"Austrian light infantry at Marengo" Topic

Frimont's advance guard contained two Austrian light infantry battalions. I read in Arnold's book that these both fought as regular infantry and did not deploy as typical light infantry in skirmish formation (page 149 pb edition). I have no idea if that statement is correct and I know that there is a lot of debate on TMP about Marengo.

Does anyone have any more details on these units tactics as I cannot find any information in English on this subject.

Don't know but they seem not to exist by 1805. That might be a clue about their effectiveness.

Arnold also states that Ney's Division at the battle of Ampfing [p.218] had difficulties with Austrian 'light infantry.' "With both flanks turned and a cloud of Habsburg light infantry to his right rear, [brigadier] Desperriers ordered a withdrawl." This is strange, because according to Arnold's OOBs, there were NO light infantry, jagers or Grenzer battalions, in the forces that engaged Ney's Division. They were all line and grenadier battalions. What Arnold says on page 149 is "Unlike the French practice, there were few men deployed as skirmishers to screen the advance."

Arnold makes no mention of any French skirmishers during either Ampfing or Marengo. Can we assume that no French skirmishers were deployed throughout both engagements? I don't think so.

I would imagine that the Austrians could have deloyed both light infantry battalions as light infantry if they so desired, and from Arnold's book, in 1800, Austrian line infantry could and did also deploy as skirmishers in 'clouds'.

McLaddie – thanks you are correct Arnold did say "few". I am looking at this from a wargaming perspective as well as a historical interest perspective, and wondering how the two light infantry battalions should be deployed.

At the moment I am seeing these as light infantry, but maybe only a third or half the unit pushed out as a cloud of skirmishers.

If anyone else has an opinion or references please do let me know

The list I'm working to for General de Brigade appeared in Wargames Illustrated, and is reproduced on my blog, here… link

My thoughts, which could be totally wrong, was to deploy the Am Ende and Bach as small Line units.

I recently purchased the Histoire & Collections "The Battle of Marengo" book by Olivier Lapray. This gives Frimonts Advanced Guard as containing:
Chasseurs Mariassy (4 companies): 164 men
4th Light Infantry Bach (1 German battalion): 277 men
3rd Light Infantry Am Ende (1 German battalion): 291 men
Infantry (1 Company): 115 men

Lapray lists the skirmishers in each brigade as being the Mariassy Chasseurs (Jaegers) which suggests that the light infantry weren't used as skirmishers. The illustrations in this book also show these Chasseurs as wearing helmet rather than the cocked hat.

The light infantry seem to have had both German and Hungarian regiments, of which there were 15, formed in 1798 and disbanded in 1801.

So, I'm not sure how to deploy my skirmishers in my game, but at the moment I'm leaning towards showing the Light Battalions in line and using Jaegers as the skirmishers throughout the army. I could be wrong in doing this.

Here's my "in progress" battalion…
link

Colin

Colin,
I recently found your blog ( very inspiring) and posted on it.
I agree with your interpretation of how the Light infantry could be deployed in a GdB scenario. I would allow 25% to be deployed as skirmishers, so Frimont has Jaegers and some light infantry in skirmish order.
I think putting both Light infantry units deployed as a 100% skirmishers feels incorrect.

My understanding is that the Austrians from both line and light battalions in this campaign were pretty adept at skirmishing, and would deploy as the tactical situation required.

This is because they were largely comprised of veterans of the 1796-7 and 1799 campaigns in Italy, where broken terrain was the norm. There's a contemporary quote from the 1799 campaign mentioned by Duffy which I can dig up if need be to back this up. In my view this Austrian army was as good as the Austrians ever got. Their officer ratio seems to be higher than normal, as you might expect of veterans, and in 1799 they had for the only time in the wars learnt the habit of victory.

While you shouldn't over-rate the lights it sounds as if they operate a bit like the red-coated British lights (52nd et al) in being dual purpose infantry. How your rules system best reflects that I can't say.

