Last Hussar | 04 Jul 2015 11:39 a.m. PST |
It's mid-late morning on the 1st July 1863. Pettigrew realises he isn't facing militia, but rather the Union cavalry screen. At what point, if any, could Lee (or possibly Mead) have decided that this particular point wasn't where they wanted to fight. Both armies were looking for each other, both knew that there would have to be a decisive battle at some point – one that would blunt the Confederate march, or would break the army of the Potomac and allow threats to Washington. But once the two armies initially engaged that morning, was the location inevitable? |
Glengarry5 | 04 Jul 2015 12:11 p.m. PST |
Nothing is inevitable but the Union cavalry commander Buford recgonised a strong position when he saw it. Lee's aggressive tactics had paid dividends in the past so it's hard to imagine him not attacking. |
RavenscraftCybernetics | 04 Jul 2015 12:21 p.m. PST |
you cant really know what was going on in their heads at the time. second guessing and speculating is an exercise in futility. |
14Bore | 04 Jul 2015 12:25 p.m. PST |
Lee was sucked into the battle, Meade's commanders decided to stay and defend. So to me Meade or his commanders could have bailed, Lee could have retreated but would have probably ended his campaign. |
Last Hussar | 04 Jul 2015 12:30 p.m. PST |
Ravenscraft – its for the mini-campaign I'm doing, rather than just a what if. If the decision is to be taken, it has to be taken early, as the other corps commanders have to be given orders – and once the other divisions are called, then inertia takes over- you can't just turn tens of thousands of men around. |
jowady | 04 Jul 2015 12:52 p.m. PST |
Pettigrew realized this on 30 June when his three regiment foraging expedition ran into Buford. He reported the same to A.P. Hill who didn't believe him. Meade of course wanted to fight elsewhere, the so called Pipe Creek position. John Reynolds was among those who hadn't gotten the circular. |
wrgmr1 | 04 Jul 2015 12:53 p.m. PST |
If I remember correctly it wasn't Lee who started it but Heath. Once battle was joined Lee decided to reinforce, believing it was just cavalry. Later in day 2 Longstreet advised Lee to side step south and maneuver Meade out of position. This should have been done in the beginning. Meade really could not refuse as he needed a battle, and wanted to protect Washington. |
ArmymenRGreat | 04 Jul 2015 1:10 p.m. PST |
second guessing and speculating is an exercise in futility Doesn't all study and analysis include some version of second guessing and speculating? Besides that, it's fun. I think it would have been tough to refuse the fight once it started and, since it started by accident, it would have been tough to refuse at all. The Confederates were up there to fight and Buford essentially picked the battlefield. |
jowady | 04 Jul 2015 1:31 p.m. PST |
Meade's plan, and remember he had only been placed in command on 28 June, is to contact the enemy, then draw him down to the Pipe Creek line that has been surveyed by Warren (Chief Engineer of the Army of the Potomac). A circular to that effect has been prepared and sent to all Corps commanders except that those in Reynolds' wing haven't gotten them yet. Buford sees that the terrain and road network at Gettysburg are favorable for a battle, Reynolds, whom Meade trusts, agrees and on the 1st fires off to Meade his famous "barricade the streets" message. Once his Army starts concentrating there is little to do. Meade though could have countermanded all of that, ordered Reynolds' wing down to Pipe Creek and fought there. But he trusted Buford and moreover he trusted Reynolds, and Slocum was within easy supporting distance. As for Lee and the whole Lee/Longstreet thing, well, it's filled dozens of books but no matter how you slice it you have to wonder if getting between the Army of the Potomac and Washington is such a wonderful idea. The Army of Northern Virginia, on 28 June, hears about how close the AoP is, it bundles off whatever extra it has foraged and not consumed, and sends it south to Staunton. (Ewell, who wrote the best report on the campaign IMO, goes into great detail about this). At this point logistics takes over, Lee has to engage before his food runs out as he has no supply line to Virginia. Remember that Lee has also sold this whole invasion as a way to relieve pressure on Vicksburg. Lee doesn't know if that has actually worked and Grant or Sherman, with say a reinforced Corps, isn't being recalled. In addition, lacking any sort of siege artillery Lee isn't going to be able to get through Washington's defenses, it's easily the most heavily defended city in the World at that time. Doing what Longstreet thinks could easily walk you into a trap. Early wrote that once the ANV started concentrating they faced the same dilemma as William I did at Hastings, fight or starve. Also the road net doesn't