it. Of course, a lot of gamers don't like this because they can see the entire battle.

I'm with Ochoin. In most rule sets the commander is a hybrid representing the commander's person (leading a charge) and an abstract game concept (command radius, rallying).

As to rallying, that very much depends on the level being gamed. I'm of the opinion that for the most part units will rally – or not – on their own. In a sense a unit needs a breather – and in that space will rally or not. The breather may come from a commander, or it may come from an NCO who halts them men and has them drink up their canteens, reload, etc.

Naturally, I like how Grande Armee handles this. A routed brigade is removed from the table. It is not "anywhere" but rather a stream from where it broke to the rear of the table. It gets one rally attempt in which case it reforms, otherwise is gone for the day. If it rallies it reforms within command radius. Commander plays no other role (not even adding a dubious leadership rating for the rally attempt).

The term is rally around the flag and not the commander. I agree with the other comments made here.
It should be remembered that a casting represents a commander and staff in most cases of higher level combat. In skirmish rules he would be a single guy.
The umbrella comparison is good if you realize that several staff officers are running around in the radius. I wish I could remember where I read it but in 1800s warfare a command established a rallying area before the battle of behind the closest artillery battery.
There are game design mechanics which reflect rallying from the command radius which we used in Guard du Corps, the touching of the unit to the commander, the turn delay for unit officers to rally their troops. And passing die roll chances. You need to select one that works for you.

Didn't Grant say something to the effect of "Now that the battle has started, I could just as well go fishing for all that I can do at this point."?

Hi, tshryock. If you would like answers to your questions, please look at what really happened at the levels you ask about. Some suggestions for you to check out: the writings of Ardent du Picq; "The Face of Battle" by John Keegan; Brent Nosworthy's "The Anatomy of Victory"; Duffy's "Warfare in the Age of Reason"; just to get you started.

Ochoin asks, "Apart from anything else, what role do our little plastic or metal commanders have in wargaming?" Well for me, they represent the location of the HQ and staff. this is where the communications flow in and out of. It should remain stationary and not move around the table like most games allow. It also should be a legitimate objective for the opposing side because if it is captured/destroyed, you have just taken away a major means from which the enemy can resist. (And remember, War is imposing your will upon you enemy by denying him the means to resist!)

The so called mechanic of "Command Radius" is something contrived for game purposes. I have never heard a really good explanation for it's reason for existance when related to trying to simulate any real life process. Command and Control is a process- NOT a radius. When have you ever heard of a subcommander stop his troops because he was "out of command radius" of his higher commander? C'mon, klet's be real here. That command will continue to do what it was ordered to do until it can no longer achieve it's mission.

Jerico Smith nailed it with grant's quote. Once the battle has been joined, the higher commanders are generally (pun intended) unable to control things. How many rule sets even try to account for what the unit leaders have done during the time frame of a turn, to maintain control over the men?
Morale checks? For most of my 63 years of life studying warfare and how armies worked, I have never read of one example where the unit's leadership allowed the men to see if they wanted to continue fighting the battle! War and the military is a study of developing a way to keep the cats hearded! Officers are tasked with "protecting the assets of their country" (ie- their men.) They always have the obligation to defend themselves but require orders from a competent authority to commit those resources to risk in battle. Once you understand how things work(ed), you will begin to see how such artificial concepts like "Command Radius" are mere game mechanics as they really do not simulate anything based upon more than the designer's idea of how his game should be played. Little or no effort to address a complex subject for a customer base who doesn't know any better. But as long as everyone is having fun….such rules continue to sell.

Writing rules that simulate real life processes and events does not have to be complex. It only needs to be based upon those value sets that apply to what really matters in the conduct of a battle. Do we really need so many large tables of modifiers to determine the outcome of an engagement? I suggest that if you answer yes, you enjoy tree counting.

To explain: No two men are exactly alike. Do you agree? If so, then please explain how units can be rated the same within a class. (Like average troops will always be rated as C while veterans B , etc.) So two units of "B" class troops are made up of what?…..clones? Units are made up of people- no two the same right? Therefore, leaders must have a wide range of management styles to maintain control over their men…..and again, no two leaders (being men, remember?) will ever be the same. So why not change that archane value set to something more appropriate- measuring how well the leaders of the unit are keeping the unit functioning as a unit and go from there?

Sorry for the length of this post, but it pains me to see someone ask a valid question (probably because what he has read about a period is NOT what he is getting from his game) and be fed the status quo answers that have been perpetuated since the 1960's.