Here's something that might help:

From Napoleon's Great Adversary by Gunther Rothenberg, 70:

‘…despite occasional efforts to promote an effective combination of light and linear tactics, the predominance of close order fighting remained undiminished. While a noted Austrian military historian has claimed that ‘by 1798 the Austrian army had learned how to fight in open order supported by closed formations,' this contention is not supported by the evidence. On one occasion, to be sure, during the battle of Novi in November 1799, the Austrians deployed in open order, but were driven off the field in disorder. Thereafter the regulations once again stressed that skirmishing was to be employed only in a limited fashion. For instance, Zach, then chief of staff to General Baron Melas in Italy, issued instructions on 1 April 1800. ‘In action,' he wrote, ‘troops must remember not to lose time with firing. Only a few tirailleurs are necessary to screen the front. If these are followed up by troops advancing courageously in closed formation, with bands playing, and keeping their formation, such as advance cannot be repulsed by an enemy fighting in open order.' Two weeks, later, on 13 April, another army order stated that ‘recent actions have shown that unnecessary skirmishing can only be detrimental…but a determined charge delivered in close order, screened by only a few skirmishers, will certainly result in victory with very few casualties.' The Austrians had not abandoned linear tactics and the campaigns of 1799-1801 again revealed that they could not match the French in broken, wooded, or hilly terrain nor that their generals had overcome their concern with secure lines of communications and retreat.'

If they weren't skirmishing, the admonishments wouldn't have been necessary. The problem wasnt't that the Austrians weren't skirmishing, but that their superiors felt they were deploying too many skirmishers. That is a theme that is repeated from 1796 in Archduke Charles' Instructions to the instructions of Swartzenburg in 1813.

There are any number of examples of Austrians skirmishing in more than small numbers from 1794 in Holland to Ampfing in 1800. I think there is evidence to support the opinion of that 'noted Austrian military historian.' Whether Austrian commanders took advantage of that ability is another thing. It is one thing to be able to fight in column and quite another to be maneuvered and engaged to advantage.

The issue isn't 'skirmishing.' That term is too many times used as an all-encompassing title for the various forms of skirmishing employed by the various powers during the period.

The question is how were troops in open order, whether light infantry or not, were employed.

Specifically here, and elsewhere for that matter, the Austrians did not use skirmishers the same way in which the French did. The French used troops in open order with main maneuver units in combat up to and including entire regiments. The Austrians, Russians, and Prussians did not.

The Austrians specifically as stated by Rothnberg, used them to screen troops in close formation, usually as a defensive measure for protection of the main force. The French did that, but they also employed them more usually as maneuver elements and as fire support elements for units in the attack. And many times instead of using the usual three-rank formation in the front line, would instead deploy their units in a heavy skirmisher screen.

Using the term 'skirmishers' has to be taken into context by the army being discussed and it does not mean the same thing every time.

Did the Austrians use skirmishers? Yes they did. Did they use them like the French did? No, they did not. And that is the crux of the issue. Rothenberg very clearly brings this out. And this has been discussed, ad nauseum, on this and other forums.

That historian that Rothenberg was referencing is the same one that Duffy does, and which I was referring to above. That is Stutterheim, a serving Austrian officer, and dated 1812:

…in those earlier campaigns hard experience taught our infantry to fight as small groups and in open and mutually-supporting ranks, and that many officers of the army acquired… a complete understanding of the kleine Krieg – both of them prerequisites for fighting in Italy. Conversely very many of the troops of the old French army had embarked with Bonaparte for Egypt, and the newcomers from Germany could not at once get their bearings in Italy. I mention this circumstance because it told very much to the advantage of the Austrian army, and contributed greatly to the successful outcome of operations in Italy.

Incidentally the comments re the French are probably not applicable to the army at Marengo. Farbeit from me to gainsay an eminent historian such as Rothenberg, but I would not be quite so dismissive of such an authoritative witness.

Zach clearly felt that the Austrian veterans were deploying into open order too readily in 1800, using tactics useful in broken terrain in situations where close formations and cold steel would be more effective. But it does nothing to suggest that Austrians of this period were not flexible – even if they were not as adept as their French counterparts in selecting the right tactics for any given situation.

