"Waterloo Betrayed: The Secret Treachery that ..." Topic

How Ney ended in the fire squad and Soult as a venerable French field marshal with all titles and honors (and political power)?

That's not sound good (smile).

Even poor Grouchy have to scape to USA!.

Amicalement
Armand

I tried to emphasize Soult's insatiable ambition – one that contemporaries "knew" just as we know Bill Clinton likes young women.

Victory under Napoleon would NOT have enhanced Soult's "resume." He was already considered one of the premier Marshals – a victory would have been Napoleon's, and Soult would have been one of Napoleon's premier Marshals, who also shined as Major General. Eh, so? Where does he go from there?

However, Napoleon removed, and Soult has a path possibly to leading the country… as it stands, he would practically do that, though under Louis-Philippe.

Further, and I know I didn't make this clear – Soult did not need to maneuver for a Belgium defeat – what he maneuvered to do was eliminate a decisive victory. Had Napoleon won a few Ligny's, he would have lost in the end. I'm quite certain the rout was not what Soult wished, and it set his plans back significantly, not to mention risked his life.

I know I failed with this point because too often many (who have not read the work) seem to think my theory is Soult brilliantly orchestrated a rout on June 18. I can't emphasize this enough – I don't think Soult even worked for a defeat – it was simply enough to prevent the decisive victories that were required for Napoleon to defeat the combined army's of Europe. If one imagines a few grinders, Soult could have been well positioned to seize control and negotiate a peace as a war weary France and an Army gutted of Napoleon's most faithful once again bow out.

In the end, there is a lot of anecdotal material that demonstrates Soult's motive… but there is hard and fast data that clearly demonstrates acts that undermined the campaign. From this, we must ask why… and to date, the answer has been "incompetence" even by those who are unaware of these acts. There is no doubt the 1815 general staff operated at far less efficiency than Berthier's – yet there have been veterans from the staffs that wrote in the decades after the campaign that this has been exaggerated. Berthier's staffs were not flawless… no human operation is… but the stories of every order being carried by multiple orderlies and on time with no mishaps is false false false.

I would argue that those who maintain the "competency" argument need to invest the same time I did and justify this – there are definite examples of orders with wrong places mentioned, and there is testimony of the order writing taking too long. But, nothing I found explains well written orders that were promptly followed but were disobedient to Napoleon's wishes. That is what I find most enjoyable – those orders that did the most damage were executed in fine fashion! The intra-day activities is where most of the criticism comes, but again, most attack this without detail. June 16th and d'Erlon comes to mind, but other authors have not explained what Soult's failure was. As I see it, the failure was not Soult's at all, but Napoleon's based on how he was misinformed on June 15th. By the time Napoleon realized the truth – mid afternoon on June 16th, just look at where the forces were, Napoleon's plans were not possible, and Soult made sure Ney got the blame.

It is very possible that Soult was mediocre, that his staff was dysfunctional, and Soult also had bad intentions. If one considers the situation of 1815, IF Soult had bad intentions, it is most probable that the general HQ would still have functioned in a mediocre fashion in their first campaign.

In the end, there is no proof to resolve the general mystery of French operations during this campaign. I offer a scenario that I believe has the greatest support of the available evidence.

I do appreciate everyone's comments, and will definitely heed them all as a second edition is planned as early as this fall due to a developing situation.

Now that is fascinating……..

Your paragraphs 4 and 5 above DO, REALLY DO, need to be incorporated into a second edition.

It never occurred to me for a moment that Soult could not possibly have foreseen his treachery leading to the disaster that resulted. It should have hit me…but it did not.

I suggested he seemed to be "just tinkering at the edges", making foul up more likely than treason. But if all he meant was to limit Napoleon's success…….

This is a good (great actually) read and very thought provoking. I still think NASA did get 12 men on the moon and that LHO solo shot JFK and Tibbets and that God was not an astronaut.

But you do have to admit, if you actually read the book (it is dirt cheap on Kindle, but the tiny format does not do it justice, I must get the proper version) it is very very thought provoking.

It is just that the whole premise seemed incredible…impossible to conceal…….too far fetched……

Great holiday read in Italy! I'll read it again in hard back

As far as the argument of concealment, keep in mind:

- What did Soult write/say about Waterloo during the rest of his life? Answer – hardly anything… and why? And why did he remove stuff from archives, and with those materials and his own, never release them? And where are those materials to this day? (and my makeshift team has identified where they were at a point in time very recently, and are on the case trying to track them down!)

- Guizot was a traitor, yet became a successful member of government. Royalists who knew kept it secret, and it was revealed in late 19th century when the Ghent correspondence was published.

- Bourmont was known to be a deserter/traitor, but likewise, the full extent was not revealed until above correspondence with Ghent was published.

The last two points above demonstrate that emotional secrets during this time could be kept. One must understand, vast majority of country (veterans) were illiterate, and could not independently verify stuff – just repeat what they heard. The war between legitimists, Bonapartism, and republicans went until the late 19th century, thus keeping strong motivations on all sides to protect their positions – and this included minimizing fodder for the opposition.

For example, Republicans worked very hard to destroy the treason narrative – and in doing so they lied, because it was well known. But for the masses, they wanted to paint Napoleon as the evil war monger, and Napoleon's crowd painted him as the defender of the rights of man.

TO THIS DAY, those two narratives are preached by various factions, and often they draw their evidence from the 19th century sources that were propaganda from both perspectives.

While today, there are many who discount Napoleon's chances in 1815 to the point where there was nothing to do but flip the calendar and eventually Napoleon would be defeated, his contemporaries had far more respect.

Thus, Soult knew that if Napoleon executed at full bore, he certainly had the ability to destroy allied armies, and to achieve dynamic successes. The country was shakey, but it was felt (again, by contemporaries) that a galvanizing victory could lead to 800,000 Frenchmen in the field by the fall and most of the country rallying behind their chosen leader – the Bourbons were despised to the point where republicans (Carnot) were working for Napoleon.

So in the first campaign, Soult nibbles – he just manufactures a simple 1 day delay, and screws around with the plan a little. It is seemingly so minor, that the VAST majority of modern books do not even mention it. Yet, it alone eliminates decisive victory, and compels Napoleon to somehow decisively defeat an allied army twice his size while he must do so while attacking their chosen positions.

Victory was still possible, the French army was man-to-man worth 2-3 of the enemy, with notable exceptions for sure… but even a meat-grinder victory was a defeat for Napoleon in June of 1815. He could not lose half his heavy horses, or significant numbers of this army as at the time it was really his only maneuverable force.

But if this thesis is wrong, then I ask, as I have since publication, please, someone explain the rewriting of the June 10th orders. They were not rewritten in a confusing way – and they were promptly and well executed… and Napoleon tried to countermand them…

And on June 14th, when Napoleon should have slept at Fleurus, Gneisenau was ordering the concentration of the Prussian army having been tipped off by some very senior deserter that an attack was coming by Charleroi.

Most conspiracy theories are crap. However, a lot of historical revision is good, imo. With the sources becoming available at our fingertips, modern historians can review events without the contemporary biases, and with all sides represented. As a case in point, ignore Soult's performance, and ignore that element of my thesis.

Until Waterloo Betrayed, the conventional history said the French concentration was brilliant…

In truth, it was a disaster.

