"Waterloo Betrayed: The Secret Treachery that ..." Topic

I can confirm that Stephen supplied me with a list of 2006 and 2007 auctions selling Soult material, of which he states that over 20 lots appear to relate to the 1815 campaign. It would be very interesting to see what they reveal and if it supports Stephen's thesis or not. Perhaps Stephen will offer the same list to TMP? I see no reason why not?

I loved Stephen Beckett's last paragraph in his latest posting and it makes just the point that I tried to, in my latest effort.

The book indeed does address just how much treachery there already was (without any contribution from Soult). I think that could even be expanded further.

I guess my point is that these incidents all saw the light of day, so they are well recognised. Something that has been concealed for 200 years, that must have required a conspiracy, is just hard to believe.

Not impossible to believe though…just hard.

I'll again say how much I enjoyed this book (almost as much as beating Man City just now). Also highly impressed by the way you have handled the flak, without getting unpleasant. Well done.

West Ham fan, eh, deadhead? Yes, for now, they do appear to be a good team with a good manager. They even beat my team a few weeks ago. But to keep with the thread, you do know that they were supplied with the Man City plans before the game started?

Brilliant……………raised a great laugh here. I thought Aguero was strangely off target on several occasions. Now I understand……..

We're coming for you
We're coming for you
Barcelona
We're coming for you

I do think there has been such a series of interesting points made here ( and some very very interesting and new, unpublished, thoughts from SB) there is a mass of stuff for another edition. I know this one must prosper first though.

The idea that Soult for example may not have foreseen a catastrophe, he maybe just wanted to hamper Napoleon's plans and invasion of "Belgium"…….with hindsight…but who could have foreseen the rout?

deadhead

In football terms, we will see how things stand next May. A long way to go yet. Will you still be singing them, I wonder? And will I?

But back to Napoleonics, I don't think anyone reading accounts of the Waterloo Campaign will be able to read them in the same way after reading Stephen's book.

An example being after I had been reading Commandant Lachouque's Waterloo, and came across things like-

On the 12th, at 4 am, he left the Elysee with the Duke of Bassano and General Bertrand, lunched at Soissoons and slept at Laon. Grouchy was there. Why had the cavalry not been sent off? Soult had omitted to send marching orders. (page 57)

So an order-a pencilled note-had been sent by both the marshal and Count d'Erlon. It is true that it was not signed and was not entered in the Chief of Staff's order book; but it was carried by General La Bedoyere, the Emperor's aide-de-camp.

La Bedoyere was shot on the 19th August 1815. And not the Emperor at St. Helena, or Soult, who died in 1851, or any of their contemporaries ever made any illusion to the event…Opaque darkness…

Count D'Erlon was not accused of treason – but he had a narrow escape. In France avenging posterity has had no need of a traitor for the 16th June, it is true, since Ligny ended up a French victory.
(pages 111-112)

Soult expressed regret about the remoteness of Grouchy's detachment in view of its importance. Jerome and Reille passed on the information given to them by the waiter at the Genappe inn about "a concerted link-up between the British and Prussians coming from Warve." "Foolishness," retorted the Emperor, "After a battle like the one at Ligny, the joining up of the British and the Prussians is impossible. If my orders are carried out, we will sleep in Brussels tonight." Why did they not do so?
(page 129)

Yes, why indeed did they not do so? Stephen's book certainly makes you question everything. Just a shame it does not provide the definitive answers, well, not the first edition anyway.

Stephen

I agree with you that it sounds like a plausible explanation of dErlon's expression that he wants us to understand that Napoleon should have known. That episode has always puzzled me greatly that Napoleon should have such poor understanding of the tactical situation.

I highly appreciate your comments here which have improved the reading experience and value of your book greatly. I whished to return the favor with my review of your book on amazon.com (Trygve Smidt).

Gazzola – there are many different versions of who/how/when for the diversion of d'Erlon to Ligny. Each and provide evidence to refute the others.

In my opinion, the focus on these details has totally derailed proper analysis of the event. While so many have tried to solve the mystery of the diversion, few have brought up that at that late hour of 5 and 6pm, Napoleon was convinced I Corps was in Ney's operational control, and hence the forces would be coming from the north west.

The surprise was so complete that it actually caused panic. This highlights how the risk of an advance from Mons had percolated throughout the French army command. This is not surprising – just look at a map – anyone can see that, not understanding where the Anglo-Dutch army was, had it concentrated there, it could easily maneuver across the rear of the French advance.

Thus, you see (in the correspondence) and overwhelming emphasis of observing the left – and it also explains Ney's orders as well – keeping strong forces and cavalry south of his position and observing the west.

NONE of the above is necessary or a concern if an entire French Corps is at Gosselies meandering up to Frasnes.

This is the big mystery – not who diverted I Corps, but why Napoleon was so uninformed. Likewise, Janin wrote he was surprised to see them so far south earlier in the day.

All these surprises… yet, the correspondence demonstrates that Soult and d'Erlon were in contact, and that Soult was aware from the 15th that I Corps was dispersed with units as far back as Thuin.

While order manipulation prior to hostilities is clear, the above is arguably more damaging. Because the situation has not matched Napoleon's words, most historians have simply declared Napoleon's words false.

I believe Napoleon wrote what he believed (including the June 15th Bulletin). I believe this because his orders match the bulletin and his history. It really is the simple explanation.

This goes part and parcel with Soult – he said he hated Napoleon. Maybe the simple explanation is he did?

deadhead – Guizot when to Ghent during 1815, and was highly criticized later in his political career for doing so.

He was accused of being a traitor, but denied it vigorously!

All that was produced against him during his lifetime were baseless accusations.

In 1902, the correspondence from Louis XVIII court in Ghent was published. Lo and behold! Guizot was a traitor! He brought detailed information from the War Ministry as documented by the Prussian minister Goltz writing to Hardenberg. Clarke also knew… who else knew?

We know not because this information was brought to light by the conspirators, but because it was finally collected and published in a rather arcane book.

Had Guizot held in his possession these materials, would we ever know?

Soult did have the majority of the military records from 1815, and hence a veil of darkness exists. Soult did not hold all material on 1815 in his possession, and we have been only able to piece together an incomplete record. As a result, we can see problems, but likewise are left with questions.

Why we can't see more is because of SOULT.

But keep in mind, by keeping these materials from view, it is not just whether he betrayed Napoleon that is left unanswered, but most questions of the campaign!

The entire conventional history has many guesses because the record is not present. For those in a rush to get to the climax, the battle of the 18th, this is irrelevant. (proof? read their book titles, how many say "4 days" in them… was Ulm a 1 week campaign? Do we ignore the previous marches? No, only at Waterloo is the campaign boiled down to just hostilities.)

