"British Guards at Waterloo - How Good?" Topic

I see that Black Powder, in their Waterloo Campaign book, rate the Guards one better than line regiments in all categories: firing, hand to hand and morale. While they put up one hell of a fight at Hougoumont, where they really that much better than line regiments or KGB? If anything, I recall reading that the Guards suffered from a lack of field experience, although that may have referred to their service later in the 19th Century.I am putting together my own rules for Hougoumont and am trying to decide just how powerful to make them compared to the Hanoverians, Nassau and French Light infantry.

KGB?

Depends on if SPECTRE and SMERSH were also present!

By 1815, the Foot Guards had a very good service record, but I pretty much think they were only as good as KGL units and the best British Foot regiments.

MHO, of course.

It should be noted that half the guard defenders of Hougoumont were newly raised from the Berkshire Militia. They were still wearing their militia uniform. These were the 2nd battalions as the 1st battalion were required to secure the capital from riots. Most had not seen any service.
Stephen

SMERSH were real. SPECTRE fictional…brilliant to spot that though. If you read "The Lie at the Heart of Waterloo" (which I was determined not to) you will be convinced that the Guards Infantry contributed little on the ridge itself. It was the 52nd that beat Boney's Guards single handed…….

To be fair, the book is far, far, better than I had expected. Its research into the final attack is extremely well done and genuinely does cast some new light into what happened. If only it had not carried that daft title and the conspiracy theory chapters that close it.

Also, do not forget how many of the "British Guards at Waterloo" sat on horses and probably proved of more use than the Union Brigade over the entire campaign (discuss……….)

OK as I typed this Summerfield posted. Is that not fascinating? Quite an insight into the "elite" unit suggested.

I have British Guards coming up soon on my "to do" list for Waterloo.

I'm fine on them being in grey trousers not white.

But Berkshire militia uniform? What the heck does that look like?

Line infantry uniform, pretty much.

The milita issue is a bit of a canard. Most regiments were glad to get drafts from the militia, which was a regular, standing force, raised by ballot, but simply limited to Home Service. Its drafts to the Regular Army were not only all volunteer, they would also have been trained and drilled soldiers. (With identical weapons, kit and uniforms).

Presumably the Guards Brigade would have had their pick of these trained soldiers, to meet their exacting physical standards. In contrast, perhaps, to the Line such as the 14th Buckinghams who, after review, were classified as fit only for LOC duties owing to the extreme youth of their soldiers.

In the event of course, the Buckinghams held fast just as well as the Guards!

Didn't the Guards have a minimum size and stature requirement?

Also the morale factor of being a Guard soldier would come into play on the battlefield. Peninsular veterans including KGL would have the knowledge and experience of the battlefield, but would be cautious.
Guards without experience would fight with elan, being a Guard. Just my thoughts.

I thought that the primary difference between Guards and line regiments is that the Guards tended to close to full strength because they replenished losses more frequently, whereas line regiments had a harder time recruiting so replacements were less frequent.

Don't know if that is true or not, just something that I heard a long time ago. It's another way of saying "rate Guards and line the same".

IIRC someone did a study of the lengths of service of soldiers in British battalions at Waterloo. Interestingly, the Guards were on average amongst the least experienced, whereas "old Spanish" battalions from the Peninsula tended to average several years with the colours.
Maybe the fancy title improved quality? ;)

My own view is that unit cohesion in battle is founded on more practical things like experience (as Napoleon said, 'Soldiers have to eat soup together for a long time before they are ready to fight'), training, previous battlefield success/confidence, etc, rather than fancy titles.

I'd rate British Guards as above average British Line, i.e. lower than Peninsula veterans, but field larger battalions for the reasons cited above.

As an aside, esprit de corps is more than a fancy title when it translates into cohesion in combat, Paul

Very few Peninsula veterans at Waterloo. Most had been sent to America, most British infantry units were second battalions. They would certainly have been glad of a few militia recruits. As stated above the militia was a full time professional body. It ewas only embodied in time of war but this war had been going some time by 1815 so the militia was a good source of well drilled experienced soldiers.

Transferring from the Militia was one of the ways that line regiments got their recruits. If you were a militia officer, you could get a free commission if you could persuade a specified number of militiamen to come with you. So it wasn't all drunks or starving men.
Militia recruits had the advantage of having already received training in drill and musketry.
It's difficult to imagine the Foot Guards tolerating old militia uniforms, or even that they would have needed to in what was, until very recently, peacetime.