But, to get back to the OP, it does suggest why the Light battalions might have been reluctant to fully deploy in June 1800, if Zach had been laying it on thick about not deploying into open order when inappropriate.

The question is how were troops in open order, whether light infantry or not, were employed.

Kevin:
Yes, that is the question. The answer is to look at what the Austrians did in that regard. It is not whether they used skirmishers 'like the French', but what evidence is there for what they did do.

Using the term 'skirmishers' has to be taken into context by the army being discussed and it does not mean the same thing every time.

Certainly agree with that. I also agree with Matthew Green that Rothenberg had a propensity for taking a quote at a specific time and place and using to generalized over decades. Again, the question is how the Austrians used their light infantry and skirmishers.

Skirmish combat gets short shrift in most narratives. For instance, besides the example of Ampfing in Arnold's book, where the 'light infantry' comes from is not addressed when there was none in the attacking forces, he later notes that at the end of the battle of Marengo p. 183:

[Ott]"sent the Bach Light Infantry Battalion to take position in the vineyards south of Castel Ceriolo to secure his flank." They delivered effective enfilade fire that deflected the French cavalry…"

Now, every example of troops in vineyards I have ever seen have units dispersing as skirmishers…which would be only practical considering how vineyards were laid out during the time. However, Arnold doesn't say one way or the other. Lots of skirmish activity is overlooked in this way.

Did the Austrians use skirmishers? Yes they did. Did they use them like the French did? No, they did not. And that is the crux of the issue. Rothenberg very clearly brings this out. And this has been discussed, ad nauseum, on this and other forums.

No, the crux of the issue, the question of this tread, is how the Austrians used skirmishers. You quote Rothenberg:

While a noted Austrian military historian has claimed that by 1798 the Austrian army had learned how to fight in open order supported by closed formations,' this contention is not supported by the evidence. On one occasion, to be sure, during the battle of Novi in November 1799, the Austrians deployed in open order, but were driven off the field in disorder. Thereafter the regulations once again stressed that skirmishing was to be employed only in a limited fashion.

The problem with this 'clear' explanation is that the evidence doesn't support his contention, just from Arnold's very vague references demonstrate that light infantry and line infantry were used in more than 'limited fashion' in a number of cases, particularly in the light infantry's traditional terrain, woods and rough terrain like vineyards.

Whether this is 'like' the French or not isn't the question. The question is what the evidence shows the Austrians did, regardless.

For instance, here is an account from a year before:

The battle of Ostrach (21st March 1799) was fought in broken terrain. During the heavy fights in the forests around Ostrach the Austrians used their line infantry as skirmishers, too. This is noticed in the after action report of FML Baillet to Archeduke Charles
(signed Spöck, 21st March 1799).

"(…) ich unterlasse daher nicht Euer königl Hoheit den Bericht zu erstatten daß 3 Bat Lacy & 2 Batt von Schröder bereits in Lager welches links an der Strasse so von Ostrach nach Foulendorf gehet ist, eingetroffen, das 3te Bat von Schröder aber welches zu blänqueln in Wald verwendet annoch zerstreut & erst sehr spät eintreffen wird – ich habe mein Quartier in dem ersten Haus zu Specht [heute: 'Spöck'] genommen."

"(…) I will not refrain from informing Your Royal Higness that 3 battalions Lacy & 2 battalions Von Schröder already have arrived in the encampment left of the road from Ostrach to Foulendorf; the 3rd battalion Von Schröder however, which was used for skirmishing inside the forest, is still dispersed and will arrive late – my quarters are inside the first house in Specht ['Spöck' nowedays]"
Österreichisches Staatsarchiv – Kriegsarchiv, Vienna; Alte Feldakten, Deutschland 1799/3/225;

Whether that is 'like' the French is not the issue here, but what the Austrians did, demonstrating what they could do. Only when we find out what the Austrians actually did in regards to skirmishing could we make a meaningful comparison.

There's a contemporary quote from the 1799 campaign mentioned by Duffy…

In which of Duffy's works?