So the points are a) Soult's control of the vital information is the key to his behavior remaining mysterious regardless of what that behavior was and b) these mysteries permeate any study of the campaign.

Most conventional histories suffer from just making statements of fact and moving on. "Napoleon planned his campaign to start on June 15th. He planned to separate the Allied armies, and destroy the Prussians, and then destroy the Anglo-dutch." Pretty much sums it up, right?

Outnumbered 2-1, and with his enemies dispersed, just how was he going to destroy them? These armies were not positioned to be destroyed – forward elements were at risk, but there was no way for Napoleon to maneuver the destruction of the enemy unless they gave battle, and his correspondence suggests he did not expect this.

Hence, while engaging in battle was certainly in the matrix of events, the statement that he planned hostilities for June 15th and his sole goal was 2 decisive battles HAS TO BE FALSE. (Clausewitz states this.) Of course, we know he planned for June 14th, and we know, as Napoleon stated, Brussels was key. But of course, we are talking about Napoleon, and I'm quite sure he had scenarios accounted for that no subsequent historian has ever envisioned.

To net it all out – because Soult did not turn over his military records from 1815 (which we now at least have a partial catalog of) there has been an inability to properly evaluate his conduct. He did what Guizot could not, keep the fine details of his actions hidden.

When I evaluated these actions, I found them highly suspect. It is not hard at all to believe he could have been nefarious and yet this not become widely known for a simple reason – what work has ever focused on Soult during 1815? Mauduit gave Soult attention in his 1815 history – he lacked details, but felt Soult was a traitor. Most have simply attributed the great failures to Soult, often with absolutely incorrect statements, "Berthier always used 3 messengers" blah blah blah.

Based on all the intrigue of 1815, I am not surprised at all that Soult's conduct has gone undiscovered/discussed. In fact, I fully expect that over time, more and more surprises will be found, not just from 1815, but all eras.

100 years from now, I bet all these scattered archives are digitized and online, and I am sure amazing things will be revealed from obscure places where maybe a secretary that we have never heard of took a portfolio of documents from some huge event and when he died they got pushed into an attic and later given to a library where no one knows what they are or those that know don't even know to look for them…

I was criticized in a review for using web links to gallica or google books etc. I did this because I think this is the future – not some old outdated bibliography that puts a burden on the reader to find the source, but a link to a digitized version of a source from anywhere in the world. My test readers (all had pdf/kindle) loved this as they could and did click to all these sources where they could judge for themselves the conclusions.

All I can say is repeat that, the more I read on this message thread, the more I can see the need for a second edition.

Your book is a superb account of something I always totally ignored (Soult or not).

Reluctantly, I would always have conceded that Q Bras and Ligny might be of some interest, the Retreat a great tale, but, only once you get to closing the gate, seizing the eagles, forming the squares, abandoning LHS etc etc does it get interesting.

However much authors could argue about the timing of von Dornberg's messages, I could never work up much interest in the opening of the campaign.

What you have shown me is that there is a great tale to tell, even earlier, before a shot was fired. I should have known,as I am fascinated by anything to do with the First Restoration and Louis' flight to ………well Ghent, eventually.

If "only" as a story of the French moves towards the border, their monumental foul ups throughout and the documented degree of treachery/desertion Boney faced (again irrespective of Soult) this is a unique book. Let's face it, there is little enough about the French side of this campaign.

Funny thing. Just looked at my "Campaigns of Napoleon" (Chandler) and I see there are two earlier volumes. Seems to suggest there was something before 1815……..naw…

Stephen

Like I said before, your book did convince me that your thesis that Soult may have been a traitor is certainly plausible. However, as you state in your book, there is not enough evidence, as yet, to confirm it. So everything is still up in the air, as it is with accusations against Grouchy and D'Erlon.

The problem is that it is doubtful if any of the historical characters, if they had actually been traitors, would have had the courage to admit it and explain whatever principals may have made them that way. Again, we have to hope that some of the missing material becomes available and supports (or opposes) your thesis. At the moment, it is very much an open case.

deadhead – you have just made one of the points in the book for me, do you realize?

The Drama of June 18th is so tremendous and focused on that the other events of the campaign get scant attention. Whole books and chapters are written about who/how/what defeats the final guard attack… an event that while full of human drama, was of low consequence to the strategic outcome.

These events dominate French sources from the 19th century as well. We must keep in mind that most of the materials that give the a more complete story of the concentration were not available for veterans or historians who could speak with living veterans to draw upon. Hence, there are more letters between Jomini and Grouchy or defenders of Ney than there are words about what happened before June 15th. In short, Ney and Grouchy, and more recently d'Erlon, have received laser like focus by authors who still state so many other basic facts incorrectly.

Speaking of conspiracies, we need a Howard Baker to ask, "What did Napoleon know and when did he know it?"

That is _the_ question, and the answers would resolve the most compelling mysteries of the campaign.

Rittmester – thanks for your support. I really appreciate all who have noticed the book has multiple theses.

To clarify an earlier post – Clausewitz stated that Napoleon's goal was 2 decisive battles – and he states this drawing upon Napoleon's primary goal of defeating the main armies of the enemy. How I wrote the above could suggest that Claueswitz stated that this idea has to be false. He did not.

Gazzola – one thing to keep in mind is that Soult had a brother, one year his junior, that led a division of cavalry during the 1815 campaign.

To be a fly on the wall when they discussed the campaign.

Can one argue that Soult's actions risked the life of his brother? But can one also argue that each victory Napoleon gained led to another battle, another campaign, and greater risk for all soldiers?

Grouchy's son Alphonso was a Colonel of a regiment of Cavlary – wounded at Waterloo. Alphonso worked with his father tireless on rehabilitating the family name. This is one of many reasons I have never felt Grouchy did anything during the campaign nefarious. Grouchy thought he was doing his duty even while his son was leading charges against the British.

Likewise, I find that d'Erlon has been unduly criticized. Many point out how he got off to a late start – which is true, yet, this veteran still ran into the rear of II Corps and would be slowed down by II Corps through the 16th. It seems to me he was quite aware of the realities of the situation, and made a judgement that history proved correct – leaving an hour later was correct, and I believe that the original order didn't take into account the moves made on the June 14th that brought I Corps closer to II Corps. In other words, the June 15th order of movement used the June 14th times of departure.

