GreenLeader | 02 Sep 2015 2:59 a.m. PST |
I am by no means an expert on this battle, but have been reading Antony Beevor's 'Ardennes 1944' (highly recommended – excellent) and find myself thinking: what on earth was the point? Did anyone (other than the totally derranged Hitler) think it could ever achieve anything? I understand the logic of attacking at the weakest point in the Allied line, and using poor weather to diminish the Allies' air power, but it still strikes me as having been doomed to failure from the very start – Patton was able to push his army up from the south, which though was done quickly, shouldn't have been a surprise to anyone; Horrocks was quickly able to bring the British XXX Corps ('four veteran divisions' as per Beevor) in to put pressure from the north and of course the 82nd and 101st were available to be rushed forwards. So even had the Germans smashed their way another 100km further west, would it have made a difference? From reading Beevor, it just seems this would have made them in an even worse position, and easier to cut off. Long story short, my (admittedly limited) understanding is that the Germans simply did not have the numbers of mobile divisions to make it work, and (worse still) lacked the ability to adequately supply the ones they did have. Sure, it caused panic for a few days and was a bolt from the blue, but could it ever have really worked? Of course, sitting on the defensive would not have worked either, I imagine, but launching the counter-strike seems to have been madness to me, even allowing for hindsight. |
GildasFacit | 02 Sep 2015 3:23 a.m. PST |
It was believed in some parts of the German high command (and not just Hitler) that the US armies were fragile and that the US government would sue for peace after a heavy defeat, particularly one that involved a large casualty list. Obviously there was plenty of evidence that this was NOT the case (the battles in Italy, for example) but logic doesn't always matter much in military decisions – even relatively sane ones. Another aspect is that the German high command simply did not realise the sophistication of the allied command, intelligence and logistics operations. This alone made their plan doomed to failure. Their assumption that the loss of the depots in the allied rear would paralyse them and remove the threat of immediate counter-attack was always false. Finally the Germans always got the luck when they needed it in the early part of the war, some of them just kept on believing that would always happen, no matter what the reality. |
Skarper | 02 Sep 2015 3:25 a.m. PST |
No. Never could have produced a victory. The best result possible would have been to break the morale of the US – but they weathered that. If the Germans had had greater tactical success and captured Bastogne and some of the other key junctions they may just have caused enough of a shock to delay the allies moves into Germany in the Spring. The Ardennes was too little too late. The Germans were nowhere near strong enough to create a breakthrough. Better to have used the forces to hold back the Soviets and let the Allies move in in the West unopposed. But that would be sane. Hitler was not even remotely sane by that point [if ever]. |
vaughan | 02 Sep 2015 3:30 a.m. PST |
"totally derranged Hitler" that really does say it all. No one on the German staff thought it had a cat in hell's chance of succeeding but had no say in it. I think it was Patton who said the allies should fall back and let the Germans reach the coast so as to capture the whole lot of them? |
Navy Fower Wun Seven | 02 Sep 2015 3:38 a.m. PST |
Bear in mind that Hitler's backing of the first proposal for a surprise armoured attack through the Ardennes 4 years previously, also against seemingly insuperable odds, had been a stunning success – it probably coloured his thinking… Main difference this time, the opposing air forces didn't sit around drinking pernod instead of flying… |
Landorl | 02 Sep 2015 4:00 a.m. PST |
Germany was loosing everywhere. They were desperate. If there was ANY chance, they had to take it. |
Winston Smith | 02 Sep 2015 4:05 a.m. PST |
Hitler was a genius while all around him were cowards and fools who did not believe in his destiny. That's why they attacked. |
John Treadaway | 02 Sep 2015 4:15 a.m. PST |
I guess also that it's easy to say this from the stand point of knowing what the allies had to counter the Germans, which – of course – we do now. But – at the time, with limited intelligence of allied formations (who were doing quite a fine job on the disinformation front since before D-Day), teamed with desperation, plus a belief in the "gambler's luck" that Hitler's plans had seemed to have in the early days and the opportunism afforded by the weather and a bucket load of King Tigers – it certainly seemed like a good idea at the time, I guess. To him, any way. But no: the war obviously couldn't be won at that point* and so unless Hitler honestly thought that the delaying tactic of the Ardennes, as opposed to, say, hunkering down in Berlin for months while being pounded by the RAF like Hamburg, was in some way beneficial to his cause (perhaps he really did think he was on the verge of another "wunderweapon" and needed to keep the Allies well away from bases in the mountains or something…) then it was pointless. But then he was bonkers. John T * "Only the heir to the throne of the kingdom of idiots fights a war on twelve fronts" Londo Mollari