If nothing else, I hope I can impact the history of this campaign by setting that record straight. We can debate why it was a disaster forever, but really, there is no debate about it I hope, at least not any more!

I appreciate all comments and criticisms, thanks!

Stephen

I hope the second edition is not too much different, I've only just ordered my copy of the first edition. But please ignore those who try to put down your work. From what I can see, you are the only author to bring out something completely new concerning the Waterloo campaign, if not anything else Napoleonic. And, as far as I am aware, it is also a challenge that no one has yet clearly disputed, other than those who mock it, probably because they don't want it to be true.

The problem is that people who rock the historical and certainly the Napoleonic boat, always tend to attract negative responses, until, of course, the work is proven to be accurate. Time will tell, I hope and hopefully any missing evidence will be offered up, rather than kept hidden, which is a disgrace by any means. I'm really looking forward to reading it.

Gazzola – the second edition will largely be defined by any new materials acquired. If none are, then it would be simply a matter of correcting translations (there are some weak translations – 19th century French was tough – but note, I included almost all the original French of critical passages just for this reason.) Also there will be the typical correction of mistakes – not a horrible number, but more than one would find if this effort had the staff behind it of a larger publishing house. Not an excuse – an admission of my weakness.

And finally, I would try to incorporate many of the fine ideas from feedback, like that on this thread.

There is no doubt that the vast majority of recent Waterloo works have broken no ground on the operations. There has been tremendous and valuable work done on capturing the life of the participants. However, as I was doing my research, at times I would get literally ed off – how come I was learning such basic facts that rocked the understanding of the campaign that I had never seen in my countless 20th and 21st century books?

Candidly, many authors have done a poor job in their race to get to June 18th. I have written to some an told them – and heard nothing back. (who knows if web sites forward emails etc.)

One thing that must be remembered is that the record is very incomplete. The biggest reason for this is the loss of French materials. We know Soult had a lot, and we know Grouchy had the most important piece. Both these individuals can be criticized for their handling of their respective materials.

Their motives cannot be proven – but both were accused of treason, and both were accused of incompetence, and to this day the general consensus is that neither did their job well. Hence, there are reasons they may have played funny with their materials and those reasons could easily be nothing more than protecting their reputation.

If a full record was found, it could very well destroy my thesis, and I look for this full record diligently, and if it destroys my thesis about Soult, I will be proud of any role I played in bringing it to light.

So I would caution everyone that while I present a strong thesis, it is far from proven… and the good news for those interested in this campaign is that the story is not over yet! While maybe everything there is to know about June 18th is known, from June 1st to June 15th, and of course the critical events of June 16th, are still lush territory to study.

About the criticisms of the book – there have been painfully few. Painfully because the work has largely been ignored – I am a crackpot, end of story. I would love it if some organization/publication would give it a credible critique.

HOWEVER, for the most part, those that know the most about the campaign, or at least French operations etc., have been the most open minded precisely because they were aware of the events I document and the suspicions of Soult. Hence, the paradox is that the loudest critics have typically been the most ignorant – one historian mocked me that all the records were in the archives and how come I thought I was the only one who had found the truth or something like that… I was just embarrassed for her – she had no clue about the realities of the official French correspondence, yet here she was publicly screaming her ignorance.

What is very ironic is that when I suggest Soult was nefarious, I do so because I respect this man. Whatever his weaknesses on the day of battle, his overall competence was immense! Napoleon selected him as a Marshal despite not being one form his circle of comrades (Italy/Egypt, etc.) He was Napoleon's first choice for Spain when things got rough, and after 1830, he had a second career that rivaled his military one. For so many, "Soult the Dolt" in 1815 is a comfortable explanation, and it was for me as well – but when you study Soult, he was brilliant. The great battle Generals were few and far between – but that is not a measure of competence.

Thus, by suggesting Soult was acting intentionally, I am defending his abilities at the expense of his fidelity to Napoleon – and in 1815, who was loyal to who? Even today, that is largely guesswork.

One thing I definitely did not find in all my reading of all the correspondence I could find – there is this theme that Soult couldn't take Napoleon's vision and turn it into orders… eh, what rubbish. People/authors say this without any substantiation… well, I provide Napoleon's words, and then Soult's – be the judge, just where in the hell did Napoleon paint some abstract picture that Soult choked on… it never happened.

Again, its just some piece of crap someone said a long time ago repeated over and over again by those who have never read the record that exists… and thus once again I say, part of the reason the book is called "Waterloo Betrayed" is because I think the history of this campaign has been tortured by those that have betrayed history by doing such a poor job of reporting it.

Sorry for the rant!

No harm in ranting. I think your messages here have only added to the book content. The idea seems so extraordinary at first (even now) that there must be huge burden of proof. Fascinating detective work.

This is the best account I have read of the part of the 1815 campaign usually ignored. Most texts really just get going at Charleroi and spend more time arguing about Wellington's hesitation, the Dutch Belgians saving the day with their initiative and Gneisenau unusually below par, by failing to get von Bulow moving faster. I have never read such a detailed account of the French attempts at concentration before all that (or imagined it could be in the least bit interesting frankly! It was).

2015 has seen a lot of rubbish alas…..and little new. This is an exception.

The best and interesting "rank" I have read for a while! (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

Hi

A question for Stephen Beckett:what got you thinking about your theory in the first place – what was the point at which you thought, Hmm. something does not add up here?

If you explain this in your book then feel free to ignore my question as i will purchase the second edition when it is published!

Very interesting 'twist' on the received history.

I explained how I came to this theory, but I will do so again in more detail.

In the 1980s, I worked on Napoleonic computer wargames. One received the 1987 Charles S. Roberts award from best pre-20th century title. I left computer games when I heard that about Wing Commander and its budget.

Anyhow, I always planned to return to military simulation, and a couple years ago, I decided to start researching again. I chose Waterloo campaign due to its small scope, and I wanted to collect every piece of information about French operations and put it in a database and allow analytics to tell us about how formations functioned. Instead of imagining how to model operations, with enough data we could simply have it pour out of history for us. Waterloo was to be a test run – most written about campaign in history, right? I thought I would find books with everything listed out. I started with the French since as the aggressor, I expected them to have more operations to study.

Over a year or so I found that I was quite wrong – French operations before June 15th have been previously studied about 5 times, and the materials were in disarray – the most critical of which are missing.

Further, I saw all the screw ups, most of which are unexplained.

But there was a critical moment.

In Gourgaud's diaries – which were never meant to be published (came out in 1890s, I believe) Napoleon said that "d'Erlon should have told him he was at Marchiennes." This was in relation to d'Erlon's movements on the 16th.

Well, I had read all the materials from d'Erlon on the 16th, and he _never_ said he had stayed at Marchiennes.

He had been quite clear, in fact, that he had 2 divisions just south of Jumet, 1 at Marchiennes, and 1 at Thuin, with a cavalry brigade in the rear as well.

I believe someone (had to be Soult) told him some explanation for why d'Erlon was so far south on June 16th – hence undermining Napoleon's plans. Napoleon was sending orders to Ney to make maneuvers while more than half of Ney's force was closer to Napoleon than to Ney. It is clear from Napoleon's correspondence that he never knew the status of his left wing on June 15/16 – it is also clear Soult was well informed.

