"Berezina out-of-context & mis-translated" Topic

To return to questions of victory, I wonder if there is the possibility of at least some kind of objectivity? Maybe we could agree that there are two criteria we collectively have reached for:

1 – The fulfillment of one's objectives.

2 – The improvement of one's position compared to the position before the battle (i.e. one has improved one's situation by fighting).

Perhaps we can agree that for Borodino and the Berezina, each side achieved one of these criteria but not the other. Personally I think that the results of Borodino were rather less good for the French than Berezina was for the Russians and that there is explicitly an element of "coulda/woulda/shoulda" about the criticism of the Russians, but I can definitely see this could be argued both ways.

A good point, or couple of points.
In terms of objectives, if the Russians were seeking to destroy the French Army at the Berezina, they failed. If they were seeking to drive the French out of Russia, and cause them further casualties, they succeeded. If the Russians were seeking improve their situation, they succeeded.

Napoleon wanted a battle, he had the illusion that one good battle would bring the Russian Emperor to the negotiation table, and then that he would beg on his knees for peace.

The Russian Army, namley under the very capable Barclay de Tolly did not give him the chance and N was very frustrated about this. When Kutusov had to offer the battle he was jumping at it – fearing that the Russians would withdraw again.

The Battle was a victory for the Allied Grande Armée, the Russian Army suffered a huge amount of victories and was not able to fight another day.

But what delusion for Napoleon, no negotiations – nothing, his desired bonne bataille (in case the blood bath of Borodino – even for his army could be termed a good battle) decided nothing, his occupation of Moscow – due to his overlong stay (again dreaming that the Russians would ask for peace terms) finally cost him the distruction of his army.

N's whole scheeming and rating the Russian Army and the Russian Emperor were a failure from the first day of the campaign, as Caulaincourt predicted.

As to the Beresina, as I said, for a trapped army, it must have been a feeling of almost re – birth – to escape.

If the Russians would have annihilated the remnants of the Grande Armée and capturing N – the Napoleonic wars would not have ended in 1815 but already in 1812. They had the army to do so, they failed at this golden opportunity.

Borodino – a French and Allies victory with no consequences for the campaign

Beresina – a French and Allies victory with severe consequences for another 3 years of campaigning

Not such a bad post, vW.

I'd agree with much of it but you overstate the monolithic determination of the Russians against Napoleon.

he had the illusion that one good battle would bring the Russian Emperor to the negotiation table

I would challenge your use of the word "illusion" & the later "dillusion". Consider what happened to the cocky Prussian state in 1806 after two battles.

Even Alexander himself was of two minds as to what action to take at the beginning of the invasion. There were pro-French elements in the Russian military & government. And other Russians were alive to the concept of harnessing, rather than destroying, Napoleon's power. I would suggest you read: Rites of Peace : The Fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna by Adam Zamoysk

Certainly their attitude hardened after the burning of Moscow & the possibility of destroying the French arose.

But to deny a crushing, Austerlitz or Jena type defeat would not have brought them to the negotiating table is simplistic or naïve.

@ Chouan

What a ridiculous imbroglio this has been.

It is depressing to see that the level of immaturity, personal invective and pettiness hasn't improved

Instead of playing the victim, why don't we move on?

I have something to offer the forum as do you. Let's not necessarily agree but agree to keep it civil.

I'm extending an olive branch. Will you take it?

BTW I'd've rather have put this stuff in a PM but you're not a member. Apologies for subjecting the rest of you to this.

You can't seem to stop yourself. In the same post that you are "extending an olive branch" you're telling me that I'm "playing the victim".

Not that this will do any good, but why do you always attempt to pick a fight with someone?

I believe that Ochoin is sincere in his offer and you would be wise to accept it.

It would be much better for everyone if the conversation stays civil.

In terms of objectives, if the Russians were seeking to destroy the French Army at the Berezina, they failed. If they were seeking to drive the French out of Russia, and cause them further casualties, they succeeded. If the Russians were seeking improve their situation, they succeeded.

Seems that the French were already retreating out of Russia, so the Russian objective at the Berezina was an attempt to trap and destroy them, which they had an excellent chance to do it.

The failure of Kutusov to support his two fellow army commanders and the excellent performance of the French at the Berezina foiled that attempt.

As one Frenchman put it, if the roles were reversed the Russians would not have escaped.

As one Frenchman put it, if the roles were reversed the Russians would not have escaped.

Well, he would say that wouldn't he? But imaginary victories are the easiest to win. I'm struck by how often battles of total destruction don't happen, presumably because the defenders have such an incentive to win, whereas the attackers are going to win in the long run anyway.

The Berezina was a disaster for the Grande Armee, with the sole consolation that it could have been even worse.

First response to my post included "A little intellectual vigour tinged with some imagination will go a long way."
Second post was responded to with "I sometimes think we stick a label on something so we can avoid too much thought." My next post was responded to with another patronising comment "Have you retreated from your position that is "hard for a modern person to imagine…" etc?

My point, that I would of thought was crystal-clear, perhaps needs restating.

The human condition is universal. History is often a cycle.
The Past is not a foreign country. Without too much strain most of us can understand a "limited war"."
Then with "You wrote something foolish & now you're covering it with rudeness rather than respond to, or ignore, my explanation. "Snide": not intended. My earlier posts were not intended to be rude. This one is.