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Dynaman8789 | 02 Sep 2015 4:45 a.m. PST |
A game from XTR/Command Magazine had some lovely Victory Levels for a Bulge game that it published. If the Germans won a strategic victory then Berlin became the first recipient of the H-Bomb. Really puts "victory" in a Bulge game in perspective. |
Razor78 | 02 Sep 2015 5:02 a.m. PST |
I think too the hope was to split the allied forces and cut the British army up north off from their supply, thus forcing their surrender and possible an armistice on the Western front. Thereby leaving Germany free to fight just the Russians on the eastern front. I guess Hitler felt he could somehow reason with the West. No real chance of it working out but I guess at that point they had to try something. Even had those forces been deployed on the eastern front it would only delay the inevitable. |
korsun0 | 02 Sep 2015 5:03 a.m. PST |
read a book recently that made some good points about the problems that Germany faced before the offensive. All based on German diaries, shows how the were plenty who thought it was doomed from the start. All it would have achieved would be to delay the Allies a few months, and probably Uncle Joe would have grabbed more of Germany. |
Garand | 02 Sep 2015 8:08 a.m. PST |
Yes, IIRC there was a lot of pushback about the offensive from some of the generals, so it wasn't universally supported by the Germans. The plan evolved from a limited offensive to cut off a pocket of Allied troops and/or rationalize the defensive lines, to be launched in the fall. It ballooned from there, similar to how the Kursk offensive evolved. Damon. |
parrskool | 02 Sep 2015 8:31 a.m. PST |
Or….. was it a deliberate allied trap to lure in the Axis Army and finish them off at a stroke ? |
Jlundberg | 02 Sep 2015 8:48 a.m. PST |
By 44 the writing is on the wall and it is a matter of how the end comes. That is part of the reason I find late war to be uninteresting. |
martin goddard | 02 Sep 2015 9:03 a.m. PST |
Antony Beevor's book Ardennes throws a lot of light upon this topic. Recommended. martin
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donlowry | 02 Sep 2015 9:21 a.m. PST |
What Razor said: split the Allies by taking the British supply port (Antwerp). And give time for more wonder weapons to be deployed and used. (Actually did go some way toward splitting the Allies, when Ike put Monty in charge of everything north of the Bulge, which really rankled the US commanders.) Most of the German generals preferred the "small solution" of cutting off a part of the US 1st Army, but Hitler was correct that this would not win the war. Basically it boiled down to: Nobody has a better idea. |
Skarper | 02 Sep 2015 9:39 a.m. PST |
The better idea was to surrender – but few dared utter that even in private. |
wminsing | 02 Sep 2015 9:59 a.m. PST |
It also, on the face of it, resembled the huge gambles the Germans had taken early on in the war that had paid off so successfully. -Will |
Jemima Fawr | 02 Sep 2015 10:18 a.m. PST |
Wot Razor and Don said; Antwerp was the objective, with the intention of cutting British 2nd Army, Canadian 1st Army and US 1st Army off from their LoC. Don, did it really rankle US commanders at the time? Like so much of the Monty-bashing, that seems like a bit of post-war revisionism reflecting post-war attitudes that weren't present at the time. It made perfect sense for US 1st Army to have been transferred *back* to 21st Army Group, with each Army Group taking responsibility for one flank of the salient (particularly as the British XXX Corps was to take responsibility for the tip of the salient at Dinant, on the right of US 1st Army). They had been part of 21st Army Group before, so the senior commanders mostly all new each other and the command structure was mainly still in place. |
4th Cuirassier | 02 Sep 2015 11:22 a.m. PST |
AIUI the thinking was that nothing the Ardennes force could accomplish on the eastern front could alter the outcome of the war, so use those forces on the western front, where the prospect of success, if not high, was at least not zero. If you have a choice between two options, one with no chance of success and one where you win if you roll triple 6 on three D6, I suppose you reach for the three dice. |
vtsaogames | 02 Sep 2015 12:25 p.m. PST |
did it really rankle US commanders at the time? According to "A Time for Trumpets" it did rankle. The command change did make sense and that's why it was done. Monty, while a skilled commander was a tad imperious. He had many enemies among high ranking British officers. While diplomatic with subordinates he was was prickly with peers and superiors. Ike, Bradley, Patton and others had issues with him. It was during the Bulge when Ike had to tell Monty "You can't talk to me that way, I'm your boss". |
