…Battle of Kursk – 1943.
"This study attempts to show the misapplication of tactical airpower by the Luftwaffe in support of German ground forces during the Battle of Kursk in July 19^3- The analysis is based on the investigation of historical references and provides lessons learned which, might, be applied in future conflicts.
The study shows that the Luftwaffe concentrated its efforts at Kursk on Close Air Support and neglected Battlefield Air Interdiction. This was primarily because Close Air Support had' proven itself so successful in German experience prior to Kursk. However, the failure of the Luftwaffe to interdict Russian reinforcements at Kursk proved to be critical and contributed to the German defeat.
Air planners must realize that a correct balance between Close Air Support and Battlefield Air Interdiction is essential to the efficient use of airpower during any tactical application in support of ground forces. Neither Close Air Support nor Battlefield Air Interdiction should gain primacy in doctrine, rather, a mix of the two should be applied on a situational basis.
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
Modern mechanized warfare is characterized by a high level of mobility and lethality. Recent conflicts like the 1973 Yom Kippur War prove this to be true. Future conflicts will also be characterized by high levels of mobility and firepower accompanied by high loss rates on both sides. The three major armed forces of the world today, the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America, have all made significant investments in upgrading the power and speed of their armored and mechanized forces. The overall impact of this fact is that major land battles will continue to be characterized by intense combat and a critical requirement by opposing armies to replace losses with reserve forces and rush them into action.
Battlefield Air Interdiction is that portion of direct air support to the land battle intended to cut off this critical re- supply of forces to the main battle. The United States Air Force's doctrine of Battlefield A1r Interdiction 1s not yet fully developed. This is true for several reasons which have their roots in the United States military policy since the end of World War II. First, the United States' reliance on a nuclear strategy during the 1950's and early 1960's deemphasized the need for the development of doctrine 1n the employment of large conventional land forces. Second, 1n the I960's and 1970's, the military establishment was involved in the conflict in Viet Nam and still had not given adequate doctrinal thought to the employment of ground forces on a scale necessary to counter the growing Warsaw Pact conventional capability. Recent realization of this threat has forced us to address doctrine seriously…"
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