The guards were good. But they weren't "elite" like the 95th or the Imperial Guard. I would say they had some certain dash or élan about them that put them above all but the best line and light troops. They had higher class officers, gold laced sergeants and better pay… But they were recruited from the same basic rank and file as the others. At Waterloo they were probably amongst the most experienced of the British troops.. 30th, 28th and 40th maybe had more veterans in them and a couple of the KGL battalions.

I've read that the Guards were able to pick and choose their recruits, while Line regiments had to take whatever they could get. Maybe their relative lack of battlefield experience was offset by the better education and motivation of the rank and file?

Transfers from the Militia were seen as a good thing in this period because they were well trained volunteers who WANTED to see active service.

They performed excellently at Waterloo, though one battalion was caught in the open by Pire's light cavalry at Quatre Bras and was routed suffering heavy casualties.

The British Guards units did not have the selection criteria that the Old Guard units in the Imperial Guard had. Still, they were excellent troops and performed as should be expected of British troops.

Brechtel wrote:

They performed excellently at Waterloo, though one battalion was caught in the open by Pire's light cavalry at Quatre Bras and was routed suffering heavy casualties.

Apart from the assumption made by Scott Bowden, what is the source for this?

See Andrew Field's Prelude to Waterloo, pages 147-148, though the eyewitness account from an officer in the 1st Foot Guards attributes the Guards breaking and running to the French artillery.

Henry Houssaye covers the incident in Napoleon and the Campaign of 1815, pages 122-123.

AF Becke covers the incident on pages 90-91 of Napoleon and Waterloo.

James Lawford mentions the incident in Napoleon: The Last Campaigns, page 125.

William Siborne in History of the Waterloo Campaign talks about the incident on page 100.

So, it appears that Scott Bowden's comments are not an assumption but comments on an action that actually occurred.

I hope that clarifies the situation and the incident and if you have any of the above references you can look them up too.

And like I said on another site. Most of the casualties were caused in the confused fighting in the successful clearing the Bossu wood itself and from artillery fire when the Guards got to the edge of said wood.

Paul :)

Brechtel189 had this to say about the Guards at Waterloo, and I replied:

The three battalions of Chasseurs, from the 3d and 4th regiments, struck the allied line to the left of where the two grenadier battalions had hit and been repulsed. The two battalions of the 3d Chasseurs were heavily pounded by two batteries of artillery during their advance, suffering heavy casualties. However, they continued to attack until surprised and fired upon by Maitland's British Guards. A ‘savage fight' ensued but Maitland finally drove the two battalions back down the slope.

There was no real fight at all! Let alone a "savage" one.

Here are some of the first hand accounts by those directly involved. This does not include accounts by external eyewitnesses.

William Siborne's published letters.

Captain H.W Powell. 1st foot Guards. letter No.109. Page 254

"They continued to advance till within fifty or sixty paces of our front when the brigade were ordered to stand up. Whether it was from the sudden and unexpected appearance of a corps so near, which must have seemed as starting out of the ground, or the tremendously heavy fire we threw into them, La Garde, who had never before failed in an attack suddenly stopped. Those from a distance and more on the flank could see the affair, tell us that the effect of our fire seemed to force the head of the column bodily back.
In less than a minute 300 were down. They now wavered, and several of the rear divisions began to draw out as if to deploy, whilst some of the men in their began to fire over the heads of those in front was so evident of proof that their confusion,that Lord Seaton (who joined the brigade, having had the whole of his Light Infantry battalion dispersed at Hougoumont) holloaed out, 'Now's the time my boys.' Immediately the brigade sprang forward. La Garde turned and gave us little opportunity of trying the steel. We charged down the hill till we had passed the end of the orchard of Hougoumont, when our right flank became exposed to a another heavy column. (As we afterwards understood of the Chasseurs of the Garde) who were advancing in support of the former column. This circumstance besides that our charge was isolated, obliged the Brigade to retire towards their original position"

Lieutenant and Captain H. Davis 1st Foot Guards. No.110. Page 257

" When the French Imperial Guard advanced to the attack,the same maneuver was repeated by the British Guards, and the French Guards whose attack was made in column, were broken and driven back with great slaughter, the field being literally covered bwith their dead."

Ensign J.P Dirom 1st Foot Guards. No.111. Page 257

"The Brigade had been formed in line four deep, and ordered to lie down. When the Imperial Guard came in sight, the men were desired to stand up….The French Columns showed no appearance on their advance, but seemed as regularly formed as if at a field day.

