"Gates of Richmond 1862" Topic

Howdy,

Work continues on the Volley & Bayonet scenario book, "A Storm in the Valley 1862." At this point, a draft of the Valley scenarios are done, with editing ongoing. Now turning to the Peninsula Campaign.

Shown below is a draft map for looking at one portion of the campaign, at the Gates of Richmond.

Draft Map

Thoughts, comments appreciated.

Ponder on,

JAS

This looks like a great idea, very impressed.

Looks like something I want.

Wow, that's great news. You'll have at least one definite purchase!

Another interested buyer.

count me in!

Jesse-

Nice map.

If you extend the map slightly southward, to Harrison's Landing on the James, you could include the last two battles of the Seven Days, Glendale and Malvern Hill.

Have you put together campaign rules yet? I would be glad to let you see/barrow/develop what I've done with a very similar gridded map and what I call "Campaign Lite". We have used it many times. It was published ages ago in MWAN.

My one suggestion would be to drop the red dots as indicating a major road… really distracting with all the buildings and hard to follow. Pink and red, dotted and solid, line and double lines… any would be clearer and easier to read. Dan has a good suggestion about extending the map.

Howdy,

I considered extending the map, as the source map shows the entire peninsula. I did not do it for two reasons: (1) I wanted to focus on the approach, attack, and counter-attack on Richmond along the Chickahominy River, and (2) I wanted the aspect ratio of the map near 3:2.

You could just as easily desire to extend the map north, to show Jackson's approach to the peninsula. There is always a desire for more, but I've found focus to be an excellent guideline for developing games.

On this map (1 ft = 1200 yards), and using Volley & Bayonet, you don't really need campaign rules. A brigade or battery takes one square of road space (one foot). Yet, I will have to devise "special" Union command rules – likely similar to that used for the Antietam scenario BACW, the original V&B ACW source book.

Ponder on,

JAS

JAS:

Personally, I hate 'McClellan' rules, which can radically skew the strategic and operational options and opportunities away from anything historical.

I've found that hidden movement [at that scale] works well. That was the reason for McClellan's hesitations: Wrong information or no information, which the South took advantage of starting with Yorktown. The 'campaign light' rules I used were for V&B, and squares equaling 1/2 mile, so around 800 yards.

Anyway, I really like the Pennsular Campaign . It has so many possibilities for interesting games.

Howdy,

The philosophy of Volley & Bayonet is, if you want command confusion, simply add more players.

That said, wargamers are far more blood-thirsty than their historical counterparts, and much less concerned with the consequences of poorly thought out actions. So I've found, some mechanism for adding brakes is needed.

In the Shenandoah Mini-Campaign that brake has been to cut Union activity in half. There are four Union divisions in the game, only half of them (determined randomly) are active on any given turn. Being in-active restricts the distances for movement. Does not mean you cannot move. Yet, the Federal commanders are still far more active than their historical counterparts. So, it is not a perfect solution.

Ponder on,

JAS

My group rarely has more than two players per side and often just one, so we like command/control rules that penalize one side. Otherwise the larger side usually just goes forward and pounds the smaller side to dust.

Just finished playing a game of Montebello 1859 where the larger Austrian force has trouble getting into action against a smaller but fiercer and more nimble French force. Good game.

Different strokes for different folks.

That said, wargamers are far more blood-thirsty than their historical counterparts, and much less concerned with the consequences of poorly thought out actions. So I've found, some mechanism for adding brakes is needed.

Understood. All sorts of 'brakes' available. I've simply found that hidden movement does a lot to even the playing field and make those who charge a head with poorly thought out actions really vulnerable to more thoughtful players. As for command/control rules…There is a big difference between saddling one side with a poor command structure and making them act like McClellan or Bazaine. That certainly isn't the V&B philosophy.

Just tossing around ideas here. What would hidden movement do for Montebello? It certainly was a big issue during the actual battle…whose out there and where?

Just a thought, a map of northern Virginia done like this would be outstanding. It would open up a large number of campaigns? Ponder is that too much?
As regards rules look at the Zouave campaign rules, most of the ideas would suite your map system.