There had been this growing feeling about Soult… why had he rewritten orders… why had the order to d'Erlon to bring across the Sambre his trailing divisions been absent from Grouchy's copy of the order book… why had Napoleon (and Gourgaud) written that all d'Erlon's forces were across the Sambre on the 15th… why did Napoleon think Ney was at Quatre Bras (which the Bulletin and Napoleon's orders use the term Quatre Chemins, while SOult used Trois Bras – so Napoleon/staff wrote the Bulletin and I think they did believe this.)

I could go on, but as a big fan of mysteries, and Sherlock Holmes etc., as well as Physics and Richard Feynman, I realized that maybe it was time to accept the SIMPLE explanation, and stop buying the very complex narrative of the conventional history.

Soult said he hated Napoleon – on March 8th, and his justification. (didn't exactly use the words "I hate Napoleon", but read what Soult wrote.)

Why do we dismiss this? Why do so many historians look back and decide that somehow, hundreds of years later, we know what was in this man's heart. Pure arrogance, if you ask me. Soult was vicious to Napoleon and Imperial veterans – yet this changed (why?) after 1830 – of course, after 1830, Soult had something to hide.

So, Soult hated Napoleon. Soult was ambitious. Soult rewrote Napoleon's orders. Soult kept intelligence from Napoleon. Soult worked like crazy for power. Soult gained immense power in 1830. Soult hardly spoke a word about the campaign. Soult hid his materials from the campaign, as did his descendants.

So when I read that diary account, it was like the straw the broke the camels back – Napoleon was being lied to, Soult was lying to him.

Soult betrayed Napoleon. That is the simple answer – the conspiracy theory is the conventional history… and mind you the conventional history is the one that ignores the data and just declares things.

And it wasn't a unique thought – Soult was suspected of betraying Napoleon by veterans, Mauduit made it a theme of his book written while Soult was still living. Gourgaud hated Soult. Napoleon said in exile that Soult would hate it if he (Soult) knew that they (Bertrand, Gourgaud, others) thought Soult betrayed at Waterloo.

So my question for those who think I'm a crack pot is simple – why do they think Soult was loyal? Yes, Napoleon seems to have believed it – yet one of Napoleon's big weaknesses was being too trusting to those around him. (ironically, I quote Soult himself saying this!)

Why do they think Soult was lying when he condemned Napoleon, but telling the truth when he praised Napoleon on June 1st. Soult was a liar – fact… but why is anyone so sure Soult lied to the Legitimists, but was faithful to Napoleon? Did Soult not serve the Bourbons as fast as he could slither up their pole, and then Louis-Philippe just as quickly?

I can't prove Soult was disloyal, but neither can anyone prove he was loyal. However, I do agree that such bold claims need to be met with skepticism, and that by default, we should assume these actors were true to their role.

But, in 1815, just as with the American Civil War, there were, as Davout said, multiple flags, including individual agendas… there were lots of traitors to Napoleonic France. It was a unique time – a civil war, if you will… and a time when the next ruling government was unknown.

So again, a lot of words, but I submit that to dismiss the possibility of Soult being a traitor to Napoleon is to simply put blinders on and ignore many facts that I STILL WAIT FOR REFUTATION OR EXPLANATION.

If Soult is a traitor, almost all of the mysteries of this campaign are answered. (And I feel I explain the mishaps of June 16th very well.)

The one thing that remains unexplained is Napoleon's lethargy early on June 17th – but maybe he was older, fatter, tired from the exertions of the 15th/16th, etc.

In my view, the overwhelming evidence is that Soult perpetuated intentional acts that sabotaged Napoleon's orders during time of war – an offense punishable by death since it is treason.

I try in the book to explain why this was able to be suppressed, and eventually forgotten by the conventional history. But even without clarity on motive (its clear to me, but not to others) does it matter?

If John Wilkes Booth had died when he jumped from Lincoln's box, and let's say we never learned anything about him thus we had no reason for why he shot Lincoln (though, ehem, Civil War, like in 1815)… would we claim him innocent but with really bad aim? Or would we accept his guilt as the assassin?

Well, Soult did sabotage Napoleon's plans. That is a fact. I don't believe he was a Forest Gump who managed to accidentally be one of the most significant figures of 19th century France – yet for two weeks in June, 1815, he was a lazy imbecile. And I note, the authors that perpetuate this point of view… they never support it. No examples, no data, just gets repeated enough that it has achieved factual status.

So another rant, sorry, but I do admit that there was a growing uneasiness, and the in a single night, I took my wife to a white board, I laid out everything that happened, and I said, "Soult betrayed Napoleon – to think anything different with the known data is to deny reality."

And I started writing that night…

Stephen

You have certainly brought something new to the Napoleonic world. Okay, maybe others knew about this or had seen the same (or some of the same) material, but for some reason did not publish anything about it (as far as I am aware).

The problem is that all new ideas, especially a hot one like this, challenges what everyone thinks they know to be true. And, of course, some people take it far too personally. The aim should be to put things right, get the facts right, prove the point or have it disproved. An author should not be attacked or insulted just because they published a book that asks a hot historical question.

Sometimes people spot something not spotted before, even though the topic may have been discussed and debated for years. At the same time, it does not mean other authors/historians were poor historians or writers, they just did not spot it, although again, there may be those who did spot it but did not think there would be any substance to it so did not look further into it.

From all our previous readings and accounts, I think most of us have had an image placed on us that Soult was not up to the job in 1815. Your book might just prove that wrong, which, for that, could indeed be seen as a good thing. Your thesis should be given the chance to be examined and discussed, which is why I have bought it (along with several other Waterloo themed titles).

As for Soult being a traitor. If proved, I think it would probably be accepted nowadays. He would just be seen as a closet royalist, so to speak. And it would enhance his military abilities and certainly that of Napoleon, which I imagine perhaps, that some people would not want to see happen. But it won't change the end result.

flipper

I don't think it matters why an author publishes a book? You are either interested in the contents or not? Stephen Beckett's book is certainly raising questions and causing debate, which is good. It has been a long time since that has happened, especially with a Napoleonic theme.

Hi

Thanks for the response Stephen.

'I don't think it matters why an author publishes a book? You are either interested in the contents or not?'

Gazzola – I don't understand what you are saying – I asked the author how he came about his 'theory' – what inspired him – if I was not interested why would I be here asking questions.

thanks.

flipper

I guess the impression your post gave (well, to me anyway) was that if you did not like his reason for writing the book, you would not buy it. Apologies if that is not the case.

But perhaps you should consider buying it now, if you really are interested in it, just in case a future edition does not happen for some time. (By the way, I'm not on a percentage for helping Stephen sells his books. LOL)

Quite interesting… taking into account that Napoleon decided to mantain Soult at his side and never left him free… he maybe was a little sick and old… but something in his instincts told him that Soult was to remain under his gaze…. were he failed was when he don't put one or two good and faithful ADC to keep a watch on Soult and informe him inmediatly if they hear or saw any extrange!…

Oh!… if Suchet were in the place of Soult… (smile).

Amicalement
Armand

Napoleon seems to have thought he could get the best from Soult at his side, and many have suggested that he didn't trust Soult on his own.

We know Soult lobbied heavily to serve, and we know Soult wished to be Major-General. What we don't know is how much of a factor was Soult's desire for Major-General that led to Napoleon giving him that appointment. Napoleon needed Marshals, so Soult may have had leverage.

