"Equivalency between Guns and Infantry (H&M)" Topic

Games give a unit a firepower. More men = More firepower- sometimes scaled (twice as many men doesn't always mean twice the firepower)

Ditto gun batteries.

Now guns have more range than muskets. However they still have an equivalency- "This battery at [range] does the same Attack as infantry in musket range."

How should we come to that number. How does different numbers of guns change that (Should we assume a 'standard' of 6 guns for this thread?)

Examples (apologies – though I intend to cross post, I have no Napoleonic specific rules that use this idea, so all the specific examples are ACW). Also please note there is some simplification and ommission (eg Peter Pig 'Centre Line' requirement)

They Couldn't Hit an Elephant. 1"=25yds
Medium Smoothbore – 1d6 per 2 guns (1 base). Total all dice and apply 1 casualty (4 men = 1 base) to a line per score
of
4 at close (up to 12"), 7 at effective(18"), 8 at Extreme (up to 30")

Infantry with rifles have a range of 8", 1d6 per 2 bases (or part there of) equivalent to 200 men (2x100men base) – 1 hit per 5 scored (so 12 gets 2 hits

F&F 1"=200yds
1 FP per 200 men (1 base) – range of 8"
Artillery (6 gun US)
10 up to 4" (Canister)
4 up to 16
3 up to 24
2 up to 32
(for CS it is -1 over 4")

Peter Pig ACW – 1" = 50yds
1 dice per stand (240 men) in front, plus half stands in 2nd rank – typically 6 base unit, so 4 dice
Hit on a 5-6. Reroll once any 1-2
Target saves on a 4,5,6 – Short range (4")
Saves 2+ long range – up to 10"

Artillery (4-6 guns)
Ranges 0-5, 5-10, 10-30
1d6 per base 4+ canister, 5+ Ball, save 3+, -1 v canister, +1 at long

BP (Generic, my estimate for Napoleonic 1"=10yds, possibly 1"=20yds ACW)
Rifled Muskets 24", Smoothbore 18". Typical Bn has 3 dice, hit 4+, save 4+
Guns (Smoothbore) Close – 6", 3 dice, -2 to save; effective (24") 2 dice, -2 to save, Long(48") 1 dice, -1 to save
Infantry that has accumulated 3 hits is shaken, hits can be rallied off except 1st hit), casualties not counted, just bn morale.

To be clear I am NOT interested in criticisms of these rules per se, and their general systems, and would ask such arguments are taken onto other threads. Of course "X has it too powerful/long/etc" is relevant. This is a thread about the relative firepowers, and what people believe a good ratio is between 6 guns and 600 men.

Well the first thing I would note, is that no matter the rules in use I always adjust musket range to 200 yards or less. So artillery can project force at greater distances by several times.

Just remember that rifled cannon are really poor canister projectors due to the canister ALWAYS taking the rifling and the resulting centripetal force greatly enlarging the area over which the canister balls are spread.

This effect is part of the explanation for the retention of the 12-pdr Napoleon in ACW forces, and is why the French adopted the mitrailluese, which was originally to have been issued in pairs to every battery, not concentrated in special batteries.

I used the smoothbore mainly because of the canister problem.

It's not really ranges I'm looking at, but more "if a battalion has 'x' fire points at effective range, how many FP does a battery have at its effective range.

Well, there's also a philosophical component to this.

if you accept the idea, as I do, and ACW medical reports and observations tend to point out, Artillery is the great wounder on the battlefield, while infantry is the great killer.

Under that idea, the primary function of artillery is to disrupt and otherwise impede, and hopefully halt, the advance of the enemy. If it causes casualties along the way, well that's all fine and dandy.

Infantry's role is to kill or drive back anything that makes it past the fire of the artillery.

In the last, firepower is replaced by the bayonet when melee occurs.

So, to my mind, if I were writing a set of ACW rules, I would consider that artillery, outside of canister range, doesn't cause any casualties, but causes friction that results in a loss of movement points or difficulty in changing formation(s) and also morale problems. If you must incur casualties, then perhaps only if a double is rolled, etc.

One interesting variant of this is a set of ECW rules called "File Leader". In that game, stands suffering casualties have the option of either removing a figure for each hit, or backing the stand up 1" for each hit, or a combination of that. Of course, in those rules, that applies to fire from both foot and artillery, but it's a concept I like a great deal.

So in short, in my hypothetical rules, artillery fire outside of canister range wouldn't cause loss of men, but WOULD result in movement penalties, disruption, difficulty in changing formations, halting advances, etc. You'd have to draw up a small chart to peg which die # results in which effect.

All casualties would come as a result of infantry fire and melee, and artillery inside of canister range.

Sort of remember Clausewitz stated 800 man bn was equal to canister from 8 6 pdr battery.
As always when in doubt look at the Reisswitz Kriegspiel, written by chaps who were there for professionnals.

I always think of a battery of artillery and a battalion of infantry as being roughly equivalent in terms of firepower.

Just to answer your question: In Johnny Reb III, there is one fire table with # of Infantry figures on the left and # of Artillery sections on the right- 3 Infantry figures (90 men) are equivalent to 1 gun section (2 gun tubes).

With the number of ordinance tests around, it is easy enough to develop an 'equivalency'.

There are at least a dozen ordinance tests available on-line and in books for the period 1776-1817 for several European nations.

There are pre- ACW and after tests too.

As both the musket and artillery results will be in 'near' perfect conditions, it is the fire power relationship that we are concerned with… even though both test results would be degraded on the battlefield. [more on that]

If you take an aggregate of all the tests, at 400 yards six 6lber smoothbore artillery can send as many bullets down field hitting the target as can THREE battalions of infantry at around 100 yards, with all infantry firing.

That means six guns can do the damage of @ 1500 men at four times the range… on a narrower front. Clausewitz noted this relationship in his writing on tactics. That is an equivalency of one gun to 250 men. That is around 2.5 times the equivalency given in most Napoleonic and ACW rules.