Pete,

In V&B's BACW you have the larger map for First Bull Run/Manassas. Very similar.

Play in centimeters (1cm = 100 yds) and you can have the above map on roughly a 6x10 ft. table.

Ponder on,

JAS

McLaddie,

Greg Novak wrote notes for the Union Army in the East, suggesting using only Corp Commanders for V&B. To my knowledge this has never been playtested.

There is a difference between saddling one-side with a poor command structure, and attempting to simulate actual behaviors with reasonable guidelines. No different than limiting reinforcements to their historical appearance.

Ponder on,

JAS

There is a difference between saddling one-side with a poor command structure, and attempting to simulate actual behaviors with reasonable guidelines. No different than limiting reinforcements to their historical appearance.

Ponder:
True. I was speaking about rules that force a player to behave or make decisions like a particular commander such as McClellan or Bazaine rather than those in a command structure, not a player.

Do you see the battles created on the map starting from a particular day with attendent troop positions after Little Mac reached the outskirts of Richmond, or the approach afrom off the East side of the map?

Greg Novak wrote notes for the Union Army in the East, suggesting using only Corp Commanders for V&B. To my knowledge this has never been playtested.

Not to my knowledge either. It would be interesting to see how that would work… I'm not sure what that would do to the ability of the Union to cover a historical front. McClellan also worked with 'wing commanders' of multiple corps too.

A real weakness of the Union command structure was the greater number of divisions and corps compared to the Confederates. i.e. the real problem was too many cooks rather than two few. Greg's solution still might work.

Howdy,

I have not gotten that far; I think you could do either. Notice the Confederate redoubts are not marked on the map. They and the Federal works are shown on the source map.

At Gaines Mill, the swampy creek on the western side of the battlefield was not shown on the source map either – the creek is shown.

Another key question is how to represent artillery for the respective armies: As individual batteries, grouped as battalions, or as brigade guns.

All of this illustrates historical scenario creation is not a simple, straight line affair.

Ponder on,

JAS

Tactically, the Union problem was that McClellan was never on hand to command on the battlefield, and the next-ranking Union commander was Sumner, who was in over his head with anything larger than a brigade.

Strategically, the problem was that McClellan believed that he was outnumbered, whereas any player with any knowledge of the actual campaign will know that that is not the case.

Howdy,

I think that is the common knowledge, but I'm not sure it is accurate.

Have you read:

scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/14610/7023520.PDF?sequence=1

or

67thtigers.blogspot.be/2009/09/mcclellan-signal-corps-and-his-time-on.html

Ponder on,

JAS

Strategically, the problem was that McClellan believed that he was outnumbered, whereas any player with any knowledge of the actual campaign will know that that is not the case.

Don:
Well, yeah, but 1. He chose to believe that, even in the face of relevant information, and 2. Many others, including the President knew better. Several of the Union leaders during the Peninsular Campaign stated that they knew they outnumbered the Confederates or gave relatively accurate estimates of the CSA Army's strength.

So, the real issues are not just too much information, but what McClellan did with what he had. Go back to hidden movement, and the question of 'how much of the enemy is where?' returns to more of an unknown. [Which is why I like hidden movement…]

Ponder:

Thanks for the links. 67th Tiger's post is interestingsda information. I wish he'd stated where he got it from.

Howdy,

I've found you need to start at the beginning of his blog in 2009 and read forward.

Actually, McClellan does seem to have been outnumbered at the start of the Seven Days (albeit not by 2:1)

Ponder on,

JAS

Howdy,

A better question, why did McClellan choose to disengage and retreat from Richmond?

I have seen some discussion of the Federals crossing the James and attacking from the south (as Grant did 2 years later).

Ponder on,

JAS

Oh, I'm all for hidden movement.

But I suspect that in any replay of the Peninsula, where the Union player is not George McClellan and Confederate player is not R. E. Lee, and the players know something of the actual history of the campaign -- it's going to come out a lot different than the real thing.

Oh, I'm all for hidden movement.

But I suspect that in any replay of the Peninsula, where the Union player is not George McClellan and Confederate player is not R. E. Lee, and the players know something of the actual history of the campaign -- it's going to come out a lot different than the real thing.