Martin Rapier | 02 Sep 2015 12:27 p.m. PST |
As above, in the war for racial dominance, the Aryans could win or deservedly perish in the attempt. Surrendering was not an option, or so the Nazi hierarchy thought. So Hitler reached for the dice and hoped for a six. And in the end Germany only surrendered when it was physically occupied by Allied forces. These are not the calculations of rational people, but adherents to a fetish death cult. |
Who asked this joker | 02 Sep 2015 12:29 p.m. PST |
I never gave it much thought. However, given that the Germans were creating essentially a salient between two armies, there was a real need for extra troops to hold it which they did not have. The allies definitely had the right strategy by letting the main assault come in (like they had a choice!) and attacking the base of the bulge where the enemy was weakest…at least in troop quality. It really would have taken a major blunder for the allies to lose that one. |
Brian Smaller | 02 Sep 2015 1:35 p.m. PST |
However, given that the Germans were creating essentially a salient between two armies, That was my thought as well – even if they had separated the allies a couple of pincer attacks and their entire breakthrough force would be isolated. Also, they couldn't replace their losses even if they had achieved their strategic objectives. At best it would have delayed the advance into Germany until summer in my opinion. |
Weasel | 02 Sep 2015 2:36 p.m. PST |
From the German perspective, it was do or die. As Rapier suggests, the entire ideological machine was built around the idea that will was enough to win and that Germans, for inexplicable reasons, had more will than their opponents. There really was no scenario at that point that would lead to anything from complete defeat of Germany. |
Robert666 | 02 Sep 2015 2:45 p.m. PST |
"in the war for racial dominance" Martin Rapier, is this what we are calling WW2 now? |
Weasel | 02 Sep 2015 3:15 p.m. PST |
For the Nazi's it was a war for racial dominance. I mean, Lebensraum, exterminate the Slavs and Poles and all that. Not exactly controversial is it? |
hagenthedwarf | 02 Sep 2015 4:40 p.m. PST |
The better idea was to surrender – but few dared utter that even in private. For whom? The Nuremberg Trials suggest that Adolf Hitler was not quite the idiot people seem so keen to make him. More to the point was how was he able to keep his armies fighting for so long in the face of evident defeat … why indeed did so few utter it even in private. Hitler was faced with dismal prospects so had to gamble with what he had. In fact he had no chance but he did not have historical hindsight on how badly outnumbered he was so he chanced what he thought might be a winning play, although his generals already knew the attempt was too ambitious. |
cosmicbank | 02 Sep 2015 6:11 p.m. PST |
Hitler = crazy all you need to know. |
zoneofcontrol | 02 Sep 2015 7:00 p.m. PST |
The other thing to consider that may well have played into all of this is the agreement on the division of Germany post war. Although not finalized until the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the discussions and an agreement to the dividing into spheres of control and influence were begun in 1944. One wonders how these affected the various allies and their reactions knowing that certain territorial areas were already decided. Obviously, you need to blunt and defeat the attack. Just how hard are your going to push back with your counter thrust knowing you could be spilling blood for land you are predestined to turn over anyway. The UK was beginning to strain under manpower requirements. The US was beginning to tinker with a post-WWII/peacetime economy. How do you want to finish winning a war that is going your way? Indeed, it had to be finished and at a price. But just how hard and how many times do you want to hit that nail on the head? |
ochoin | 02 Sep 2015 7:26 p.m. PST |
. How do you want to finish winning a war that is going your way? Indeed, it had to be finished and at a price. But just how hard and how many times do you want to hit that nail on the head? What an excellent point. WW1 ended "too soon" because of war weariness. Hitler would have been well aware of this. Was he gambling on the Allies refusing to pay a further price? |
Mark 1 | 02 Sep 2015 11:17 p.m. PST |
Bear in mind that Hitler's backing of the first proposal for a surprise armoured attack through the Ardennes 4 years previously, also against seemingly insuperable odds, had been a stunning success – it probably coloured his thinking… Indeed. I think too the hope was to split the allied forces and cut the British army up north off from their supply, thus forcing their surrender and possible an armistice on the Western front. Thereby leaving Germany free to fight just the Russians on the eastern front. These are the critical issues. Hitler hoped that a breakthrough in the Ardennes, as in 1940, would allow his forces to dash to the sea. He was trying to write the script of Dunkerque II: the British Run Again. He hoped that hammering on the Americans, then splitting the allies and cutting off the British, would