When they got within a short distance, we were ordered to make ready, present and fire. The effect was evidently most deadly. The French columns appeared staggered and, if I may use the expression, convulsed. Part seemed inclined to advance, part halted and fired, and others, more particulary towards the centre and rear of the column seemed to be turning round.

At this moment our line was ordered to charge….On our advance the whole French columns turned round and made off."

From William Siborne's unpublished letters.

Captain John Reeve No. 97 Page 160

"When the Imperial guard made their attack at about 7o'clock pm the 1st Brigade of Guards were lying down in a line of four deep resting upon their arms….On the enemy's column arriving within about 30 paces of our line they halted, but from the warm reception they met with, instead of deploying they commenced firing several files deep, evidently in confusion, we charged them – they went to the right about and fled in all directions."

Ensign Thomas Robert Swinburne No.105 Page 166-167

"….we were ordered to rise and fire a volley and charge. This the French received and I think that they were no more than 15 yards from us; they were so close that some of our men fired from the hip….The fire was very destructive, as there was a hedge of bodies lying and over which we passed in the charge after them down the slope. "

Ensign Daniel Tighe No106. page 168

"….till on the advance of the Imperial Guard we got word to advance in line and poured in a rapid fire into the advancing columns of the Imperial Guard which they stood but a short time and retreated in full disorder."

Gareth Glover's Waterloo Archive volume IV

Major General Peregrine Maitland No 54. page 132

"The moment they appeared and began to form about twenty yards to our front, we poured in the most deadly fire that perhaps ever was witnessed, as the field of battle abundantly testified to the following day. The Imperial Guard retreated; the whole of our line advanced and the rest of the part of the enemy was all flight"

Private Henry Swan No.64 page 141

"….the Duke of Wellington come to us and told us that we was agoing to be exposed against Guards, the first time that ever we was in our lives. When he said ‘Now Guards for your honour you must stand, form four deep and for every man to load and lay down, and when I orders you up, you will fire a volley into them, come to the port and charge.' When he ordered us up with ‘Up guards and at them' which we did with a Huzza and the French turned round and run a little way, that being the close of battle""

I have never read a first hand account where the Chasseurs did anything other than get slaughtered and break in quick succession. Houssaye, and Lachouque may say different, but then again and as I have said before, their tomes are dated and very inaccurate.

The 4th Chasseurs pressed on and drove Maitland back, but was attacked by Adam's brigade on their left flank by the 52d Light Infantry supported by the 71st Foot.The Chasseurs were quite literally overwhelmed and the attack collapsed.-See Becke, 222-227; Houssaye, 223-232; William Siborne, 337-350; Esposito/Elting, Text for Map 167.

And

The idea that Maitland defeated the attack of the five Guard battalions is an error. Only three of the five were engaged by Maitland, and one of them, the 4th Chasseurs drove Maitland back

The 4th Chasseurs 'drove' no one back. Their advance to the left of Maitland after he advanced caused the Guards to retire less they be out flanked. The 4th Chasseurs never came into contact with the Guards on their advance and were promptly attacked by the 52nd, 71st, 2nd/95th and two companies of the 3rd/95th in support,

Where is the evidence for this 'error'. Who wrote that the 1st Foot Guards engaged five battalions?

after the two battalions of the 3d Chasseurs had been defeated by Maitland. And the 4th Chasseurs were outflanked by two of Adam's regiments, not Maitland.

Whoever said that Maitland outflanked the 4th Chasseurs?

Paul :)

Kevin,

You present an interesting set of secondary sources concerning the British guards at Quatre Bras and, bizarrely, the only one from which you mention an eye witness account contradicts your assertion. We must have very different editions of Siborne as page 100 in mine covers events well before Quatre Bras and the later coverage of the Guards' encounter with the French cavalry certainly does not contain a description of them being routed.

Repetition of a claim by a number of writers does not prove it to be true; it merely shows that they all make the same claim.

William Siborne in History of the Waterloo Campaign talks about the incident on page 100.

I looked up the Siborne (is the edition different? I think the page numbering is severely out). It rather has the British and Brunswick Guards routing the French Cavalry…https://archive.org/stream/waterloocampaig00sibogoog#page/n191/mode/2up

AF Becke covers the incident on pages 90-91 of Napoleon and Waterloo.