Napoleon put Flahaut on Davout in Paris before the campaign, I do wonder why he didn't have someone plugged more into the general staff. It is clear that Soult had correspondence with subordinates that Napoleon did not see. That is not evidence of treason, but it was the opportunity for malfeasance… as well as an opportunity for simple failure in the sense that this was a new staff taking on relatively new duties.

One thing to be sure, Napoleon chose this – and he lost. My work is not meant to somehow vindicate Napoleon. I simply believe the conventional histories to have many (many!) flaws, and this is my attempt to explain some of the greatest mysteries of the campaign.

I had never understood June 15th/16th, but now I do.

I had never understood the early part of June 18th, the deployments and expectation of Grouchy's arrival or that recalls sent so late (noonish, 2pm ish) could have any chance of success, but now I understand.

But to the point that Napoleon wasn't completely comfortable with the situation, on June 16th he sent 2 (Bussy, Janin) to the left wing to report on its status personally to him. I wonder if anyone knows of similar examples of this while campaigning with Berthier? I could not find them, but this is the type of info that can require digging.

Janin specifically mentions that no one told him forces would be south of Gosselies, and he is critical of the staff work for this – again, confirmation that Napoleon and the entourage really believed the left was consolidated with Ney and carrying out Napoleon's orders on the occupation of Quatre Bras and deployment towards Genappes etc. Everything Napoleon did on June 16th was based on wrong information – and yet there is at the very least evidence that Soult was better informed.

And on June 17th, Soult's letter to Ney blames the entire situation on Ney – and I can only believe that the night of the 16th, Soult made sure to plan firmly in Napoleon's mind that Soult's old enemy from Spain (Ney) was the root cause of the day's missed opportunity, and with what Napoleon knew, he would carry this belief into exile.

Yet Ney, though his battle execution may have been lacking, was not responsible for the events early on the 16th. He was following his orders as written, and there was absolutely no urgency in them as Napoleon did not believe there would be a battle that day, let alone two.

Excellent posting Stephen.

Hi

'Gazzola'

Just to be clear – I have no 'issue' whatsoever concerning the ideas/issues/content raised here and in Stephen's book.

The only reason I asked the question was that I am intrigued as to what got the ball rolling for the author.

Many thanks.

Stephen… have you found any correspondece between Soult and the Royalist before/during/after Waterloo campaing…?

Just curious.

And… about the great mistery of Waterloo when Napoleon "desapear" from the battefield to Genappe for some hours?… was sick?… have some important info to hear about the Prussians?… he need a rest?… no matter that happened in any of the 65 battles he fought!…

Great job my friend.

Amicalement
Armand

Anothe question … if you allow me… have you found info about how Soult didn't send an strong cavalry detachment to Braine L'Alleud at the french Army far left flank and to Lasne or Ohain to the far right flank?… by memory I have read a french book were Napoleon mention that…

Amicalement
Armand

Tango's question I also posed earlier.

Soult is very secretly trying to sabotage Napoleon's efforts.

But he does not tell the Royalists in Ghent this. Ah, the war is lost, he is seen as a treacherous incompetent who abandoned Louis XVIII, to serve Boney…..but made a mess of it. Not a good career move. Not impossible, especially with your subsequent suggestion that he just wanted to limit Boney's success, not create a catastrophe!

Or instead, the whole thing is with the agreement of the Royalists. Now we have the conspiracy theory, not the lone gunman. Now comes the doubts that nothing has surfaced after two centuries…….not one conspirator has sold his story to the tabloid press.

Do you think Soult worked in isolation (the lone gunman in the schoolbook depository…..who surely did the deed solo, with the best shots of his life) or was he part of a Royalist conspiracy (The Grassy Knoll thing, after all how else did he ease the defections of senior officers?)

What I love about your book is that it has attracted so much comment, without once (here anyway) descending into personal attacks on your professionalism or competence. Folk are sceptical (I see US spelling is different), but no-one is mocking

deadhead

Interesting post you made. But Soult would surely have to be careful. He would have to prove to the Royalists that he was against Napoleon, but at the same time not give the game away. And perhaps the Royalists/Allies also wanted to wait to see if what information he was offering was true before believing he was a closet Royalist, so to speak. And if he gave too much away, or offered anything too early, it may well have exposed him or made Napoleon suspicious that there was a spy in the camp. Better to look incompetent at first before setting to work to ruin Napoleon's plans big time, if he had done so. I have the book but have not read it yet. I'm still trying to catch up with my reading. So many books…

A few questions I'll try to answer at once:

- French cavalry maneuvers. First, a "corps" in French at that time meant a body of troops – 100, 1000, 10,000. Thus, one finds writing where "a corps of troops…" and it could mean as few as a squadron. This has confused later historians, and at times the wording has been used to refute claims because "such and such Corps did not do such and such." But squadrons of cavalry were thrown here there and everywhere.
The 17th was chaotic, and the movements of the cavalry are most uncertain. What took what side roads etc while they lumbered up to Mont St. Jean, and how far did who get on the 17th. The battle of the 18th did not start early due to the inability of the artillery – but because the French army was not in position. (This does not negate the impact of the mud on the artillery.)
Milhaud is said to have reported from the right flank on the maneuvers of the Prussians, where a corps was observed moving… but see above. Napoleon was aware that Prussians were on the right (a lot of evidence of this, sorry Mr. Coppens) but this was not surprising, in his mind, he had routed a Prussian army, so there would be small formations across the countryside looking to find their way. Indeed, did one of these intercept orders to Grouchy on the evening of the 17th?

Pierre de Wit is highly critical of the reporting of the French cavalry maneuvers on the French right – and his research is extremely good. (waterloo-campaign.nl)
Napoleon said (I think, don't remember source) that he had about 2,000 troopers ride around the left of the French position, with some claim this contributed to spooking Wellington about his right. It has been reported [about a million unverifiable things] about June 18th. I'm afraid that the more I study this campaign, the less interested I become in June 18th, and can't add much.

- Did Napoleon nap at Waterloo in the rear? I dunno. I favor that he didn't as most of the memoirs/accounts I've read so he was attentive all the time. But I read that there is a source that quotes Chasseurs at Le Caillou saying that saw him come to nap etc. As with many of details of June 18th, I have no clue.

- I have not found hardly any correspondence of Soult with anyone relating to 1815-1830! Wonder where it could be??? <much sarcasm with maniacal laughter in the background> Of course, he certainly wrote a lot while serving King Louis-Philippe! Soult reached out to Davout, and that was kept by Davout, but who did Soult reach out to otherwise? Republicans? Legitimists? Bonapartists? So we hold this thought…

- It is April, 1815. Napoleon is on the throne, a Bourbon king has fled the country. At that moment, the Bourbons had no legitimacy. How could they? Napoleon and a 1,000 men sneeze and blow the ruling monarch of Europe's largest country across the border?

Only in retrospect does Louis the XVIII, marching at the head of the victorious Allied armies, seem strong. In April, he is a laughing stock. Most did not believe the Bourbons would hold the throne… and they were right – Waterloo bought them 15 years. Quick trivial question, where is Charles X buried!? Yeah, who cares… hint, not in France.

Yet Europe is arrayed against Napoleon… can he survive? Well, look what he did in 1814 – with 60,000 men. After 10 months of the powdered wigs, most of the country is ready to die for Napoleon. Republicans serve the empire. There might be 800,000 men under arms in the fall.