One the battlefield, you have some other things to consider when looking at the 'downgrading' of results for that fire equivalency:

Artillery men are often better trained and usually more experienced than infantry men.

To load a cannon is six operations, to fire a musket is 8 to twelve. An artillery piece also has fewer moving parts.

The cannon is loaded with supervision of a team with one or two operations each. Infantry not.

Now this fire equivelancy is only between infantry and artillery over 100 to 400 yards. That doesn't count the ability of artillery to reach out to three to five times that distance.

All told, I think that artillery is way undervalued in most wargames. I have designed one board wargame with that relationship and have changed the firepower in a number of rules. It leads to more historical uses of cannon.

I always consider effects and outcomes rather than counting the beans.

A battery could usually keep it's own frontage clear of enemy formed troops, imho. Obviously there will be exceptions, but that should be the expectation.

Most long range muskets should be quite ineffective. Engaging rather than destroying. A long range firefight could go on for hours.

Looking to Nosworthy's famous tome, I would rate 2 deep line, trained or vet, British doctrine at close range the same as the artillery battery.

Impulse infantry would not be too much different imho if properly trained. So I would rate an 1805 French army very close to that. Less so for 1809 -12, 1815.

Everyone else would be a bit less if firing in 3 ranks, if Columnar doctrine, if conscript/Militia/ poorly trained. So pretty much all continental armies in 1813-14 except for a few decent units.

So whatever your casualty rate is, it needs to be linked to your morale effects. 25% casualties is a huge rate of loss for a battle, so keep the hits down and the morale effects high.

Your views may vary, of course!

If you do fancy looking at data and counting some beans, you can find all your answers, with rationale, in the classic "Firepower" by B.P. Hughes.

With the number of ordinance tests around,

I agree, there are far too many regulations these days.

As noted above, for smoothbore eras, I generally reckon one battery to be the rough equivalent of an infantry battalion – on a much shorter frontage and with a much longer range, along with all the advantages that crew served weapons have in terms of cohesion etc.

Once you are into rifles (the OP spans multiple periods), then the relationships change, particularly once infantrymen can shoot down exposed gunners with impunity, and gunners can chuck shrapnel shells several km.

McLaddie's post sure puts artillery in a truly frightening light, I had never before realized just how devastating a battery can be, based on those calculations. Truly impressive.

McLaddie's post is particularly frightening – the 6 guns to 1500 infantry at 400 yds. From the use of the word 'bullets' I assume it is some sort of case/canister etc. What is the sort of fire power of solid shot , 6-9 lbs?

TK has an interesting insight about artillery (ball) disrupts, muskets kill. Most games only assign kills. BP takes the opposite approach, where there is only friction.

There is much conflicting data about the relative effectiveness of artillery and infantry fire, even from those who witnessed battles of this era.

Regarding the Ordnance tests mentioned by Bill, we would need exact details to come to any conclusion. Range, target size, volley fire or individual aimed fire from the infantry etc, etc.

Some of the test results that I have seen involved the artillery firing canister at a target 62 metres wide and 5.5 metres tall, achieving 18% hits at 400 metres. Others show that smoothbore musket fire from infantry hit a 6 feet tall by 2 feet wide target at 100 yards with 25% of rounds fired and this musketry example is over the course of thousands of rounds, not just one random test. Which is most effective from these results? I'm not sure that we can tell, but it certainly doesn't show that one battery firing at 400 yards is more effective than three battalions firing at 100 yards.

Those who experienced battle came to very different conclusions. Clausewitz, who has already been mentioned, wrote this:

The fire of artillery produces greater effect than that of infantry. A battery of eight six-pounders does not occupy a third part of the front of a battalion of infantry, is worked by an eighth of the number of men composing a battalion, and does certainly twice, if not three times as much execution with its fire

No range is mentioned by Clausewitz for this fire effect.

A completely different opinion is offered by George Cathcart who served as an ADC with the allied armies in the 1813 campaign in Germany where there was plenty of artillery present. In a summary of the tactics used by the various nations he has this to say about artillery:

In a general action, when opposed to troops who have been in many battles, the fire of artillery ceases to intimidate, and its real effect, except in certain accidental circumstances, where crowded defiles or villages disputed with obstinacy place an unfortunate mass of infantry at their mercy, is in fact far less destructive than that of musketry at point blank range, or the bayonet duly brought to bear and applied with energy. In modern warfare, therefore, artillery and cavalry, powerful as they undoubtedly are when properly applied, can only be considered as auxiliary arms.

"Point blank range" for infantry of this era, as mentioned by Cathcart in the above quote, was considered to be around 200 yards.

There are many other such quotes that could be used to support either view.

Cathcart talks about musketry 'at point blank'. I wonder what the effect would be at 80 yards plus.

Artillery has never 'felt right' to me in the H&M games I've played – certainly not something that could smash enemy formations, but I wonder if wargamers use it too piecemeal, and in too few numbers.

As added to the above post as an edit, point blank range to a Napoleonic soldier was not what we consider it to be today.

Point blank range for a musket, as far as the British were concerned, was around 200 yards and this was judged as the distance a musket ball would travel before hitting the ground if the bore of the barrel was levelled and fired by a standing infantryman. (The British and French had a slightly different way of determining this distance, but the result was pretty much the same).

"Point blank range" for infantry of this era, as mentioned by Cathcart in the above quote, was considered to be around 200 yards.

Come again? The British advocated leveled muskets at 200 yards? I know that every nation did fire at that range and greater… but this is the first I have heard of 200 yards being considered 'point blank range.'

Cathcart seems to be speaking of tactics and situational issues rather than simple comparisons in performance, as Clauswitz was.

Certainly an issue, but if the question is comparing musket to cannon equivlancy in ability, not how well a particular unit or nation used either tactically, I would think the equivalency is pretty obvious. Certainly, the various tests have to be compared apples to apples. Again, if the ordinance tests are seen as about as perfect as conditions could be, then even with both artillery and infantry performances downgraded for battlefield conditions and tactics, the comparison still stands.