I can't find any reference to the incident in Becke at all. The only direct reference to the French cavalry at Quatre Bras was Ney's message to Soult on the evening of link but this has no mention of any details of anything much at all. In passing, I was interested to note that Ney claims to have sustained rather higher casualties than are normally attributed to the French (6,000 rather than 4,300-500).

Henry Houssaye covers the incident in Napoleon and the Campaign of 1815, pages 122-123.

Houssaye mentions the incident briefly: link However, after previous investigations on TMP, I'd always need to see the original source for corroboration of Houssaye.

The source from the Foot Guards is here: link

So what we seem to have is a situation where the French cavalry charges, the 1 Foot Guards (and others – note how they were joined by stragglers from other units) run to the edge of the wood then destroy the French cavalry with combined fire from the Brunswickers, taking many prisoners.

Looking at the losses for Pire's lancers, link we find that 21 officers of the 59 present were killed or wounded, which I suppose sounds about right for heavy fighting.

BTW, the losses of 1 Foot Guards are very interesting: link

2/1 Foot Guards: 35 officers (2 killed, 4 wounded) 919 men (23 killed, 256 wounded)
3/1 Foot Guards: 40 officers (2 killed, 5 wounded) 982 men (20 killed, 235 wounded).

To my mind, that suggests that the majority of the casualties were actually caused by musketry and melee. There were no 'missing' – i.e. prisoners at all.

Anyway, it appears that this is the incident referred to. 'Rout' seems to be the wrong word here: tactical withdrawal at speed, seems for once to sum up the situation rather better!

Fixed the link to Siborne: link

Indeed, I do not know of many routed units that very quickly managed to deliver an effective volley and defeat the enemy that had routed them.

It is strange that Kevin's copy of Siborne seems to have significantly different page numbering from both mine and Whirlwind's. I am also struggling to find a description of the rout of the Guards in Becke.

The question was asked if there were any other sources besides Scott Bowden for the rout of the Guards battalion at Quatre Bras. I gave five other sources. Seems to me the question was asked and answered.

The woods gave the Guards a place to rally, and being a good unit under competent leadership they did. And they suffered heavy casualties.

It does seem to me that any criticism of the British, the Guards, and Wellington is usually met with 'disbelief' which is somewhat silly. However, people can believe what they like. And it should also be noted that Wellington said that 'all troops run'-not a 'tactical withdrawal at speed' (which is ridiculous-they ran for the woods).

Also, the French cavalry was not 'destroyed' at Quatre Bras-that is just nonsense.

The question was asked if there were any other sources besides Scott Bowden for the rout of the Guards battalion at Quatre Bras. I gave five other sources. Seems to me the question was asked and answered.

Well, no, because under investigation the sources don't say that. And they appear to be all secondary works.

it should also be noted that Wellington said that 'all troops run'-not a 'tactical withdrawal at speed' (which is ridiculous-they ran for the woods).

Well, fine. But the point is the word 'rout' here isn't being used by you with anything like its normal meaning. Normally rout implies defeat and disintegration. But here we find it is the French who are severely defeated in the action which seems incompatible with the way rout is normally used.

Also, the French cavalry was not 'destroyed' at Quatre Bras-that is just nonsense.

Well, 'destroyed' is more or less a direct quotation from the primary source:

The French Cavalry charged our left and drove us all into the wood on the right. The hollow way now covered us from the Cavalry, and from it the men threw in so destructive a fire as to nearly annihilate them, whilst the Brunswickers (whose front became uncovered by our retreat into the wood) formed square beautifully, and did their part most effectively in their destruction. Many men and horses were taken who fled for shelter into the wood, which supplied our mounted (or rather dismounted) Officers with fresh horses. In this charge Lord Hay was supposed to be killed.

So, according to the primary source, it isn't clear that the French cavalry even contacted the main body of the battalion – or even entirely certain that they contacted any guardsmen at all – or that the guardsmen were in any sense routed – there is no indication that discipline had broken down at all. However, it is clear that it was the French who were "nearly annihilated" in the affair and their discipline broke down to some degree – and their officer casualties seem to bear this out to some degree.

So, are there any other primary sources from either side which could provide a different view to the whole affair?

It does seem to me that any criticism of the British, the Guards, and Wellington is usually met with 'disbelief' which is somewhat silly. However, people can believe what they like.

Well actually it appears that anyone who looks at the primary sources and then doubts Houssaye or Bowden is met with 'disbelief'. This is the real source of the "silliness".

