Tango01 | 18 May 2015 11:23 p.m. PST |
…, July 1, 1863. "Do not bring on a general engagement, Confederate General Robert E. Lee warned his commanders. The Army of Northern Virginia, slicing its way through south-central Pennsylvania, was too spread out, too vulnerable, for a full-scale engagement with its old nemesis, the Army of the Potomac. Too much was riding on this latest Confederate invasion of the North. Too much was at stake. As Confederate forces groped their way through the mountain passes, a chance encounter with Federal cavalry on the outskirts of a small Pennsylvania crossroads town triggered a series of events that quickly escalated beyond Lee's—or anyone's—control. Waves of soldiers materialized on both sides in a constantly shifting jigsaw of combat. "You will have to fight like the devil . . ." one Union cavalryman predicted. The costliest battle in the history of the North American continent had begun. July 1, 1863 remains the most overlooked phase of the battle of Gettysburg, yet it set the stage for all the fateful events that followed. Bringing decades of familiarity to the discussion, historians Chris Mackowski and Daniel T. Davis, in their always-engaging style, recount the action of that first day of battle and explore the profound implications in Fight Like the Devil." See here link Amicalement Armand |
avidgamer | 19 May 2015 4:04 a.m. PST |
"July 1, 1863 remains the most overlooked phase of the battle of Gettysburg…" This is the stupiest thing I have read in years. No one overlooks it! Everyone that reads about Gettysburg to any extent would laugh at this one. Everyone knows how this day set the outcome for the AoNW to lose. They were behind the eight ball after after day one. |
Who asked this joker | 19 May 2015 4:20 a.m. PST |
This is the stupiest thing I have read in years. No one overlooks it! I think this is a pretty harsh statement. When folks game they usually game A) Fight for Little Round Top or B) Pickets Charge. That's usually what is covered in detail in documentaries as well. The only thing I take exception to is that Culp's Gill usually gets even less attention. |
Landorl | 19 May 2015 6:44 a.m. PST |
I guess Culp must be some sort of fish for it to have gills… :-) |
avidgamer | 19 May 2015 7:19 a.m. PST |
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Who asked this joker | 19 May 2015 7:19 a.m. PST |
I guess Culp must be some sort of fish for it to have gills… :-) LOL! And even less attention goes to his HILL! |
avidgamer | 19 May 2015 8:06 a.m. PST |
So let me rephrase it… uneducated and less well read gamers will over look it. Pick up a book about the battle (almost all books about Gettysburg) and you can't overlook its importance. |
mjkerner | 19 May 2015 8:52 a.m. PST |
Iron Brigade, McPherson's Ridge, Railroad Cut. 'nough said. |
GoodOldRebel | 19 May 2015 9:21 a.m. PST |
Having played several of the scenario's in the WSS special on the first day, I can see the point the authors were trying to convey. The more famous events of Little Round Top, Devil's Den/Wheatfield and Pickett's charge do overshadow much of the fighting on the first day and the fighting on the Confederate left?. |
avidgamer | 19 May 2015 9:46 a.m. PST |
The events of the first day are of a critical nature to Lee's thinking and planning for the rest of the battle. It didn't have to force him to stay and fight it out but he decided to based upon the lack of information, subordinates reluctances to do very much (Ewell & Early) and arguments with Longstreet. After the first day's fighting a nice chunk of Lee's army was already beat-up badly. You can never say with certainty what COULD have happened but as it worked out there was little chance to destroy the Army of the Potomac in a meaningful way, strategically. The very poor strategic results on the first day made it extremely difficult win the sort of victory Lee had hoped for. At best Lee might have been able to force the Army of the Potomac to withdraw south to the Pipe Creek line only to have to fight another battle against a dug-in Union army. Little Round Top and Pickett's charge get all the headlines but the 1st and 11th Corps ground down 2 of Lee's corps (almost) in the process costing Lee valuable time, ammo and manpower. The officers lost at all levels, but most critically at regimental level, could have been the worst hit. Most, if not all historians, know this and write about it in great detail. Wadsworth's, Robinson's and Doubleday's divisions dealt a severe blow to Lee's army probably worse than he knew. |
Navy Fower Wun Seven | 19 May 2015 1:36 p.m. PST |
So is this a book to avoid? |
Who asked this joker | 19 May 2015 2:06 p.m. PST |
One way to keep the Early's attack from succeeding is to not allow the 11th to walk into a trap. Barlow deployed too far forward and was crushed from all sides. Howard had to keep feeding his troops into the fight until his corps collapsed late in the day. Had he held back near Gettysburg, things might have been a bit different. |
John Miller | 19 May 2015 6:14 p.m. PST |
Who asked this joker: Barlow seems to have avoided much criticism for this. It seems like a blunder, (?), that other Generals would be roasted pretty handily for by modern historians. I wonder if you or any other TMP posters would have any opinions you would care to express on this. This probably reveals my bias against Barlow, I find him hard to like. Thanks in advance to anyone who would like to comment. John Miller |
avidgamer | 20 May 2015 4:16 a.m. PST |