But still, he is a long shot – and who will replace him? The Republicans again? They hate each other as much as the king! But maybe – certainly Fouché is up to something…

And then there is Louis-Philippe – army actually likes him, some love him… and there is real evidence he may have already been working on getting ride of his fat cousin. (See Munro-Price)

So what does Soult do? For sake of this discussion, let's agree that Soult wanted greatness. Was that wealth, power, prestige, all of the above? Who knows, but its clear he wants to be at the top.

So to start with, you align with Napoleon. Most do not believe the Bourbons will ever be restored. (again, don't view history from our seat here, imagine April, 1815) So what comes after Napoleon, and how do you have a seat at the table when Napoleon goes? By serving Napoleon WHO IS CLEARLY popular with the people.

So while Soult has many contacts in Ghent, and may have (and I believe did) learn much of what the Royalists were doing, Soult does not contact them. Soult is brilliant, and he knows that alignment with the Bourbons not only offers no personal success (Minister of War under the Bourbons?) but that interactions with the Bourbons could be a stain. (they had already been, and would be again.)

No matter what move he takes, it is a risk to what appears to have driven his life, satisfying his ambition. For certain, without that, he could have done what others did and just stay home.

So now Soult is in position to undermine Napoleon… but his eye is on the prize. And note, June 25th, Soult, instead of taking command of the army and defending France! (La Marseillaise breaks out in the background) Soult asks to be relieved and rushes to Paris and becomes a politician.

Louis-Philippe is in England, and Fatty beats him to Paris and is restored by Wellington. Soult's plan (just like Fouché's) is destroyed. Who could have forseen a decisive defeat and the Bourbon restoration so quickly? Both Fouché and Soult's machinations have hurt them. Fouché serves the king (at Wellington's assistance and the King's great person anguish as Fouché was a regicide) but as soon as possible Fouché is gone. Soult powers on…

But what if the war had gone on 8 months, and Napoleon was beating the allies back, but attrition was taking its toll. Can you not see Soult a) inviting Louis-Philippe back with a liberal monarchy which would allow Soult a greater role? b) orchestrating something with Fouché or some other group to take the country? c) etc. etc.

So Soult's conspiracy was small – that is true.

But I do disagree that it could not remain secret – see Guizot. Guizot was a part of a Royalist conspiracy that was only revealed due to correspondence published long after death. Those that knew (e.g. Clarke, Wellington, Prussians, etc.) never revealed it.

And how do you keep something secret? One way the accused does it is to remain silent. Don't take the stand if you are brought to trial. Make a prosecutor find the evidence and prove you guilty. What evidence? Well Soult has a lot of evidence… ever seen it?

So did Soult act 100% alone? Possible. Did he have orderlies in the know? Very possible. Would they keep a secret?

It is tempting to think that such a great secret would come out… but again, put yourself in the time. The entire 19th century was a French civil war with time-outs. Legitimists vs. Republicans vs. Bonapartists. That is point 1.

Point 2 is – what was Waterloo? It was a painful dagger. It greatly influenced French culture. (read Jean-Marc Largeaud's book "La défaite glorieuse de 1815 à nos jours") Waterloo was so powerful that both legitimists and republicans hated those who fought against France – and I tried to quote a passage in the book that both demonstrated how Guizot was punished (for just visiting Ghent, they never learned he actually WAS a traitor) and how names such as Rochechouart were condemning Guizot and praising Soult. (Soult was praised for fighting for France in 1815 by someone who probably descended from someone who fought Napoleon's armies in the Vendee, think about that!)

So what you have is a set of circumstances that led to a century of silence, wars of words, dishonest history, etc. etc. This is why I do not think one can just say that any acts back then would have come to light, because during the actors' lives, the information was always sensitive.

And there is some proof…

200 years later – why has the Bourmont family allowed access to their archives only for friendly biographies and never released all of Louis-Auguste-Victor's correspondence? Did he and his wife talk a little dirty of something? So what… could be fascinating…

200 years later – where are Soult's materials for 1815? Really, seriously? That is some amazing dedication to silence. So question for deadhead – can one keep records for the most famous campaign in history a secret for 200 years? Answer: yes!

Hence, I believe it is very possible it was just Soult, or Soult and a small group of dedicated legitimists (who did not need to know Soult's plans). Wouldn't it be nice to read what Baudus wrote about Soult's escape? It exists! Apparently Soult family had it in 2006! What was written didn't make Baudus' book, and why is that?

Certainly, I don't know… and this is the great weakness of the case… but it is also the brilliance of Soult. His story of the campaign is almost 100% consistent. The only contradiction is his feelings of Ney, and of course, he probably told Ney's son something nice since the guy's dad was dead. Other than that, Soult was perfect… why? BECAUSE HE SAID NOTHING. (dispose of the body, check… remain silent, check…. have your performance criticized and just ignore it so as to not implicate one's self, check… wow, amazing discipline!!!)

Contrast with Grouchy, who told so many lies and played with the record so much that even Vandamme (who hated Grouchy) wrote to Gérard that Grouchy would help himself most if he JUST SHUT UP. And Grouchy became THE villain of the campaign for 19th century France – true? No, but as we already covered, the history of the campaign in the 19th century France was really bad, with moments of great clarity. But it takes a lot of analysis to extract the history from the commentary, and there is good history in there.

What would have happened to Soult/family/wealth had Soult come out in his lifetime and said, "Hey France, you know that Waterloo thing… yeah, it was me!" Remember, it wasn't like things died down, because who came after Louis-Philippe? And Bonapartism was a real factor in France…

Put it this way, go watch video of people falling from the World Trade center and then imagine what happens if someone went into New York city and said they played a significant role in 9-11. That person would be torn to pieces and you could buy bits of tissue on ebay…

Final comment – One must be skeptical of my thesis, to not be would be foolish. However, to believe the conventional history is to be an idiot! :)

Many thanks Stephen.

Your threads are one of the most interesting I have read here since day one (smile).

You mention Fouché… but not Talleyrand… he was of course there… in the fog… until his dead…

Amicalement
Armand

Stephen

I always believe in questioning everything and researching into something as far as it is possible to go, if the topic grabs me. Research can sometimes be very repetitive and frustrating, but it can also be very rewarding, although sometimes you don't find what you want, it disproves what you thought or, if you are lucky, it confirms it. That is the 'fun' of research.

At this moment, I can not say that Soult was a traitor or not. I have not read your book, as yet, but I'm really looking forward to reading it. And I welcome anyone who asks decent and challenging questions and does not try to force their opinions and viewpoints down our throats.

The question you have raised over Soult will not go away until those with the evidence to confirm or deny it have the courage to share it with those interested in progressing and solving a historical question, in this case, a Napoleonic one.

As I keep saying, it won't change history and I'm sure any surviving members of the Soult family (and/or whoever holds the required evidence) will not be threatened in any way for what their ancestors may have done. Perhaps at the time, but surely not now? But the fact remains, your thesis, as far as I can see, has yet to be disproved. And that is very telling.

Armand – thank you. The Waterloo campaign is far more interesting than the simple bowling alley up the Charleroi-Brussels road starting on June 15th!

Gazzola, as I mentioned, the impact of getting the 1815 events correct goes far beyond the campaign as many narratives and opinions on Napoleon, Soult, Ney, etc., have been formulated based on these events considering how well known and analyzed they have been.