lead to a breakdown in their alliance. Many many times during his rise to power, and as part of his maintenance of and expansion of power, his political and military successes had been built on the tactic of dividing his opponents, separating them and putting their immediate interests at odds with each other. It worked to separate France from Belgium and The Netherlands in 1938-40, to separate the Western Allies from the Soviet Union in 1939/40, and to separate the British from the French in 1940. He used it to bring the Romanians into the Axis alliance, and to get the Hungarians into the war. The "genius" of Ike was his ability (and deliberate priority) of keeping the western alliance in place not only as a theoretical political alliance, but as a functional military alliance in practice. Hitler was unable to even consider that his "genius" for generating conflict among his opponents was insufficient to fracture the Western Alliance. The Ardennes was too little too late. The Germans were nowhere near strong enough to create a breakthrough. Ah, but the Germans in fact WERE strong enough to create a breakthrough. And they did, in fact, create a breakthrough. But they had given up on mobility in favor of combat staying power over a period of 3 years, and their forces were no where near mobile enough to EXPLOIT the breakthrough they created. The Germans never really understood how and why their early war blitzkrieg worked as well as it did. Their transition to heavier and heavier armor, even while their opponents become more and more mobile in all their forces, meant that they had all the wrong capabilities for the operation they attempted to pull off. Better to have used the forces to hold back the Soviets … The forces used in the Bulge were only marginally relevant on the Eastern Front. The Bulge was a singular event on the Western Front, but there were more than half a dozen Bulge-sized (and larger!) battles on the Eastern Front from June of 1943 to December of 1944, and the Germans were defeated every single time. They managed to scrape up enough reserves to do it ONE MORE TIME … why would we think it would make any difference on the Eastern Front, when it didn't slow the Russians down the first 8 times? -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
UshCha | 02 Sep 2015 11:34 p.m. PST |
Thhe logic was there but not the forces or planning. You do not destroy an army on the fighting at the front. You kill it by destroying its Logistics, its ammo dumps, cutting its supply lines and destroying the repair depots. That, if effective, it would have done all of the it could hold for long enough. |
Skarper | 02 Sep 2015 11:50 p.m. PST |
Well – there is the whole "Enjoy the war because the peace will be terrible" meme. For many surrender meant death or imprisonment. But given it was coming anyway – better to surrender and avoid the needless loss of life – but I do get why the didn't. As to the salient the Allies lost more men retaking the ground lost – perhaps due to an aversion for encirclement battles? |
Jubilation T Cornpone | 02 Sep 2015 11:51 p.m. PST |
The logical move with our hindsight would have been to surrender. Ignore Hitler. Lay down weapons and stop any further bloodshed. Admit defeat.I have certainly never been in that position. Not many of us have. One or two on this site perhaps. Armand (Tango) for one (in a limited sense. The British certainly weren't cutting swathes through the Argentinian countryside). I wonder how we would really react? With enemy forces driving on towards our capital whether it be Washington, London etc. Would we allow logic to dictate our course of action, stop further bloodsbhed, bow to the invader. Or would we want our military to grasp for that one impossible dice roll? |
Skarper | 03 Sep 2015 1:52 a.m. PST |
There is inertia/momentum in almost all human decision making. The troops conditioned and programmed to obey orders would not surrender without a fight – mostly. The generals even less so. When I say logical it is in the abstract sense. They were bound to try something in late 44/early 45 to somehow turn the tables. It couldn't work but in many ways they were right to try. |
Fred Cartwright | 03 Sep 2015 3:56 a.m. PST |
It was believed in some parts of the German high command (and not just Hitler) that the US armies were fragile and that the US government would sue for peace after a heavy defeat, particularly one that involved a large casualty list. I don't think any of the German generals were under any illusion about the chances of success. They tried hard to get Hitler to accept a small solution, which was a limited attack in the Ardennes aiming to trap and eliminate half a dozen U.S. Divisions, but Hitler was having none of it. I think it was Rundstedt who said something like "If we reach the Meuse we should get down on our knees and thank God!" |
vtsaogames | 03 Sep 2015 8:50 a.m. PST |