The term "Point Blank" has a specific technical definition: the range at which a projectile fired by a leveled weapon would strike the ground. It carries a rather different colloquial meaning nowadays – along the lines of "deadly range". The two should not be confused or conflated.

B

The term "Point Blank" has a specific technical definition: the range at which a projectile fired by a leveled weapon would strike the ground. It carries a rather different colloquial meaning nowadays – along the lines of "deadly range". The two should not be confused or conflated.

Blutarski:

Thanks for the clarification. My question was really one of whether soldiers were taught to fire with leveled muskets out to 200 yards, whether termed 'point blank' or not. e.g. soldiers told to aim at the knees or head etc. at different ranges. Obviously the weapon's kick would have something to do with that adjustment.

I am also thinking of the military procedure for volley fire that called for 'level'.

This is straying from the subject somewhat, but in answer to Bill's question on levelling:

In the British Manual and Platoon Exercise used in the Napoleonic Wars, there is no allowance made for the range of the target when aiming and several officers mentioned the fact that soldiers would aim at a target at 50 yards in the same manner that they would aim at one at 300 yards, having no knowledge of ballistics. However, the instructions show that the soldier was expected to do more than just level the musket:

the right cheek to be close to the butt; the left eye shut, and the fore-finger of the right hand on the trigger; look along the barrel with the right eye from the breech-pin to the muzzle, and remain steady. Pull the trigger strong with the fore finger, and, when fired, remain looking on the aim while you can count one—two.

Point blank range was considered to be a very important distance as it was the dangerous space swept by fire with the projectile still travelling on a fairly flat trajectory, and in theory no sighting adjustment would be necessary within this range in order to hit the target somewhere. If the target was outside this distance, it could only be hit by plunging or ricochet fire.

The British only practised musketry to a range of 200 yards, i.e. within point blank range. Undoubtedly in battle they occasionally opened fire at greater distances, usually with little effect.

Major S:

It isn't really straying from the subject when the topic is 'Equivalency between guns and infantry'.

Thanks for that information. It has always fascinated me the wide variety of reports on just this issue 'aiming' at the target during this period. I have a couple of accounts where Napoleon ordered more 'target practice' before his campaign in 1800 and another for 1813 with new recruits.

I think I mentioned it someplace else, but I have a friend [a military man who had, one job among many, to test the performance of weapons ]who fires both Brown Bess and French Napoleonic muskets. He found he couldn't hit a 3 X4 foot target at eighty yards more than 3 or 4 out of ten at 80 yards. He was using pre-packaged round and powder wrapped paper as did the original soldiers. He Stuffed the paper down to hold the ball. He'd done it this way for quite a while until he thought to wrap the ball in the paper [or keep it fully wrapped and tied as it came] He found that he could hit the same target 7 out of ten at 150 yards or more with that little change… I am sure *somebody* had already figured that out during the 1700-1800s and can explain how skirmishers would open up at 200 to 150 yards with reported effect.

I think the instruction for aiming is a good illustration of a major difference between artillery and infantrymen. The artillerists practiced that 'aiming' as a team of specialists, as they did the loading. I've read several accounts of infantry muskets being recovered in significant numbers with several rounds rammed down the barrel during the Napoleonic and AC wars. I have never heard of such a think among the artillery. It would make sense to say that artillery fire was far more reliable and less prone to misfires because of that. [I think Hughes suggests 5% to 20-5% for artillery compared to infantry.]

I've put a lot of time into this question recently, using the numbers in American Kriegspiel. I dont have my calculations in front of me, but it includes the numbers of casualties per minute that can be expected to be inflicted. The numbers are based on breechloading rifles but they can be messed around with to reflect muskets. The upshoot of the numbers are that infantry fire combat would wear battalions down very quickly, in a few minutes. Also, the rate of casualties over time was more important in determining break points than total casualties (skirmish fire was not sufficiently heavy to make
Formed troops break). Theres too much to go into just
Now (at the bar, typing on phone!) but if you dont mind sitting down with a pencil and want to mess around with some hard numbers, the book is on google books for free. Im messing around with some ideas for a wargame based on the book already, which will be completely different from most sets out there. TKindres is 100% right when he said that there's a philosophical element to the OP question.

A very useful and interesting reference source is Fuller's book, "The Rifled Musket", which, among other things, reproduces in full the results of a comprehensive evaluation of ACW long arms undertaken by the Union Ordnance Bureau.

All tests were of 50 shots fired by 10 men at a 10ft x 10ft target with point of aim at the center.

RANGE (yards)_______100_____200_____300_____400_____500

SB-sglball (volley)____74%_____36%_____14%
SB-sglball (file)______78%_____40%_____18%
SB-sglball (skirm)_____96%_____50%_____14%

SB-bk&ball (volley)___72/53%__36/21%
SB-bk&ball (file)_____70/55%__44/15%
SB-bk&ball (skirm)____62/56%__40/13%
*Pct=ball/buck
Lack of test results for 300 yds suggests buck & ball was range limited, which would not necessarily surprise me.

RANGE (yards)_______100_____200_____300__________500

Rfl Musket (volley)____96%_____64%_____46%__________24%
Rfl Musket (file)_____100%_____74%_____58%__________38%
Rfl Musket (skirm)____100%_____82%_____58%__________42%

It must be conceded that the sample size is not statistically decisive, but the test conditions were equal and it can be considered possible to argue that although the rifled musket could be seen as only somewhat more effective than a smoothbore firing single ball ammunition at 100 yards, it was nearly 2x as effective at 200 yards, 3-4x more effective at 300 yards, and nearly as effective at 500 yards as the smoothbore was at 200 yards. Buck and ball ammunition rendered the smoothbore materially superior to the rifled musket at 100 yards, about equal at 200 yards, but unable to compete at any greater range.