All that really matters is that this is a hobby. If you are enjoying what you are playing, then the hobby cannot offer to be more for you. But if you have been playing for some time and have experienced a few quarky things happen, chances are you began to question the rules. Raise hands here….how many have ever changed a rule because the way it was written just does not work to meet your mind's image of reality you have read about? Just remember that not all of us arrive at that point at the same time. For those that do….welcome to the next level! It's becomes even more fun on this side of the page!

best to all.

v/r
Tom

George Washington rallied routing troops more than once. And they ignored him more than once. Rolled high, rolled low.

Tom, I've always seen command radius as a "forcing" mechanism to keep friendly troops in contact with one another--at least in tactical level horse and musket rules. If there is no penalty for troops breaking away from the main line, the whole idea of linear warfare breaks down. There are other ways to do this, of course, but command radius is one of the more effective ones. It's a gameism designed to illustrate a very important concept. Just a thought.

BY

I think that Grant's quote should be taken in context. He spent a good portion of his time at Shiloh, rallying troops, even though there were several creeks and rivers to fish from in the area. Grant was talking about battles like the Wilderness where he commanded hundreds of thousands in difficult terrain.

Most Corps commanders from Marmont, the Russian general Wuttemburg to Longstreet all agreed that the three things they were left to do once the battle was joined were:

1. Determine where to send the reserves
2. When to call a general advance or general retreat
3. Rally and reform troops.

The same was true of Army commanders. This is exactly what Napoleon did at Austerlitz and Jena.

But that is not the same set of roles seen for division and Brigade commanders, though rallying troops was something they did.

As for command radius, the question is which mechanics called 'command radius' are we talking about? It was conceived of and first used in Avalon Hill's Gettysburg, if IIRC.

In most cases it is a 'forcing' mechanism. It forces players to keep troops together, but not for the tactical reasons that led real commanders to keep troops together. It is sort of like tying someone's arms to their sides so they will 'act like' real soldiers at attention.

The best 'rationale' I have read for the command radius was given by Bob Coggins on the TMP. He gave the distances a horse and rider could travel in X amount of time delivering orders. Unfortunately, that had little to do with how large numbers of troops were controlled… particularly when most 'command radius' represent distances that riders could traverse several times within most time scales.

The question is how troops were actually controlled on the ground by black powder officers, and what game mechanics would mimic those methods.

In Lee Kennet's "The French Armies in the Seven Years' War", he speaks about the issues with How Regiments were created and organized. Since officer positions were still purchased in many countries, it would be unfair to order a patrol out from just one company, if they did not return intact, the loss would be devistating for that Company commander and could ruin him, financially. Therefore, that patrol would consist of detachmants from all the companies and the risk would be equally shared. When that happened, one has to ask just how effective was that ad-hoc unit since the men came from different companies and served under different leaders.

Back to command radius:In the examples that McLaddie provides us, there may be enough time to deliver a message, but nearly inpossible for a commander to have knowledge of a situiation, digest the threat, devise a plan of action, pass it either verbally or written to a messenger, the messenger delivers it without taking more time to find where the heckk the intended officer was within his own OA, for the intendant to read, translate the new order to actions and get the men acting upon itt all within the typical time a game turn represents!

Linear warfare is not just at the lower levels, but deployment, in depth at the grand tac level as well. Keeping everyone "in position" was difficult, at best, even with the help of those officers functioning as Mestre d'Camps. Staff officers were generally staff officers because of their social structure and not known for their expertise!

So what "I" propose and an answer to McLaddie's question posed in his last sentence is this: Provide multiple challenges vying for the higher levels of command's time/efforts. Let the player decide what he needs to spend his time on. I don't think a designer needs to try to cater for all instances within a repretoir of mechanics the leader could use, but rather, focus upon the degree of success his choices have on the operation of his army up to this point in time (turn). After all, is it not the effects we dice for (what did our fire do to the target?; Did the unit stay or run away? etc.)?

Yes, indeed, ZOCs were in my first wargame (Tactic's II..a 1957 edition!) Command control in that game only played a part in the Organization. (As a kid, I used mine to plug holes in the line for defense because it allowed me to use my "Fightn'" units that could attack, as a reserve. Yes, very gamey! (but effective within the existing rules.)