Don:
Well, yeah. What's the fun in replaying what already happened? And you can't make players 'unknow' the history…though I've had fun replaying various campaigns with different periods, map names and armies, only recognizing which war it was 'really' from later in the game/campaign.

Besides can there ever be game mechanics that can *make* players be Georgie Mac or Marse Robert unless it's a scripted movie?

It's a great map and a fascinating 'limited' campaign for miniatures.

JAS:
Thanks for that. I'll read further. IF I haven't said it, I think a scenario book and campaign of the Peninsular Campaign is a great idea and the map well done… [It's just those red dots that keep grabbing my attention…]

Actually, McClellan does seem to have been outnumbered at the start of the Seven Days (albeit not by 2:1)

I was thinking of the total sizes of the armies involved rather than particular engagements, but you're saying Lee has a larger army than McClellan at the start of the Seven Days? What are you subtracting from the totals? Even with Jackson's corps to the north, I don't see it, though the sizes were close with his addition.

Best Regards, Bill

You might could make rules to force dumbness on a player, but you can't make him smarter than he really is. There was, however, plenty of dumbness on both sides during the Peninsula. On Lee's part, it was mostly in expecting too much from an assortment of inexperienced subordinates of varying levels of competence. Some overly cautious, others overly aggressive, and hardly any ever where they were supposed to be when they were supposed to be there.

Mc Laddie (Bill),

About 70,000 Federals, and 80,000 Confederates.

On Army strengths:

67thtigers.blogspot.be/2015/06/the-effective-strength-of-federal-army.html

Ponder on,

JAS

Howdy,

Why did McClellan disengage his army?

I don't have a good answer for that.

Ponder on,

JAS

JAS:

Thank you for the estimates. I am not sure about this calculation: "The number of "extra duty" men is estimated at 25% of PFD and thus deducted, yielding ca. 63,000 "effectives" (table 1)." That strikes me as pretty high, though it is true, unlike the Confederates, in calculating returns, the Union did count those on detached duty as 'present'.

Why did McClellan disengage his army?

For the same reason Hooker did at Chancellorsville a year later…

Howdy,

For the same reason Hooker did at Chancellorsville a year later

That would not seem to apply. The Chickahominy was a major obstacle to maneuver. After Gaines Mill, Confederate forces were divided by the river. With all Federal forces south of the river, and shifting supply to Harrison's Landing, McClellan would seem to be in a superior position. Yet, McClellan had apparently already made the decision to withdraw.

Ponder on,

JAS

Hooker had ninety thousand men, most still fresh, esconced behind log earthworks that later amazed the Confederates…after Hooker retreated. He was facing perhaps thirty-five thousand Confederates on May 5th. Lee was determined to attack. Artillerist Alexander later stated that no higher compliment could have been paid the ANV than the two people that believed the Rebels would be victorious: Lee and Hooker. Hooker explained his decision by saying "He had lost confidence in Hooker."

McClellan retreated for basically the same reason. Neither McClellan nor Hooker retreated because of any inferiority in position or troops.

I've been working on the Peninsula for VnB, but am trying to make an odd little Yorktown campaign. Basically the plan would be to have day long turns and if either side elected to assault you get a VnB game. This post was an attempt to construct strengths: link

On McClellan's decision to change base – it was because his logistics had been blown away. Stanton had issued an order in May to prevented McClellan from shifting his base from the Pamunkey to the James, and when Jackson came down on Porter he'd basically opened the way for Stuart's cavalry to ride off and seize it (McClellan's forces had already loaded most of the supplies onto transports to move to the James and they fired the rest). From Gaines Mill onwards McClellan is simply trying to feed his army who as of the evening of the 27th have only a few days rations to hand and no resupply.

and "Thank you for the estimates. I am not sure about this calculation: "The number of "extra duty" men is estimated at 25% of PFD and thus deducted, yielding ca. 63,000 "effectives" (table 1)." That strikes me as pretty high, though it is true, unlike the Confederates, in calculating returns, the Union did count those on detached duty as 'present'."