Fuller's book is IMO a "must have" for any "dyed in the shoddy" ACW buff.

B

But again, I fall squarely into the camp that although these benchmark tests are all well and good, what they show is potential, and not actual combat capabilities.

Add to that the effects of terrain, and to my mind, there is little to be seen in difference between the musket and the rifle-musket or rifle in combat upon American battlefields. Virtually impossible to consider small-arms engagement beyond canister range as well, because of the tactical conditioning of the officers in command, and the terrain itself. In situations where artillery COULD be brought to bear over reasonably open ground at it's own effective range, such as during Pickett's charge, the infantry again, for the most part, held it's fire until the Confederates began to cross the Emittsburg Road, at about 200 yards distance from the federal lines.

It's fascinating to consider all the various available data sets, and compare them to period comments, AAR's, etc.

To my mind there are two fields of fire. There is canister range, which is also infantry range, and then there is artillery long range. The majority of the killing gets done inside of canister range. Artillery fire beyond that MAY result in some casualties, but overall, the main effect is to slow down and/or disrupt enemy formations, movement, etc. Force the enemy to deploy from maneuver columns into line, where he has less control over his troops and communication is more difficult, and movement slower.

If I were to write a set of rules (and I am, FWIW) I'd have only two ranges. for artillery: Canister, and more than canister. Infantry fore would be capped at canister range. Casualties only occur inside of canister range.

But that's how I see things. YMMV, of course, and that's fine. But after so many years of reading the various manuals, reports, etc, this is my personal conclusion on what it all means, and how GENERALLY, things were used.

V/R

Actual capabilities in battle depend more on the training and experience of the unit than theoretical performance. An 'old' battalion produced significantly more firepower than an untrained 'new' battalion.

That said, even if battlefield ranges in practice were much the same between units with rifles or smoothbores, a percussion cap rifle is more reliable than a flintlock and a minie bullet has a much higher velocity and a flatter trajectory than a smoothbore ball (which of course is why armies adopted the new rifles as fast as they could).

TK wrote -
But again, I fall squarely into the camp that although these benchmark tests are all well and good, what they show is potential, and not actual combat capabilities.

>>>>> Absolutely agree.

Add to that the effects of terrain, and to my mind, there is little to be seen in difference between the musket and the rifle-musket or rifle in combat upon American battlefields.

>>>>> Within 100 yards, agree.

Virtually impossible to consider small-arms engagement beyond canister range as well, because of the tactical conditioning of the officers in command, and the terrain itself.

>>>>> Agree. Even with rifled weapons, fire beyond 250 yards or so was frowned upon except in unusually favorable circumstances.

It's fascinating to consider all the various available data sets, and compare them to period comments, AAR's, etc.

>>>>> Very true.

To my mind there are two fields of fire. There is canister range, which is also infantry range, and then there is artillery long range. The majority of the killing gets done inside of canister range. Artillery fire beyond that MAY result in some casualties, but overall, the main effect is to slow down and/or disrupt enemy formations, movement, etc. Force the enemy to deploy from maneuver columns into line, where he has less control over his troops and communication is more difficult, and movement slower.

>>>>> Whereas most (but by no means all) of the actual killing was done by artillery canister fire, long range fire had an important effect in terms of disruption, as you mention above. One of those effects (and one which is IMO manifestly under-represented in rules) is to produce large-scale straggling: men dropping out of the ranks for psychological reasons rather than physical injury. Du Picq's description of McDonald's great column assault under Austrian artillery fire at Wagram made a terrific impression upon me in that respect and a close examination of Pickett's attack at Gettyburg suggests a similarity in behavior.

Are you by any chance attending HCon? Would love to meet up for a good chat on this.

B

TK wrote:

But again, I fall squarely into the camp that although these benchmark tests are all well and good, what they show is potential, and not actual combat capabilities.

That's a given. As I said, the ordinance tests are the weapon capabilities under near perfect conditions. It is the comparison in performance between musket and artillery that is important for the thread question rather than simply counting hits. I believe that comparison would hold under battlefield conditions regardless of the degrading of performance. Given the difference in training, experience and team work between the typical artillerist and infantryman, the artillery performance should 'degrade' as much as the infantry.

For instance, Nosworthy describes the firing arc necessary for rifled muskets to hit out to 400 yards, which would require some experience and time to think about it, something that the ordinance testers would have but those in battle often wouldn't.

Both Napoleonic and ACW artillerists had three 'ranges' for artillery. Canister/case at around 200-400 yards depending on the gun, direct fire out to 900-1000 yards, and then 'random' fire beyond that. Random fire as described by Tousard and others is TK's description of "the main effect is to slow down and/or disrupt enemy formations, movement, etc." It was 'interdiction'. Clausewitz describes as a courier his ability to tell how close he was
to the front lines by the type and quality of the artillery shot falling around him.
Direct artillery fire was often employed specifically to cause casualties, which would of course, disrupt formations, movement etc.

Often the difference between artillery and infantry fire was that the artillery fire outside canister ranges was applied against moving targets over longer periods of time compared to infantry volley fire, which often involved firefights quickly resolved. Longer firefights like those at Albuera or between the Stonewall and Iron Brigades the day before 2nd Manassas have their stragglers too, as well as rooting the units in place while hidden by lots of smoke.

McLaddie:

Just for the record, I'm not disagreeing or arguing with you about any of your comments.

I believe that the one thing which gave artillery some greater flexibility was the development of better shells, along with spherical case/shrapnel and better, more reliable fuzing by the time the ACW rolled around.

Being able to burst overhead of columns, with a cone of projectiles centered on the arc of flight, made maneuver columns more susceptible to casualties than with just solid shot, and forced them into line much more quickly.

Great thread so far!

V/R

Is there any data for how many casualties arose from artillery, musketry or the bayonet? My impression is that artillery caused more casualties than anything else where it was deployed in numbers.

