"Andrew Field's Criticism of Marshal Ney" Topic

Field, in his Quatre Bras book link , quotes Ney receiving the following order from Soult/Napoleon:

(Napoleon's) intent is that you should attack all that is in front of you, and then, after having vigorously pushed it back, you should advance towards us to assist in enveloping the force I have just mentioned (i.e. the Prussians at Ligny)

Field says that "this is the first order that categorically directs Ney to fall on the Prussian rear; it is clear and unequivocal". He then criticizes Ney for not sending his uncommitted troops to Ligny. But to my mind, Soult/Napoleon's order makes clear that Ney has to vigorously push back the Allies first, before moving to Ligny . With that in mind, it seems absurd to condemn Ney for trying to recall D'Erlon (which Field then does). Ney obviously needed every soldier at Quatre Bras to enable him to carry out this order. I honestly don't understand Field's reading of this – what do other TMPers think?

I am a Ney fan, but…

He was all about proving his worth, when he "got his blood up" he had tunnel vision. I don't think he disobeyed Napoleon but he absolutely did not see the big picture and Napoleon made his plans (pin one army, crush the other) very clear. The same applies at Waterloo, although I think Napoleon is much more culpable there, since he was on the field. I believe D'Erlon is more to blame for the Quatra Bra/Ligny debacle, he should have obeyed his commander in chief over Ney. Imho of course…

It seems you have taken that passage slightly out of context. First of all, overall, Andrew Field is defending Ney, and everyone else, from Napoleon's subsequent blame for everything that went wrong. For example he makes the very valid point, the first historian to do so that I have come across, that Ney was operating without a staff, so command and control were virtually non-existent, which had major implications, and was entirely Napoleon's fault for employing Ney so late in the day without giving his the tools for the job.

As for D'Erlon, Field goes on to say that any level headed combat appreciation of the situation would have shown that recalling I Corps at the time that Ney did was too late to effect the combat at QB, effectively making the Corps make no contribution at either battle.

Of course, you could argue that Ney should have had his Corps closed up and under his hand earlier in the day. But in the absence of clear directives from above, and without any staff other than his personal aide, easier said than done!

didn't Drouets corps belong to Ney's wing anyway?

I totally agree with Field's/417's point about the staff. I didn't mean to pick a passage out of context, it just seemed a good one to indicate how, until late in the day, Ney was being explicitly ordered to push the Allies back at Quatre Bras rather than just contain. If we grant this, then Ney's behavious becomes perfectly reasonable.

As for D'Erlon, Field goes on to say that any level headed combat appreciation of the situation would have shown that recalling I Corps at the time that Ney did was too late to effect the combat at QB, effectively making the Corps make no contribution at either battle.

Agreed in principle, although I disagree with Field in his certainty that Ney could be sure that D'Erlon would not arrive in time: he wasn't *that* far away.

D'Erlon did have Ney as his immediate superior, but I can sympathise with his predicament on receiving an order from one of Napoleon's ADCs, which as I understand it, really amounted to receiving an order directly from the Emperor himself. It would take an iron individual to effectively tell the Napoleon "I know you want me on *this* battlefield, but I'm going to *that* one."

Did d'Erlon receive direct orders from Napoleon? This is not clear – I currently favor de Wit's analysis that he did not, see the 2 articles on the movement of d'Erlon's corps at link There are no surviving orders from Napoleon to d'Erlon. There is testimony of expecting d'Erlon to arrive down the Nivelles-Namur road from QB, but as II Corps was in the lead, this could simply have been supposition that II Corps would push beyond QB and screen the movements of I Corps.

What is clear is that the entire episode of June 16th was dominated by how ignorant Napoleon was of the dispositions of his left wing, starting on June 15th. Napoleon never knew I Corps had divisions south of the Sambre (see his Memoirs and Gourgaud's account) and most likely believed Quatre Bras was occupied and the anglo-dutch army retreating. (See the bulletin, obviously written by Napoleon/staff as QB is referred to as Quatre Chemins in both Napoleon's letters of the 16th and the bulletin, whereas Soult was still calling it the trois-bras in the June 16th and 17th orders. This was most likely not a bulletin "lie" as the location was not well known – see how many names it has in the French correspondence – and thus was not going to excite the citizens of Paris. See the morning orders of June 16th where Napoleon clearly believes it is already occupied and that Ney has operational control of I Corps and II Corps, see Janin's account where he was ordered to report on the left, and was shocked to find troops (I Corps)in front of Gosselies.)

Thus June 16th, for the left wing, was to be a lazy day preceding the overnight march to Brussels. Napoleon never knew d'Erlon was closer to himself at Fleurus (I Corps was at Gosselies until 3pm) than to Ney. Had Napoleon known the dispositions of I Corps on the evening of the 15th, he certainly would have given more urgent/precise orders on the morning of the 16th as what he did order was not executable in the timeframe he intended. (the left to be in place and resting well before 3pm)

Napoleon and many of the Generals were highly concerned with Mons and the open left flank of the army. (See correspondence on June 15th, see Vandamme's panic at Ligny, see VI Corps left at Charleroi with orders to support the left if necessary, see Ney's dispositions, and the forces left at Frasnes)

All Napoleon's orders (that have survived, there is contradictory testimony, but again, see de Wit's analysis) go to Ney, Napoleon thought Ney had consolidated his forces. Ney never had the strength to bring anything to bear on Ligny – the concern of what forces could come from Mons and Nivelles was significant, and hence why d'Erlon decided he had to move back to the left when he learned Ney was struggling.

Had Napoleon been aware of I Corps' position, then his plans formulated around 2pm would have been far different – VI Corps was not needed to protect the rear and the gap on the left with I Corps south at Gosselies at the time. Ney with 3 divisions would not have had the strength to maneuver on Ligny, as Napoleon had already been informed by late morning that there were anglo-dutch forces at QB. Interesting to hypothesize what Napoleon's plans would have been…

Regardless, the majority of the analysis of June 16th typically ignores Napoleon's ignorance and the concerns of Anglo-Dutch maneuvers on the left. Napoleon did not benefit from knowing where the allied armies were – and due to the traitors that informed Gneisenau of the advance via Charleroi on the evening of June 14th, Napoleon was completely caught off guard by the presence of 3 Prussian Corps at the Sombreffe position.

Ney's lack of organization and staff is discussed in numerous works in the 19th century as many rose to the Marshal's defense from Napoleon's accusations.

Ney's lack of urgency on June 16th was directly a product of the orders he received. The entire day was screwed by Napoleon's ignorance that began on June 15th. However, one must note that while the allied plans to concentrate on the Nivelles-Namur road was very risky (see Clausewitz) and underestimated what Napoleon could do – one can argue that the boldness of that plan, even though aided by French traitors (see Lettow-Vorbeck/Ollech/others for Prussian testimony of such), that boldness surprised Napoleon and in no small way led to disrupting his plans.