Kevin,

The problems with the sources that you provided are:

1. Most of them are secondary sources.

2. Some of them at least do not quite seem to say what you claim they say.

Therefore, although the question has been answered, the answer supplied by you is a trivial one as it does not contain any useful information.

As you say, people can believe what they like, and I am sure that you will continue to do so in the face of primary source evidence where it contradicts your views.

Rating the British guards units at Waterloo is quite difficult for the reasons given by others above.

Using the OP's criteria, my own view would be:

Firing: Same as most British line as I cannot see what training or experience they had that made them any better.

Hand to Hand: Same as most British line as I cannot see what training or experience they had that made them any better.

Morale: Better than most British line as they are an "elite" unit; such a categorisation tends to lead to officers and men having greater determination to uphold the traditions and reputation of the unit, as well as imbuing a certain confidence.

‘On the French left, two strong battalions of British guardsmen had deployed into the Bossu wood. Unfortunately, there is no French account of the fighting here, but we get a good feel from an officer of the 1st Foot Guards:

‘The men gave a cheer, and rushing in drove everything before them to the end of the wood, but the thickness of the underwood soon upset all order, and the French artillery made the place so hot that it was thought advisable to draw back to the stream, which was rather more out of range. A great many men were killed and wounded by the heads of the trees falling on them as cut off by cannon shot.'

Prince Jerome's men were eventually pushed out of the wood, but formed up to its south and disputed with determination the exit of the guards who tried to deploy in the open ground. However, suffering casualties from the French fire and threatened by cavalry, in a scene reminiscent of early in the day the two guards battalions broke and dashed for the safety of the trees and the hollow way which ran along its edge. Pire's troopers failed to catch them and suffered severely from their fire and that of a Brunswick square which stood in the open ground. Cooke's men, faced by the determined resistance and the strongpoint of Pierrepont held by Jolyet's men, advanced no further; the skirmisher fire continued until darkness fell.'-Andrew Field, Prelude to Waterloo, 147-148.

‘When eight o'clock had passed, a battalion under Maitland, sallied forth from the south-western extremity of the wood to recover Pierrepont; the battery of Foy's division arrested its progress with a heavy fire, and Pire's indefatigable lancers charged it, then drove it back in disorder and pursued it to the edge of the Gemioncourt brook; it escaped, however, to the cover of the wood.'-Henry Houssaye, Waterloo, 122-123.

‘The 1st Infantry Brigade was composed of the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 1st Foot Guards and was commanded by Major General P Maitland.'

‘The Brigade arrived at Quatre Bras about half past six o'clock on the evening of the 16th June, and was at once employed in driving the French out of the Bois de Bossu. Arriving at the southern extremity of the wood, and pursuing the enemy beyond it, it was forced back by the French artillery as far as the rivulet which crosses a portion of it.'

‘It then formed line to its left as far as the Charleroi road, and, after engaging the infantry in its front, its left flank was assailed by the French cavalry, whereupon it quickly retreated to the ditch which bounded the wood, and from thence poured in a most destructive fire on the cavalry which, together with a flanking fire from a square of Brunswickers, drove them from that part of the field. It and the 2d Brigade remained at night in possession of the Bois de Bossu.'-HT Siborne, Waterloo Letters, 241-242.

‘The spirited and determined nature of the advance of the British guards not admitting of that restraint which, considering the many intricate parts of the wood, was essential for the preservation of order, led to great confusion in the ranks by the time they reached the southern extremity, after having fairly driven out the French; and in this state they ventured to pursue the enemy on the open ground, but were quickly repulsed by his reserves; and the French artillery poured so destructive a fire into the portion of the wood, that Maitland deemed it advisable to withdraw the 2d battalion…to the rivulet, where it was immediately joined from the rear by the other battalion of his brigade.'