How to deal with the effects of longer range artillery fire is one of the big challenges of grand tactical level rules. Very often it on the basis of a low probability of major damage (hit on 6, etc). This doesn't reflect the historical effects all that realistically, where the damage was small casualties more frequently and evenly.

It wasn't just that it might temporarily disrupt and slow down formations. Long exposures would degrade formations, creating what amounts to fatigue – or that is my speculation.

British-allied infantry suffered quite severe casualties at Waterloo, and were very weak at the end of the day. On the right this seems to be mainly the result of artillery. Some of this from horse artillery brought up alongside the cavalry attacks – but my impression is that much of it was that it was from long range fire accumulating over time. On the left skirmishers from the wreckage of d'Erlon's corps also contributed.

Matthew

Just for the record, I'm not disagreeing or arguing with you about any of your comments

TK:

Yep, I didn't think that, nor I with you. Tangential information surrounding the topic.

It may have been answered, but I'm missing it as it isn't flagged. The effect of ball – ie outside canister range. What sort of casualties would it produce, in comparison with Infantry, or are we looking really just at disruption at over 400 yards?

Depends upon the target, the nature of the ground and th obliquity of the fire in relation to the facing of the target.

Solid shot fired over ground that does not permit ricochet fire at right angles to a single unit in line = little effect.

Ricochet fire materially improves effect.

Ricochet fire against a brigade in succession of lines = better effect.

Oblique or enfilade fire = great effect.

A large close order target (say, Sumner's very dense divisional attack formation at Antietam) greatly increases the mayhem.

B

B

From the designer notes of my Snappy Nappy rules, you might find this of interest. Somewhere in my notes (somewhere) is the book I used to extract the info for the rules:

Artillery

Purists might remark that artillery seems to have a higher maximum range in Snappy Nappy than they would expect. Well…not exactly, although we "rounded up" considering that an artillery stand is 24 guns (3-4 actual strength batteries), which means that like infantry, a stand of batteries does not mean each one is lined hub to hub in the same spot. Smaller sections might be moved about, and it is not unusual for sections to be temporarily (or even in error) posted forward.

Most armies used canister at 400 yards range: about 3 inches in Snappy Nappy parlance. So that's where the first range band sits.

Looking at a table from a 1793 artillery test (with brass tubes), "1st graze" -- the point at which a solid cannonball landed -- from a 12 pounder cannon was at a maximum of 1200 yards. Rule of thumb was that the cannonball would ricochet and cover half as much ground, with an 80% chance of another ricochet covering half as much again--about 2100 yards in total. That would be a maximum range.

Maximum 3 pounder range was 900 yards. The second Snappy Nappy range band is 2.1-6 inches. Maximum 6 pounder range was 1400 yards. The next Snappy Nappy range band is at 9". So we made the 12 pounder a maximum range of 12" in order to make a chart cleanly dividing ranges in increments. Artillery pieces larger than 12 pounders were usually used only in siege operations, not field combat.

Next was to find the lethality of the various artillery pieces. Tests from the period showed that 6 pounders were roughly 50% more effective than 3 pounders, and 12 pounders were about twice as effective as 3 pounders. Starting at the canister range, that made the dice: 2 (3/4-lber), 3 (6/8-lber), and 4 (12-lber). Since a 3 pounder only went out another range band, that made lethality only 1 die. The rest of the chart filled in nicely, and playtesting shows that the ratio of lethality worked well in proportion to the movement.

A footnote: an artillerist named Muller calculated that one 6 pounder cannon will kill or wound 164 infantry over a 1600-yard attack. As one artillery stand represents 24 guns, that would make the math: 24*164=3936…roughly a unit of two stands in Snappy Nappy terms!

Let's do the Snappy Nappy wargame math. Infantry in Column moves 6" a turn, so at a minimum, one isolated 6 pounder artillery stand would get 1 die (at 6" range) and 3 dice (at 0" range) of fire at the isolated infantry unit. Of the four dice (each with a "+1" modifier to hit a column), assuming a 50% chance of a successful fire, two would hit, requiring two MCs. In the resulting MC roll (also assuming 50% chance of passing), one of the two would fail, thus requiring a second MC. That would give a 50% chance of repulsing the infantry from a melee (essentially stopping them from contacting in the first place). The next turn, should the infantry attack again, another 3 dice would be fired. Frontal attacks against artillery may not be the wisest tactic in a commander's success book.

Now, if the artillery is properly supported, or if the infantry is of poorer or better quality, you can start to see that the permutations of success depend upon what you bring to the field of battle. And if you bring together a Grand Battery of guns, you can start to see what infantry faced if forced to attack head on. The idea is that the ratio of artillery attacks to infantry moves to damage sustained remains consistent.

Ok- I found one of my better break-downs of the firepower issue in AK. These numbers are based off the Prussian ones….

This is from a post I did on here a few weeks ago:

"Let's say that your basic unit is a battalion. To be specific let's say a battalion of 600 men in two ranks, on level ground, standing, not fatigued physically by marching (even across a flat field in formation) fresh to the combat (in gamer parlance "not disordered") and of average training and sound morale. At 100 meters facing the same they can expect to take 37 casualties in 1 minute of fire against a similar unit (in morale, size and formation) (assuming 3 rounds per minute). My personal reading of the text leads me to think that this is a maximum result of the fire, not the average (the author is assuming breach loading rifles but importantly he does not assume aiming but rather an area fire to the direct front. He states most men can't pick out a target in combat in any case, so I don't think there would be much of a difference in hits). Furthermore the reduction in effective strength (according to the book) is 3 times the number of casualties (skulkers, men carrying the wounded, etc). That means if a game battalion has 6 "strength points" it could take 1 hit in just 1 minute of fire at 100m. Interestingly AK doesn't mention First Volleys, although it does state a 10% decrease in effect after 10 minutes of fighting, 20% after 20 minutes (I may be slightly off here). As far as break points go, skirmishes are much more likely to run than units in formation (how often do you see skirmishes retreat in rule sets?), and columns less that lines but the real determining factor that drives a unit to retreat is not total casualties but the rate of casualties. In the above equation, considering 37 casualties in 1 minute, the battalion could be expected to break 20% of the time. Curiously, AK (played, if I recall, with two dice) only has a unit break with the possibility of a rally during the same "day" (note not battle) when the player rolls a number tying the calculated target number. Less than that the unit is so damaged it can't fight further, more than that the unit doesn't retire from the firing line. I find this to be quite interesting because it's very different from the behavior of units in most Napoleonic war games. According to AK a unit pushed to breaking will only be able to rally that day one time in ten.