One can argue that having Howard's two divisions sent forward (and getting hammered in the process) may just have been the best move! It allowed the First Corps to fight longer and to wreck Heth's and most of Pender's divisions. Had the 11th Corps NOT been sent forward the 1st Corps would have been forced to withdraw allowing time for the two Reb corps to coordinate an attack on Cemetery Hill or out-flank it. That would have forced Meade to fall back to his Pipe Creek line. It is a shame that men had to fall almost as a sacrifice but in the long run the victory at Gettysburg was the high water mark for the Confederacy and never again was Lee able to take the offensive in any meaningful way. If Howard had deployed his entire Corps forward it probably would have ended the same way with NO reserve left for Cemetery Hill. "So is this a book to avoid?" I don't know. It could have been a typical publisher quote to generate sales. Barlow was ordered forward by Howard. As far as we know he was not told _exactly_ where to place his men. We know there weren't enough men in the 2 11th Corps divisions to cover the north of town but… when they were sent forward there wasn't enough information known to Howard that Early's division was going to arrive on Barlow's flank. That's the rub. Union cavalry pickets did know that Rodes was arriving near Oak Hill but not Early's division. Barlow moved forward and supposedly was given the ‘okay' from Howard that his deployment was fine. Remember though, that deployment was ‘fine' if only the Rebs they had to contend with was Rodes. Could Barlow have pulled back once the true nature of Early's attack was revealed? We'll never know how that would have worked but it certainly would not have helped enough to stall Early's advance very much longer. Barlow was aggressive by nature. He was a good officer throughout the war. I would not place a huge heap of blame on his doorstep. I fault Howard for not handling the situation properly from Cemetery Hill. He stayed there during the whole afternoon apart from when he first rode forward to speak to Doubleday and Schurz when there was NO fighting going on. It was during the lull in the day's fight. After this initial visit he never returned to look for himself when he received calls for help and also calls from Doubleday to withdraw to Seminary Ridge, a shorter line to defend. |
avidgamer | 20 May 2015 4:28 a.m. PST |
Oh one other thing concerning Blocher's Knoll (Barlow's knoll)… if Barlow had withdrawn to straighten his line severe consequences would have occurred. Giving Early that high ground directly in his front would have been as bad as when at Chancellorsville Hooker pulled back from Hazel Grove. It gave the Rebs a chance to pound the Union army from a higher point. At Chancellorsville Barlow was sent forward with his brigade to support the Fairview line after Hooker gave up Hazel Grove. He saw the result. Perhaps that was his thinking to hold the higher ground. Better to hold the high ground then try to hold the lower ground. Something that if viewed under a microscope seems an easy criticism of Barlow but if viewed in broader history perhaps not. He may have thought to hold the high ground at all cost was better because the alternative is NOT an alternative. |
davbenbak | 20 May 2015 6:58 a.m. PST |
Thanks to all for posting an insightful and gentlemanly discussion that makes me want to learn more about these events. |
Who asked this joker | 20 May 2015 7:05 a.m. PST |
I wonder if you or any other TMP posters would have any opinions you would care to express on this. I think most historians view Barlow's deployment as a delaying action…which it wasn't. Quite frankly, the 11th got pantsed…again (remember Chancellorsville?). If Howard truly wanted to delay, he would have setup the main body along the road that passes by the county alms house. @avidgamer this is a ridge line so you are not really giving up the high ground. You are replacing one position for another. Anyway, then several regiments should be used around the knoll and the woods beyond a a skirmish line. This would almost certainly make Early deploy and would slow his attack. It would also give the 11th time to dig in…at least somewhat. Finally, it would keep the corps closer to the division in reserve (Steinwehr). Barlow's Knoll is described as a "slight rise." It is high ground, but as I've pointed out, so is the area around the county alms house. |
Loyalhanna | 20 May 2015 8:36 a.m. PST |
Hello All, I am just in the process of finishing this book, (about 10 pages to go). I have enjoyed reading it, and it does have some very interesting information and opinions. Some of the contributors to the articles are park rangers and guides, (both current and retired). This book is a history/ tour guide of the first days action with GPS coordinates. Some of the info is repeat for some of us who have read a lot about the first day. I would say this book falls into a category between general and in depth study. Some of the information provided is enough to interest some of us diehards,but would leave us disappointed with the lack of regimental information and maps with their positions. With that being said I would say that the book has accomplished what the author intended it to be. I am not disappointed that I added it to my collection and it fits in well with the other history/guide books that I have, (The Complete Gettysburg Guide/ Petruzzi, Gettysburg: The Story Of The Battle With Maps/ Stackpole, A Field Guide To Gettysburg/ Reardon and Vossler, The U.S. Army War College Guide To The Battle Of Gettysburg/ Luvaas and Nelson, and the history/walking tour guide "The Devils to Pay" John Buford at Gettysburg/ Wittenberg. It is definitely worth the $10.91 USD that Amazon is selling it for. take care, Keith |