(Hitler) hoped that hammering on the Americans, then splitting the allies and cutting off the British, would lead to a breakdown in their alliance. He also hoped for a last minute diplomatic miracle, like Frederick's in 1762. Frederick was going down the drain towards the end of the Seven Years War. The Austrians were near the end of their rope, as were the Prussians. The Russians kept up their relentless pressure from the east. Frederick hung on to the bitter end. Then Czarina Elizabeth died. Her health had been an issue for a while. Her idiot son Peter took the throne long enough to call off the nearly victorious war. The Austrians threw in the towel. Little matter for Prussia that Peter was soon overthrown by the army and his wife Catherine raised in his place. Prussia had survived against most all of Europe. Hitler made reference to this miracle of the past, likely to the exasperation of his generals. He hoped FDR's passing was such a moment. |
Grumble87106 | 03 Sep 2015 10:42 a.m. PST |
Ummmm, but Roosevelt didn't die until April 12, 1945. :? How does this apply to the Bulge? |
Marc33594 | 03 Sep 2015 10:57 a.m. PST |
Let's face it, after the 20 July attempt on Hitler's life and the failed coup d'etat no one was going to seriously confront Hitler. After nearly 5,000 were executed in the wake of the debacle one did take one's life into one's own hands to point out any rational objections. By now Hitler was delusional and growing more so. He ordered divisions that were mere shadows of themselves around as though they were at full strength. This would only worsen as time passed. As has been pointed out the very character of the German Army had changed from one geared to the offense to one based on defense. Further modern wars are won by logistics and even at is peak the German logistic system was cobbled together and at best provided just enough. And while by concentrating what few effective forces were available they could still achieve a breakthrough there was no hope to maintain an offensive over any appreciable distance. Other than a few fanatical followers one would be hard pressed to find any in command positions who really believed this plan would work. But, adhering to their training, they would nonetheless press on. And, if all else failed, there was always Henry Fonda :) |
christot | 03 Sep 2015 11:43 a.m. PST |
There is the small point that the allies had made it clear that when (no question of if really) Germany was defeated there was to be unconditional surrender, I don't think even the majority of senior Nazis were under any illusions as to what that meant for them, or for that matter a large portion of the German public, given that what unconditional surrender would have meant for the allies had the roles been reversed, it is no surprise that any straw was clutched by the German command and nation as a whole. |
donlowry | 03 Sep 2015 2:35 p.m. PST |
As for logistics, there were several problems: 1. In order to keep the build-up secret/hidden, supplies had to be offloaded from the railroads well to the east of the front, in the Schnee Eifel. 2. German panzers got really awful gas mileage, often measured in gallons/mile, not miles/gallon. 3. The road network was woefully inadequate, resulting in huge traffic jams, making it difficult to impossible for the supply element to reach the troops who needed the supplies. (Some reliance had been made during planning on capturing US supply dumps, IIRC, which didn't happen in any sizable quantities. The famous story of Peiper failing to take the supply dump at Spa is not fiction.) The company of Jagtigers never did get into the fight because it was stuck in traffic far to the rear. 4. And, of course, once the weather cleared (thanks to Patton's chaplain), Allied air forces were able to interdict at will. |
Navy Fower Wun Seven | 04 Sep 2015 3:56 p.m. PST |
Just learnt that Anthony Beevor, author of the latest Bulge book, served himself, post war of course, in the 11th PWO Hussars. Counts for a lot in my book when a military historian has served and therefore has some knowledge of operational decision making. Saves them from a lot of the 'if x told y that p was at q at XXXX hours, then why on earth didn't y decide pq and so win the battle 8 hours earlier' type of history which some revisionists like to indulge in… |
GreenLeader | 04 Sep 2015 11:49 p.m. PST |
Yes indeed – Beevor writes very well, and it stands to reason that someone with a military background is rather better planced to write on military history than a pure academic. One of my pet hates in popular military history is hearing how an infantry attack 'succeeded because of overwhelming numbers', having just been told that the attacking force outnumbered the defenders by (eg) about 2:1. Such excuses for the defeat invariably have a political motivation. Not on military history, but I will always remember Sir Ranulph Fiennes' foreword in his book on Captain Scott – a man who it has recently become fashionable to dismiss as an idiot. As Fiennes (who is a great polar explorer himself, of course) said: "if you are going to criticise / comment on someone going through hell, it helps if you have been there yourself" (or words to that effect). I think the same stands true for military history. |
wardog | 06 Sep 2015 11:54 a.m. PST |
if Rommel had been in charge would he have achieved a better result |