I just looked up your profile. Possibly, you were an officer and a … well, possibly an officer at any rate."
I'm then accused of "playing the victim"! A fight was started, but not by me. If Ochoin had been civil in the first place, or had even responded to what I wrote, rather than using my, fairly neutral, first post, as a pretext to show his intellectual superiority, the situation wouldn't exist. I might be inclined to be civil now. However, having produced his insults, and added insult to injury with his "offering the olive branch" post, I'm now advised to be civil?

Ending a sentence with a preposition is something up with which I will not put.

attributed to Winston Churchill

My vote is along the strategic line that the Russians wanted the Napoleonic War to end with the Russians with their army firmly established in central and western Europe AND having had a major role in defeating him.

Otherwise, Austria and England would get the benefits of the French collapse.

To accomplish this, the Russians needed to

[1] not destroy the cadre of their own veteran troops

[2] have 6-12 months to rebuild their army from the trained recruits now marching towards the army.

[3] have 6-12 months to stage supplies across the relatively barren Belaruss and Polish plains

[4] have time to position their army in central Europe for the restart of hostilities

[5] give time for the Prussian army to rebuild, the shaky German states to waiver and the Austrians to gain their courage and rebuild their army.

[6] keep the megalomaniac Napoleon in power, so that the allies would have to act united, rather than working out separate peaces that would strengthen them (future Russian rivals) at the expense of France, while doing nothing to strengthen Russia.

Notice that the French/allied invasion force was down to maybe ten thousand or less- what difference would a pitched battle have made? Killing French by fire or ice and starvation was all the same in the end.

Napoleon himself did not need the remaining French army to save himself- he could have flown at anytime with a picked escort. So capturing the French army did mean capturing Napoleon, (if one thinks that was the primary objective).

@1968billsfan

Your stated Russian war aims are plausible but I feel far too clinical to be truly possible.

The shock of invasion seems to have left the Russian political & military hierarchy grasping for solutions & I don't believe any foresaw the scale of the ultimate French disaster.

Later, in 1813, such a cogent plan is far more likely than in 1812.

I'm willing to be proved wrong, though. do you have any evidence such a scheme was being articulated in 1812?

"As one Frenchman put it, if the roles were reversed the Russians would not have escaped. "

I find such statements useless, how would we know? in 1805 there were already quite successfull Russian rear guard actions and in 1812 Napoleon couldn't catch them at all.

The Grande Armee at the Berezina, regardless of the heroics displayed by the men that were able to bear arms, was lost. Kutuzov knew that, and the numbers clearly show that. The 50,000 men that were on the east side of the Berezina, between the 26th and 29th of November, were reduced to 4,000, in less than two weeks, as they recrossed the Nieman. Those loss were sustained by privation and attrition much more than at the point of the sword, bayonet or lance.
Combat at the Berezina was somewhat pointless, from a Russian perspective. The Russians were essentially a broom sweeping their front yard.
Had Napoleon been captured at the Berezina, an enormous political vacuum would have been created – Russia didn't need that. Both the Prussians and Austrians were reluctant allies to the French in 1812, but release them from the choke hold of the French in 1813, and who knew where things might end. In November/December 1812, the Russians had strategically defeated the French, but they didn't want to eliminate the Napoleonic dynasty. The decision to take that course only came in the Autumn and Winter of 1813/1814.

As a preliminary note, a Russian "corps" was typically 2 infantry divisions, often with attached regular cavalry. They were substantially smaller, except in artillery, than the French conception of a "corps". This applies to the comparison of "divisions", "brigades"/"regiments" and even "battalions". Of course, while both French and Russian formations were depleted by November 1812, the French were quite more depleted. So, the original difference in the size of the formations was no longer to their advantage. Further, a large number of the French (50,000 to 75,000) had, since Krasnoï, ceased to be active combattants – the so-called stragglers. These stragglers were almost as numerous as still-combattant soldiers.

As the campaign year started, the admiral Chichagov's Danube army (about 2 re-inforced Russian corps) had its vanguard in Serbia, and the majority of its troops west of Bucharest. His center was thus west of Warsaw and almost as far south as Rome. He proposed to continue to (i) fully liberate friendly Serbia and push into French-held Illyria, with the goal of (ii) taking Venice with one corps – while, with his second coprs (i) liberating Greece and (ii) being lifted by the British to liberate south Italy, with a final goal of Rome. This plan was thought too risky, both logistically and because the Turks might re-form new armies to oppose the second legs of the plan.
The admiral then proposed, as an alternate, driving due north with the goal of (i) taking/liberating as much as possible of Hungary and Austrian Galicia , and (ii) continuing north via Cracow to Warsaw and, if possible, the Baltic coast. This plan was thought too risky also : if the Hungarians did not rise but instead loyally defended their place in the Austrian empire, they could block the second leg of the plan. And the Austrians might cling forever to their alliance with the French if the Hungarians did rise.