favor this maneuver. Once there is a Federal blocking force in Gettysburg Lee's road options are limited, his direct roads are blocked. Lee had planned to concentrate his army along the Chambersburg Pike and move east towards York. Of course the fight was initially precipitated by Heth, but there is strong evidence that Hill was spoiling for a fight. Hill did not detail extra wagons to Heth for the supposed "foraging expeditions", although Pettigrew had extra wagons with him of the 30th. It would not be the first time nor the last that Hill's impetuous nature would get the ANV into trouble. But the overall decision is still Lee's. There is a lull in the fighting around noon on the 1st. Then, as Ewell's troops start to appear Lee decides to press the thing. But Lee certainly could have withdrawn to the passes in South Mountain, along the Chambersburg Pike. So essentially the answer is that both Lee and Meade could have drawn back. |
Porthos | 04 Jul 2015 1:35 p.m. PST |
wrgmr1: it was indeed Harry Heth who started the battle. Since he had realized that while writing his memoires after the war, he claimed to have wanted to search for shoes. However, Jubal Early was some days before him in Gettysburg (IIRC June 29th) – and Heth WAS aware of that, of course – several historians claim this to be some excuse and he really was looking for a fight. |
MajorB | 04 Jul 2015 2:02 p.m. PST |
Doesn't all study and analysis include some version of second guessing and speculating? </>No, it doesn't. |
Last Hussar | 04 Jul 2015 3:10 p.m. PST |
Pipe Creek was the plan on the 30th, but overtaken by events on the 1st. Could he have actually gone 'No', lets try to get them here'? |
William Warner | 04 Jul 2015 5:53 p.m. PST |
Don't forget that until the afternoon of July 2 Lee had no cavalry to screen any attempt to break off the action at Gettysburg if he had so desired. |
Dynaman8789 | 04 Jul 2015 6:01 p.m. PST |
William gets to the entire crux of the whole matter. |
Panzerfaust | 04 Jul 2015 6:42 p.m. PST |
Yes, either or both could have refused but of course there may have been bad consequences. Lee most certainly should have done so, how can you possibly argue with that? Choosing to assault an enemy that has found an excellent defensive position was folly. I think there is an amazing amount of Lee apology on this point and basically everything he does throughout the war, no matter how egregious the blunder (battle of Antietam anyone?) I don't buy the argument that Lee couldn't have withdrawn intact. He did it enough times after terrible battles, including this one. I don't buy the argument that he would starve. Compared to other times like the Antietam campaign his army was fat and well supplied. The critical issue was resupply of ammunition. Obviously he had enough ammo to fight a large three day battle. At the very least, Lee should have realized after the second day that he wasn't going to win and that he needed to come up with a better solution. He could have disengaged and made a move to place his army between the AOP and Washington as suggested by Longstreet, finding a good defensive position and wait for Meade to attack. Lee could have simply dug in on Seminary ridge and waited for Meade to attack. I think this could have been the best solution. Lee now has his cavalry to notify him if Meade tries any funny business like a flanking move. Meade would feel compelled to attack, especially once those telegraph lines to Washington start buzzing. If Meade takes the bait and makes a frontal assault on Seminary ridge it doesn't matter how well coordinated it is, it is doomed to fail just like every other frontal assault in the war. Especially in this battle where the forces are equal. And the one thing Lee is brilliant at is tactical defense. If he had held one corp out of this defense and sent it on a flanking move so as to hit the Federal rear after that army had dashed itself on Seminary ridge he would not only have won the battle but possible smashed the AOP. There were no real barriers to stop the AOP from getting away (as far as I know), but it would have been yet another defeat and maybe a catastrophic one. Once achieved he could have been resupplied with ammo via the Shenandoah and then moved to cut all communication to Washington while the AOP cowered behind the Washington forts and licked its wounds. Once Washington was cut off the Lincoln government may have fled to New York by boat and suffered a terrible, maybe irreversible humiliation. Of course it was impossible to actually take Washington, but that wouldn't be necessary, just cutting it's rail link with Baltimore would be a huge event. Even if it was for a short time. If Meade had refused battle he may have been relieved of command. Maybe Lincoln would have given him another chance, probably would have. Halleck didn't have it in for Meade like he did for Hooker as far as I know. |