All of that directly impacts game turns and movement. If a turn is 1 minute you can figure that a unit can move 75m per one minute turn while in formation and keep firing and movement in lock step. If you start increasing movement beyond firing you'll begin to get a distorted effect cropping up in the game.

Try looking at the frontages of your units to figure out the basic groundscale of your rule set is, then figure out what 1 minute of movement would look like. You can then use that, along with fire effect calculations, to see how much time you're actually modeling with your rules, and therefore what your turns are actually showing.

The whole time/space issue with wargames is fascinating."

There's info on artillery as well. I haven't done as much reading on that but I really need do so. You can see just from the above that a war-game based on the numbers above would be VERY different indeed from the offerings out there.

EDIT: In answer to the OP- if you have a set game turn, like I'm debating doing in my game, say one minute, or even greater, you could actually get away with calculating the effect of each cannonball fired by that battery in that turn. You'll have to make some allowances, but if you know your cannons are only firing for, say, two minutes per "die roll," you could calculate the exact number of maximum balls fired, the exact casualties expected at certain range bands and then create a chart that would reflect that as a "best case" is, then figure out a reasonable minimum and a median, then use that as the basis for your calculations. People might nitpick it but as long as you can reasonably defend you're numbers the reasonable majority or Napoleonics players will certainly cut you some slack :)

Say you have a ten gun battery, and can expect under best circumstances, say, one round a minute (I'm making this up for simplicity) and 50% hits at 800 meters, at a three ranked target in one volley you could except to inflict 15 casualties per minute with roundball at that range. In ten minutes you'd inflict 150 casualties, but you'd also have fired 100 round shot- a not insignificant sum! According to the AK numbers above an infantry battalion could quite easily take that fire standing up- it's not much worse than skirmish fire, actually. (I'm not sure what the actual rate of hits at 800m is, but you see my point I hope!)

I agree that a 6 pdr battery would have the equivalent firepower of a battalion. Let's look at it this way. Generally, a 6 pounder has nearly the same weight of projectile as 100 muskets, so a battery of six 6 pdrs would therefore have the same weight as a 600 man battalion and therefore roughly the same "firepower" IN CANISTER RANGE of about 200-300 paces. (I believe I read in a Duffy book stating that Frederick the Great ordered his 3 pdr battalion guns to open canister fire at 300 paces.) We can assume that the maximum percentage of hits by the battalion would approach 20% at 200 paces. The battery would be roughly the same at about 200 paces, assuming that about 1/3 of the balls would pass over the line, 1/3 hit the ground and 1/3 being at the correct height, of which many will hit, so about 20% max. I believe that when using solid shot, the physical damage would be very slight, as any one ball actually hitting a 2-3 rank unit can only take out a couple of men, so even a perfectly aimed volley from the battery is only going to take out a dozen or so men. Now image this line of men 600 or more yards away, moving within a veritable smoke screen and the prospects of ANY balls hitting seem remote. Most rules give artillery much more accuracy and much more power outside of canister range than I think is appropriate. Like several have said, it's disruptive, fatiguing, and demoralizing more than it is damaging to troops. The Polemos family of rules agree and their long range "bombardment" rules effectively simulate this. Nice thread, BTW.

Here's another wrinkle to consider for the ACW period.

On both sides, the "standard" way of giving fire was not with an initial volley, but with the soldiers being ordered to "fire by file".

In this order, the right hand file in each company fired their weapons, then began to reload. As soon as they had initially fired, the NEXT file to their left fired, then the next, etc, until all the company had fired.

While this was happening, the soldiers who had fired began to reload, and would then begin to fire at will.

By this means, the right hand files would be reloaded and firing before the full company had completed it's fire. This system allowed for a constant, and aimed, fire upon the enemy, and also allowed for a better field of view, as the smoke would more quickly dissipate across the entire front of the battalion, rather than hang in a hevy sheet after a battalion volley.

When it was desired to use volley fire, two problems developed that had to be dealt with. The first was the smoke, of course, which without some sort of wind could hang about, especially if there was a high humidity index. The second problem was that the enemy could advance his forces, knowing that it would take you at least 30 seconds to have the entire battalion reload and be prepared to fire again. These two problems were solved by only firing the first rank in a volley. The 2nd rank remained at either shoulder arms, or at the ready. Once the front rank had reloaded, and returned to shoulder arms, the 2nd rank could fire.

There were certainly times when volley fires, in their various incantations, were used, but by far, the most common form of delivering fire was "Fire by Files"

How, and if, that should be considered is something worth discussing.

Great thread, and some absolutely excellent discussion and data here.

Something to consider regarding the differences in accuracy for the smooth bore versus rifled muskets at range..

While there is an impressive and marked increase in accuracy for the rifled musket, it should be noted that the difference in percentage may not necessarily have such an equally impressive effect on actual numbers of casualties, regardless of ideal firing conditions or not.

For example, the smoothbore firing at 100yds achieved 22% less hits on the target compared to the rifled musket (file firing). An impressive number by any account. However in a "real life" volley where you may be very lucky to inflict 10-20 casualties on an opposing line, this really only equates to 2 to 4 more casualties at the very best. Not nearly so impressive as the firing statistics seem to imply, and certainly actual battlefield conditions would whittle away even this very modest increase.