So …. the admiral Chichagov was ordered to give up most his gains, to make a concessionary peace with the Turks (giving up modern Romania and leaving the Serbian insurrection to the tender mercies of Turks), and to begin the long march back from Serbia and Romania deep into the Ukraine, to turn north, to pick up about 1 corps under the command the general Tormasov, to re-man and re-fit his army on the march, and then finally to move against the southern flank of the French main line of advance.
This huge movement was not much different in length than that made by the French during the campaign, was not all in completely friendly territory, and was made through areas even poorer and less developed than western Russia. The re-manning and re-fitting on the march worked rather better than anyone, even the Russians, could have expected.
Arriving at the Berezina, the admiral was successful in blocking the French army at Borisov, burning the bridges there. The admiral then thought the main effort of the French would be a re-newed attempt to cross along the same main road that had been their life line through the whole campaign. He detached a division-sized formation under the general Chaplitz to block at Studenka, but he did not think this was the likely to be the crossing point, and soon partly recalled Chaplitz.
This was his key mistake. The French did cross at Studenka, blocked the admiral from the network of minor roads leading west from there and made good an escape. This was the famous "battle" of the Berezina, that the French did "win".
And the admiral was casheried and exiled (to England) for his mistake.

The graf Vitgenshteyn had started the campaign with only a single re-inforced corps. He had sustained substantial losses in the months of fighting and had received only second-line troops and militia to re-build his force. At the Berezina, to which he had moved with all due speed, moving cross-country and arriving from the north-east, the graf Vitgenshteyn split his forces between the two enemy rear-guard divisions. He compelled the surrender of the division at Borisov. At Studenka, the graf Vitgenshteyn was in combat with the second rear-guard division. His success in this combat forced the burning of the improvised bridges, leaving the graf Vitgenshteyn the so-called stragglers.The graf Vitgenshteyn was then out-numbered by his prisoners several times over, and – after a long year's campaign – his corps was finally incapable of futher action to pursue the French.
This was *not* the famous battle of the Berezina. This was the nightmare, the horror, the holocaust, the catastrophe, the abbatoir, etc. about which the French witnesses so often wrote. And no reasonable person could fault the graf Vitgenshteyn for his conduct here – neither his eagerness to close with the French, his success in his combats with the French rear guard, nor the results he achieved in cutting off 60,000+ French from escaping – all with only a single reinforced corps under his command.

Which leaves the prince Kutuzov, and the main Russian army, which did not fight the French at the Berezina. Unlike the admiral Chichagov and the graf Vitgenshteyn – and for that matter the empror Aleksandr – the prince Kutuzov truely did not want to "trap", "cut-off" or "destroy" Napoléon at the Berezina.
We can impute several motives for this. We can think he feared Napoléon. We can think he considered a broader strategic question and thought the French would be needed as a continuing geo-political force in Europe. We can take him at his word – that his army was exhauted and his operations needed to pause to incorporate replacements and supplies just as they had after Borodino and the retreat past Moscow. And that he would then resume operations and take the French at Vilna, where their own exhaustion would force them to pause.
Or we can join the graf Tolstoy in thinking that the old campaigner had reached his own point of exhaustion. The prince Kutuzov was 67 years old – old still today for a Russian man – and had only 5 months left to live. He had saved his country in a campaign against the largest army ever assembled in Europe, led by greatest general in history. His work, and his life, was at and end. He could do no more, and no more could have been asked of him – or so it did seem to the graf Tolstoy.

So, we all have opinions. That is what makes discussion interesting.

- Sasha

In Leo Tolstoy's novel War and Peace, Mikhail Kutuzov, the commander of the Russian army, promises to build Napoleon and the French army a "golden bridge" out of Russia – that is, to allow the French to continue on their hasty retreat without attempting to do battle, which would only bring about needless destruction and loss of life.

<b.Russia Against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace
By Dominic Lieven

link

1968billsfan – "Why don't you knock it off with them negative waves? Why don't you dig how beautiful it is out here? Why don't you say something righteous and hopeful for a change?"

You see these pesky facts spoil the narrative of how wonderful a victory the French had at the Berezina…..

Tolstoy was a novelist and his 'view' of Napoleonic warfare is just a little odd.

I would suggest that anything he said should be taken with a large salt pill.

I didn't care too much for the novel War and Peace when I read it in college.

If Kutusov actually wanted to 'golden bridge' he certainly screwed the pooch on that one, as then he 'allowed' both Wittgenstein and Tshitshagov to fight a pitch battle and get badly whipped at the Berezina. Seems to me the evidence points just the other way.

Bills Fan,

Just a little clarification, the "golden bridge" comment was relative to the movement of the French on the road through Krasnoï to Orsha (15-17 November) – not the Berezina. And it was not so much a bridge out of Russia. Quoting from the same work as that to which you provided the link:

"Even had Kutuzov wished to catch up with Napoleon, there is no way that he could match the speed of the French retreat without wrecking his army. The old field-marshal was very happy with this situation. He regarded the 'battle' of Krasnyi as a triumph and as a vindication of his strategy. Wel over 20,000 prisoners and 200 gun had fallen into Russian hands, and a furthur 10,000 enemy troops had been killed, at a minimal cost in his own soldiers' lives …. his face shone with happiness."

Kevin,

You will recall, I am sure, that the prince Kutuzov not only did not command the admiral Chichagov, but indeed did not have too clear of an idea where he was. The last dispatch from the admiral that reached the prince Kutuzov was received on 19 November, and indicated that the Danube army was marching on Minsk [!], now well to the Russian rear. Kutuzov sent to re-direct the march on Borisov, on the Berezina, but did not know of the admiral's movement there until after the initial clashes at that town, which took place on 23 November.