See Carman – effective strength he reckoned to be 60-80% of PFD, with veterans tending towards the latter. Working with Antietam numbers we have a detailed report from Meade that only ca. 2/3rds of those PFD in 1st Corps were actually in line of battle. Franklin reckoned (in B&L) 75-80%.

Moreover, I recently undertook a survey of the Confederate claimed "engaged" in the Seven Days, and compared to Harsh's PFD figures compiled from the CSRs. For infantry the claimed engaged/ effectives etc. averaged 75% for infantry, ca. 90% for arty and ca. 60% for cavalry. If I accept these I should make similar adjustments. I ended up with (after amalgamating Richardson's weak division to two brigades, and noting Peck's division already had been amalgamated to two brigades) 30 massed stands (2 with 6 SP, 4 with 5 SP and 24 with 4 SP).

For the rebs, many brigadiers report "effectives" in the 1,200-2,000 range, but 3 brigades (Ransom, Walker, Lawton) are so big they need to be divided into 2 massed stands. There is a claim by Alexander that Longstreet's division was only 9,051 effectives strong which I still can't verify (working from Jubal Early's claims of Lee's strengths, and Early didn't do footnotes). I don't really want a mix of linear and massed stands…..

Howdy 67th,

I've really enjoyed your blog posts.

I am going through sifting of sources for much the same reason. Looking for best estimates of strengths for V&B orders of battle. Yet, I have not spent years pursuing ACW, and I'm trying not to look like an idiot.

How can I get in touch with you off the mainstream of TMP? email?

I am very experienced with V&B, however. I generally would not mix linear and massed stands – would go all massed, even at lower strengths. At brigade scale ACW, the only place I would use linear stands is for dismounted cavalry this early in the war.

The other V&B issue is how to deal with artillery. Currently, my thinking is using divisional guns for each brigade to the count of 4 guns per brigade. Surplus guns going to batteries or battalions for divisional or corps guns.

Ponder on,

JAS

Howdy,

On McClellan's decision to change base – it was because his logistics had been blown away. Stanton had issued an order in May to prevented McClellan from shifting his base from the Pamunkey to the James, and when Jackson came down on Porter he'd basically opened the way for Stuart's cavalry to ride off and seize it (McClellan's forces had already loaded most of the supplies onto transports to move to the James and they fired the rest). From Gaines Mill onwards McClellan is simply trying to feed his army who as of the evening of the 27th have only a few days rations to hand and no resupply.

But once to Harrison's Landing they stayed put through the month of July. So, any rations crisis would seem to have been short-lived, due to the confusion of the sudden change.

Mac had proposed moving his base to the James, much earlier, and was not allowed to.

Ponder on,

JAS

Howdy,

When McClellan proposed marching on Petersburg, but was vetoed by Halleck, was this theater or was he serious?

Ponder on,

JAS

67thtigers:

You might be interested in Stevenson's Stone's River. Stevenson was at Stone's River and writes about the differences in 'present for duty' between the Union and Confederates in giving the numbers for the battle. Of course, this is the Western Theatre.

As for Union detached duty, I would think 80% more reasonable for the Peninsular Campaign. An average of 1 out of every 3 or 4 men just feels excessive.

Ooh, and just FYI. Concerning Massed vs Linear stands. What we have done is put all our ACW troops on linear stands, possibly semi-brigades, which then can make a formation change to Massed, where two stands form up and move as one stand with all the attendent benefits. The process is the same as going Stationary.

We found this adds interesting tactical nuances as well as allowing:
1. Brigades can cover historic frontages [particularly with such varied sizes of brigades] and
2. Brigades support brigade which was the SOP rather than a brigade in depth. [for the most part]

We do this for the 1859 War too.

Howdy,

Always a challenge to compare between western and eastern theaters. Very different armies.

Can you provide specific examples of the frontages you wish to replicate? How do you divide strength points, and deal with combinations of varied morale states? What happens should one linear stand by eliminated, can the remaining form a mass stand again?

What would a 3SP brigade do?

Ponder on,

JAS

McClellan had to change his base to the James River, since Jackson and others had turned his right (Porter) and were threatening his York River base. However, that does not mean he had to retreat all the way to the James. Once south of the Chickahominy, he could have stood fast or gone over to the offensive. But he didn't have the moral courage (guts) to do it.

