In Bloem's second action, he describes how the group became the unit of manoeuvre when the squad was unable to get forward. In this account, the squad is called a section. The smaller Gruppe is referred to as group.
''Forward!' I shouted, taking my place with three of my staff ten paces in front of the section leader, Holder-Egger, and the section in well-extended formation ten paces behind him again."
This is the point in Bloem's account where his company is heading out across
an open meadow. The unit had to cross 1500 yds of open ground.
"Here we were advancing as if on a parade ground…."
Bloem does not give more detail of what this means, although Bloem was with a section that was advancing and there is a further description later in this account that gives a strong indication.
After a brief altercation with an officer patrol of the British 19th Hussars (in the scattered buildings on the left), Bloem ordered the advance to be resumed.
"As we left the buildings and were extending out again, another shower of bullets came across the meadow and rattled against the walls and all about us. More cries, more men fell. In front a farm track on a slightly raised embankment crossed our direction.
'Line the bank in front,' I ordered, and in a few short rushes we were there, lying flat against the grass bank and looking cautiously over the top. Where was the enemy? I searched through my glasses. Yes, there among the buildings away at the far end of the meadow was a faint haze of smoke. Then… let us get closer.
'Forward again at the double!' We crossed the track, jumped the broad ditch full of stagnant water on the far side, and then on across the squelching meadow. Tack, tack, tack… cries more lads falling.
'Down! Open fire far end of the meadow range 1000 yards!'"
At this point, Bloem's small unit had come under fire again, which caused him to order them to ground.
"And so we went on, gradually working forwards by rushes of a hundred, later fifty and then about thirty yards towards the invisible enemy…
Bloem talks about how difficult the advance was, including the "broad water-logged drains and barbed wire fences that had to be cut through."
The next quote is extremely interesting, IMHO. As Bloem is crossing the meadow in short rushes, he notes:
"Where was the rest of the battalion? Nothing to be seen of them. Yes, there …a hundred yards to our left a section [of Grenadiers] was working forwards like us by short rushes. …its leader, in front at every rush, taking giant strides… Now they were down again, this time along another broad water-drain with a barbed wire fence along the enemy's side of it. And what was [the NCO] doing? Sure enough, he was running along the whole front of his section cutting the wire fence himself, in the middle of a burst of rifle and machine-gun fire.
I looked again all round. The enemy was still invisible. [The NCO] was off again with his section, another long rush. He was now level with us, if anything slightly ahead.
'Lads!' I called out, 'Did you see that? A Company is getting ahead of us. Can we allow it?
'No 1 Section rush!' And so another thirty yards nearer the enemy, and about twelve in front of Graeser's section."
At this point, Graeser brought his section over to join up with Bloem, who picks up the account:
"I shouted down the line: 'Advance by groups from the right, in short rushes.' And then I heard Holder-Egger's voice as he led on forward.
From our new line I again searched the front through my glasses. Still no sign of the enemy. To the right and left, a cry there: 'I'm hit, sir!' …Behind us the whole meadow was dotted with little gray heaps. The hundred and sixty men that left the wood with me had shrunk to less than a hundred. But Grabert's section at my signal had now worked forward and prolonged our line.'
At this point, about 500 yds from the canal bank (ie 2/3 of the way across the meadow), Bloem and his men hugged the ground. The officers shared some champagne before attempting to resume the advance. Bloem noted that the British enfilade MG fire (the East Surrey's MG section) from the right had died down.
"Looking down the line I shouted; "Advance by short rushes from the right!" and the order was passed along.
From now on the English fire gradually weakened, almost ceased. No hail of bullets greeted each rush forward, and we were able to get within 150 yds of the canal bank. I said to Graeser: 'Now we'll do one more 30-yard rush, all together, then fix bayonets and charge the houses and the canal banks.'"
Bloem had mistaken the fall off in English fire for the equivalent of the effect of German rifle fire superiority. He was very wrong.
"The enemy must have been waiting for this moment to get us all together at close range, for immediately the line rose it was as if the hounds of hell had been loosed at us, yelling, barking, hammering, as the mass of lead swept in among us.
'Down!' I shouted… Voluntarily and in many cases involuntarily, we all collapsed flat on the grass as if swept by a scythe.'
Now Bloem's unit came under heavy fire "from the strip of wood that jutted out into the meadow to our right rear". Bloem assumed this was friendly fire but signalling with the red communication flag and frantic whistle blowing by the NCOs did not diminish the fire. In fact it was coming from the MG section and part of C Company, East Surrey Regiment, BEF. Bloem and the remnants of his unit were pinned until nightfall, suffering further casualties during that time.
Robert