"Screening a Fortified Farm" Topic

I'm afraid my tactical knowledge has a few holes in it. What woud be the likely historical tactical deployment used to screen such a position as La Haye if you are D'Erlon and have a division (without a Legere component)for the purpose?

Pretty straightforward: send out your skirmishers to keep contact, deploy your infantry and artillery in such a manner as to hammer the much smaller defensive garrison if it dares to stray from behind the walls. This is what I've done in every game of Waterloo I've ever played.

@ Catenwolde.

If only Jerome had followed your wise counsel!

Could I add, if in a game you need to take a BUA, the trick is to co ordinate your assault. Attack with large numbers on more than one side to split the garrison's fire and add every advantage you can. Eg our rules add tactical factors if engineers and sappers lead the assault.

Suspect these wargame tactics would be quite hard to execute in practice. A couple of things stand out from my attempts to examine the problem of the two farms in my Waterloo simulations.

First the core of each farm is quite small. In fact almost nobody tries to represent them in their true size on the table, since they would scale down to a hen hutch. That limits the size of garrison, of course, but it makes it physical hard to assault with very large number of men attacking at once. I am sure I have taken either or both of theses farms in games utilising two whole brigades. That is manifestly unrealistic.

Second the buildings are situated in hollows and partly screened by woods and orchards. The former more significant for LHS the latter for Hougoumont. This limits visibility and the ability of artillery to pummel them.

Of course these observations lead to a puzzle. If the farms were so small and partially hidden, why did they have such an impact? Why couldn't the French infantry sweep past them as if they weren't there? They would have been unable to deploy any kind of significant fire on passing troops. I must admit I haven't a good answer to that. I give them a "zone of control" and bypass the deeper question.

It was because they were small and partially hidden that made them effective in breaking up any large-scale assault – La Haye Sainte and positions to the east effectively reduced d`Erlon`s force – he was obliged to deal with them using parts of the 1st and 4th divisions.

Fire from LHS apparently impacted on the later French cavalry charges (IIRC, there are accounts of men in the centre of their squadron being lifted off the ground – along with their horses – by the inward press of those trying to avoid the firing).

I can perhaps understand why Hougoumont was not bombarded by field guns proper, because of the limited line of sight, but surely LHS could have been breached by the Grand Battery? Or were the 6- and 12-pdrs too small to do enough damage?

Hello le Grande Quartier General!

Screening LHS was not a likely historical option. LHS represents a defensive strong point intended to break up attacks. It also represents a clear danger to any units that would move past it either from flanking fire or rear attacks. Ignoring or screening it could jeopardize D'Erlon's entire attack. I don't think any competent commander would ever have even considered screening it. That's simply a wargamers dream option.

Also note that D'Erlon's Corps was deployed with LHS being almost dead center between the 1st & 2nd Div. These formations were packed very close together. There is no real movement possible. Your only option is straight forward. The only real option the French had was to have deployed D'Erlon's Corps much further east and on a different axis with a protecting flanking force on his left to protect him from any attacks from LHS. This is however with hindsight and would have required a very elaborate deployment plan which was probably impossible to have figured out and executed. Also keep in mind that the further D'Erlon moves away from the center it's less likely that Napoleon would have the resources in place to crush the Allied center. So moving D'Erlon was highly unlikely.

I think both sides knew the complications of LHS and both Napoleon and D'Erlon thought the Divisions could deal with it. The concept of taking a strong point was not new to them.

Best regards,

Glenn

I'm away from home so don't have access to my resources. But when I last looked at a detailed contour map my impression was that LHS would have been invisible to the grand battery, or most of it. Haven't checked this thought out on Google Earth though!

Once I did try to push the main French attack further east than d'Erlon's historical one. Got tangled up in the Papelotte, etc complex, and the attack proved slow to develop.

I don't think actual fire from LHS on flanking formations would have amounted to a great deal. Still I guess that soldiers get very nervous of flank threats, and it would not take much to have a significant psychological effect.

I guess screening using skirmishes backed by cavalry (to fend off counterattacks) would have been feasible, but would probably have taken up more space than would be worthwhile. The whole idea of screening would be to enlarge the amount of open ground through which the main attack could pass.

All the Waterloo Farms and hamlets would have been clearly marked on the French maps and partially shielded by terrain or not, would not have been any surprise to the French.
Additionally, the battlefield was reconnoited by the French prior to the fighting.

I believe General Haxo, Napoleon's chief engineer, himself scouted LHS and reported that the farm had no significant added fortifications.

This was a British oversight, I believe. Imagine what the Russians might have made of the building had they have been the defenders.

Oops!

I just realized that my eyes read "La Haye Saint" in the OP and my brain interpreted it as "Hougoumont" … ;)

As others have noted, in a wargame everything depends on how LOS to LHS is established. If it is readily visible by French massed batteries, then it goes up in smoke. If not (as it probably shouldn't be) then you can either 1) screen it with a single battalion and perhaps some extra LC, as the garrison is small and will have a hard time charging, or 2) run up a couple of horse batteries. The real danger is the Brit's using it as a covered staging point for a counter-attack, but a small covering force and flank reserves should balance that. If the French haven't invested heavily in taking Hougoumont (as they shouldn't!), then the importance of LHS is lessened, as the same screening force can watch both points more efficiently, and LHS effectively becomes the left flank of the French central attack, with no effort wasted on either farmstead and a nice flank reserve in place as a bonus.

I think to understand what happened at LHS, Hougoumont and Papelotte you need to think about what the actual orders probably were combined with their intentions. Using wargamer tactics won't give you any historical insight.

D'Erlon is positioned to deliver the main attack and cavalry is assigned to protect his flanks as he advances.
The massed battery is deployed to flatten everything in his path before he makes his attack.

Once the attack begins it seems that every Brigade is expected to attack what is in front of them. Charlet gets the short straw and finds LHS in his path. He has to attack it, screening is not an option. To reinforce this when you look at the other flank Papelotte is not directly in the path of Brue. Clearly either he, Durutte or D'Erlon saw it as a danger and they attacked it as well. They seem to have gone out of their way to make that attack. Obviously screening was not in their play deck.

D'Erlon and Reille covered completely different parts of the battlefield. Trying to coordinate a single screening force to cover or "watch" both LHS and Hougoumont was never a historical possibility. Different objectives in different zones.

Napoleon may well have known about Hougoumont or LHS, and they were marked on maps. But how far that knowledge extended down the chain of command is another matter. I remember reading of one French officer's account that he was surprised to see the Hougoument buildings beyond the woods. The position was much more difficult than he had supposed.

Whether the average Fantassin knew of the existence of LHS or Hougoumont is irrelevant. Their commanders did.

I sometimes think we imagine Napoleonic armies approaching each other like blind Giants. Apart from spies and a myriad of deserters, the French commanders, from brigade upwards, sent out their own scouts.

That the French staff at Waterloo weren't as sharp as usual is fairly obvious but they weren't tyros.

I'd be interested to know how far down the line of command in any of the Napoleonic armies maps were supplied.

Ochoin,

Take a look at the discussions here about Bernard Coppens` work on the maps available to Napoleon & the French commanders and also the orders given by Napoleon via Ney as to the objectives of the attack and the special instructions given to d`Erlon`s command.
He also has a website about the book and his other work.

Thanks for the head's up.