So while I feel we may have faith in the data, and that it is indeed compelling, the actual effects in terms of numbers of casualties are not nearly so catastrophic as one would imagine.

Cheers,
Bob

It's an observation from more recent military trials, but the usual observation is that troopers on a live-fire exercise as opposed to a firing range are about 10% as effective/accurate as their range performance, and troopers in actual combat are about 10% the effectiveness as their exercise performance.

Inkbiz – I fully concur with yourself and LitS with respect to battle casualty rates; such historical data as is available permit no other conclusion. By posting the data from Fuller's book, I did not intend to suggest that it was in any way representative of actual battlefield performance; my intent was solely to offer the data as comparative accuracy benchmarks for the different weapon types – for example, if SBs could inflict 4 casualties at X range over N time, RMs would be likely to inflict 5 casualties.

B

Blutarski, yes, absolutely and fully appreciated, I just was fiddling with some numbers, based on that excellent reference you posted.

Regarding the 'buck and ball' data you posted, does your reference designate wether the results for the buckshot accuracy is per grouping/load of buckshot, or per individual buckshot pellets? It would be kinda I nteresting to see the difference in actual hits based on that..

Cheers,
Bob

Hi Bob,
Re the buck and ball results: separate volley, file and skirmish firings were conducted @ 100 yds and then repeated at 200 yds. In each firing ten men fired five rounds (each of 1 ball + 3 buckshot = a total of 50 balls + 150 buckshot per firing) for a total of fifty discharges at a 10ft x 10ft target. The number of balls hitting the respective target was counted and the number of buckshot pellets to hit was separately counted for each firing. The results in my above post were in all cases reported as A/B percentages, where A = the percentage of balls and B = the percentage of buckshot striking the target.

Hope this clarifies.

B

This is a very interesting discussion. Does anyone recall the ratio of battlefield casulties between artillery and infantry. I don't have the figures in front of me but I believe artillery casulties constituted something like 10 to 20% of all battlefied casulties. Does anybody know? Also, did this ratio change from the Napoleonic period to the ACW?

All we have to use in determining the 'equivalency between guns and infantry' are these things:
1. Comparative ordinance tests
2. the views of experienced officers
3. Doctrine: the SOPs for artillery and infantry fire
4. Reported battlefield use
5. Our own calculations…which are pretty weak substitutes for the first four sources.

There were any number of ordinance tests in the years leading up to the Napoleonic wars and during them.

Russ mentions Muller, an officer in the King's German Legion whose "Elements of the Science of War was published in 1811. There many others. The mean figures for the British and ordinance tests betwen 1770 and 1813 can be found in Adye's Bobardier and Pocket Gunner. Hughes utilizes this information in his book Firepower. But there were many others. Otto von Pivka [aka Digby Smith] in his Armies of the Napoleonic Era gives the results of 1790 Hanoverian tests. There is also Picard's La Campagne de 1800 en Allemagne which gives the mean for French weapons at the time. Then there are Scharnhorst's extensive tests in 1813, to name just a few.

So what do they show as far as infantry fire? shooting at targets the height and frontage of a company [@100 yards]:

Muller 1811: well-trained men 53% at 100 yards
Picard 1800 60% at 75 yards
Hanoverian 1790 53.4% at 83 yards
Scharnhorst 1813 65% at 80 yards.

Muller also had poorly trained men fire, and came up with 40% hits at 100 yards. Scharnhorst's number is a composite of six different weapons, from the Brown Bess to the Austrian Fusil. It is pretty clear that under perfect conditions, one could expect 50-60% hits between 80-100 yards.

Now, the artillery. Let's just concentrate on case/canister shot. Light case would be used out to @250-300 yards. Heavy case, out to 500-600 yards. 6# light case carried 85 balls, heavy case 30 to 40. Uxbridge lost a leg at Waterloo from heavy case, a ball about 2 inches in diameter.

Muller figured that a six pounder in an attack over 1600 yards would inflict 120 casulaties. What is important is that 100 of those casualties would be within 400 yards.
So what was the number of canister balls that hit the target?

Muller 200 yards 55 balls/light case per round
400 yards 36 balls/light case per round
600 yards 6 balls/heavy case per round

That is 64%, 42% and 20% hits. This is well within the test results from the other ordinance tests. To compare it to infantry, a six pounder put as many balls in the target at 200 yards as did a hundred infantry at 100 yards. This would lead one to give an equavalency of one gun to 100 men. However, artillery would hit with canister several times before the attacker was within infantry range. If you roughly calculate that it would take infantry a minute to cross one hundred yards, artillery firing twice per minute, infantry three times, the artillery would get off 8 shots to the infantry's three.

OR 2.5 the hitting power more or less. This is exactly the extimate Clausewitz gives in his tactical treatise. Clausewitz was an artillery instructor under Prince Auguste 1803 to 1806.

But what about round shot? Muller gives these percentages for round shot that hit a sheet six feet high and 100 yards wide.

3pdr 450 yards 100% of shots hit.
470 yards 34%
1100 yards 20%
6pdr 520 yards 100%
950 yards 31%
1200 yards 17%
12pdr 600 yards 100%
950 yards 26%
1300 yards 15%

This is rather concervative compared to Scharhorst and the Hanoverian tests, but you can see why 1000 yards was generally seen as the 'effective range' of artillery.

This is what is reported for the French by
Gérôme - Essai historique sur la tactique de l'infanterie (1903), p.222, footnote #1:

Les distances maxima prescrites pour le tir á boulets étaient de :800 mètres pour pièces de 12; 750 mètres pour les pièces de 8; 600 mètres pour les pièces de 4. Pour Pour le tir á mitraille: 600 mètres pour les pièces de 12: 550
Mètres pour les pieces de 8, 400 mètres pour less pieces de 4. Les portées maxima étaient de 1.800 mètres pour le 12, 1,500 mètres pour le 8, 1.200 mètres pour le 4.