When he did leave the Ligny battle to return to Quatre Bras, it is again (there is so much of this) evidence of the French higher leadership having tremendous concerns about their left. So many look at the map and push blocks around with the safety of perfect intelligence – but those guys knew that had an army cut across their rear then the French army could have been outnumbered, encircled, and with a river on their rear. I agree with the analysis (of others, btw) that say d'Erlon, believing Ney's situation was urgent, erred on the side of caution.

Of course, march to the battle and eliminate the threat of encirclement etc. etc. Not saying I agree, simply that every study of this campaign should almost have a chapter called, "Mons" The impact of that area and its potential played such a huge role for the French and the Anglo-Dutch yet some books do not even mention this at all, or do so to criticize Wellington.

Stephen

In my opinion, if D'Erlon received an order from the Emperor to march to Ligny, that is what he should have obeyed, no matter what. He should have dismissed any other demands/orders from lesser commanders. But if, as you suggest, we make allowances for D'Erlon, then perhaps we should be doing the same with Soult?

I believe Soult's brother commanded the 4th Cavalry Division at Ligny but he wasn't at Waterloo. Instead, his division was with Grouchy, so perhaps Soult did not see him in that much danger being with Grouchy? Grouchy's son commanded the 12th Chasseurs a Cheval and was at both Ligny and Waterloo.

Stephen

It would probably be helpful for an extended study of the preliminaries to the fighting, as well as to understand the actions on the 15th-17th June, to make a complete "Intelligence preparation of the battlefield" seen from the French side. I.e. go through every factor about the enemy and the terrain which might influence Napoleon's plan for the campaign, then leading to an understanding of which courses of action were open to the Allies and the Prussians. This might lead to a better understanding of what probably were the concerns of the French commanders and general staff.
You could then plug in what you know from correspondance to fill in with factual assessment from the French side, giving a guide to what Allied course of action was most probable and/or most dangerous to the French. Although you have presented some of this analysis already, it could be furhter developed with details such as when, where and with what forces could the Allied intervene/attack on the 16th and 17th etc.
Although this is standard procedure which has been developed after the Napoleonic wars, the basics would have been the same then and for someone like Napoleon, he would probably have gone through this extensively in his mind many times before and during the campaign.
If you need a hand, I might support you with the methododology.

Btw, Clausewitz's analysis of the campaign provides much to this analysis regarding the Prussian forces, as well as anlaysis as to some of the assessments Napoleon had to do in line with my above statement.

Gazzola – did d'Erlon receive a direct order from Napoleon to march to Ligny? This is very much in dispute. I do agree with you though that had d'Erlon received a direct order from Napoleon, he should have followed it – and I believe had he, he would have.

de Wit has 2 PDFs on his website devoted just to the issue of d'Erlon's movements on June 16th. Even if one ignores his conclusions, he demonstrates how all the primary actors contradict themselves. Thus, books tend to follow whomever they believe the most (Houssaye believed everything Baudus wrote – including the "easy as breakfast" quote.)

De Wit believes the critical question is who diverted I Corps to Ligny. I have a different take – I believe the critical question is why didn't Napoleon know where d'Erlon was. All the preserved orders are from Napoleon to Ney, and leave the decision to Ney of what to send behind the Prussians. (I do favor de Wit's analysis of what happened.)

Later memoirs speak of the staff scanning the horizon waiting for d'Erlon. Were these written because the staff was aware of an order TO d'Erlon? Or once d'Erlon was the force that arrived, did the account state d'Erlon with hindsight as the force that the staff was clearly waiting for.

Fundamentally, I believe had Napoleon known the disposition of the left wing, the orders given would have been more direct. Why send orders to Ney to dispatch d'Erlon when d'Erlon was closer? Hence, I don't believe that happened. As it stands, orders to Ney in some manner led to d'Erlon's diversion from much farther south, and this shocked _many_ French at Ligny. Clearly, the understanding of the situation which had percolated throughout the command structure was flawed.

Rittmester – I'm considering something similar, email me.

Stephen & Rittmester

Hasn't Andrew Field done this to a certain degree, in his two books Prelude to Waterloo: Quatre Bras and Waterloo?

In terms of orders to D'Erlon he writes:
'A little after four o'clock, the first two-divisions passed the Roman way when D'Erlon was joined by Colonel Forbin-Janson, a staff officer from Imperial headquarters. He carried an order from Napoleon ordering Marshal Ney to send d'Erlon corps to the east and attack Ligny from the heights of Saint-Amand, in line with the emperor's new strategic design. The order was written in pencil and was almost illegible.' (page 149: Quatre Bras by Andrew Fields)

However, as detailed and informative as Andrew's books are, I am not saying his books offer a minute by minute breakdown, as you both appear to be suggesting your idea for a study would be?

Check the sourcing of Fields quote, and then check Uffindell's breakdown, and then check de Wit's, and then Houssaye's (in his footnotes) and then tell us what the truth is!

The orders that led to the diversion may have been copies of the previous, registered orders, or may, as some claim, be orders Napoleon hastily put together and sent directly to d'Erlon. Napoleon declines this, and as de Wit points out, he had no reason to decline this as had he, it gave him even another event to credit himself and criticize others over.

I believe what Rittmester is a strategic outlook prior to hostilities.

Gazzola
I agree that Field has done a good job at anlazing the situation and orders during the 15-16 June in his Prelude to Waterloo. I have not read his book on Waterloo yet though, so I am not able to assess that.

However, my idea was to do a complete intelligence assessment as seen from the French side _before_ the campaign started. This would discuss the relevant factors regarding the terrain and infrastructure, environmenatal factors (daylight hours, weather etc), Allied strengths and weaknesses and how these could influence the French plan. Although we today know much of Wellingtons and Blüchers plans for the campaign, this analysis should present probable courses of action for the Allies such as the French probably would assess them before the campaign started, i.e. without hindsight and the information we have today. It should illustrate what the French probably was looking for actions from the Allied side. Thus it should help establishing a basis for a discussion such as Stephen e.g. has made here regarding what the French were expecting or were afraid of regarding an Allied thrust from Mons.

Stephen, I have mailed you on the @mapleflower.com account.

Rittmester

Sounds good but would this be based on known material or be like Stephen's fascinating and plausible thesis, basically incomplete due to missing material?

Gazzola

The intention of the analysis would be to recreate a situational picture which the French high command probably had, based upon what documented historical information/"facts" we have combined with professional military methodology to connect the dots. The basic operational and tactical considerations we do today are quite similar as to those they did then, although changes in technology and infrastructure etc. make the process more complex today.

