"T-64s in Cold War Europe?" Topic

I know these were first produced in the mid-1960s, hence the designation, but from what I've read, they had a lot of teething problems early on, which apparently weren't really overcome until around 1979, or so.

There's been a lot of discussion about which tanks the Soviets, and/or their erstwhile allies/subjects were equipped with as well.

From reading those reports, and commentaries here, it seems that the T-64 was to be the premier Soviet tank back in the day, and that the T-72s were either provided to the Warsaw Pact, and/or kept in reserve in the Soviet Union, in areas away from the front lines.

Given all the teething and maintenance issues though, I'm wondering if an invasion of Western Europe had been seriously considered, if perhaps at least some of those T-72 units would have been shifted to a more forward deployment in Eastern Europe, prior to 1979?

[Pre-T-80 deployment]

Seems to me betting the "farm" so to speak, on tanks very expensive to maintain, and prone to breakdowns might not be the best offensive strategy when one goes to war. As an example, the too early rollout of the Panther tanks, on the Eastern Front during WWII, many of which broke down during their first engagement(s).

I'm not disputing the info and deployments that we've discussed previously, which do all appear to point to the T-64 being a major player, from the mid-1960s through the end of the Cold War.

However, I do find it very interesting, and perplexing, given that its teething problems weren't really fixed until about 15 years after it was first produced.

Thoughts?

Chieftain was not without problems either!!

Tally Ho!

Look at how long aircraft development took/takes and how many aircraft have operational challenges (F-104 anyone?) through their life cycles.

Why does the phrase Gearbox leap to mind Nick?

Fatman

Mako11
Part of the fact was that the T-64 was a good tank and a big advance on the T-62, as has been said all new kit has teething problems and the Soviet's well known quality control issues make it almost a standard. By the time the extent of the problems was obvious it was too late, factories had been built, contracts had been issued to cronies and supply chains set up. It was just too big to fail. Think F-35. ;-)

Fatman

Developing a modern weapon system takes a long time. Design of the Patriot missile began while Ike was in the White House, but it was not fielded until the 80s. The Soviets preferred to enter mass production sooner in the development process than the West and work the bugs out later. Most of their newest designs were issued to units close to the factories to facilitate correcting problems. The West prefers to find and fix most of the bugs before full scale production. Even then, design flaws take years to manifest themselves before a fix can be started. Mass production of the M1 began in 1979, but by 1983, the most frequent sighting of them at Ft Knox was being towed by an M88. A flaw in its armor wasn't discovered until we lost 1 in Iraq in 1991.

The T-72 wasn't without teething problems either. The split projectile/propellant auto-loader is fairly notorious.

The main problem with the T-64 was with the engine and that was only as bad as WWII era tanks, so in reality more than sufficient for war time purposes (as the tank would most likely be destroyed or heavily damaged before the engine failed).

The whole point of elite units in the Soviet military was to create strategic breakthroughs that follow-up forces (likely in T-62/55/72) would exploit. The T-72 was more reliable but it was a big step down in lethality (spotting the enemy first and landing the first accurate shot is the determining factor in tank battles).

GSFG wouldn't even have been predominantly T-64 until the mid-70s anyway, so the early T-64 units could have been babied a bit (or at least given a very short march route into NATOs lines).

Oh, I know all too well about how slowly some things can progress, especially with the most recent F-35 example.

So, should we be considering special rules for the early T-64 variants, e.g. T-64 and T-64A, to account for some of its teething issues, like some rules do for Tiger tanks, especially for the late 1960s and 1970s, before the T-64B was issued?

Then again, perhaps the engine breakdown issues only really are relevant prior to battle (check for vehicle serviceability for your force, prior to the start of the game/attack), and/or on campaigns.

Not sure how to model the dangerous loaders, and/or the very slow loading (1 round per minute) if the autoloader fails, so will probably ignore that).

