"If the Gordon Relief force had arrived in time... " Topic

I watched the old classic 'Khartoum' last night, and got to thinking: 'what if the desert column had arrived in time?'. My natural assumption has always been that they would have saved the day, rather like a camel-mounted version of the 7th Cavalry in the old western films.

But is this logical? The Desert Column was only about 1000-2000 strong with four field guns, and had taken a bit of a mauling at Abu Klea.

The rest of Wolseley's force (about 3000 men) came up the Nile on boats, and were expected to take longer.

Despite Gordon's claim that even just 200 British infantry would make the difference, was it perhaps a blessing in disguise that neither force arrived in time? Khartoum was stormed by an estimated 50,000 Mahdists… would a couple of thousand British troops really have made a difference? Or would we be talking about a second Isandlwana?

Sudan would now be a Methodist country.. what a thought!

Isandlwana was a one off – poor deployment, idiotic supply situation, incompetent generalship. Nothing to suggest the same problems in the relief force. With enough ammunition Gordon's assessment even was probably right (and should be taken in the context of his experience inter alia in China..)

Chokidar

Who knows, but I am not so sure… Gordon had 6000 men at his disposal already, and they were swamped pretty easily. Sure, they were not professional British troops, but all the same…

The Desert Column came within an Ace of being over-run at Abu Klea when they were facing just 5000 Dervishes, though obviously they were not defending fortifications there.

Though a Methodist Sudan would be something to behold and at least one would be able to enjoy a B&S sundowner – when I was there, the place was dry… the horror!

'In time' is meaningless in this context. The Mahdi could have launched his assault any time after the level of the Nile dropped and the results would have been the same. It was the advance of the Desert Column that triggered the final assault.

It's a good point GreenLeader, and certainly something worth pondering.
Gordon could easily also have been knowingly overstating his belief in the hope that if he had 200 British troops greater efforts would be made to supply and rescue them (although neither held true really for the Second Afghan War). I am just intrigued knowing the odds he and Ward faced against the Taipings that he seemed so sure – he does not strike one as being over optimistic by nature (he was after all not only Methodist but also an Engineer! and quite probably mad!)

Could possibly have ended up rather like the first relief of Lucknow, with simply more people bottled up, and a worsening supply situation.

Food for thought!

I think it unlikely that the Relief Force would have ever arrived "in time" since the Mahdi was aware that it was coming and changed his timetable accordingly. What could the small advance force on the steamers have done? Probably nothing since the perimeter to be defended was just too large. The massacre would still be fun to play (sort of…).

There was a hardcover book about 20 years ago that had the relief expeditions saving Gordon, then the second half of the book was about what happened afterwards. Can't remember the name of it for the life of me, but it was pretty interesting.

Streitax said it first and rightly: The Relief Column (actually only Wilson with 2 boatloads of a mixed force) could have come a week earlier, or a month earlier, and Khartoum would still have fallen just before its arrival.

The Mahdi was simply waiting as long as he could to let starvation and despair do its work on the garrison, and would have attacked--just as he did--as soon as it looked like there was any chance of reinforcements arriving.

Poor Gordon was pretty well doomed from the start, and only a failure of nerve by Mohammad Ahmed (which almost happened after Abu Klea) could have changed the outcome.

Regarding the benefit of those relatively few troops that Wilson might otherwise have delivered to Khartoum, I think some are fixated on their numbers as being the measure of their possible effect. On the contrary, Gordon's request of as few as 200 was predicated not on firepower but the moral effect on the Mahdi and his Ansar.

The British Redcoat was already a subject of awe and even superstition in the Sudan, whose fighting abilities were legendary and frightening to them by all stories and reports of them for years. And, the actual arrival of them in Khartoum would be the undeniable proof of Britain's commitment to opposing the Mahdi--and that many more were following.

Whether the psychological effects would have been enough to make the Mahdi retreat to Kordofan is obviously debatable, but not to be dismissed after his near meltdown after the news of Abu Klea.

This issue is well addressed and persuasively put to bed by Doug Johnson in his relevant article originally published in "Savage And Soldier" years ago, and reprinted in the latest edition of "The Mahdist Wars Source Book," available through Amazon.

TVAG

From what I've read, the attitude among commanders in the relief column was that they were there to get Gordon and other foreigners out, not to fight the Mahdi. The collapse of the Egyptian position in Sudan was accepted as fait accompli…

A curious "what if". Though if I ever get my figures for this period painted, I plan to ignore Gordon entirely and just have lots of curious engagements along the Green Nile off to the west, especially in those places where it is actually not too far from the Red Sea coast.

The Virtual Armchair General

I have always thought along pretty much the same lines as you in terms of the 'moral effect' of a few red coats… but this article (perhaps it is even the one you were refering to? but it doesn't really support the points you make) rather pooh-poohs that notion:

link

Doug Johnson wonders was it really the Sudanese (who had never faced them before 1884, so hardly could be expected to have some sort of long-held, legendary fear of them) who were in awe of red-coated troops, or was it the Victorian British themselves?