I have not yet seen any documented intelligence reports which were available to Napoleon, such as reports on the political situation in Belgium, Allied troop strengths and positions, road conditions etc. If this existed, this would be the basis for the analysis.
However, if the documentation is not available then it is still possible to make an analysis of the factors to make an assessment of the situational awareness the French command most likely had. The intention is to have a structured approach to this to have a clear understanding of what reactions from the Allies would the French command expect as most likely and most dangerous, based on what would be feasible and align with previous experience.

Imagine an equation (a+bx)= where the answer is the result of the battle of Quatre Bras. Since we know the answer but the value of the factors within the brackets have been obscure, what Stephen has done is to analyse and discuss a new combination of possible values for a better fit. My proposal is to help fix/nail one or more of the values by the use of an established professional methodology, thus making it easier to analyse the one which is less clear. It will not provide THE ANSWER, but it will hopefully contribute to clarify the discussion as to what interpretations are more probable than others.

Rittmester

It sounds to me, that in a sense then, the study will contain a certain amount of guesswork, since a fair amount of information is still unknown, missing written orders, intelligence reports etc, which is why the definitive account of the Waterloo campaign has yet to be written, if it ever will be. Plus we have little chance of knowing what orders or intelligence findings were passed on verbally, other than what has been mentioned in memoirs etc. That means you are generally going to have to rely on what is already known and out there, unless, of course, there is a sudden rush of new material becoming available? That would be nice, if it were true. But even so, the idea sounds fascinating, so I look forward to hearing more.

Gazzola
You are right.
It will be much like real intel work. You put together what is known, make some presumptions according to previous experience and then produce Your assessment step by step in a structured way.
However, sometimes you find sources previously considered irrelevant for publication when you look at it with this perspective. We'll have to see what comes up, if any. Structured and precise analysis can produce quite accurate assessments. One trap to avoid here is, however, is to avoid looking at the result in the wrong way and tweak the method to make the assessment fit the result. The result should be used to verify the assessment and value of the factors, or to indicate that the values/factors have to be adjusted.
Bottom line; difficult to say anything of the outcome before it is done.

Rittmester

I wish you the best of luck and look forward to seeing the result. Will you be doing this on the overall campaign or as individual studies of the three main battles?

Thanks Gazzola
The main work will be for the campaign and the situation before each day and/or battle, if I do them, will only be minor updates. I guess the updates might be interesting to do as well, based upon the reports to the French high command. However, this analysis has already been done by Stephen where he points to the probable situational picture Napoleon had due to lacking reports/information from Soult.
We'll see when things get going.

A warning to those contemplating reading Stephen's book. You will not be able to read a Waterloo Campaign account, from whatever angle, again, without questions popping up with every read.

For example, I'm reading some Waterloo titles, simultaneously, chapter by chapter and comparing what I find. And what do I come across:

On the 12th June: 'Napoleon stopped at the Prefecture where his staff had already installed his 'palace', but was unpleasantly surprised on his arrival to find that Emmanuel de Grouchy's 13,000 cavalry were still in the area, the order to leave having somehow not reached their commander. Now the cavalry would have to ride sixty miles north in two days with no time to rest before the fighting began.' (page 83: Waterloo by Tim Clayton)

I think the words 'somehow not reached their commander' is very telling. Was it Soult's incompetence or was it deliberate?

Then we find that old chestnut, which thankfully Stephen rightly questioned and dismissed in his book, which relates to why so many accounts still repeat that Napoleon was supposed to have said that Wellington was a bad general and the British soldiers bad troops. This incorrect claim can yet again be found in Robert Kershaw's 24 Hours At Waterloo, page 64. Unfortunately, Kershaw does not mark his source for this, which suggests it is one of those myths passed on and repeated without proper research.

I'm only about a third of the way through the two titles, so who knows what I will find further on?

Also just started on Wellington's Hidden Heroes by Veronica Baker-Smith. So far, no questions raised. LOL

Grouchy did not get his orders, and there is debate on the impact. I know one French historian who has forgotten more than I know about this period who believes this was devastating – the cavalry started the campaign weakened, none more than the heavies, and their performance was sub-par repeatedly.

I look at the situation, and find it too gross to be intentional, but to make sense if it were a mistake. Sending Soult to Lille on the eve of the campaign was arguably problematic – and we must wonder, who made the mistake? Maybe Bertrand, who dictated and sent with cover letter orders to the other Corps in Soult's absence?

Further Soult's repair of this mistake was interesting, for he sent Grouchy the original orders of June 10th. Not the orders he came up with on the 12th. Did Soult base the orders of the 12th on the Bertrand cover letter, or on the actual text of Napoleon's dictation? Many questions here – the answers are being actively sought.

The "Breakfast" quote deserves attention. I decided to scrutinize this quote because having studied French operations to such a fine detail, I believed Napoleon had the utmost respect for Wellington and the British Soldier. Napoleon then confirmed his respect for the British soldier in exile, but this was of course after events had unfolded.

Most historians discount that Napoleon sent recall orders to Grouchy on the night of June 17th and morning of June 18th. There are reasons for this – such as those orders not appearing in the Register. (the register, which is just a copy that Grouchy provided long after events and that has numerous things missing – that part is often left out… or worse, the historian didn't know! The copy turned over to BNF by Grouchy's son was still a copy, and matched what Grouchy had previously published.)

There are numerous backing sources for Napoleon's recall orders, the most impressive to me comes from Baron Stoffel quoting his uncle who was on Soult's staff.

Yet, we must agree that the hard and fast evidence is lacking.

And so we return to the Breakfast quote – a single source, from notes for that source's book, and that source (Baudus) did NOT use that super famous quote in his own work, yet did include MANY colorful incidents and quotes from Napoleon in his book. Why wasn't it used?

Further, after a bit of research, half that famous quote found in Chateaubriand's "Mémoires d'outre-tomb" and further quoted by others citing him.

It is possible that the full quote is accurate. Besides Baudus, there were several with royalist leanings on staff, and most certainly Chateaubriand spoke to most of them. However, as much as Napoleon was prone to great statements of anger/exaggeration, Napoleon could never match the great exaggerations said about Napoleon!

So at best, this is a quote with a single source with tangible doubts to its veracity… starting with the fact that the source did not use something so explosive in his own work, and that half of the quote was known to another. Considering how Chateaubriand spoke of Napoleon and used the half of the quote in his work, I do not doubt had he heard the whole thing, he would have savored it.

And now we come to the lesson of history – that so many with strong linguistic skills and credentials use without question the breakfast quote and relish in painting Napoleon as overconfident, yet ignore the possibility of recall orders which have more substantiation.