Here's a list of performance capabilities, and limitations, from Wikipedia:

Capabilities and limitations[edit]

The T-64 did not share many of the drawbacks of the T-72, even if it is often confused with it:
The automatic loader is hydraulic, not electric, thus is much faster (loading cycle of 6 to 13 seconds), more reliable, and less sensitive to jolting when running off-road. It also has a "sequence" fire mode that feeds the gun with shells of the same type in less than five seconds. It is also able, in the modern versions, to turn backwards to keep a good speed at the end of the loading sequence.
Driving seems much less exhausting for the crew, thanks to assisted controls and a more flexible suspension.[22]
The ammunition is stowed at the lower point of the turret shaft, minimizing the risks of destruction by self-detonation.[citation needed]
The tank commander's cupola provides good vision, the antiaircraft machine gun can be operated from inside the turret; the commander can also control the main gun sight if necessary.

Additionally, the adoption of the autoloader was highly controversial for several reasons:
Early versions of the autoloader lacked safety features and were dangerous to the tank crews (especially the gunner, who sits nearby): Limbs could be easily caught in the machinery, leading to injuries and deaths. A sleeve unknowingly snagged on one of the autoloader's moving parts could also drag a crewman into the apparatus upon firing.[23]
Powder charges were stored separately from the shells in a vertical position, presenting much larger surface for a potential hit. Moreover, due to the lower placement of the autoloader's carousel and T-64 smaller roadwheels, the charges were covered only by the thin side armor, without the benefit of the roadwheels or the side skirts for additional protection.
The turret was poorly configured to allow the human crew to manually load the gun should the autoloader break. In such situations, rate of fire usually slowed to an abysmal one round per minute as the gunner fumbles with the awkward task of working around the broken machine to load the gun.[24]
While having smaller tank crews (three vs. the usual four) is advantageous since more tanks can theoretically be fielded using the same number of soldiers, there are also serious downsides. Tanks require frequent maintenance and refueling, and much of this is physically demanding work that several people must work together to accomplish. Most of the time, these duties are also performed at the end of a long day of operations, when everyone in the tank is exhausted. Having one less crewman for these tasks increases the strain on the remaining three men and increases the frequency of botched or skipped maintenance. This problem worsens if the tank's commander is also an officer who must often perform other duties such as higher-level meetings, leaving only two men to attend to the tank.[25] All of this means that tanks with three-man crews are more likely to suffer from performance-degrading human exhaustion, and mechanical failures that take longer to fix and that keep the tank from reaching the battlefield. These problems are exacerbated during prolonged time periods of operations.
The T-64 was criticized for being too mechanically complex, which resulted in a high breakdown rate. Problems were worst with the suspension system, which was of an entirely new and advanced design on the tank. Due to these problems, teams of civilian mechanics from the T-64 factories were "semi-permanent residents" of Soviet tank units early in the T64's initial adoption phase.[26]
The 5TDF opposed-piston engine, while powerful and compact, was very finicky and prone to malfunctions and fires. Russian expert Viktor Murakhovsky, then a battalion commander in Group of Soviet Forces in Germany reflected that in his unit the rate of the engines requiring a major overhaul was close to one per tank in a year. He also noted the difficulty of starting this engine, especially in the damp German winters, and that starting aids used by soldiers, like the high-pressure air and/or oil injection, often led to the engine fires.
The subsidiary of the State Company Ukrspecexport, the State Company Ukroboronservice, concluded the foreign economic contract for major overhaul and supply of 50 main battle tanks T64BV-1. The works will be performed by the State Enterprise Kharkiv plant of armored tanks.[27][28]

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-64

Thoughts?

I think something we tend to overlook in assessing Soviet reactions to problematic kit is their defensive mentality.