avidgamer | 20 May 2015 10:09 a.m. PST |
"If Howard truly wanted to delay, he would have setup the main body along the road that passes by the county alms house." We don't have all the facts from that day but we can only glean some details today. Schurz left his thoughts as did Doubleday and Barlow as a counter-part to Howard's. It appears that we know that Howard was thinking more about Oak Hill than Early's approach. Perhaps he thought he could handle Rodes with the 1st Corps' help so he concentrated all his attention facing north-west. Barlow asked Howard if his deployment was ‘okay' with Howard and he had no objections. Barlow claims HE had no idea what was coming from the north east. Howard did get information from cavalry pickets from that direction but perhaps he did not believe them or… perhaps he thought they were too far away to be of any concern. Maybe he thought Slocum would come up soon and could fill any gap on Barlow's flank? We don't know for sure. " this is a ridge line so you are not really giving up the high ground. You are replacing one position for another." Well I would disagree mildly here. It wasn't significant enough to offset the higher ground on Blocher's knoll. Union guns would still be at a disadvantage in numbers and positioning which would undermine any advantage which this slight ridge might offer. Just remember how well (not!) the Union position was at Fairview in dealing with Hazel Grove. That did no go well. Howard's huge oversight was not having escape routes drawn up in the event that both Union Corps would need to fall back to Cemetery Hill. This oversight led to unnecessary Union captures while passing through the streets of Gettysburg. "This would almost certainly make Early deploy and would slow his attack." Yes but it would not have not altered the outcome one bit. "It would also give the 11th time to dig in…at least somewhat." Well you know that wouldn't have happened. Howard wasn't around to order it and even handed direct orders from Hooker at Chancellorsville (and reprimanded) did not nudge Howard to erect earthworks facing west. In hindsight it makes sense now but that wasn't going to happen. "Finally, it would keep the corps closer to the division in reserve (Steinwehr)." With the town between Schurz & Barlow and Steinwehr that point is moot. They might as well have been 13 miles away. The town precludes any real help and is more of a hindrance. Besides, Howard was loath to send anything north or west of town. Fun discussion but it is all ‘what-ifs' so… everyone is right and everyone is wrong. We'll never know. |
Who asked this joker | 20 May 2015 11:15 a.m. PST |
Well I would disagree mildly here. It wasn't significant enough to offset the higher ground on Blocher's knoll" There is a reason it is called a knoll and not a hill.
Here is a guide standing at the county alms house. Relatively flat actually. The little rise in the distance is Blocher's (Barlow's) Knoll. From here. link Here is a pretty good map of what Barlow did. link His mistake should be self evident. Taken from here. link |
Tango01 | 20 May 2015 11:56 a.m. PST |
Superb threads boys! Many thanks!! Amicalement Armand |
John Miller | 20 May 2015 4:17 p.m. PST |
All Hands: Thanks to everyone for all the interesting observations and comments to my question. John Miller |
avidgamer | 21 May 2015 4:04 a.m. PST |
Who asked this joker, As I said I would STILL mildly disagree. I have been to that site yet I still maintain that the shortened line along that 'ridge' would not have made any difference and it could have been a worst result. The bottom line was that there were too few men to hold too long a line. It was poorly chosen and mismanaged by Howard. Sad but true. :( |
Who asked this joker | 21 May 2015 6:07 a.m. PST |
As I said I would STILL mildly disagree. Mildly…missed that part. I enjoyed the debate. The bottom line was that there were too few men to hold too long a line. This much is certain since the entirety of Ewell's Corps was coming up the flank. However, I contend that the 11th would have given a much better showing than they did in the real battle. The flank attack largely did precipitate the general retreat from Seminary ridge back up to cemetery ridge anyway. It might have been a bit more…orderly. |
avidgamer | 21 May 2015 8:51 a.m. PST |
Well Doubleday wanted to fall back during the lull in the afternoon's fighting to Seminary Ridge. Howard said no but if he had allowed it the 1st Corps could have provided the 11th Corps with some needed help. Of course not men but makes the 11th Corps line shorter! It would have freed up Robinson's division to fall back and face JUST north instead of facing west, north and east. Having Slocum come up would have helped enormously but… sadly that was not in Slocum's M.O. That's another discussion. Gettysburg Magazine recently had an article about that mess. It's fun to debate this stuff. |
Who asked this joker | 21 May 2015 9:26 a.m. PST |
Well since we are talking about Union mistakes, I suspect Sickles deserves some love for the second day., deploying on the wrong ridge. Maybe there was a rivalry between him and Barlow. Who can make the bigger mistake in deployment? |
avidgamer | 21 May 2015 10:19 a.m. PST |
Oh no no no… Mistake?! Sickles made a mistake? Is that even possible? Just ask him. He'll say he won the battle of Gettysburg! If it wasn't for his actions Meade would have retreated to Pipe Creek and lost the battle. Sickles saved DC in the bargin! He told Lincoln that when he got back to DC, the on the 4th while recuperating from his wounding. No controversy at all. ;) |