I can't bang the drum long enough or loud enough to use this example (and there are many others) on how POORLY this campaign has been studied and represented.

Gazzola, I'm glad my work is raising questions. That was my goal. If find almost ever work in English to be a race to the 18th. To his credit, Ropes did not do that, but unfortunately his study was done prior to many important pieces of correspondence becoming available.

link

There has been positive movement on bringing new materials to light.

Hi Stephen

I have the Ropes account online.

Yes, it does make you wonder why the author did not offer the source for the breakfast quote, since most of the quotes he used were given the source.

I may have been a little hasty on no questions being raised when reading Wellington's Hidden Heroes, since, after making that claim in my previous post I came across the following, concerning Grouchy-'Partly due to Soult's incompetence and Napoleon's often confusing orders, as well as his own inexperience, he was to become a scapegoat for French defeat.' (page 29) I guess it may well be very interesting to see what else Vernonica mentions, but it is a nice little book, so far anyway.

Debatable if Napoleon's order's were confusing – depends on whether the recall orders were sent. If indeed over 12 hours passed without any orders from N. to Grouchy, and looking at the end points, one can say they were confusing…

Of course, Soult's orders in the afternoon of June 18th – GO TO WAVRE, COME TO US – likewise leave a bit to be desired.

Grouchy did absolutely become the scapegoat for the campaign in 19th century France. I document in the book the French grammar lesson blaming Grouchy from the 1860s.

I read a long time ago (and I wish I remember the source) where someone said that the most well known events were the ones most incorrect (or the most myth). Maybe someone remembers?

The mundane seems to get objective treatment, but the big things get the emotional treatment. Waterloo is a perfect example of this, and even the more recent attempts to make it right seem to focus on which battalion was where, or some detail about June 18th.

Hi Stephen

I was definitely too quick when I made my statement about Vernonic Baker-Smith's book Wellington's Hidden Heroes.

I just came across this in her book: 'The only deserter was General Bourmont who, as one of Ney's A.D.C's had argued fiercely with his chief at Auxerre.' (page 32)

It is a shame she did not read your book before going to publications? LOL

Wow – only deserter? Even the popular accounts mention his staff… maybe that was meant to be only deserter of significance… at least then it would be wrong, but consistent with the majority of all the other wrong accounts.

As I have mentioned, revisionist history/conspiracy theories are certainly something to suspect.

But in this case, it is the CONVENTIONAL history that finds its roots in revisionist history that was incredibly successful in changing the narrative of this campaign. In the immediate aftermath of the campaign, France knew that treason played a major role – but as there was a general understanding of the various sides in the conflict, it also was not that surprising.

The later French generation that wrote about the campaign contained many who were against Bonapartism or Napoleon, and they worked hard to scrub any excuse Napoleon had away for defeat, and to paint him as one with insatiable ambition. As these were French accounts that pushed a view consistent with what the Anglo view was, one can imagine how readily adopted it was. Charras became definitive, etc. etc.

What is SO disappointing is that for modern accounts, the reality was readily available.

It sounds like Baker-Smith's book, from the title, is focused on Wellington's army. Hence, her error was to even bring up French treason at all – why mention Bourmont? I'm sure she has the account of his crossing wrong as well, based on the flawed conventional account where he leaves at the precise moment where he can do no harm… yet the King showers him with rewards.

Stephen

I've not read all of Baker-Smith's book yet, but it reads at the moment like a history of the creation of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Army and their opponents the French. The actual involvement and fighting by the Netherlanders does not occur until about half way through the book.

There may be other blunders within the text but it is an enjoyable and informative read, so far. I just hope it does not turn out to be a Hofschroer type, in that, as he tried to convince the reader (and failed in my opinion) that Waterloo was a German victory, this author might try and convince the reader it was a Netherlands victory. We shall see.

Stephen Beckett: I would not have bought this book. Frankly, I am a skeptical old b------ in regards to conspiracy theories. I have been following the discussions above with great interest, and your responses have changed my mind. My book buying has been curtailed somewhat by money,(or lack of same), space, and time. I intend to order this book however. A most interesting topic, indeed! Thanks, John Miller

John, great, I think you will find that regardless of where your end up in your judgement of events, you will at least have an understanding of events far better than before.

I really don't believe this is a conspiracy theory… this book may be the first that really decided to scrutinize Soult during this campaign, and it is one of the more recent books to point out the level of royalist activity in France during 1815.

It is not the first book to make the traitors of the period a focal point:
"Les Traîtres de Waterloo", Revue Napoleonienne, Volume 7
link

Bonnal de Ganges, E. Les royalistes contre l'armée (1815-1820): d'après les
archives du ministère de la guerre. R. Chapelot et cie, 1906. <http://books.
google.com/books?id=qBtBAAAAYAAJ>

Bustelli, G. L'Enigma di Ligny e di Waterloo (15-18 Giugno 1815). Vignuzzi,
1896. <https://books.google.com/books?id=pJ8UAAAAYAAJ>

The Bustelli book blames practically every senior officer in the French army of treason… but, it contains an analysis of the orders, both in the "order book" and known to exist, and finds the glaring inconsistencies.

JFK assassination has a lot of conspiracy theories, and we laugh at most… but what if seniors members of the military and government had gone over to the Soviet Union during 1963… what if a member of the Secret Service detail in Dallas had defected on November 22nd, 1963. What if members of the military and government were communists who preferred a Soviet style government, but still served their country.

If that were true, I believe we all would believe that there was something beyond Oswald.

That was France in 1815. And the presence of a traitor behind every door definitely impacted the operations of the campaign.

I believe a second edition will become available in early 2016. It is taking time – but new materials are being tracked down.

One doesn't need a credential to be a good historian, only only needs persistence and passion – and anyone who says differently lacks both.

Why should Napoleon send any recall to Grouchy at the 17th of June or very early 18th, he did not reckon that the Prussian would be ready for battle at the 18th.
When Napoleon did realize that the Prussians appeared, and the French were quite surprised at Plancenoit and the Prussians almost captured it in the first rush – then it was too late and Grouchy was already committed at Wavre.

VonW

Napoleon knew the Prussians were retreating/maneuvering a substantial force in the direction of Wavre. Regardless of the state of combat readiness of the Pru forces, any commander would want to both secure his flank, I.e. maneuvre a force a sufficient strength to keep the Prussians from influencing the upcoming battle, as well as concentrate as strong a force as possible for the battle which was evident to take place on the 18th.
Although Napoleon did not have an updated picture of the situation at Wavre, or perhaps especially because of this, I do not find it strange at all that he would send orders for Grouchy to speed up his maneuvre towards the French right flank.
It is understandable, looking at the hilly terrain with winding roads between Wavre and Plancenoit (roads are winding and narrow still today), that Grouchy was reluctant to maneuvre his Corps into this area. However, looking at his amount of light and medium cavalry (which could be supported with light inf for this purpose), it is hard to assess it was something else than negligence to actively reconnoitre and patrol this area to 1) secure lines of communications with the main Army and 2) find and prepare avenues of approach if needed to link up with the main Army.