‘The time which would have been occupied in restoring the order and regularity that had been so completely lost during the progress of these battalions through the wood, was considered too precious for that purpose at such a moment, and the brigade was ordered to form line to its left, outside the wood, the men falling in promiscuously as fast as they emerged from cover, and extending the line into the plain between the wood and the Brussels road. Thus formed, the line advanced, through but for a short distance, which it opened and continued a brisk fire, under which the French infantry, in its immediate front, deployed with the utmost steadiness and gallantry. This advance had been followed by the Brunswick guard battalion, which was now maneuvering to form on the left of Maitland's brigade. The French cavalry, which had been watching for an opportunity to charge the brigade, now made a dash at its left flank. When the irregular formation of the latter, which has been already explained, is considered, it is evident that any attempt to form square at that moment would have involved the British guards in inextricable confusion, and have rendered them an easy prey to the French horsemen. Rapid as was the advance of the latter, its object was frustrated in a manner which testifies the extraordinary discipline of the men of that brigade. Mere discipline it was not; it was an instinctive momentary impulse, which seemed to animate the whole corps with the sole conviction, that the only step to be taken, the only chance left for safety, consisted in a general and instantaneous movement to the ditch which bounded the wood on their right. This was accomplished with complete success, and the French cavalry, which had advanced in full confidence of an easy triumph, were hurled back in confusion by a volley from the ditch, which the brigade had lined with a rapidity, a dexterity, and a precision, quite wonderful; while at the same moment, the Brunswick battalion threw itself into square, and received the cavalry with a degree of coolness, steadiness, and gallantry, which won for it the warmest admiration and ecomiums of the British who witnessed the maneuver. The flanking fire which was thus brought to bear so suddenly on the French cavalry by the Brunswickers, and the destructive front fire so deliberately poured in amongst them by the British guards from the ditch, fairly drove them out of this part of the field.'-William Siborne, History of the Waterloo Campaign, 100-101.

‘It was past 8 pm when one of Maitland's battalions broke out from the southern border of the Bossu Wood and advanced to storm Pierrepont. Woods, never very difficult to get into, are proverbially hard to get out of. As the Guards attempted to make ground to the southward they were pounded in their advance by Foy's divisional artillery, and Pire slipped his tireless lancers at them and pushed them back into the wood. Owing to the confusion and the fire of the French guns, it was not possible for the Guards to form square to resist the cavalry. Having regained the shelter of the wood, the Guards extended along its edge and beat off the horsemen with a heavy and destructive fire.'-AF Becke, Napoleon and Waterloo, 90-91.

‘Bachelu's division although no longer capable of a sustained attack, sent forward a cloud of skirmishers that descended on the 95th and Kielmansegge's Hanoverians around Thyle. They cut the Namur road but could not penetrate into Thyle itself. By the Bossu Wood a dangerous situation developed for the defenders as Jerome's brigades drove through nearly to Quatre Bras. But once again the red-coated columns came pouring up the Nivelles road. Cooke's 1st Guards Division had begun to arrive; at once it was plunged into the struggle. It checked the advance of Jerome's men, but the French fought with great determination. Slowly and at heavy cost the Guards gained the mastery.'-James Lawford, Napoleon: The Last Campaigns, 125

The conclusion drawn from the above on the stated action is that at least one of Maitland's two battalions from the 1st Foot Guards suffered heavy casualties, 'broke' and was routed by French artillery fire, and followed by Pire's lancers and driven into the Bossu Wood where they rallied. After reforming they drove off the French cavalry. They were fortunate that there was woods behind them to which they could run and then rally.

So none of the accounts that you initially suggested supports your assertion that:

one battalion was caught in the open by Pire's light cavalry at Quatre Bras and was routed suffering heavy casualties.

As far as I know, only Scott Bowden in "Armies at Waterloo" suggests that the heavy casualties were caused by being overrun by Pire's lancers.

Who do you think caught them in the open and running for the woods? That is most certainly in some of the above accounts.

William Siborne 'artfully' talks about it without mentioning Pire's cavalry at all.

And HT Siborne certainly mentions it…

Please define "caught in the open".

If you are suggesting that this means that the "heavy casualties" were inflicted due to the Guards being overtaken by the lancers and being speared, then your accounts don't support it.

The conclusion drawn from the above on the stated action is that at least one of Maitland's two battalions from the 1st Foot Guards suffered heavy casualties, 'broke' and was routed by French artillery fire, and followed by Pire's lancers and driven into the Bossu Wood where they rallied. After reforming they drove off the French cavalry. They were fortunate that there was woods behind them to which they could run and then rally.

Literally not a single one of the sources you have quoted suggests that the 1st Foot Guards was routed because of the French artillery fire. All the sources agree that the British advance was stopped by the artillery fire, then the guards ran into cover from the advancing cavalry and then routed the French by the combined fire of the British and the Brunswickers.

I honestly don't see the problem here.

I see the problem; it is an inability on Kevin's part either to accept or understand that even his own sources do not support his claims.