And although the 1st Separate corps under the graf Vitgenshteyn was nominally part of the prince Kutuzov's command, in fact he had been communicatinng directly with the war ministry and court at Saint-Petersburg throughout the campaign. Again, communications between Kutuzov and Vitgenshteyn were limited and delayed, and – due to the road network – required relay as far back Vitebsk and thence Polotsk, the latter 250 km to the rear of the 1st Separate corps. So, I really don't see what you are thinking of when you imply the Kutuzov could either arrange, or prevent, the arrival of either the 1st Separate corps or the Danube army at the Berezina. For obvious reasons of command structure, distance, weather and geography, the movement of the various Russian forces was, in fact, essentially un-coordinated, except at the most "macro" level.
You know, they did not have radios back then.

Can you, by the way, describe why you think the graf Vitgenshteyn "g[o]t badly whipped at the Berezina"? With only the 1st Separate corps (now mostly composed of second line units and militia), he manage to capture Partonneaux's division as a whole, and rapidly fought throgh the rearguard division at Studenka, causing the bridges to be fired and permitting to the capture of serveral tens of thousands of enemy troops. That just does not look much like "whipped" to me. The graf Vitgenshteyn mmight be faulted for losing contact with the French II corps, but frankly the French high command had left the Bavarian VI corps to be destroyed (which it was) in order to allow the French coprs to disengage. But all this was weeks before. At the Berezina, the Russian 1st Separate corps was trying to catch up to the French, moving overland from the north east.
And you know, they did not have heavy lift helicopters back then.

Overall, Kevin, I find your comments simplistic, lacking in nuance, and would be very pleased to have your thoughts in greater detail.

- Sasha

P.S.
"I didn't care too much for the novel War and Peace when I read it in college."
Did you ever try the work as written (in Russian and some French)? Russians might say it is better that way. To put it another way, how do you think Shakespeare would be, if translated into Russian? Actually, Macbeth maybe works OK, but the other plays, and the poetry, …. not so much.

Быть иль не быть – таков вопрос; что лучше,
Что благородней для души: сносить ли
Удары стрел враждующей фортуны,
Или восстать противу моря бедствий
И их окончить. Умереть – уснуть –
Не боле, сном всегдашним прекратить
Все скорби сердца, тысячи мучений,
Наследье праха – вот конец, достойный
Желаний жарких ….

And so on.
:-)

Please remember what happened when Russia was allied with Austria and the Habsburgs went to war quickly without waiting for their Russian allies to organize and march the thousand miles from Moscow to Vienna. Please remember what happened when Russia was allied with Prussia in 1806. Once again the Russians were not in a position to support their ally, who was crushed long before the Russians were even able to get to Poland. The Russian ability to defeat France would have to come from a situation that allowed Russia to get its armies within support distance of its allies and close to France.

to Brechtel198

If Kutusov actually wanted to 'golden bridge' he certainly screwed the pooch on that one, as then he 'allowed' both Wittgenstein and Tshitshagov to fight a pitch battle and get badly whipped at the Berezina. Seems to me the evidence points just the other way.

I guess we have some new definition of victory.

The French lost 20-40 thousand and the Russians lost at most 15 thousand. (30 is bigger than 15)

In the following continued retreat, the French lost and additional 16 thousand.
(the losses in retreating from a battle are also a measure of success)

The French did not hold the ground after the battle, the Russians did.

…and I guess in 1940 the French won the battle of France because the Germans should have beaten them much worse than they did.

Can I have a couple of puffs on whatever you are smoking?

"get badly whipped at the Berezina. "

Napoleon escaped by the skin of his teeth, a great performance but far off whipping the Russians, the Allied Grande Armée got an awfull defeat in the 1812 campaign, a sort of apocalyptic disaster.

To brechtel 198:
in simple words; I think you make a mistake: the Russian were the ones mostly in green, not the French

Success for the French would have been to either

retaking Minsk, where the supplies for supporting their army had been lost to the Russians (2 million rations, 40 days grain & cattle, 30K shoes etc. from "Narrative of events during the invasion of Russia by Napoleon Bonaparte" by Sir Robert Thomas Wilson )

OR

keeping the crossing at Borisow, where his entire army could have easily cross the Berezina with dry feet and at their ease. Either of them t would have been a success.

Instead Napoleon had to squeeze a fraction of his army through a mouse hole. It wasn't fate but rather poor generalship that got Napoleon into a bad situation. But why give the Russians any credit for being able to march an army (that had just defeated the Turks) from Serbia (e.g. as far south as Rome) to cut off Napoleon's supplys, if you can instead praise the superman?

Can you, by the way, describe why you think the graf Vitgenshteyn "g[o]t badly whipped at the Berezina"? With only the 1st Separate corps (now mostly composed of second line units and militia), he manage to capture Partonneaux's division as a whole, and rapidly fought throgh the rearguard division at Studenka, causing the bridges to be fired and permitting to the capture of serveral tens of thousands of enemy troops. That just does not look much like "whipped" to me. The graf Vitgenshteyn mmight be faulted for losing contact with the French II corps, but frankly the French high command had left the Bavarian VI corps to be destroyed (which it was) in order to allow the French coprs to disengage. But all this was weeks before. At the Berezina, the Russian 1st Separate corps was trying to catch up to the French, moving overland from the north east.
And you know, they did not have heavy lift helicopters back then.