"Napoleon knew the Prussians were retreating/maneuvering a substantial force in the direction of Wavre."

I disagree on that, in case he would have known, Grouchy would know as well and pin the Prussian Army – so they might not send even one corps.

According to Napoleon the Prussian Army as in that bad shape that is was not possible for them to interfer in any operational art of war for the next days.
According to his opinion he had beaten them thoroughly.

He even did not anticipate that Wellington would make a stand at the 18th and for that reason his army wasn't ready to battle as late as noon on the 18th – nor was the Armée du Nord concentrated.

Grouchy did not have satellites to direct his persuit, in the end he caught the Prussians at Wavre but it was too late.

In case he would have known all that what you suggest, it would be insane for him not to do a complete concentration of forces to be ready in superior strength to attack Wellington's army at the 18th of June.

Instead he was beaten by his usual own grand tactical manoeuvres.

About the traitor theory, I have usual big problems to believe them, but Soult must raise some suspicion, he could have written a central piece of work about the campaign, but he stays silent and destroys documents.

So what was Soult up to – not before the battle, but after Napoleon arrived in St. Helena??

"According to Napoleon the Prussian Army as in that bad shape that is was not possible for them to interfer in any operational art of war for the next days.
According to his opinion he had beaten them thoroughly…"

Well… he had beaten them… no doubt of that?. Remember the first information when the French light Cavalry said that the main Prussian Army retreat not to Wavre… they were speaking about those 7 or 8.000 troops that scape to the North (strangles)… so… even Grouchy think that the Prussian didn't march to Wavre at the beginning…

"Instead he was beaten by his usual own grand tactical manoeuvres."

His own tactical manouevres give him near 60 battle victories my friend. (smile)

"He even did not anticipate that Wellington would make a stand at the 18th and for that reason his army wasn't ready to battle as late as noon on the 18th – nor was the Armée du Nord concentrated"

Remember also the weather my friend… Napoleon want to used his artillery and the battlefield was cover with water from the heavy rains… he decided to wait untill the artillery balls can ricochet… (smile)

"…but Soult must raise some suspicion…"

As you can read here… he must raise a LOT of suspicion!. (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

First, Napoleon recalled troops to a major battle THROUGHOUT HIS ENTIRE CAREER. The last time he had done it… eh, June 16th, 1815.

Napoleon was aware that a body of Prussians were retreating on Wavre. Their size was not known. Grouchy also knew… its all in their correspondence. Caveat – there are questions about the correspondence, but in this case, there are multiple sources of Napoleon's knowledge. Note, when the French used "Corps of troops" during this period, it could mean a Corps, or it could mean a few squadrons, it wasn't absolute. Just as the Corps of French that teased Wellington's right was probably just a 1000 cavalry.

An order of battle was issued in the late evening of the 17th or early morning of June 18th – regardless of what Napoleon thought, he was prepared for a battle on the 18th and was frustrated that conditions delayed concentration.

Much is made that Grouchy was dispatched – but few mention that there simply was not capacity on the Brussels road for more French troops. Thus, one can see Grouchy's mission as both pursuit and advance towards Brussels.

Finally, if the Prussians do not intervene, many believe (and Napoleon certainly did, which is all that really matters) that French win the battle. How many hammer blows could Wellington's left sustain, and if Napoleon isn't defeating the first couple of Prussian attacks, Ney isn't operating without supervision. Etc. etc.

As I believe Napoleon's goals in this campaign were political, occupying Brussels, and compelling the Allies concentrate north of the city – as well as forcing the King to flee, satisfied Napoleon enough.

Those that argue that Napoleon's plan was to come between the two armies and then defeat each in turn never adequately explain 2 facts:
- Napoleon expected the Allies to retreat, and left nothing in the record that demonstrates some grand design for forcing decisive battles.
- What maneuver could Napoleon perform that would compel the Allied armies to concentrate and give battle – thus enabling their destruction?

Only hindsight offers a Prussian army at Ligny, and an aggressive Allied response south of Brussels. Even if Napoleon was aware of every detail of the Allied plans, he expected his surprise to force retreat.

Indeed, I argue (and devote an essay to this on the book) that had the French achieved the anticipated surprise – had the operations gone as expected, and had traitors not tipped off the Prussians, the Nivelles-Namur road would have been seized. I have wargamed this extensively – and I invite others to do so – just what does Wellington and Blücher do if they are not chatting at noon on June 16th, but have French forces baring down on their isolated units with their direct communications greatly impacted?

Yet – friction of war came through, and even then Napoleon was presented a golden opportunity at Ligny. During the campaign, the correspondence demonstrates that Napoleon was for the most part prepared and anticipating everything.

What he could not anticipate was that his understanding of his own army's dispositions would be so dramatically different than reality, and that his Major-General would not keep him properly informed – despite the documentary evidence that Soult knew facts that Napoleon never learned.

Soult went into exile, and returned when the king allowed in 1819 – kissed ass, played nice, and then assumed a major role in government after the July revolution.

He is reported to have said that his greatest battle was Toulouse, where he defeated 3 armies. There is NOTHING to argue here, as so many do about who won that battle, again, what matters is what Soult thought. Who cares if its true… the point was Soult, the Marshal General of France, the ex-Prime Minister, the most senior military personality in France, made sure that as he exited the world stage, he had defeated Wellington where Napoleon had not…

Oh, and the Waterloo campaign was Ney's fault…

"His own tactical manouevres give him near 60 battle victories my friend."

No doubt, but in 18th June the Allied did quite a classic "Napoleonic move" against him, outmanoeuvred and out witted him.

The wet ground, another smoke screen of late start, there were other battles fought under similare weather conditions in the past as well.

Had Blucher been blocked by Grouchy he would have been considered as one of the greatest blunderers of all time, who should have moved his troops further away. But luck also plays a big hand in many battles and the allies were extremely lucky at Waterloo. Blucher did not outwit Napoleon, he had been defeated by him at Ligny and but for the non-arrival of D'Erlon, he escaped a bigger defeat and only then, thanks to Grouchy's poor intelligence, he managed to outmanoeuvre Grouchy and arrive at Waterloo to save the day.