ArmymenRGreat | 04 Jul 2015 8:30 p.m. PST |
No, it doesn't. Any examples? Here's what I'm thinking: hard science has stated assumptions, math has theorems, and history has interpretation. All are some version of speculation (often educated and fact-based, but still guesses) and all are important to furthering the study of the respective field. @MajorB – Let me know what you're thinking. |
TKindred | 04 Jul 2015 8:44 p.m. PST |
The other point is this: Lee was looking for a fight as well. he wanted very much to destroy the AoP as a fighting force and he believed he could do that. And why not? His men had never disappointed him before. Chancellorsville was not 2 months past, and the AoP had been on the march pretty much since then. Their troops were fatigued as well, and besides, they had a new commander. Meade had certainly expected to fight at Pipe Creek. It is my personal opinion, and nothing more, that in the haste of things, Meade and his staff hadn't fully realized the importance of the road AND rail network at Gettysburg. You take that, and you pretty much control the access through a very large area. But a good read, too, is "The Wartime Papers of RE Lee." If you can find a copy it's an excellent resource. In it you will find almost all of his actual correspondence not just to the government, but to his family and friends. It's an incredible insight into the man's views and hopes. It also has his AAR's and those are quite eye opening as well. But either side could have pulled back and maneuvered elsewhere. Local foraging was going very well, and the memoirs and personal letters of ANV soldiers, especially some of the Texans, give a great insight into how much food and other items they were bringing in. |
jowady | 04 Jul 2015 10:22 p.m. PST |
Don't forget that until the afternoon of July 2 Lee had no cavalry to screen any attempt to break off the action at Gettysburg if he had so desired.
Not entirely true, Lee had Imboden. Pipe Creek was the plan on the 30th, but overtaken by events on the 1st. Could he have actually gone 'No', lets try to get them here'?
Meade only had two Corps engaged as of the 1st. They could have disengaged and then met the rest of the Army at Pipe Creek. |
donlowry | 05 Jul 2015 9:11 a.m. PST |
Lee DID withdraw intact after 3 July, so he could have done so after 1 July, with or without Stuart (who didn't do much to screen the withdrawal, anyway), or after 2 July. He just felt that if he hit 'em 1 more time, a little harder, they would cave in -- but they didn't. When Lee asked Ewell about moving the 2nd Corps around behind the 3rd and 1st to turn the Union left, Ewell (or Early speaking up first) said it would damage the corps' morale to abandon a position it had taken. This was a specious argument. Maneuvering is not retreating. I think the truth is that Lee, Ewell, Hill -- practically everybody but Longstreet -- were over-confident after their string of successes in Virginia. |
Old Pete | 05 Jul 2015 11:17 a.m. PST |
Have to agree with you donlowry. Having visited Gettysburg why Lee ordered the attack against the Union centre on July 3rd is beyond belief, even withdrawing possibly to a good defensive position would have been a better option. Think Lee thought his troops could take any position, for the southern cause this over confidence proved disastrous. |
capncarp | 07 Jul 2015 6:41 a.m. PST |
Has the concept of Lee's staying northward been addressed? Forcing the Susquehanna at Harrisburg (the river is laughably shallow in many places) would have sent massive panic throughout the North--the move would have cut rail transport west for quite some ways and threatened a Northern state capital. It would also have forced into battle the contents of the several training camps located about the city (Camps Curtin, Cameron, etc) which had raw recruits, unblooded in battle, in them. |
donlowry | 07 Jul 2015 8:30 a.m. PST |
If the ANV had crossed the Susquehanna, it's doubtful it could ever have gotten back again. |
138SquadronRAF | 07 Jul 2015 9:47 a.m. PST |
Have to agree with you donlowry. Having visited Gettysburg why Lee ordered the attack against the Union centre on July 3rd is beyond belief, even withdrawing possibly to a good defensive position would have been a better option. Think Lee thought his troops could take any position, for the southern cause this over confidence proved disastrous. I'm currently reading McKenzie's "Uncertain Glory" the work show clearly how Lee was wedded to the idea of attack with disastrous consequences in a war of attrition, one is force to conclude that Bobbly Lee was on of the best generals the Union had and how lucky Lincoln was that he turned down command back in '61. |
OCEdwards | 07 Jul 2015 11:57 a.m. PST |