That historian that Rothenberg was referencing is the same one that Duffy does, and which I was referring to above. That is Stutterheim, a serving Austrian officer…

Rothenberg did not reference Stutterheim. His reference was Der Krieg von 1805 in Deutschland und Italien by W Rustow. If Rustow was quoting Stutterheim, all well and good, but I do believe that Rothenberg was referring to Rustow as the 'historian.

Rothenberg does have Stutterheim's Krieg von 1809 in his bibliography.

Of course the Austrians (all units) could deploy skirmishers which was also well recognized by the French themselves, that Austrian attacks were usually initiated by clouds of skirmishers.

I`m pretty sure this subject has been discussed here before on TMP… maybe try a search on Google?

In which of Duffy's works?

His book on Suvurov's 1799 Campaign.

At the moment I am seeing these as light infantry, but maybe only a third or half the unit pushed out as a cloud of skirmishers.

That was the general Austrian practice outline in 1807. 1/3 in the skirmish line, 1/3 as supports and 1/3 as a formed reserve. However, that means the entire force is dedicated to skirmishing even though only a third are actually in the front line at any one time.

Lapray lists the skirmishers in each brigade as being the Mariassy Chasseurs (Jaegers) which suggests that the light infantry weren't used as skirmishers. The illustrations in this book also show these Chasseurs as wearing helmet rather than the cocked hat.

EB:
Like the British later, the Austrians despensed their jagers/light infantry in company packets among the brigades, but also combined them into one battalion as required. Being light infantry in Frimonts Advanced Guard, it was expected that they would act as skirmishers… That was why light infantry/grenzers were placed in the Advanced Guard of Austrian Corps and Armies. Whether, when in contact with the enemy, they fought as skirmishers or formed infantry and how much in each formation depended on the tactical situation and the commander.

I can give you the references for that if you like.

"The Austrians had always more riflemen than us in this war. Brushmaker will still notice in 1800 "this crowd of riflemen who usually accompany the attacks by the Austrians." [Of Cugnac, Campagne of the reserve army, fall II, p. 432]
[1864 reprint of Duheme's Essai historique sur l'Infantrerie Legere page 72.] Duheme was present in Flanders during this time and has a great deal to say about the Austrians:
"These advanced guards, well handled, only disputed their ground long enough to make us waste time and men. They brought us from one position to another till they reached that which they really meant to defend. There they let us use up and scatter our last battalions whose ardour generally shattered itself against their entrenchments. Then fresh troops issued from them in the most perfect order, they in their turn, threw out skirmishers upon our flanks, and thus they charged at advantage troops dispersed and fatigued, corps in disorder and unable to rally most of their men.
Duhesme later in his work writes,
"We did not have other light infantry only the 12 battalions of foot chasseurs. The Austrians approached with more, more skilful and more tested light troops."

The Austrians had a long tradition of using light infantry – in the period of 1792 – 1815 the usual Grenz Regiments, as on other nations as well, like in France, or Britain – could fight in close and open order.

As McLaddie pointed already out – you will find Grenz regiments usually in the advance Guard, a prerogative position of light troops, when Napoleon took over a lot of Grenz regiments in 1809 they were made light infantry for good reason.

and yes indeed the topic was discussed extensivley demonstrating aptly the lack of good sources in English, the only one person with competence about the Austrian Army during the Napoleonic time would be Dave Hollins, just forget the other sources like Rothenberg.

link

As some of the fighting in the later stages of Marengo was in and around vineyards, and as discussed vineyards then are different from now. But does anybody have a visual or descriptive reference? I was in northern Italy at the beginning of the summer and was staying in the middle of a vineyard and it was not ground that you could imagine any sort of troop formation to stay in order. I'd like to see how it could have looked in 1800.

EB:
The vineyards were much the same in 1800 except for the following differences. They were patchwork like so:

or this:

instead of vast lines of vines without any trees:

link

and they didn't have the stakes and trelleses that they do today to make the vines grow out and low. Trees were often planted in the vineyard and the vines encouraged to grow up them to get the sun, sort of like this:

Though with lots more trees as in the 2nd picture above, often lines of them blocking the wind on the north side of the vines.