Back to command radius:In the examples that McLaddie provides us, there may be enough time to deliver a message, but nearly inpossible for a commander to have knowledge of a situiation, digest the threat, devise a plan of action, pass it either verbally or written to a messenger, the messenger delivers it without taking more time to find where the heck the intended officer was within his own OA, for the intendant to read, translate the new order to actions and get the men acting upon it all within the typical time a game turn represents!

Tom:
And how do you know this is "nearly impossible?"

Becasue in this day and age of GPS , radios and varying "nets" with satellite photos-real time, unless you have dedicated assets, it is barely possible to accomplish within 15 minutes. I have tracked how long it takes for a Battalion HQ (yes, modern times) to act upon actionable intel and the fastest I have seen was around 25 minutes, longest two days, with an average being 1.5 to 2 hours before the company commander received direction as to what the Btn CC wanted done. It took another 20-30 minutes to get the affected platoon(s) moving towards that goal.

In H&M times, with his command scattered over large swaths of terrain, often barely visible, with time it takes for a galloping messenger such distance would not leave much time for leaders to make decisions and /or to get units moving in a new direction or posture within a typical 15 minute turn.

IIRC, McLaddie, you might have some first-hand experience with such modern matters yourself?..

Cheers!
Tom

In H&M times, with his command scattered over large swaths of terrain, often barely visible, with time it takes for a galloping messenger such distance would not leave much time for leaders to make decisions and /or to get units moving in a new direction or posture within a typical 15 minute turn.

Is that what the commanders themselves reported, trained for, and expected? What was the decision-cycle they anticipated? If it was 'nearly impossible', obviously they wouldn't try and do something else. If the decision-cycle was indeed longer than most game turns, then what are we talking about time-wise?

I have tracked how long it takes for a Battalion HQ (yes, modern times) to act upon actionable intel and the fastest I have seen was around 25 minutes, longest two days, with an average being 1.5 to 2 hours before the company commander received direction as to what the Btn CC wanted done. It took another 20-30 minutes to get the affected platoon(s) moving towards that goal.

I think the problem with this analysis is that H&M battles bear little relationship to modern combat, in distances, organization, combat missions, communication methods, command responsibilities and SOPs. It is comparing apples and oranges.

for example, The distance between a battalion commander, a 'platoon' and/or a company in the H&M era was measured in tens of yards, not hundreds or even thousands as it is today.

From what I read of the period (and yes, the specific period, national organization and even individual personality can be involved), there still was (and had to be) a central point for the commanding general to receive the upward flow of communications. You are right in that there is no comparison between now and back then. My point was that what might be possible now (the process completed within 15-30 minutes) it may take an hour or more in the H+M periods.

Even at the battalion level, what command to the companies etc. downward would be issued? How long would that take for the regimental to the company to the platoons to the individual soldiers take? It is well beyond the 15 minute (typical) time limit of one turn. Also, what if the porder is misunderstood at some level and gets worse as the "Game of telephone" results begin to take effect? Also, at what point within the 15 minute turn would all of this happen? (Beginning, 4 minutes in, 5, 10 14?)

So rather than trying to model the process, (be aware of what the game is trying to simulate happening and of all the infinate possiblilities that could influence) why not just provide the gamer with the situation he now has to work with? (ie: focus upon the value set of "results" and NOT try to explain how the General's aching ingrown toenail is affecting his judgement today?)

Such an approach is simple, to the point and keeps the game moving while presenting the gamer more of a challenge at the level he is playing at. (Having to deal with what to do next when the army is not doing what he ordered as quickly as he wants?) There is a saying that planning does not mean much but without planning, the battle is lost.

So while the General may roam the field where HE feels the need for his presence is (most likley where his main effort is occuring), his chances of reacting to something going wrong elsewhere adds even more time (thus less ability to influcence events elsewhere before he may even know about it….

tshryock: Did any of this help you in answering your question?

I play games. I am quite happy for my commander to take his place either leading from the front or to bolster morale of those around him by his mere presence. Units in my game halt and self rally or they skeedadle.

You are right in that there is no comparison between now and back then. My point was that what might be possible now (the process completed within 15-30 minutes) it may take an hour or more in the H+M periods.

Tom:
First of all, that is a question that was very important to H+M military men. Second, because of that, what *might* be possible was closely studied and methods described both as treatises and in AARs.

Even at the battalion level, what command to the companies etc. downward would be issued? How long would that take for the regimental to the company to the platoons to the individual soldiers take? It is well beyond the 15 minute (typical) time limit of one turn.

You are asking basic questions about how commands were communicated. Some of it would depend on what commands were being issued and at what point of a battle…even at what point of an advance or defense.