Yeah, I'm sure Lincoln appreciated the Peninsula, Second Bull Run, Harper's Ferry, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and the (generally) masterful defensive campaigns of May 1864-February 1865. Lee was flawed by all means, but so was Napoleon, so was Cochrane, so was Frederick. It's obviously untrue that Lee was a liability for the Confederacy. |
SCOTT BOWDEN | 07 Jul 2015 7:10 p.m. PST |
"I'm currently reading McKenzie's "Uncertain Glory" the work show clearly how Lee was wedded to the idea of attack with disastrous consequences in a war of attrition, one is force to conclude that Bobbly Lee was on of the best generals the Union had and how lucky Lincoln was that he turned down command back in '61."-EJ McKenzie's book is one of the most laughable thesis ever put in print and has no basis in any understanding of Lee and of modern warfare. |
138SquadronRAF | 08 Jul 2015 6:38 a.m. PST |
McKenzie's book is one of the most laughable thesis ever put in print and has no basis in any understanding of Lee and of modern warfare. Well I do plan to reread "Last Chance of Victory" next. Let's see if a book specifically about Gettysburg can answer the question. |
1968billsfan | 18 Jul 2015 9:30 a.m. PST |
Lee was looking to gang up on isolated Union corps and defeat them in detail. If he could pull off one or two such battles, he would have a clear superiority and could progress to a capture of a major northern city or a battle that would break the main Union army. Although Lee was happy to be feeding on northern supplies, horses and resources, he also had a ticking timeline on how long his army could maintain its controlled and established supplies before having to scoot back south for reorganization. The first day of Gettysburg was a wonderful success. Two Union Corps were wrecked mainly by a convergent attack from the north on the Union flank. Unhappily for Lee, the Union was reinforced just enough on the second day to prevent the complete destruction of these two corps and maybe one corp that might have come to their support. When faced with the entire Union army, in unfamiliar terrain and with the supply line problems on the other foot (in comparison with Virginia). Lee showed his mortal limitations, and couldn't pull a rabbit out of a hat. |
OCEdwards | 18 Jul 2015 12:37 p.m. PST |
1968bf – very well put. Indeed, prior to the 3rd day charge, Lee had a significant advantage so far as casualties go – prior to the third day, Union casualties were probably at about 21k, whilst Confederate casualties were probably at about 16.5k. Lee had successfully wrecked most of I Corps (with only Stannard fresh), the two divisions present of III Corps, and XI Corps (except for the troops at Cemetary Hill on day 1); he'd also done serious damage to V Corps (2187 casualties from about 11k present). Though some of Lee's brigades were spent, his army was still in decent condition. All of which means at one level Lee had had an okay first two days of battle – one day a clear win, the second a stalemate. But obviously the two key positions had been held by the Union (Cemetary Hill and LRT) and Lee either had to retreat and accept defeat after nearly winning (Bragg style, arguably), hold his ground and risk his line of supplies being cut in an attempt to get Meade to attack, or attack again. He attacked again. |
donlowry | 19 Jul 2015 8:16 a.m. PST |
The two key positions the Union held were Cemetery Hill and Culps Hill. |
basileus66 | 20 Jul 2015 7:45 a.m. PST |
I think that Lee misread his opponent will to fight, particularly after the trashing the Federals had suffered on 1st July. The second day didn't dispel the notion. Certainly, the ANV hadn't been able to pierce AoP lines, but it has been a close run thing. The moronic advance of Sickles had jeopardized AoP's center-left, and if Longstreet would have behaved a little bit less morosely it could have broken the whole AoP's left. The AoP of Hooker or Burnside would have retreated after the trashing suffered in the first two days of the battle, and probably Lee was counting on it when he planned for the 3rd day assault. And it could have worked if better supported and co-ordinated with pressure on Meade's flanks (Meade withdrew troops from the right to reinforce his center). That is when Lee messed up. He didn't pay attention to his subordinates actions and plans; he didn't exercise his command role as he was supposed to do. Yes, Lee could have retreated, but why should have done it? He saw a chance -a good chance- and took it. That it failed shouldn't blind us to the fact that the Union victory wasn't pre-ordained. On the first two days it could have gone either way. And even in the third, if better organized, the Confederates had a chance to pull a victory. Still, I agree that after three days of slaughter it is doubtful that the Confederates would have had the strength needed to threaten Washington. |
Cleburne1863 | 20 Jul 2015 7:38 p.m. PST |
You can no more refuse Gettysburg than expect the Spanish Inquisition! |