Stand corrected on Rothenberg's source, though there surely some overlap (Stutterheim may have been using this source). As McLaddie has said the Duffy work was Eagles over the Alps (1999) on Suvorov's 1799'campaign. The Stutterheim work he quotes is his 1812 history of the 1799 campaign in Italy. Whether this is the same Stutterheim who served with distinction in 1809 and who wrote an account of the 1805 campaign, I don't know – he died in 1811. If so he did not actually serve in Italy in 1799 – though he was at the seige of Genoa in 1800.

Does anybody know what action the Piedmontese saw? Dave Hollins, in his Osprey Marengo book, has an army list for the Seige and Piedmontese are listed there. But what happened to those units? Did they all just go home?

'…Rothenberg had a propensity for taking a quote at a specific time and place and using to generalized over decades…'

I don't agree.

Rothenberg certainly does not do that in Napoleon's Great Adversary. He covers the major topics (staff, artillery, skirmishers, etc.), by period. First he addresses the issues in the Austrian army in 1792. Then consecutively during 1792-1797; 1799-1801; the first reform period-1801-1805; the 1805 campaigns; the second reform period 1806-1809; 1809; and 1810-1814.

Skirmishers are addressed nine different times in the volume which gives an excellent picture of how the Austrians employed skirmishers.

And the Grenz are also covered, and even more thoroughly in his volume on the Grenz, The Military Border in Croatia.

And it should be noted that before the wars, the Grenz were not regular troops and they seldom fought in conjunction with formed regular troops on the battlefield. And their value as light infantry was lessened by the Austrians themselves before the period 1792-1815 by the attempt to make them regulars.

The main point with skirmishers of any army during the 1792-1815 was to employ regular light infantry in conjunction with formed bodies of troops. Not only did senior Austrian officers not like to do this, but their employment of troops in open order was usually defensive.

Lastly, Rothenberg is still the authority on the Austrian army of the period and he has yet to be surpassed.

I don't agree.

Rothenberg certainly does not do that in Napoleon's Great Adversary. He covers the major topics (staff, artillery, skirmishers, etc.), by period. First he addresses the issues in the Austrian army in 1792. Then consecutively during 1792-1797; 1799-1801; the first reform period-1801-1805; the 1805 campaigns; the second reform period 1806-1809; 1809; and 1810-1814.

Skirmishers are addressed nine different times in the volume which gives an excellent picture of how the Austrians employed skirmishers.

Kevin:
I already knew you wouldn't agree. I wasn't talking about Rothenberg's organization of the book, nor how many times he
addressed skirmishers. I was speaking of how he used references and quotes and the generalizations he made from them.

Lastly, Rothenberg is still the authority on the Austrian army of the period and he has yet to be surpassed.

If I thought he gave an excellent picture of how the Austrians employed skirmishers compared to what I have read of the primary sources, especially the ones he used, I wouldn't have said what I did. Whatever else that Rothenberg is an unsurpassed authority on, what he writes in that book and the generalizations he makes don't match well with the evidence.

Or should I simply ignore what I've read because Rothenberg is 'the authority' and just quote him?

EB:

About the Vineyards. Frank Chadwick included a Marengo scenario in his Volley & Bayonet "Road to Glory" edition. In it, he has the entire length of the roads east of Marengo traveling west to east lined with trees. [All on the south side except for the road north of Castel-Ceriolo. There the trees line the north side of the road. He writes in the scenario notes:

The tree-lined roads noted on the map are not simply lined by trees. These trees had had grape vines introduced, making them a form of tall vineyard, and providing a very thick wall of foliage. These vine-filled trees greatly reduced visibility and had a major impact on the tactics of the battle.

While not all vineyards were formed that way, a good number of them were. The idea was to get as much of the vine in the sun producing, rather than a bush where much of the plant was shaded. The common solution later in the century was to make fences and force the vines to grow out, getting the sun, rather than up which was harder to harvest.

Hope that helps.