Howdy Don,

Strong statement, what is your basis for that opinion?

I've found everybody knows is a pretty poor reference.

Ponder on,

JAS

Well, McClellan crossed at least elements of all three divisions of 5th Corps to the right bank of the James.

Dan Butterfield is mentioned in the OR by the CO 3rd regulars (south of the James) and his biography confirms he took his whole brigade and attached battery over the James and remained in place for a week, pushing forward probes to Petersburg

link

The OR report's other corps elements south of the James (4 coys of 1st Michigan from Martindale's bde, 3rd Pa Res, some cavalry), and an examination of letters seems to indicate much of the Pennsylvania Reserves crossed the river (at least the 3rd, 7th, 8th and 9th Pa Res). They recrossed to Harrisons on 15th August.

It's clear to me that McClellan intended to cross 5th Corps to the right bank, and was interrupted in the process of doing so.

"McClellan had to change his base to the James River, since Jackson and others had turned his right (Porter) and were threatening his York River base. However, that does not mean he had to retreat all the way to the James. Once south of the Chickahominy, he could have stood fast or gone over to the offensive. But he didn't have the moral courage (guts) to do it."

Well, that's partially true. However of course he was not in supply once south of the Chickahominy, and the army needed to shift left to get over the White Oak. He was essentially trapped between two water features and had to not be.

McClellan's INTENT was to move to the position the army occupied at Glendale and hold there. The navy claimed it was impossible to stay so far upriver, and originally stated he needed to withdraw past the Chickahominy – i.e. to Williamsburg. The note saying this is what caused McClellan to leave his command post on Malvern Hill ca. 1600 during the battle of Glendale and go to meet Commodore Rodgers in person. That meeting was interrupted by Longstreet's attack, and McClellan cut the meeting short (barely a few minutes into it) and climbed the rigging of the Galena to observe the action and sent out a series of orders via optical telegraph (mostly directing Couch's division north to reinforce the threatened point). A few minutes later the Galena spots Holmes' column and goes into action against them; McClellan leaves the Galena during the first break in the firing and our next known timing is at 1900 when he writes two telegrams to Stanton and Mrs McClellan at 1900 from Turkey Bridge, and he's apparently been up to his CP and seen the field by this point. McClellan certainly sends to Marcy that they may need to move back further around this point:

"June 30, 1862
Haxall's house, Turkey Island

Please bring Hd Qrs down here. The wagons have been down towards Harrison's bar – 6 miles below here. Navy men say we must occupy a point below City Pt in order to enable us to use transports. Let all the Engineers & Topo Engrs go to work to examine the point on which we must take up our new position. The probability is we must take up a new line parallel to that which we now hold and come down the river below City Point. Send back to Smith and ascertain how much more of the train is yet to move. Also ascertain what roads exist leading from our present position e.g. from White Oak bridge to Long Bridge & Jones Bridge.

GB McClellan
Maj Gen"

What McClellan didn't expect was that Franklin would abandon his position without orders. When Heintzelman found out in the evening that Franklin had retreat he rode up to Malvern House and found McClellan, who told him he'd heard and had just received confirmation that it was true that Franklin had quit his position without orders. McClellan then ordered the withdrawal of the right and centre onto his left wing (Porter's corps and Couch's division on Malvern Hill).

Malvern Hill is of course bad ground, since there is no way of obtaining supplies there and any force on it can be easily encircled, which is exactly what Lee was attempting when Armistead accidently triggered the assault on Malvern Hill.

Can you provide specific examples of the frontages you wish to replicate?

JAS:
Well, there are any number of examples, but most of the Confederate brigades in the attacks of the second day of Gettyburg had fronts one to four hundred yards wider than the 300 represented by the brigade stands. In every
case, the brigades were in a single line with supporting brigades behind them rather than each brigade deploying in depth, which is part of what Massed stands represent.

How do you divide strength points, and deal with combinations of varied morale states?

We can, though don't usually, divide the brigades up by regiments and their morale grades. [Poorer regiments on one stand and better regiments on the other.] We divide them as evenly as possible, and if two morale states are in one massed stand, the morale state of stand in front is used. The front stand takes the casualties first. Morale is always by stand and

What happens should one linear stand by eliminated, can the remaining form a mass stand again?