I can't tell you if Soult was a traitor – what I can tell you is that the evidence supports intentional nefarious acts far more than all the collective "competence" histories which are rarely substantiated. Note, there IS evidence of poor staff work in 1815. There is correspondence with places that don't exist. There is testimony of inefficiencies. The supplies and organization of the rear was apparently atrocious.

Hence, one can easily say that Soult was a poor Major-General. Further, these traits may have had a significant negative impact despite best efforts.

However, what I document cannot be attributed to the above. Most of the bad acts were in the inter-day correspondence where time was plentiful, and there were few examples of mistake etc. The intra-day operations is where most testimony points to struggling. In the end, once reading the book, each can decide what they believe about Soult's performance.

In a debate with someone, Berthier's performance at the beginning of the 1809 campaigns was pointed to as an example of mistakes not equating to treason.

But, this is weak. Berthier may have performed poorly, but likewise the communications from Napoleon coming from semaphore and horse created confusion.

Further – did Berthier condemn Napoleon? Was Berthier's staff full with royalists? Was the army full of traitors? The overall situation, and the specific events surrounding the headquarters staffs were utterly different. Finally, was there a single example of Berthier changing Napoleon's orders that was even remotely similar to what Soult did on June 5th and June 10th of 1815?

I'm not sure I will ever be able to prove Soult's intentions, and likewise I doubt anyone will ever disprove this thesis. But the reason for this is the big story – so many of the original materials have been compromised or lost.

If we find those, maybe clarity will emerge, and thus I hope the entire community of Napoleonic history enthusiasts will work together to find them.

We have a lead, and hopefully the first week in September we'll get some insight – or maybe another lead. I don't know how long it will take, but I hope that sometime this fall we'll get some new materials.

Stephen

I hope the lead does lead to something like an answer. 200 years is far too long to wait for the truth, whichever way it turns out.

Just started to slowly get into the book. It is a very interesting read. It is slow reading because I am also reading some other accounts on the campaign at the same time, so I am flitting from one to the other. But I spotted something interesting when I was browsing through one of the other titles. It relates to Napoleon's movements in June.

'On the 12th, at 4am, he left the Elyeee with the Duke of Bassano and General Bertrand, lunched at Soissons and slept at Laon. Grouchy was there. Why had the cavalry not set off?? Soult had omitted to send marching orders.'
(page 57. Waterloo by Commandant Henry Lachoque)

The plot thickens.

Thanks for the info my friend…

Amicalement
Armand

One of the most common mentions of Soult's failures is the lack of orders to Grouchy immediately prior to the commencement of the campaign.

Further, despite his rewriting of the orders of the 10th, Soult will then forward the orders of the 10th to Grouchy when he finally does send them – which he did in haste realizing the mistake – yet he had just carefully rewritten the dispositions of III Corps, IV Corps, and VI Corps…

I believe the failure of getting orders to Grouchy was a mistake brought about due to his mission to Lille. Had Soult been nefarious with Grouchy, why not send the new/wrong orders, but on time?

This is a good example of the struggles the new staff would have – with Soult absent, who was in charge? Bertand sent some orders direct to Corps leaders, but not Grouchy? Etc. etc.

This lack of running on all cylinders and very obvious mistakes has actually worked very much to Soult's favor!!! Soult's and his staff's failings were grumbled about during the campaign, and eventually have become a fact of the campaign (and for good reason.) Hence, if there was a problem in 1815 – Soult was simply not up to the task.

And – I found time and time again that very knowledgeable historians on the campaign in Belgium were completely unaware of the pre-June 15th order manipulation, or the June 15/16th intelligence manipulation with d'Erlon.

Basically, June 15th started slow, blame Soult. June 16th was mismanaged, Berthier wouldn't have allowed that. June 17th started slow, Napoleon was old. June 18th was a disaster, Ney was an idiot.

Hence, the purposeful actions that were done well and sabotaged Napoleon's efforts have simply been lost – and Napoleon's words in exile have been ignored (which isn't true at all, they have been cherry picked to prove negative theses against Napoleon, but anything that would support Napoleon is branded a lie.)

My point is that I do not believe Soult and his staff operated any where near the level of Berthier's… yet this provided its own cover for Soult's actions. I don't believe Soult intended this (if he did, wow, evil genius personified) but it is possible that he relied of inexperience (his own, staff, etc.) as possible explanations to Napoleon for mistakes… and since the record absolutely supports that Napoleon did not know the truth, a truth that has been preserved, malfunction provided an excellent means and opportunity for Soult to undermine the campaign while hiding in plan sight.

And with 3 months plus having passed, those that have called me a crackpot have still not refuted the facts I have brought to light, or offered alternative explanations for Soult's actions.

Wouldn't it have been convenient for Napoleon if one of Soult's rewritten orders not been carried out so well and punctually… but wait, could Soult do that? The answer is yes.

Of course, we must remember that we are judging everything on hindsight and were not there at the time, so it is easy to say what should or should not have been done or ask why was that done or that not done. And it may be an answer that can't be resolved until someone takes the courage to offer up the missing information.

Stephen:
Please forgive me for asking what might seem irrelevant questions, but I did answer someone on another forum who advocated the same hypothesis. Will you then indulge me by catching me up on two questions?

Are you a Francophone?

Did you once argue that Louis XVIII refused promotion to Soult, saying (aprox.) "we know what happening at Waterloo"?

Do you know what Napoleon meant when he told an aide, "Blue is blue and white is always white" ? (quoted on that site. If that was included in your post, perhaps you van flesh it out.).

Forgive these questions, but they will clarify my view of your very honest argument.

Cheers,
Phil

Philin Yuma

Are you trying to imply that Stephen is a hypocrite or may have misinterpreted French material?

Forgive the question, but it will clarify my view of your need to ask such questions?

A reasonable question, though, surely, an honest (my term) hypocrite (yours) is a contradiction in terms.

I am confused by the posting of this topic on several Napoleonic forums. I must admit that I had mistakenly thought that the other poster was "abeckett" (possibly thinking of Henry II and "Who will rid me of this troublesome priest?"!)
Stephen links us to Pierre de Wit's site, there, and that is filled with quotations in French. A friend and I were reading the passages and translating them on the fly, looking for a particular passage, when she came across Napoleon's remark on learning of Bourmont's defection, "Blue is blue and white is always white". She did not understand the meaning of the easily translated passage and I wondered if Stephen did, since he also quotes Louis XVIII as saying to Soult, who was job hunting, that he did not trust him and that despite Soult's effort to play the matter down, "everyone remembers what happened at Waterloo", which he seems to believe is evidence that Louis was referring to Soult's betrayal of Napoleon, but which I believe referred to Soult's betrayal of the king.

At any rate, I can find no record of my question or Stephen's answer in the thread in question -- possibly more confusion on my part -- hence my questions.

Cheers,
Phil

I can only apologise that I seem to have lost my supporting member status overnight and my Deadhead icon with it. How was I meant to note that it was 26th August in the USA (especially when it was 27th here!)?

Annual sub paid now, should have my Skull F(oh, you cannot say that next bit) back by tomorrow.

Come on guys. We all know that e mails and web messages can be so easily misunderstood or misread, especially if "English" is not your first language. Nothing personal or insulting meant here I am sure. (Just think if Wolfe had not scaled those heights, or Boney had not sold off most of modernsouthern USA………what would be the lingua franca?)