At the Berezina, Victor successfully defended the Studenka bridges over the river against the repeated attacks by Wittgenstein.

Victor's rear guard division, under Partouneaux, was surrounded and captured at or near Borisov, south of Victor's line on the Studenka ridge. Because of that loss, Napoleon sent another division over to fill the gap left in Victor's line. Victor was also supported by Guard artillery companies on the west bank of the river.

Boulart commanded part of the Guard artillery there and left an account of that action. Victor's line was penetrated more than once by the Russian attacks, but each penetration was driven off and sealed, and one of Victor's counterattacks was by his attached cavalry brigade which consisted of the Baden Hussars and the Hesse-Darmstadt Cheveaulegers.

The charge was successful, suffered heavy losses, and defeated Russian cuirassiers into the bargain, one of the few instances during the wars where light cavalry defeated heavy cavalry.

Wittgenstein never penetrated to the bridges over the river while fighting against Victor. Victor withdrew at the end of the action and then the bridges were set for demolition by Eble and Seruzier. Eble crossed to the east bank and attempted to get the stragglers, civilians, and fugitives to cross, but most of them refused and they were later taken by Cossacks, looted and abused-men, women, and children.

Eble delayed the demolition of the bridges between a half hour and an hour in order to give the stragglers and fugitives a chance. However, the bridges were burned by Eble and Seruzier and then Wittgenstein advanced to occupy the now-destroyed bridgehead which delayed his crossing.
Victor's defense was excellent and he was outnumbered between two and three-to-one. So, yes, Wittgenstein was defeated, hence my comment of ‘whipped.' If you don't agree, then please provide evidence to the contrary.

I took my information from the following source material:

-The Battle of the Berezina by Alexander Mikaberidze.
-The Campaign of 1812 in Russia by Carl von Clausewitz.
-Napoleon's Invasion of Russia in 1812 by Eugene Tarle.
-Narrative of Events During the Invasion of Russia by Napoleon Bonaparte by Sir Robert Wilson.
-Russia Against Napoleon by Dominic Lieven.
-Swords Around A Throne by John Elting
-A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars by Vincent Esposito and John Elting.

All of the above material, which includes two primary source accounts, all agree on the fighting on the east bank of the Berezina between Wittgenstein and Victor.

Therefore, your ‘assessment' of the action is wrong and presents a very inaccurate picture of the events and the fighting on the east bank of the Berezina during the French crossing and operations in the area.

You are also wrong in your statements regarding the Bavarian VI Corps. The French did not ‘abandon' Wrede, nor was the corps ‘destroyed' by the Russians.

Again, if you disagree, then please provide supporting documentation.

And although the 1st Separate corps under the graf Vitgenshteyn was nominally part of the prince Kutuzov's command, in fact he had been communicatinng directly with the war ministry and court at Saint-Petersburg throughout the campaign. Again, communications between Kutuzov and Vitgenshteyn were limited and delayed, and – due to the road network – required relay as far back Vitebsk and thence Polotsk, the latter 250 km to the rear of the 1st Separate corps. So, I really don't see what you are thinking of when you imply the Kutuzov could either arrange, or prevent, the arrival of either the 1st Separate corps or the Danube army at the Berezina. For obvious reasons of command structure, distance, weather and geography, the movement of the various Russian forces was, in fact, essentially un-coordinated, except at the most "macro" level. You know, they did not have radios back then.

It appears to me that all you are doing here is offering excuses for the Russian failure at the Berezina and without any supporting documentation.

You will recall, I am sure, that the prince Kutuzov not only did not command the admiral Chichagov, but indeed did not have too clear of an idea where he was. The last dispatch from the admiral that reached the prince Kutuzov was received on 19 November, and indicated that the Danube army was marching on Minsk [!], now well to the Russian rear. Kutuzov sent to re-direct the march on Borisov, on the Berezina, but did not know of the admiral's movement there until after the initial clashes at that town, which took place on 23 November.

The point is, Kutusov failed to support his colleagues at the Berezina and it was done deliberately, as was his blaming Tshitshagov after the action, which Yermelov disagreed with.

And that fact has already been clearly demonstrated to you.

Overall, Kevin, I find your comments simplistic, lacking in nuance, and would be very pleased to have your thoughts in greater detail.

I've always attempted to adhere to the KISS rule-Keep it Simple, Stupid.' That is in direct contrast to the old axiom ‘If you can't dazzle them with brilliance, then baffle them with BS.'

It appears to me that the second dictum is what is usually present in your postings. I could be completely wrong with that impression, but comments about radios and ‘heavy-lift' helicopters is nothing but condescension as well as obfuscation, intentional or otherwise.

Unfortunately, comments such as those do not add to the discussion at all.

As for the term ‘nuance' here is a workable definition:

Nuance:

1. a very small difference in color, tone, meaning, etc.
2. a subtle distinction or variation
3. a subtle quality : nicety.
4. sensibility to, awareness of, or ability to express delicate shadings (as of meaning, feeling, or value)

I have noticed an increasing use of the term ‘nuance' on the Napoleonic forums lately and it seems to be occurring with the same annoying frequency, ad nauseum, that the term ‘paradigm' did in grad school. I made it a point never to use ‘paradigm' in anything I had to write in grad school, and did pretty good. I'm treating the term ‘nuance' the same way.