Whereas Kevin states:

"one battalion was caught in the open by Pire's light cavalry at Quatre Bras and was routed suffering heavy casualties."

Field, quoted by Kevin, states:

"Pire's troopers failed to catch them"

Whoops, so Field says that they were not caught at all.

W. Siborne, quoted by Kevin, says:

"made a dash at its left flank." and then "Rapid as was the advance of the latter, its object was frustrated in a manner which testifies the extraordinary discipline of the men of that brigade."

No catching them in the open there either.

HT Siborne, quoted by Kevin, clearly does not mention that the Guards were caught by the lancers.

As for the Guards being broken by French artillery immediately before being charged by the lancers, none of the sources mention that.

Kevin, you really are making yourself look very foolish by arguing that your sources say something that they do not.

'However, suffering casualties from the French fire and threatened by cavalry, in a scene reminiscent of early in the day the two guards battalions broke and dashed for the safety of the trees and the hollow way which ran along its edge.'

This was posted above from Andrew Field's book. Please notice the term 'broke' when referring to the Guards battalions.

And the following is from HT Siborne, as quoted above:

‘It then formed line to its left as far as the Charleroi road, and, after engaging the infantry in its front, its left flank was assailed by the French cavalry, whereupon it quickly retreated to the ditch which bounded the wood, and from thence poured in a most destructive fire on the cavalry which, together with a flanking fire from a square of Brunswickers, drove them from that part of the field. It and the 2d Brigade remained at night in possession of the Bois de Bossu.'

Again, either one or both of Maitland's battalions from the 1st Foot Guards broke and ran for the woods, suffered heavy casualties and were chased by Pire's cavalry to the woods.

So, I agree with you: 'I honestly don't see the problem here.'

Now, if you have material that disagrees with what I've posted, then please post it. As it is all you are doing is disagreeing without supporting your disagreement with anything.

Kevin,

You seem to be changing your argument from the lancers catching the guards to chasing them; are you actually admitting that you, and Bowden, got it wrong?

The words "retreated" and "broke and dashed for the safety of the trees" do not imply that either battalion routed or "broke" in the way that wargamers understand it. Neither does the fact that, on reaching cover, the Guards inflicted heavy casualties on the lancers and saw them off.

None of your sources state that the lancers inflicted heavy casualties on the guards.

Your own sources show that you are wrong; there is no need to provide any others.

You think Kevin's arguments on this occurrence is bad, you should see what he makes of the Genappe action!

Paul :)

Green Tiger: "Very few Peninsula veterans at Waterloo. Most had been sent to America, most British infantry units were second battalions."

Kempt's, Pack's, and Lambert's Brigades, and Adam's Light Infantry Brigade were first battalions (3/1st Royals was effectively a 'first' battalion) (excepting the 2/95th Rifles, who were a crack unit in their own right) and the average length of service in these battalions was several years with the colours. A typical Line battalion, the 28th, for example, had an average of 10 years service with the colours. To give another example, in the 42nd a high proportion of the men were awarded the Corunna clasp. While Halkett's Brigade was of second battalions they were mostly long service regulars (I recommend a very interesting history of the 30th by Carole Divall which explains the recruitment and replacement of the battalion, and notes the experience of the battalion at Waterloo).
Interestingly, it was the Guards who were among the least experienced of the British battalions – IIRC the Guards had received 800 men direct from the depot shortly before they went to Belgium.

Excellent posting-very well done.

Ouch, it was painful to watch someone trying to dig their way out of such a hole.

We all make mistakes, the only problem comes when you try and bluff your way out of it

Painful or wryly amusing?

perhaps you two, and others, might want to take a look at what actually happened.

Pire's cavalry (lancers and chasseurs a cheval) was definitely in the area from which Maitland's Guards battalions were broken up and driven back into Bossu Wood.

Interestingly, Paul Dawson, in his review of the new Quatre Bras volume by John Franklin, states that 'the Dragoons scattered elements of the British Guards [National Archives of Scotland, letter dated 19 June 1815, sent to Glasgow].' That is supposedly by a British eyewitness, though he makes the mistake of identifying Pire's units as 'dragoons.'

However, it should also be noted that the 1st Chasseurs a Cheval, part of Pire's division, wore helmets, not shakos in Belgium in 1815, and depending on what the reference actually states, the eyewitness may have stated 'light dragoons' which was the British equivalent of Chasseurs a Cheval.