Beckett's book is far, far, better than I had expected. As indeed is that awfully titled "The Lie at the Heart of W". At least Beckett has come up with a new "conspiracy theory" (which still bothers me…a lone gunman is not a conspiracy…..the evidence that Soult acted in an anti Boney party seems lacking).

deadhead

I'm enjoying reading Stephen's book. The question he raises of was Soult a traitor to Napoleon, ties in with other age old questions concerning the Waterloo campaign. Why, after Soult's vicious proclamation against Napoleon on the 8th March, did the emperor even consider Soult for any position, let alone one of such importance? How did Soult manage to convince Napoleon he did not mean what he said in the proclamation, of if he did mean it at the time, that he was now dedicated to Napoleon's cause? And why did the allies execute Ney and not Soult? Surely Soult would be considered as turning against the French king just as much as Ney did? What is it that we do not know, that perhaps has not yet been revealed or seen, for whatever reason, that will help us understand what happened in 1815 and answer these questions. Was he a traitor or just bad at his job? Stephen's book has, at the very least, brought up questions that should have been well answered by now. It is unbelievable that we are still asking them 200 years later, especially if someone can provide the missing pieces of the puzzle, but refuses to do so!

I participated in a few discussions online, but always by my name as I don't use aliases. I no longer participate at Napoleon Series due to their censorship of adults who don't go by aliases.

I don't know what a Francophone is. I did not bother to google it. I am American. I have friends from France, the UK, Germany, and more, but I have no loyalties or even that much affinity for any European country. When I visit them, I am a tourist, and I find European history to be very fascinating. I do admire Napoleon, and believe he was the "good guy" in the war against the monarchies of Europe. But I do repeatedly try to state that my theory is not meant to rehabilitate Napoleon – he lost the 1815 campaign, and one reason was his arrogance that he could control the loyalty of those around him. My goal is to point out that the conventional history is a) very wrong and b) the errors lead to poor analysis, such as the confusion of June 16th.

I do not recall any discussions about Soult attempting to get employment with Louis XVIII after Waterloo. I have pointed out some apocryphal material on Soult before, such as a letter an author claimed Soult wrote volunteering to overthrow Louis-Philippe. No one believes it is true, but what is telling is Soult's reputation in the 19th century.

I have pointed out that in the Chambers during the July Monarchy, Soult was often praised and took full credit for having served against France's enemies and invaders in 1815 – even while Guizot and others were criticized for their royalist sympathies. In exile, Napoleon said that Soult only wanted to serve (the king at that time) and he (Soult) would be upset if they (Napoleon and his entourage) believe he betrayed at Waterloo.

The "Blue is Blue, white is white" line has a few origins, Napoleon said he said it to Gérard (I think) and others reported it as well. It is possible it was a common saying and Napoleon may have said it a few times about Bourmont etc.

When Napoleon told Davout he wasn't concerned about appointing royalists (such as Bourmont) especially considering the good service by some during the first empire, Davout responded, paraphrasing, that then there was one flag, and today (1815) there are two. 1815 France was essentially a civil war, and those loyal to the king, or paid off by the king, worked to undermine Napoleon's government. I believe it was treason, but I'm sure someone can make the argument that Bourmont or DuBarail were freedom fighters.

The Whites are the Bourbons, and Blue was the revolution, and Napoleon was pointing out that Bourmont, who had fought against the republic and been implicated in plots against Napoleon, was "always white."

Pierre de Wit's website is the single greatest collection of historical materials or links to historical materials for the campaign of 1815 that are online, so I often point people to that if one wishes to see much of what I discuss. However, de Wit has never endorsed my theory nor spoken to me. My purpose of pointing individuals to that site is that often I say, "Soult did this" and those seemingly little knowledge of the campaign will tell me I'm wrong – from de Wit one can see orders and their bibliography. I provide the same in my book including copious links to Gallica and other primary sources that have been digitized.

I do this because really knowledgeable individuals have asked me things like this just recently, "are you sure Soult just couldn't read Napoleon's handwriting." Incredible – if you don't know about the campaign of 1815, that is ok… but please, before you argue, learn. Read. The information is widely available much to the shame of many modern works.

Having said all this – I'm not sure how this has anything to do with my argument or honesty.

Soult rewrote Napoleon's orders of June 10th, and certainly did not deliver Napoleon's intentions on June 5th to Gérard. I have a lot more material beyond this, but I like to stop there.

Thoughts/theories on why Soult did that?
There is no evidence that stores or the roads were a factor.
Napoleon countermanded Soult's orders immediately.

So why did Soult completely undo Napoleon's campaign plans for 1815?

Competence? If so, explain, because he rewrote the orders in fine detail and they were promptly followed. So what competence are we speaking of? Soult's inability to understand Napoleon's vision? Is that necessary? Send IV Corps to Philippeville by June 12th. Have III Corps and IV Corps on the right at Philippeville and Mariembourg by evening on June 13th. Very simple. In fact, the concentration on the frontier was as extremely simple as far as Napoleon's strategic preparations go. Why wouldn't it be, it was all inside the Frontier of France!

Thank you, Stephen for your response. I found your explanation of why Napoleon said "Blue is blue and white is always white" to be an excellent indicator of your knowledge of the situation and more than adequate to confirm my original evaluation of your theory.

I would respectfully suggest that when you come across a word that you do not understand, that you let Google be your friend. A Francophone is one who speaks/understands French. I suspect that you do not, though you may not regard this as an impediment to your theory.

Cheers,
Phil

I think francophone and francophile may have been confused earlier. The former is a French speaker, the latter one who favours anything French.

A Francophobe is anyone who has ever visited Paris….

Ney and Labedoyere were shot and Soult was not.

I think much depended on where the king was when one declared for Napoleon.

He was still at the Tuilleries in Paris when the first two, who held Royal commissions committed "treason". Once Louis had fled the country was left without a government or army head. It was then possibly (very arguably)"one's duty" to serve on for the good of one's country (threatened with invasion)

How many officers shoot Napoleon when he return from Elba Island?

It seems that many can be put in the list of "traitors"…
and he did not anything against them.

As Soult have one of the most important jobs in Napoleon campaign… during the 100 days… it's quite intriguing / rare that he was not immediately shot as if they were other much less participation in the "government" or "campaign" of Napoleon.

Not mention who managed to scape like Grouchy…

Amicalement
Armand

Sorry, what I meant was the legal status of those who fought for Boney in 1815 before and after Louis XVIII departed for Ghent.

Rather like those who fought for countries who capitulated to Hitler and those who fought on in exile. It made little difference, let's be honest, but, as the chap leading your firing squad cried "Fueuer" were you a Franc Tireur (A "terrorist") or a freedom fighter? You were shot anyway.

To be fair to them Nazis in WWII (OK not easy to be fair) Czech, Polish, French (really tricky for them as an Armistice signed), Dutch, Belgian, Norwegian, Danish etc military captives were usually treated as POWs anyway in WWII……even their Jewish captives did better than their relatives back home…….generally…..as long as they were still recognised as military.

I think Ney betrayed his commander, but once his commander in chief abandoned his country, anyone then was then freed from his oath. Tricky that. It is like lovemaking…………Timing is everything. Too soon and du bist gefucht. Too late we can all dream of, and take those tablets that send you to sleep…………

Ney and Labedoyere betrayed their C in C and the country's ruler. Soult etc waited till Louis XVIII abandoned them and left the country defenceless….timing mate…….

and I do know I will get back my supporting member status, with my Grateful Dead icon, as I have paid my sub 48 hours ago…….If only I had been reminded, without being just dropped!