I appreciate our discussion vonW, however, I disagree on some of your points :)

"I disagree on that [Napoleon knew the Prussians were retreating/ maneuvering a substantial force in the direction of Wavre."], in case he would have known, Grouchy would know as well and pin the Prussian Army – so they might not send even one corps."

According to de Wit ( PDF link ) Napoleon was aware of a substantial Prussian force moving towards/at Wavre by the evening of June 17th. Napoleon was also aware that von Bülow's Corps was not engaged at Ligny as well as unaccounted for yet and therefore still fresh and available for immediate action (i.e. already on 17th and definately before 19th).

Although translations of Grouchy's 10PM message (17th) to Napoleon in Field's "French Perspective" and Beckets "Betrayed" differ slightly, both say that Grouchy warn of a Corps moving towards Wavre. However, the two translations differ as to how large a portion of the Prussian Army might move towards Pervez (North-East of Gembloux), i.e. in a direction mid beween Brussels and Liege. This message arrived at Napoleons HQ at Caillou around 2AM (18th). Based on new intel from his strong cavalry reconnaisance Grouchy confirms with a message despatched at 3AM (18th) that "All my reports . . . confirm that the enemy withdraws to Brussels, concentrating there, to give battle there, after having joined Wellington."
I have not had the time to look up when this message reached Napoleon, it probably did not arrive before noon, but the previous message in itself would have raised concerns in the French high command. This it also did, making them order strong reconnaisance on the right flank of the main army, eventually picking up the approach of the Prussians.

Thus, Napoleon had every reason to order Grouchy to maneuvre so that he hindered the Prussians from intervening at Mont Saint Jean. Although one should consider that Grouchy had to take care not to divide his forces, Grouchy's own conclusion on the Prussian intent and "Schwerpunkt" towards Brussels should likewise have resulted in both a strong reconnaisance at first light 18th on his left flank and in the direction of Lasne-Wavre, as well as pressing the pursuit much harder.

You argue that Napoleon would be insane not to concentrate his forces more if he knew that Wellington was to deliver battle and the Prussians were moving up to join him. Napoleon and others on his staff recognized and expressed that Welilngton's position before the bois de Soignes was a dangerous one because he could be utterly destroyed if he had to retreat along a few roads through the woods under heavy pressure. Wellington had to be quite sure of victory (or consider Brussels as very important). Was he expecting reinforcements from the Prussians?

Some argue that the heavy artillery duel (over the ground for d'Erlon's attack the next day) before nightfall 17th served as a confirmation for Napoleon that he was confronting the concentrated Allied Army and not only a rear-guard. Field shows in several of the eye witness accounts he draw upon that most in the French Army expected a battle the next day.

So, if Napoleon and his soldiers expected a battle on the 18th and he received a message at 2AM that at least one Prussian Corps wass advancing on Wavre; would it not be quite probable that he ordered Grouchy to draw closer, interject a strong force between the main French Army and Wavre as well as press the pursuit?
I find it highly probable.

Was there treason involved so that messages did not reach Grouchy and/or was not recorded?
Although Becket presents good arguments, I look forward to see more research to build an even stronger case. I would also like to support this research with the aim to illuminate the issues more if possible.

"« Le général Müfling rapporte les paroles suivantes qui aurait été prononcées par Napoléon : « (…) l'armée prussienne est complétement battue ; elle ne peut se rallier en trois jours ; j'ai 75 000 hommes ; les Anglais en 50 000. (Fußnote 9, C.de W. Histoire de la Campagne 1815, Stuttgart et Tubingue 1817) » – Coppens S. 129
« Seul Jérôme Bonaparte ose hasarder l'hypothèse d'une jonction des alliés. Mais il n'est pas pris au sérieux : « la jonction des Prussiens avec les Anglais est impossible avant deux jours, après une bataille celle de Fleurus (Fußnote 11 – la bataille de Ligny) », répond l'Empereur, « suivis comme ils le sont pour un corps de troupes considérable (Fußnote 12, Foy dans Girod de l'Ain page 278). « – Coppens S. 129

Napoleon doesn't have the Prussians in his book for the 18th, why otherwise the Prussians couldn't believe their luck to approach the rear of the French unmolested?

"Bülow : » l'ennemie se montrait d'une négligence incompréhensible et semblait ne faire aucune attention à notre existence. » – Coppens S. 237
Falkenhausen Major des 2. Husarenregiments trifft auf keinen Franzosen und auf keine Vorsichtsmaßnahme zur Beobachtung der rechten Flanke Napoléons.
« Vers 11 heures du matin, Blücher quitte Wavre et se dirige, par Limal vers Chapelle Saint Lambert. Au même moment, l'avant-garde du corps de Bülow, composé de 2e régiment de hussards de Silésie, d'une batterie de 12, et de la 15e brigade d'infanterie, arrive à cet endroit. » – Coppens S. 186 / 187
« Le major prussien von Damitz , qui a écrit en 1837 d'après les souvenirs et papiers de général Grollmann, quartier-maître de Blücher, écrit : « Là, ou apercevait clairement les dispositions prises par les Français et les Anglais. Il ne parut pas un homme pour empêcher cette reconnaissance. » – Coppens S. 187
"« Un chef d'escadron du 7e hussards, Dupuy, placé à l'aile droite de l'armée raconte avoir vu Domon l'après-midi. Il n'était donc par partis reconnaître des troupes ennemies menaçant le flanc droit : « Jusque vers quatre heures, nous restâmes paisibles spectateurs de la bataille. Dans ce moment le général Domon vint à moi ; le feu des Anglais était à peu près cessé ; il me dit que l'affaire était gagnée, que l'armée ennemie était en retraite, que nous étions là pour faire jonction avec les corps de maréchal Grouchy et que nous serions le soir à Bruxelles, il partit. (Fußnote 9, Dupuy (Victoir) Souvenirs militaires, Paris 1892, page 290) » Coppens – S. 190"
"« À quatre heure et demie, des coups de feu d'artillerie se font entendre sur le flanc droit de l'armée française. D'après les témoignages émanant de son entourage, Napoléon est surpris : il ignore s'il s'agit de Grouchy ou de Blücher.
Le capitaine Coignet, attaché à l'état major général, écrit : « Il arrive un officier près de l'Empereur qui arrivait de notre aile droite disant que nos soldats battaient en retraite : « Vous vous trompez, lui dit l'Empereur, c'est Grouchy qui arrive. « Il ne croyait pas à un pareil contretemps. Il fit partir de suite dans cette direction pour s'assurer de la vérité. L'officier, de retour, confirma la nouvelle qu'il avait vu une colonne prussienne s'avancer rapidement sur nous et que nous soldats battaient en retraite. (Fußnote 1, Les cahiers du capitaine Coignet, Ed. Jean Mistler, Hachette, 1968) » Coppens – S. 237

In my opinion the wing of the Armée du Nord which Napoléon did command was not ready early at the 18th because the impression of Napoleon was that Wellington did retreat, he slept through the night and conducted none of his ususal in depth pro battle reconaissances.