P.S.
"I didn't care too much for the novel War and Peace when I read it in college."
Did you ever try the work as written (in Russian and some French)? Russians might say it is better that way. To put it another way, how do you think Shakespeare would be, if translated into Russian? Actually, Macbeth maybe works OK, but the other plays, and the poetry, …. not so much.

I am very thankful that my Russian instructors in both high school and college didn't require we read War and Peace in Russian. I really can't see it improving. It's still boring and presents a skewed perception of Napoleonic warfare. And, if I recall correctly, the anti-German comments were just a little much.

I can't see reading Shakespeare in Russian at all, but that's merely personal choice. When I read this comment the only thing that readily came to mind was Christopher Plummer's characters comment in ‘Star Trek: The Undiscovered Country (Star Trek VI)' about reading Shakespeare in ‘the original Klingon.'

I guess we have some new definition of victory. The French lost 20-40 thousand and the Russians lost at most 15 thousand. (30 is bigger than 15). In the following continued retreat, the French lost and additional 16 thousand. (the losses in retreating from a battle are also a measure of success) The French did not hold the ground after the battle, the Russians did.

I would suggest that you've missed what actually happened. The Russians were attempting to stop the French retreat from Russia. They attacked, they were defeated, and the French continued their retreat. Holding ground was not the French objective, not was it the Russian's. The French achieved their objective by defeating on the ground the two Russian armies attempting to stop them. The Russians failed.

Further, a significant portion of the French casualties were not combatants, but stragglers and fugitives-at least 10,000 and as many as 20,000. The numbers of casualties on both sides is not accurately known.

Success for the French would have been to either retaking Minsk, where the supplies for supporting their army had been lost to the Russians (2 million rations, 40 days grain & cattle, 30K shoes etc. from "Narrative of events during the invasion of Russia by Napoleon Bonaparte" by Sir Robert Thomas Wilson ) OR keeping the crossing at Borisow, where his entire army could have easily cross the Berezina with dry feet and at their ease. Either of them t would have been a success. Instead Napoleon had to squeeze a fraction of his army through a mouse hole. It wasn't fate but rather poor generalship that got Napoleon into a bad situation. But why give the Russians any credit for being able to march an army (that had just defeated the Turks) from Serbia (e.g. as far south as Rome) to cut off Napoleon's supplys, if you can instead praise the superman?

The ‘superman' comment is just plain silly. No one said anything about ‘fate' or anything of the kind, nor is anyone making someone into a ‘superman.' That's either a red herring or a strawman argument. In either case, it is a logical fallacy historically speaking.

The best comment I've found regarding the outcome at the Berezina was Clausewitz's. You might want to take a look at it. It's in his history of the campaign.

And the French were successful by any accurate meaning of the word. The Borisov bridge was lost before the main army arrived. Napoleon and Caulaincourt and others inspected the destroyed bridge there. Caulaincourt described the scene.

The Studenka ford was discovered by Corbineau, who commanded the II Corps cavalry. Oudinot ran a deception operation to disguise the fact that Eble was building two bridges at Studenka. The Russians were taken in by Oudinot's successful deception. By the time that Tshitshagov discovered the French intentions, the operation was already underway with a successful French bridgehead on the west bank of the river.

The French got their army across the Berezina, which was their object, and that denotes a successful operation and a Russian failure, which was compounded by Kutusov's failure to support his ‘colleagues.' In short, the Russians lost with two armies defeated in the field and the third refusing to participate in the action.

Please, who left Russia with 8 thousand scarecrows? The Victor of Berezina, of course. The French did not get their army across the Berezina. They got a fraction of it across and a tiny fraction back to safety.

I'll just say it again. The Russians wanted to keep Napoleon from retaking Minsk. The Russians did not want to die to the last Russian in order to destroy Napoleon and every last one of his soldiers who had invaded Russia in order to present the spoils of the war to Austria and England.

By the way, if you want to support your argument from Claudiwitz, then don't make snide BS comments ("If you were only as smart as me, you would know what….") but quote him directly to support your argument. It would be less arrogant and would contribute to the quality of these discussions rather than lowering the level of the discussion.

I've listed sources which you might find useful. The intention of the Russians was to stop the French from crossing the river-they failed.

I made no 'snide BS comments' and your 'interpretation is ridiculous as well as inaccurate, as is your conclusion.

Minsk was not Napoleon's objective, although the Russians were worried about losing it as that is where they were supplying their army.

Perhaps if you didn't assume an adversarial relationship and make incorrect assumptions of what my intent was in writing, the discussion wouldn't degenerate. In other words, please stop trying to pick a fight. I won't engage you in one.

There was no insult intended. I've quoted Clausewitz before and didn't see the necessity of doing it again. And it's a good book, something all of us would benefit from reading.

Let's look at a little example of "nuance" …..