Then the remaining linear stand fights as a linear stand. Yes, the remaining stand can form a small stand again with another Friendly linear stand, though if stands from different corps attempt it, the Corps commander needs to within command range.

What would a 3SP brigade do?

Be one linear stand or two stands. [your choice. Remember that linear stands can have 3SPs too.] 300 yards will have some 700 men in line, with maybe the same number of men in a second line, However, you don't see that in the ACW. What you often see in battles are 1500 men covering 600,700 or more yards of front. For instance, Early's attack on the second day.

So, Hood's division has a two brigade front supported by two brigades, so the divisional front was the better part of a mile… while V&B would really have the two brigade covering 600 yards or less than half a mile. Obviously,
1. In V&B, the brigades can cover some more space as long as there isn't three inches between them.
2. Tactically, Brigades did keep their fronts to @300 yards for a variety of reasons including Stone's River and Gettysburg, and then other times they had a front twice or more than that. The idea is to provide the same flexibility to the players.

We have liked the variant, but it certainly isn't for everyone.

"As for Union detached duty, I would think 80% more reasonable for the Peninsular Campaign. An average of 1 out of every 3 or 4 men just feels excessive."

Aye, and my figures assumed 75% plus officers. McClellan in his writings said remove 1/6th, including officers. I think we're in the ballpark.

That makes, with officers, McClellan's effective infantry strength around 66,000 or 132 SP. We should add around 6 SP of cavalry effectives and the arty.

The rebs largely give their own "effective" strength as roughly:

Magruder: about 13,000 "men", say 14,000 offrs and men (2x 4 SP and 4x 5 SP bdes)

Holmes: Walker's 4,000 man bde (2x 4 SP bdes), and consolidate Daniel's bde (ca. 1,370 effective inf "men") and the two engaged regts of Wise's 814 offr and men (inf only) into a single 4 SP bde

Huger: Mahone (1,800), Wright (2,000), Ransom (3,000) and Armistead (ca. 1,800, assuming 57th Va is average) – say 3x 4 SP and 1x 5 SP bdes (transfer strength from Ransom to make up)

Longstreet's wing

Longstreet: 9,051 inc. arty – a very low number for 6 bdes (6x 3 SP bdes), which I reject and make all bdes 4 SP

AP Hill: 14,000 (2x 4 SP and 4x 5 SP bdes)

Jackson's wing

Whiting: 4,000 (2x 4 SP bdes)

Ewell: ca. 6,000 infantry (3x 4 SP bdes), from 6,664 engaged inc. arty

Jackson: tricky – say (with the addition of the 47th and 48th NC) the division proper averages 3x 4 SP bdes, plus Lawton's fat bde of 3,600 men or closer to 4,000 (another 2x 4 SP bdes)

DH Hill: 10,000 (5x 4 SP bdes)

say 31x 4 SP bdes, 9x 5 SP bdes = 169 SPs

Yes, that means the rebs are actually stronger, but from Livermore onwards (and especially after Joseph Harsh's work) we know this to actually be the case.

PM contact – try getting me at armchair general: link

Where I note I haven't had a fight with Kevin Kiley in over six months!

Howdy McLaddie,

I don't see those kinds of frontages in the diagrams I have of Seven Pines, Gaines Mill, Glendale, or Malvern Hill. So while your suggestions may have merit for other theaters and times, they don't seem to apply to the Peninsula in 1862.

I would be interested in reading a write-up of the rules covering your linear-mass suggestions. YOu could post it on the V&B yahoo group in the files section.

Ponder on,

JAS

67th,

Signed up as Ponder. It won't let me PM until I make 5 posts. Perhaps you can send me a PM.

JAS

I highly recommend this set of maps: link

On the set of maps I sent you'll note the early fat brigades of 2,000-2,500 in line are about half a mile in length! That would be best approximated by 2x 3" stands and their ZoC.

It's something I don't like about VnB – worked well for Napoleonics where "columns" (actually double and triple lines) were the order of the day, but not ACW.