Dear Green Leader,

The reference to Gordon/Others belief in the likely moral effect of simply have "red coats" show up is stated in his own communiques and by comments in the literature generally.

However, where I may personally have miscommunicated would be if I gave the impression that Doug Johnson said that himself in his many articles for S&S and his new material appearing in the MWSB.

The case he definitely makes is the myth of the relief being "just too late."

However, it was not necessary for the Riverine Arabs or the Beja to have previously met the Brits in the field to already have a respect bordering on fear of them. The Sudan may be remote, but it was not on the far side of the moon. After all, there was no missing the fact that the former Egyptian Government/Army had been toppled in a single campaign the same year that the Mahdi began his career from Abba Island.

Indeed, it's worth considering that the timing of the Mahdi's revolt was not necessarily pure coincidence, either. When would have been a better time for attempting throw off the Egyptian yoke than when they have just been defeated at home?

Additionally, there could be no missing those same Brits (though not wearing "red coats" this time) making what looked like quick hash of Emperor Theodore in Abyssinia to the south just 16 years before. An event which the inhabitants of the Sudan saw as a case of one bunch of Christians stomping another--normally probably a "win-win" to their Muslim sensibilities--but proof of the ruthlessness of those same British to do in some of "their own."

And, all that said, it's probably not wrong to consider the Brits being rather "in awe" of themselves, too.

But then again, with their track record, what should anyone else have thought?

TVAG

A fair point!

The book referred to above by aegiscg47 is Gordon of Khartoum by Peter Johnston. Its a smallish HB book with the first half taken by with a standard bio of Gordon, but the second half is a 'what if' if the Desert Column had gotten through and managed to get Gordon out. I won't spoil the outcome, but as a piece of alternative history its not bad, as long as you accept one slightly outrageous happening.

Eclaireur – Exactly. Khartoum was doomed from the beginning. The only question is whether they could have gotten Gordon to leave. I think the only way he would go was if he was kidnapped – obviously against his will.

It's really impossible to say. one has to keep in mind that starvation was the main weapon on the Siege of Khatoum so the question really should be, if the relief column had made it to Khatoum, would they have been able to relieve the garrison (both manually and materially) long enough for Wolseley's force to get there?

It's all conjecture of course but an interesting question. I'm about to embark on Beyond the Reach of Empire: Wolseley's Failed Campaign to Save Gordon, Mike Snook which focuses on the question of why the campaign failed. Cannot wait to read it but I'm up to my eyeballs in miniatures and paint prior to Salute!

Darrell.

Just Add Water Blog:
link
Gewalthaufen (Late 15th /Early 16th Century) Blog:
gewalthaufen.blogspot.co.uk
La Journee (Early 15th Century Blog):
link
Shooting Leave (Late Victorian Blog):
allthebrave.blogspot.co.uk

Atheling: Snook's book is really excellent, well worth reading.

49Mountain: thank you for acknowledging my point! While it's absolutely true that Wolseley was a blow-hard who would like to have expanded the mission, from my reading of Snook and other sources on the campaign, it seems pretty clear that by the time they got near to Khartoum they were more realistic about their mission.
They'd seen the collapse of the Egyptian position, had some hard fights themselves and, more importantly, realised the logistic complexity of going further with even their own small army. Add to this that instructions from Cairo and London were pretty forthright by late on in the campaign that they were just going to get the foreigners out, and I think even Woleseley would have called it quits if he could have achieved that mission. And, indeed, I think there was discussion of dragging Gordon out if they had to.
It's also worth remembering that the careful deliberation shown by Kitchener in the later campaign resulted in large part from his understanding of the big logistic and operational challenges to be overcome, something he had learned on Woleseley's expedition.
EC

One of my most enjoyable wargames campaigns in more than 30 years of gaming was a slightly adapted version of the TSATF "fire and sword in the Sudan" campaign (still available online I think) covering the Khartoum relief expedition.

We also had rules for Gordon being hustled out of the city against his will by the relief expedition (with a chance, never reached, of him being accidentally shot in the scuffle).

Our campaign saw Khartoum relieved, but Wolseley was critically wounded and General Graham was the hero of the day. Fred Burnaby was accidentally machined-gunned by the Egyptians while leading a cavalry charge and Valentine Baker retrieved his reputation by staying well away from any railways! I think there's an account of our campaign floating around t'internet to this day.

Johnston's book is a good read, and Snook's is a 'must have' for anyone interested in the period, as are TVAG's source books that got me interested in the first place.

But Wilson DIDN'T arrive in time, and thus he and Gladstone are forever known as murdering incompetants or worse.

The Brits would have carried the day had they arrived. That's my 2 cents.

Of course the Virtual Armchair is one of the most respected Gordon scholars, IMO, so I give him great deference. (seriously)

But we woulda won! I know, I gamed it and I won! :)