Rough Translation:
The maximum distances prescribed for the solid shot were: 800 meters for 12 pound pieces;
750 meters for 8 pound pieces;
600 meters for 4 pound artillery pieces. .
For canister: 600 meters for 12pounders:
550 meters for 8 pound pieces,
400 meters for 4 pounders or smaller.
The limits possible were 1,800 meters for the 12, 1.500 meters for the 8, 1,200 meters for the 4.

Also keep in mind the penetrating power of artillery and that if at all possible, artillery was fired at a target on the oblique to enhance that power. [Much like WW1 machine guns were set up to fire down a line rather than straight ahead.]

Clausewitz says there were two types of combat, destructive and decisive. "Artillery increases the destructive principle of fire; it is the most redoubtable of arms, and its want, therefore, diminishes very considerably the intensive force of an army." He also notes the ratios of artillery to infantry 2 or 4 to 1000 men. Or about 240 to 350 men per gun.

And of course, in actual combat performance, each arm would perform less efficiently, but there is every reason to believe the 'equivalency' would remain the same or better for the artillery compared to infantry.

MDavout:

The reported ratios for both the Napoleonic wars and ACW run around 60-70% musket, 25-35% artillery and one or two percent bayonet.

The basic problems with these numbers is that they are counting wounded, not dead and in any number of cases a wound by canister fire would look the same as a bullet[s]. It can be argued that artillery and bayonet wounds would likely be more deadly. More destruction and more purposeful ending of a life.

Here we go to number crunching that has limited value, but can help to see that there is more to the story. Wagram is a possible example. The Austrians suffered 37,146 casualties. Even if we allowed 100,000 of the 130,000 French infantry [75%] to claim ALL the casualties as musket inflicted, this comes to 185 hits for every 500 men for the entire battle. [Remember that at 80 yards, there was a 60% hit average under perfect conditions. One volley at that distance by 500 men should cause 300 casualties.]

If artillery is credited with just 40% of the casualties, further estimating that 400 our of the 488 guns [80%] were used during the battle [some were guarding Labou Island etc.] each gun caused 38 casualties or 228 to 308 per battery. [Muller's test has ONE gun causing 120 casualties in one advance.]

So under perfect conditions according to Muller 500 men cause 300 casualties in one volley, while one 6pdr causes 120 casualties in one advance.

With a 60/40 division of the Wagram casualties comes to 500 men causing 111 casualties while one gun caused 38 for the entire battle. IF you *assume* this represents a degrading of performance on the part of infantry, they are at 27% of 'perfect' for just one volley and artillery is at 31% of 'perfect' for firing on just one infantry advance over 16 minutes.

I think it is easy to see that giving musket fire the majority of casualties has its problems. Whatever the 'correct' ratio of casualties between infantry and artillery, artillery's performance is probably causing significantly more casualties of the total than the arm is generally given credit for.

FWIW, this is a short piece on the bayonet I wrote a few years back for a couple of blogs. It might be of some small use here.

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The Bayonet

In American Civil War literature, no single item of equipment has had such a poor treatment as the bayonet. Appearing in the 17th century, the first known examples were said to have derived their name from the French Town of Bayonne, where it is alleged they were developed. Hard to say for certain.

What can be said for certain is that, by the time of the Civil War, the bayonet was still seen as an integral part of the Infantryman's kit, and many descriptions of both fact and fantasy were given of bayonet charges, coupled with cries of "Give ‘em the cold steel, boys!" by writers and politicians alike.

However, after the civil war, and interesting thing happened. Historians started to report that, despite all it's reputation, the bayonet was hardly used at all! How could this be? How could so many period letters and accounts be so wildly inaccurate?

The allegation of the rarely-used bayonet is a case of examining a fact out of context. The claim is based upon fact: The Surgeon General of the Army of the United States, in 1870, caused a series of books to be printed entitled: The Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion, (1861-65) . These books, in several volumes, outlined all of the actions, capabilities, results, orders and letters of both armies Medical Departments during the course of the war. Among the many fascinating tidbits is a table of types of wounds treated in Federal Hospitals. Fewer than 1,000 bayonet wounds are listed.

Historians jumped upon this and began to proclaim that, far from being the decisive weapon, the instrument of close-order combat, the bayonet was by and large an impediment to the soldier, who had little use for it other than as a tool about camp or bivouac. Other writers, following the initial wave of books and articles, continued to report the same, and it has influenced many an arm chair general's discussions of ACW period combat.

Yet, there remains all those pesky letters, diaries, and other contemporary accounts, such as Jonathon Newcomb's letter regarding his unit (3rd Maine Infantry) and their actions during the 7-day's battles of 1862. Newcomb writes that the 3rd was posted in line of battle behind a rail fence, half-obscured with tall grass and ordered to lay prone. As the 8th & 11th Alabama approached, the 3rd Maine "rose up and fired a volley, then pitched into them with bayonets and clubbed muskets and drove them back for nearly a mile".

The answer to the question is elegantly simple and involves the bayonet itself. The weapon was an 18" long steel triangular shape, with fluted blade which tapered into a solid triangle, attached to a socket via a curved steel shank. It was not sharpened, and was designed for thrusting and parrying. It's cross-section created a wound that would not close easily, and as a result, was normally fatal. Yes, fewer than 1,000 wounds from bayonets were treated at Federal Hospitals during the war. That is because the majority of bayonet wounds were fatal, or were so slight that surgeons could deal with it and return the man to his unit without having to go to the hospital.

Litter bearers only picked up the wounded. Burial details only rarely remarked upon the nature of wounds. Thus, they were not included in the statistical abstracts put out by the Surgeon General's Office.

Bayonets were used, and often with deadly effect. At times, the sight of a determined force advancing with fixed bayonets was enough to cause the other side to "skedaddle" before they came to close-quarters. However, the myth that bayonets were never actually used in combat should be put to rest alongside those of the "ragged Reb" and the ‘well-fed Yank" and others I will address in coming posts.
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V/R