So in case Napoleon would have taken the possibility that the Prussians would arrive at his right flank or rear, I find it incomprehensible that he even didn't guard it, no outpost, nothing.

Also, why not draw Grouchy immediatly to his right flank, to intercept and even more strange Grouchy could do one of his famous manoeuvres sur les derriere of Wellington, not even this he took in account because at the evening of the 17th he did not reckon with a battle at the 18th.

Bernard Coppens put is all well together in his mensonges – the book helped me a lot to understand more about this battle than any other.

Stephen Beckett: Thanks for responding to my remarks. Looking forward to a very interesting read. John Miller

- Napoleon expected the Allies to retreat, and left nothing in the record that demonstrates some grand design for forcing decisive battles.
- What maneuver could Napoleon perform that would compel the Allied armies to concentrate and give battle – thus enabling their destruction?

Stephen, I am of the opinion that the classic Napoleonic operational strategy was to advance until engaging the enemy and then concentrating the non-engaged corps to achieve a mass of troops to achieve victory. He must have expected that by advancing on Brussels that there would be opportunities for a decisive battle.

The 1815 advance is very similar to that of 1806, a strong central column and two wing columns with the guard behind the centre column. Would the two "facts" be equally applicable to 1806?

I have found your work interesting. The jury may need a lot of convincing though. I think the Scots term of "not proven" may have to apply here.

According to Napoleon, who, as we all know, was there, he did expect a battle and did write to Grouchy to move some of his troops to join up with his right wing.

On the 17th June.
'At 10 o'clock in the evening, I sent an officer to Marshal Grouchy, whom I supposed to be at Wavre, to let him know that there would be a big battle next day and that the Anglo-Dutch army was in position in front of the forest of Soignes, with its left resting on the village of La Haye. I ordered him to detach from his camp at Wavre, before daylight, a division of 7,000 men of all arms and 16 guns to go to St. Lambert to join the right of the Grand Army and co-operate with it. As soon as he was satisfied that Marshal Blucher had evacuated Wavre, whether to continue his retreat on Brussels or to go in any other direction, he was to march with the bulk of his troops to support the detachment he had sent ahead to St. Lambert.'
On the 18th June:
'A second officer was sent to him at 4am to repeat the order sent to him the evening before.'
(pages 254-255: Napoleon on Napoleon edited by Somerset de Chair)

Napoleon also writes that messages arrived from Grouchy after his two letters had been sent. But some messages sent may never have reached Grouchy, due to the intervention of the Prussians. Indeed, Tim Clayton (Waterloo, page 333) writes about the Prussians intercepting and capturing messengers travelling between Napoleon and Grouchy. This perhaps suggests that Stephen's suggestion that orders to recall Grouchy were sent (pages 164-169 & 314-315) may well have occurred. Of course, this is not definite, but then again, nothing is, other than the result of the great battle.

Mike – in 1806 the Prussians were concentrated and maneuvering. I agree with you that Napoleon's basic plan was to improvise based on his superior intellect and the French operational superiority. He could do this either offensively or defensively.

However, in 1815 the enemy armies were NOT concentrated, and this is what Napoleon expected. Everything he wrote and did suggests he felt his surprise would compel a retreat. He had the proclamations to distribute at Brussels already printed.

But of course, Napoleon knew that things could change, and when he wrote to his Brother on the eve of the campaign, he said, "we might have a battle." His intelligence would almost always be a day old when he got it.

Hence, I don't see 1815 similar to any of Napoleon's campaigns, but you are right about the formation of the French army. One can see in Bertrand's letter to Soult of June 10th where Bertrand described the army formation as Reille on the advance, Vandamme on the right, d'Erlon on the left, Lobau in the center, with the Guard as the reserve – the classic square of advance.

Gérard wasn't accounted for as he was still some ways off – but one can surmise that IV Corps' role would be to protect the right against the Prussians during the advance on Brussels.

And then Soult changed things. One issue that I am really researching right now (and hence the search for more materials from the campaign that have not previously been seen) is did Soult create a "square" of advance which pointed at Mons. And a question that I cannot find the answer to – Just when did Napoleon settle on Charleroi versus an advance on Mons? As late as June 10th, the issue was apparently still undecided. And if anyone has any evidence to the contrary, please share.

Gazzola – look up the Stoffel article on the activites of June 17th – there is an actual quote from one of the recall orders to Grouchy. Note that these particular orders, in hostile country and with it known that bands of Prussians were everywhere after Ligny – these were the orders that needed to be carried by numerous orderlies. The orders to Vandamme on the morning of June 15th required no such safeguards.

What is interesting is that the evidence of the capture of the messengers to Grouchy largely comes from Prussian or German sources – as does the evidence of the traitors that tipped off the Prussians on June 14th of the definitive advance on Charleroi.

And so let's connect the dots – if Napoleon wasn't sure of an advance on Charleroi until June 10+???, then the Allies couldn't know it either, regardless of all the French activity that Wellington said was constant since May, and hence not very useful. Thus, those traitors (*cough* Bourmont and/or staff *couch*) which provided definitive intel (*cough* June 13th movement orders with final preparations for advance on Charleroir *cough*) did enable the Prussians to reinforce the Nivelles-Namur road.

The Allies received intelligence that Napoleon planned a feint on Charleroi and an advance via Mons. What if that was Napoleon's plan. Or what if Napoleon had 2 plans. What if Napoleon allowed the Mons plan to be floated as _the_ plan knowing that it would be betrayed to the Allies. Napoleon knew there were spies/royalists in his midst. Then what if the swing to Charleroi happened at last moment. This could be an explanation for some events, say, if Soult was surprised by this as well – though it in no way explains the screw up with Gérard. Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the campaign, both sides basically emphasized the correctness of their decisions, and it takes scrubbing the correspondence to see what was actually believed – which rarely matches the later memoirs!

But be weary of books that state Napoleon's "actual intentions" during early June… unless they can point to some piece of correspondence that I have not seen, it is clear that things were far more fluid than many allow.

The history of this campaign is far more exciting when the full extent of uncertainty is allowed for. Most importantly, it is also more accurate.