You receive your shiny new T-64 tanks with a parade and speechs and bouquets of flowers – perhaps a speech by the General Secretary… these finest product of Soviet engineering have been provided to you by hero workers exceeding all previous production norms, etc etc…

Subsquently pointing out that the autoloader doesn't work and the power plant can't get the vehicle out of the Kaserne, was not the way to get ahead in the Soviet Army…

I tend to omit reliability rules ON the table and instead factor them in when setting up the scenario.

Just remove a tank or two from the battalion and you're good.

I suspect that even up to the mid eighties you'd find plenty of T62's coming at you as well. From what I'm learning, outside of GSFG you'd find plenty of tanks that weren't a T64 or T80.

The Warpac didn't use the T62, it was too expensive. The Soviets charged a high license fee. Czechoslovakia built them for export only and I don't think any of the other members manufactured it.

Navy- you are absolutely right. I've had a couple of first hand accounts of GSFG units preparing for major exercises in the 80s signing off their vehicles as fully operational when many would essentially be unfit to fight at all due to one or other major problems with their weapons/sights/rangefinders/stabilisers/radios etc. They had been unserviceable for months and would remain so for months, and soon break again.

Soviet military industry was capable of creating incredibly advanced and innovative concepts but was absolutely terrible at mass producing reliably working versions of these.

The basic picture I have got is of Soviet AFVs that were broadly reliable as basic moving machines- but very unreliable as integrated weapons systems. The more advanced designs such as the T64 and T80 fared worst in this respect.

We definitely need to move away from evaluating Cold War Soviet hardware on their ideal "Top Trumps" data to something more like the grim reality of what was actually available to the troops. On the plus side, they did have a LOT of it….

"Just remove a tank or two from the battalion and you're good".

Yea, I was thinking the same thing, though to make it a bit more interesting/frustrating for the opposing sides, let them know they have a company, battalion, etc. of the appropriate force, but then make them roll for their vehicles out of service, instead of doing that for them in advance, just to increase the anxiety level(s) a bit.

Of course, this applies to both sides as well, since NATO vehicles had their issues and gripes as well, but perhaps were a bit more reliable in terms of quality than Soviet ones.

Mako and Cold Steel have it pretty well covered.

One other thought to bear in ind. Soviet tank crews were selected based on their height. So shoving three poorly educated uzbeks into your most modern design created some problems. It took a few years to iron out the problems with the engine, suspension and loader. Once they did, they created training programs specific to the vehicle. Once these were in pace, most problems were reduced in number.

Despite the problems, when it was working, it was at par with the best anyone had. I still think it is better than the T80 variants.

dragon6, was talking about Soviet stocks, not warpac, but a good point.

So, should we be considering special rules for the early T-64 variants, e.g. T-64 and T-64A, to account for some of its teething issues, like some rules do for Tiger tanks, especially for the late 1960s and 1970s, before the T-64B was issued?

I would.

Might be fun, at least for the NATO side.

Roll 1D20 every time you fire your 125mm cannon. On a 20, your turret crewman has been eaten by the automatic loader. Your new main gun ROF is one round per minute.

The Soviets always intended on keeping two main tanks in production and in the field. The T-64s were meant to be in the elite units while the T-55s then T-62 and later the T-72 were in the first echelon. The Soviets did not want to worry with putting better tanks (T-64s then T-80s) in units that would have high attrition early in the fight. The higher quality tanks were for the reserve echelon after the low quality ones were used as cannon fodder to open a hole through the line.

The tanks with better optics and better long range capabilities would then fight in meeting engagements following the breakthrough. Which is where those capabilities meant more.

I'm sure the T-64 had its problems, but probably not as bad as we were led to believe. It is great OPSEC to get your opponent to disregard your best tanks due to exaggerated rumors of its flaws. I recall hearing during the run up to the ground offensive during Desert Storm about the flaws of the Bradley. It supposedly had a bad transmission and was very limited in how fast it could move meaning the tanks would have to slow down too. So Saddam's army had nothing to fear from wide flanking maneuvers, the vehicles just couldn't handle it.