I do not speak French – Jean-Marc Largeaud, who wrote the foreword for my book, not only does as he is French, but he also understands 19th century French, including rhetoric, idioms, and obscure military terms. While I had another translator do the initial pass, much of it suffered, and Jean-Marc helped fix up about half of it – the most important half. There is still work to do there, but I am very confident that the theories my work puts forth do not suffer from translations as I have had very significant French and German test readers who know the period and campaign very well. After much debate there has never been an example where any discussion hinged on an element of translation.

The King did a good job of deciding the "date" where one was a traitor, versus one was serving the new government. In this manner, Ney did betray Louis XVIII, as did thousands of civilians. Louis didn't want to execute anyone, and wanted them to all get away, but a few were caught. The King thought Ney did more damage getting executed than escaping, but did not intervene to save him. Interesting trivia – royalists disguised themselves as simple soldiers to man the firing squad, and per custom, later billed Ney's family for their uniforms. In fact, the entire 150 man company that both guarded him and manned the firing squad may have been emigres – aftewards many of them bragged about it, but this was not well received even by the royalists, and even less so as Ney's exploits became well known.

Why is this trivia important? First, Ney's family has the records, including the bills. Second, there are several references to the bragging of those that participated. Third, there are references by those who wrote about the braggers and were disgusted by them.

I point the above out because many say, "there is no way someone could have betrayed Napoleon and it not be well known." Really? Yet the above detail about Ney's execution shocks most I tell – including those that have studied the period their entire lives. The fact is, the intrigue of this period between legitimists, Bonapartism, and Republicans was widespread and deep, and today, VERY LITTLE OF IT IS KNOWN. It was a war, secrets were precious, reputations were important to protect, and this continued through the 19th century.

Did you know Victor Hugo's father in law was a paid royalist on Davout's staff? Probably not. Guizot was a traitor, was accused of it, and always denied it, and yet after everyone is dead, the evidence came out, he was a traitor. Why didn't those that know (Prussians, and members of the Kings staff at Ghent) say something? I thought that was the rule, if know of a conspiracy, say something, can't keep a secret, right? WRONG. Secrets were kept – I'm sure far more than we know.

McCarthy "shamefully" persecuted Alger Hiss for being a soviet agent… and Hiss was. Uh oh, eh, sorry McCarthy? WMDs have been found in Iraq, and Sadam paid terrorists and their families with cash when they killed allies of the USA. The greatest weapon Sadam had was money… yet 100 years ago, what will the history be?

Soult was initially censured, but was eventually proscribed, though he was already in Germany at the time.

I don't think there is great mystery or intrigue to who the Royalists punished. The ultras would have probably loved to execute most who served the Empire… the King was wiser and knew the throne was only precariously held. Charles X was more radical, and quick, after he lost the throne, he died outside of France and is buried where!??!! don't know, don't worry, hardly anyone does… the answer is… who cares. While Louis XVIII wasn't much, he did understand reality better than his brethren.

Charles X is buried in Slovenia… not quite France, is it?

If there is a bit of intrigue, it would be… why was Grouchy treated so well in 1830? Why did he get is Baton back, even before someone like d'Erlon was reinstated? What was so important about Grouchy?

Grouchy had information, and when Grouchy finally revealed this information, the material that incriminated Soult WAS MISSING.

How convenient, eh?

You seem to be unraveling a bit, Stephen. Conspirators everywhere!

I am a little surprised that your acquaintances were shocked to hear that Ney was purportedly shot by emigres; that story is as old as the hills. It was customary, nasty but customary, to charge the family of a man executed for treason for the price of the bullets, but the uniforms? Wasn't that rather giving the game away?

It has been amply demonstrated from the position of Ney's body after his "execution" that he wasn't killed at all and that Wellington conspired to have him shipped to America, where he quickly mastered a fluent American dialect and ended his life as a respected teacher of Latin and other useful stuff,

Actually, though, it is pretty well known that Ney spoke such excellent American English because he was, in fact, American. He sailed for France as a lad and joined the army, where he swiftly rose through the ranks (well, he was an American, after all) and then, after his fake execution returned to the US to live out his days.

Did you know that "Ney" in Arcturan means "bravest of the brave"? This would certainly be consistent with his having crashed his spaceship in France and taken on the identity of a French human and would certainly explain his atrocious accent. At the moment of his execution, his spaceship beamed him to the US, leaving only a fake but wrong-way-up fabricated body in his place. And so on.

Cheers,
Phil

Excellent thread Stephen… I enjoyed them more and more (smile)

What about Davout?. He was the last Marshal to resist in the gates of Paris (Grouchy fly before he would be caught)… was Mac Donald who save him? . The last flee with the King and also resist alone in a bridge against a whole French Cavalry unit (by memory) before his return to the side of the King … therefore I consider their opinion had a good specific weight with Louis.

Always took my attention that there are not Davour memories!.

Amicalement
Armand

Stephen

I second Tango01. And just ignore those that try to mock you. They're scared that a truth might be revealed which will further dent their already decaying rosy image of those they support during the Napoleonic period.

Those who supported the Bourbons could have left with the king. They did not have to stay in France. So timing in that sense did not matter-it is what they did that should count, so to execute one and not the other (Ney and Soult) is quite comical and revealing.

I'm not aware that it was a custom to charge a 'bullet fee' for anyone being executed during the Napoleonic period? I know it existed in later periods but that was not in France?

As for those creatures charging the family for the false uniforms they had made and wore for Ney's execution – that is unbelievable. And fancy going through the sly and cowardly act of pretending to be soldiers? What brave men they were. I doubt any of them experienced any military action and typically could only fire on an unarmed man.

Concerning the missing material incriminating Soult-if it was missing, how do we know it incriminated Soult? Is the answer to that in your book. I'm only about a third way through at the moment. But perhaps it not only incriminated Soult, it may have also incriminated Grouchy?

I participated in a few discussions online, but always by my name as I don't use aliases. I no longer participate at Napoleon Series due to their censorship of adults who don't go by aliases.

Could you explain this comment, please? The Napoleon Series does not allow aliases. Everyone has to register and post with their real name to be allowed to post.

The Napoleon Series does not censor anyone who 'don't go by aliases.'

Good question Kevin!. (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

Beckett's hypothesis is perfectly reasonable and we saw far worse associated with JFK in Dallas, or NASA and the moon landings. If we have doubts (and I still do, with nothing like his expertise in researching the primary sources) let's answer them with carefully thought out arguments, not sarcasm.

All conspiracy theories do degenerate into that argument "The evidence is not there, because the conspirators are hiding it" and the less evidence there is, the more there must be a conspiracy…………unless of course……..

Odd thing I have said before. The one thing missing here is any suggestion of a conspiracy. Facilitating the odd defection, (clumsily), risking being seen as an incompetent rather than a secret patriot, being so Machiavellian as to outdo the original………Soult seemed to be acting alone!

Great book. Well worth the read

deadhead

'Soult seemed to be acting alone' I can see your point, but surely that is based on material available? If any missing material becomes available, he may well 'seem' something entirely different-or not, depending on what the missing material reveals? But it is certainly annoying, if not disgusting, if someone out there is holding back any missing material. After so long, it really is pathetic.