Kevin wrote:
"Victor's line was penetrated more than once by the Russian attacks, but each penetration was driven off and sealed, and one of Victor's counterattacks was by his attached cavalry brigade which consisted of the Baden Hussars and the Hesse-Darmstadt Cheveaulegers. The charge was successful, suffered heavy losses, and defeated Russian cuirassiers into the bargain, one of the few instances during the wars where light cavalry defeated heavy cavalry."

First, let's review exactly which Russian cuirassiers we are talking about. The cuirassiers in 1st Separate Coprs were 4 weak depot squadrons ….

Combined Cuirassier regiment
…. formed from the depot squadrons of the 1st Cuirassier division
…. attached to the 1st Separate Corps from 5 Jul, then with 559 (all ranks)
…. commander colonel of the Life-Guard Horse regiment Aleksiy Adrianovich Protasov (1780-1833)
…. deputy commander colonel of the Chevalier Guards regiment Ivan Zakhar'evich Yershov (1777-1852)
…. regimental adjutant cornet (lieutenant 31 Oct.) of the Chevalier Guards regiment Grigoriy Aleksandrovich Okunev

1st guard division : guards colonel Protasov
- replacement squadron of the Chevalier Guards regiment : staff-captain Mikhail Nikolayevich Avdulin-2
- replacement squadron of the Life-Guard Horse regiment : captain Vladimir Karlovich Knorring-1

2nd army division : guards colonel Yershov
- replacement squadron of His Majesty's Life-Cuirassier regiment : major (lieutenant-colonel 18 Oct.) Timofey Savel'evich Karskiy
- replacement squadron of Her Majesty's Life-Cuirassier regiment : major (lieutenant-colonel 31 Oct.) Stepan Alekseyevich Semeka (Sameiko)
- (joined 3 Oct.) replacement squadron ** of the Astrakhanskiy Cuirassier regiment : lieutenant-colonel Fyodor Vasil'evich Gromov

** The Astrakhanskiy Cuirassier regiment was formed from drafts on existing cavalry regiments at the end of 1811. The "replacement" squadron was composed of those found unfit to serve from those initial drafts and volunteers (mostly troopers' under-age sons) from the regiment's depot and settlement area. Immediately or shortly after its arrival, this squadron was distributed as replacements for the two Life-Cuirassier regiments.

After linking with the cavlary reserve of the Main Russian army in January 1813, the men the Combined Cuirassier regiment were sent as replacements to their parent untis. The staff officers were all promoted and decorated, most being assigned to command brigades and regiments.

It was the guards colonel Yershov's division (only) that faced the brigade of Baden Hussars and Hessian Chevaux-Legers. The other divison was at Borisov. Yershov's division had previously actively fought in 5 minor engagements and the 2 battles of Polotsk. They numbered no more than 200 troopers, likely less, at the Berezina. They were described as only a "Züge [platoon] fiendlicher Kürassiere" by their opponets.

Their opposition :

badenische Husaren-Regiment
- commander colonel von Laroche-Starkenfels
- 4 squadrons, 399 all ranks as of 1 Sept.

hessische Garde-Chevaulegers-Regiment
- commander colonel von Dalwigk
- squadrons, 348 alll ranks as of 1 Sept.

Nafziger gives the brigade 350 troopers at the Berezina. Their own histories say 400 or more. They were relatively fresh, having done some rearguard duties, but seeing no pitched battles. They were expert, trained and experienced light horse. Actually, I wonder how they could lose upwards of half their numbers so quickly in the period from 1 September to the end of November. One supposes it was the usual : no food, no forage, low temperatures, sick men, dead horses, Cossacks, Bashkirs, Kalmyks and other assorted causes – none of them glorious.

What is generally acknoweldged is that the action of the German light horse at the Berezina was, by some definition, a devotional act worthy of awe and admiration. As with all the great French "victory" at the Berezina, the heros themselves did not actually survive their heroism : less than 50 all ranks of the two regiments survived the battle. Their action is often refrerred to as a "Death Ride", as in the title of this painting :

Their action was more complex than simply charging the Russian cuirassiers. From prior actions, a gap had devleoped in the center of the division acting as rear-gaurd at the Studenka bridge. To cover this gap, the German light horse was ordered forward. First they charged and cleared a depot battalion of the Russian 34th Jäger that were dispersed as skirmishers, halting the advance of the formed heavy infantry following behind. The German light horse was then counter-charged by the little band of Russian cuirassiers. Although the German commanders were wounded and almost captured, they continued a melée with the Russian heavy horse until charged by the depot battalion of the Pavlovskiy Grenadiers (yes, Russian heavy infantry *did* charge cavalry – rather often). Disengaging, and attempting to reform, the German light horsemen were blasted at close range by the guns of a Russian heavy artillery company that had been brought witht the Pavlovskiy's. The combined effects of these actions delayed the Russian advance toward the Studenka bridge just long enough for the gap in the French lines to be filled. Almost the entire German brigade lay dead or captured – a "Death Ride".

Nafziger descries the action well, if briefly, in English : link
His account is not substantively at variance with primary source accounts of the action that I have seen in German or Russian.

So, Kevin, how about telling us how we have "one of the few instances during the wars where light cavalry defeated heavy cavalry"? Can you substantiate this little bit of cheer-leading with primary source material in the original language?

Yours in firm nuance,
- Sasha

Guys, I linked the Clauswitz in my first post. We can all read the whole thing. Such as ….