A brigadier in a SYW, Napoleonic up through ACW could issue an order to his brigade [say 2,000 to 4,000 men] in less than 20-30 seconds down to the individual soldier. Many Napoleonic officers referred to this communication as 'instantaneous.' For a Division commander, [10,000 men] depending again on the circumstances, such a command could usually be given, received and acted on in less than a minute.

That is true of both infantry and cavalry.

So in trying to extract an answer from the command radius discussion that reignited: Rallying troops appears to be accepted as a valid action for a commander at just about any level (which was my base question).

If you believe in command radius for a commander, then it makes sense that rally attempts could only take place within that radius.
If you don't believe in command radius, rallying troops can be done using some other mechanism -- base-to-base contact, spending a command pip, etc.

I'm assuming that rallying troops would be a lot of work -- with all the shouting and sword waving and issuing of threats, grabbing of flags -- and if a commander is attempting to rally a unit, he should probably not be doing much of anything else?

I'm assuming that rallying troops would be a lot of work -- with all the shouting and sword waving and issuing of threats, grabbing of flags -- and if a commander is attempting to rally a unit, he should probably not be doing much of anything else.

Probably in many cases. In some, not so much. Soult used lancers and small bodies of infantry to stem the tide at the end of Waterloo.

If you believe in command radius for a commander, then it makes sense that rally attempts could only take place within that radius.
If you don't believe in command radius, rallying troops can be done using some other mechanism -- base-to-base contact, spending a command pip, etc.

It isn't a question of what you believe in. This isn't a religious question. It is a question of what that radius or 'pips' represent in the capabilities of an officer…based on the historical record. That is the history being modeled.

If it is a question of attempting to rally every routed unit within some 'command radius', it would have to be a feally small radius… for all that sword-waving and yelling to affect those around the officer. It would be far more reasonable given the task and physics, not to mention the historical record being modeled, for the officer to be attached to the unit/units being rallied. The same is true for the pip mechanisms.

I ran across this interesting account of rallying troops in Mikaberidze of compilation Russian Eyewitness Accounts of The Campaign of 1807

This was written by Aleksey Sherbatov, a 25 year-old Major General in the Russian army about his first action, part of an effort to delay the French:

This was my first battle and, despite having no prior military experience, I was given command of the position where the enemy directed his main attack, seeking to turn our position and cut off our line of retreat to the main army. During the battle my dispositions somewhat reflected my inexperience--at first I occupied the woods as only a novice would do but upon seeing that the enemy anticipated me with his skirmishers and thereby breatly threatened me, I made the fortunate decision to abandon the woods and take up position in the open plain. I must note that my entire regiment consisted of young and previously untested soldiers and that like me, not a single staff or junior officer had experienced war before.

Coming out of the woods with its left flank, one of the battalions… moving at the head of the column came under fire from the enemy skirmishers, who had managed to get through the woods, became disordered and began to retreat in disorder, veering to the side. This disorder soon spread through my entire detachment because fear, like electricity [elektrism], spread in an instant from the head of the column to its end, and my own regiment became disordered as well. Observing the shameless retreat of this diordered corwd, I galloped to the fleeing standard-bearers of my regiment, jumped off my horse, grabbed a flag and rushed with it to the spot where the detachment had to be rallied. All the other standard-bearers followed me and, in turn, the disordered battalions followed them. Upon reaching the rallying line, I ordered my adjutants to place flags at battalion distances so the soldiers could rally accordingly. This was accomplished at once and other regiments followed this example and the disorder was thus extinguished. This incident showed that it was inexperience, rather than cowardice, that was at the root of this momentary disarray and I considered myself fortunate that in my very first battle I was able to save myself and the troops entrusted to me from shameful behavior. As the result of my dispositions, the enemy was contained until the night fall.

This is interesting for a number of reasons:
1. The inexperience of the entire detachment, officers and men.
2. How Sherbatov was able to rally the troops.
3. The ability of the adjutants who could place flags at "battalion distances" by eye…over several hundred yards.
4. The cascade effect of the disorder AND the rallying of the troops. A number of rout mechanics mimic the cascade of routing units, but none of them include the cascade effect of troops rallying.
5. Sherbotov's effort at analyzing of the quality of his command and their actions.
6. And to the point of the thread: Sherbotov's effort was very local--one flag--and the resultant rallying doesn't seem to have taken that long…even for the entire detachment.

#4 is VERY interesting. Had never thought about that before. Cascade rallying…hmm.