If the Guards were "broken up" or "scattered" how did they manage to put in a most destructive fire?

and as I said before. The vast majority of the Guards casualties came about in the confused, hard fought fighting within the confines of the Bossu wood and the cannonading suffered as the Guards emerged from the wood. If the Guards were "scattered" or "broken up" they would not have been able to put up such a fire that sent the said French cavalry packing.

The Guards were not broken unless that is you believe Field "the two guards battalions broke and dashed for the safety of the trees" Houssaye "Pire's indefatigable lancers charged it, then drove it back in disorder and pursued it to the edge of the Gemioncourt brook;"

You notice that Field says two guards Battalions were broken in this incident, and Houssaye says "it"?

Paul :)

Accounts of the two Bns. of the 1st Ft. Grds @ QB seem to differ quite a bit. Here is one from "An Historical Sketch of the Campaign of 1815" by Cptn. Robert Batty of the 1st Grd.

" Tired as the men were, no time was to be lost; and Major-General Maitland's brigade, consisting of the 2d and 3d battalions of the 1st regiment of guards, immediately formed line, and, cheering, entered the wood. The 3d battalion, under Colonel Stuart, was on the right; the 2d, under Colonel Askew, on the left; and the gallant style in which they charged through the Bois de Bossu swept all before them, and in a few minutes the enemy was completely driven out of it: the intricacy of the wood,, however, broke the line of guards, and when they advanced from the opposite side of it their formation was very irregular; they found immediately in their front a well-formed line of French infantry, who instantly engaged them; the guards however pursued their success and were driving the French up the rising ground opposite, a destructive fire being kept up on both sides, when the enemy's cavalry, seeing the guards unsupported, and their irregular formation, suddenly formed on the heights, and made a rapid charge with a view of relieving their infantry ; but General Maitland, perceiving their intention, ordered the immediate retreat of the guards to the wood, as all attempts at forming squares would have been in vain. On gaining the wood, they immediately formed along its skirts, and opened a most destructive fire on the French cavalry, which now retreated in the greatest disorder, leaving many killed on the ground: again the guards sallied from the wood "

p. 50-51
link

According to Batty it took only a few minutes to push the French out of Bossu, they were then involved in a fire fight with French Infantry and them charged by cavalry while in an irregular formation.

So considering that the two Bns. of the 1st Grd each suffered about 25% casualties during that short time on the field who did it to them ?
I find it hard to believe that artillery fire while in Bossu would have done much. Maybe the fire fight, but it also doesn't seem to have lasted very long. A cavalry charge into the retreating unit seems to be a likely cause.

Cliff

And my account comes from Lord Seaton.

"….Quatre Bras, which we reached about 5 in the afternoon and were immediately hotley engaged in the Bois de Bossu and at nightfall we had succeeded in taking the wood from the enemy but not without very great loss."

Paul :)

'the Dragoons scattered elements of the British Guards [National Archives of Scotland, letter dated 19 June 1815, sent to Glasgow].'

So another eyewitness who doesn't say that Pire's units made contact or that the British routed before the French were definitely routed by the British and Brunswicker fire.

And that is an error as there were not French dragoon units on the field and Pire was on the field and heavily engaged.

And it should be noted that (again) the 1st French Chasseurs a Cheval wore helmets, not shakos, in Belgium in 1815 and along with their green uniforms, could undoubtedly be mistaken through the smoke and mess as 'dragoons.' There is also a chance (and we don't know because the quotation was not supplied) that the identification was 'light dragoons' which the French chasseurs a cheval were the corresponding light cavalry unit to British light dragoons.

be mistaken through the smoke and mess

Good to see a historian balancing the academic certainty of archive hounds with an awareness of the confusion, stress and adrenalin of combat, and its effects on memory!

In 21st century operational after action reports, the immediate post engagement testimony of the human operators and decision makers is so often contradicted by the electronic logs of the systems and weapons used, it now makes me doubt any battlefield witness…certainly enough to make me wonder if all this froth is justified!

Good to see a historian balancing the academic certainty of archive hounds with an awareness of the confusion, stress and adrenalin of combat, and its effects on memory!

It is certainly good when a historian keeps an open mind, shippers. As you post, perception clouds eyewitness accounts – leading to conflicting narratives. In the end, even after triangulating everything, we are often left with data that at best supports but a probable version of events.

So a dogmatic refusal to consider evidence that challenges a certain point of view is less than helpful