Wittgenstein "could have" cut off the French before Borisov, if he moved due south at exactly the right moment. But he, thinking he had 100,000 men directly to his front (not 30,000 that he could have masked), continued to move south-west toward Borisov. To do otherwise seemed "unter diesen Umständen blind daraus zu gehen, schien der Sturz des Curtius in den Abgrund zu sein." Also, he thought, from by-then out-dated information, that the admiral Chichigov was moving on Zembin, not the Berezina at Borisov, and had only a vague idea of Kutuzov's dispositions. While missing oppportunities, von Clauswitz summarizes that Wittgenstein's action resulted in a "glänzenden Resultat" because of the huge haul of prisoners, including Partonneaux's entire fresh division.

He discusses the admiral's mistake in concentrating on Borisov. He discusses Kutuzov's not moving to support. He concludes that ….

"Selten kommen die Russen den Franzosen zuvor, so viel Gelegenheit sie auch dazu haben; und wenn sie ihnen zuvorgekommen sind, so lassen sie sie immer wieder durch; überall sind die Franzosen im Gesecht Sieger; jene erlauben ihnen das Unglaubliche zu voll. bringen; aber — ziehen wir am Ende die Summen, so hat die sranzösische Armee ausgehört zu sein, und mit Ausnahme der Gesangen schast Bonapartes und seines Generalstabes hat der Feldzug den vollständigsten Ersolg. Sollte nun der russischen Armee dabei gar kein Verdienst zukommen? Das wäre ein sehr unbilliges Urteil."
(OCR is a little off, but I *did* link the original.)

- Sasha

Being a equal-opportunity-for-"glory"-as-seen-in-anachronistic-and-romantic-paintings kind of guy, here we see the little Combined cuirassier regiment blowing through Corbineau's crack brigade to take or destroy 15 pieces pieces of Bavarian artillery at 1st Polotsk :

Actually, quite a celebrated feat of arms in Russian histories. Not a "Death Ride". And not part some foreign Emperor's invasion thousands of kilometers from the troopers' homes. But, instead part of defending the trooper's own country. Still, it has the general look and feel of "glory" that would have merited repeated trumpeting by Kevin if done in Napoléon's name.

- Sasha

"You are also wrong in your statements regarding the Bavarian VI Corps. The French did not ‘abandon' Wrede, nor was the corps ‘destroyed' by the Russians."

Kevin, out of all the VIe Corps, how many Bavarians escaped and mustered with VIe Corps after the Berezina?
How many Bavarian infantry flags were taken out of Russia?
How many Bavarian artillery pieces made it out of Russia?

Please do not give me the count of the VIe Corps at 1 January 1813 as reported in the 13th (1904) volume of Darstellungen aus der Bayerischen Kreigs- und Herresgeschichte. We all know that these are the depot scrapings that were never in Russia being brought up.

Since ever after the pull back from Polotsk, the Bavarians were put in front of the Russians to cover the French marching off, and got completely chewed up doing that, I would call it "abandoning". But maybe you will want to call it being given the glorious opportunity to sacrifice themselves for Napoléon? To participate in the great "victories" of French Empire?

Anyway, if you don't like to think of them as abandoned, it is OK with me. Either way, they were quite dead or captured. Essentially all of them.

- Sasha

The only person that has brought up the concept of 'glory' is you.

Why is that? Is it meant as a distractor, a red herring, or a strawman? Or is it merely intended as a pejorative.

You have erred in the following:

-The overall result at the Berezina.
-Kutusov's 'purpose' for not showing up at the action.
-Wittgenstein's defeat by Victor.
-The outcome for the Bavarians.

And you haven't proven any of the above from your point of view, but instead have attempted to obfuscate the actuality of the situation for whatever reason.

I've listed the source material that is readily available. And you have provided nothing of consequence to support your position. In short, you're wrong and refuse to admit it.

I would now suggest that the 'discussion' is over.

If you wish to continue, please by my guest, but unless you have substantive support for your ideas, it appears to me that you really don't understand the period or the battle at the Berezina at all.

lastly, your labeling of the thread is an accurate depiction of your point of view, because it accurately describes what you have done here.

Brechtel198 18 Apr 2015 12:34 p.m. PST

I've listed sources which you might find useful. The intention of the Russians was to stop the French from crossing the river-they failed.

I made no 'snide BS comments' and your 'interpretation is ridiculous as well as inaccurate, as is your conclusion.

Minsk was not Napoleon's objective, although the Russians were worried about losing it as that is where they were supplying their army.

Perhaps if you didn't assume an adversarial relationship and make incorrect assumptions of what my intent was in writing, the discussion wouldn't degenerate. In other words, please stop trying to pick a fight. I won't engage you in one.

There was no insult intended. I've quoted Clausewitz before and didn't see the necessity of doing it again. And it's a good book, something all of us would benefit from reading.

Ah….. you're not trying to pick a fight and refuse to engage in one,,,,,however,

"..your interpretation is ridiculous as well as inaccurate, as is your conclusion."

Gee, You say you are not doing exactly what you are doing… Get a grip on reality. Of course, you just need to get in the last insult and wish to call it quits then, with you ahead. You are right in one thing, I will ignore any of your posts in the future.

Oh by the way, the Russians were drawing very needed and useful supplies from Minsk. French supplies they were.