"Could the South Have Won the War?" Topic

By March 1865, it was obvious to all but the most die-hard Confederates that the South was going to lose the war. Whether that loss was inevitable is an unanswerable question, but considering various "what if" scenarios has long been a popular exercise among historians, novelists and Civil War buffs.

To explore that question, historians often use a concept known as contingency: During the war, one action led to a particular outcome, but if a different action had been taken it would have led to a different outcome. The problem with each scenario, though, is that although superficially persuasive, it collapses under the weight of contradictory facts.

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In a George Washington or Ho Chi Minh sense, yes. Make the Union unwilling to continue.
The Union armies always managed to gain impressive and obvious victories at crucial politically important times.

Goofing up the Trent Affair was the single best opportunity the Union had to lose the ACW. Absent that, it was unlikely as the Union advantages in industry, rail lines and population were overwhelming if brought to bear even semi-effectively.

Neighbor John Wilkes (Howard C. Hickman) hosts a barbecue party at his Twelve Oaks plantation. Scarlett pines for Wilkes' son, Ashley (Leslie Howard), a lanky, soft-spoken young man of refined bearing, though he doesn't reciprocate her feelings. Scarlett continues to flirt with other boys despite her willful obsession for Ashley. All the young women go inside for an afternoon nap while the men meet in the parlor for cigars and brandy. Most of them boast of how the South will surely win the war but one gentleman, Rhett Butler (Clark Gable), a visitor from Charleston, South Carolina, disagrees. He states that the South cannot win a protracted war purely through the exhibition of pride and notes how the North is better equipped and industrially superior, able to produce weapons of war quickly. Charles Hamilton (Rand Brooks) is offended by Rhett's opinion and openly tells him so, even going so far as to suggest a duel. Rhett, knowing full well that he's a much better shot than Charles and that this argument is not worth his life, leaves. Charles brands Rhett a coward but Ashley assures him that Rhett would have killed him in the duel.

About a year ago I bought Steven Newton's Lost for the Cause: The Confederate Army in 1864. It definitely was the best read of this last year. Newton not only provides a complete order of battle for the Confederate army for April 1864, but also examines a number of issues dealing with the last year of the war.

His first chapter is an extension of the order of battle he has constructed. He concludes that the Confederacy was able to mobilize an additional 75,000 men in the course of the winter of 1863-64. In a comparison of the ratio of Confederate troops to Union strength it is demonstrated that the ratio did not fall from the mid-1863 levels until the latter half of 1864. Building on this, Newton concludes that to say the South was inevitably overwhelmed by the greater numbers and/or economic might of the North is untenable. The South lost not by a lack of troops but by the mismanagement of the forces it raised.

Comparing troop strength ratios and losses in eastern Virginia the Army of Northern Virginia never fell below 57% of the Army of the Potomac.

Date US PFD CS PFD

30/6/64 110,262 63,234 (57%)
31/8/64 60,167 50,029 (83%)
31/10/64 90,043 51,729 (57%)
30/11/64 111,919 71,514 (64%)

From this Newton claims, with good reason, that Lee successfully held Grant to a stalemate in front of Petersburg. The idea that the fighting in first the Overland Campaign and then the Petersburg Campaign successfully attrited down the Army of Northern Virginia cannot be sustained.

In the Valley Early was also initially successful in tying down a much larger Union force. By the time the last major battle was fought at Cedar Creek in early October Union forces in the Shenandoah were 35,610 strong whereas Confederates had only 14,000 men. This strength ratio of 40% was considerably lower than the strength ratio Lee enjoyed because of the heavy detachment of Federal forces to the Shenandoah. Here Newton observes that why "Lee failed to make use of Grant's diversion of force … is a question of strategic and operations decisions rather than one of resources."

It was in Georgia that the war was lost for the South. Looking at the ratios of infantry strength one can see a steady decline in Confederate strength.

Date US PFD CS PFD

31/5/64 94,310 54,263 (57%)
31/8/64 88,086 48,081 (54%)
31/10/64 75.659 38,263 (51%)
30/11/64 67,674 34,818 (51%)

Newton looks further into losses in the Atlanta Campaign and observes that under Johnson the Rebels maintained a favourable ratio of losses compared to the Union army. Where the Confederates fell short was their comparative inability to successfully return convalescents from their hospitals back to the front line. At the point Johnston was relieved from duty the Confederates had lost 7,700 fewer battlefield casualties than the Federals, but the Army of Tennessee had lost a much larger ratio of strength once losses from disease is factored in.

The battles subsequently fought under Hood resulted in the Rebels losing 2000 more men than the Federals. Had Hood prevailed in his attacks the cost would have been worth it, but as it was his operations severely cost the Army of Tennessee. And as Newton points out, it was the heavy losses sustained by the Army of Tennessee that crippled the Confederate war effort.

But was the Confederate loss of the war inevitable? On 23 August 1864 Lincoln wrote in a memo "it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected…." At this time Grant was stalled in the trenches in front of Petersburg. In the Valley, Sheridan was mustering his forces at Harpers Ferry, but Early still was holding him at bay. In Georgia, although Hood had been unable to defeat Sherman in battle, the Army of Tennessee still held Atlanta in a siege that looked to end up as another Petersburg stalemate. If, as Lincoln saw it, the upcoming November election would reflect northern opinion on the course of the war, the war was still not a clear Northern victory.

Events proved Lincoln's fears to be unfounded, the fall of Atlanta and the defeat of Early gave Lincoln the support he needed to continue the war to the end. But how close was the outcome and was it only a matter of greater resources on the side of the Union?

Early lost both the Third Battle of Winchester and the Battle of Fisher's Hill. His defeat at Cedar Creek, however, came only when Sheridan successfully rallied his defeated army and launched a counter-attack. Had Early been a bit more fortunate he might have been able to keep victory within his grasp. Indeed, if "for the want of a nail" Sheridan's horse had stumbled and fell on his 12 mile ride to Cedar Creek….

A re-examination of Hood's first two battles in front of Atlanta also shows how events could have changed. In the Battle of Peach Tree Creek had Hood been able to attack one day sooner the Army of the Cumberland would have been caught astride Peach Tree Creek and far less prepared to defend itself. In the actual battle, timing again proved to be critical as the attack was delayed for two hours. It should be noted, however, much of this delay was due to poor co-ordination between the Confederate forces, and command and control issues had long been a problem in the Army of Tennessee.

Similar problems occurred in Hood's second attack, the Battle of Atlanta. Piecemeal Confederate attacks, the miss-deployment of Hardee's Corps, and the lucky deployment of a Union division covering the rear of the Army of the Tennessee resulted in a second Confederate defeat.

But all three of these events could not be necessarily attributed to the superior resources of the North. Instead it was better generalship and the roll-of-the-dice in battle that gave the Union its victories.

Therefore it could be argued that if the South had been successful in its defense of Atlanta and the Valley Lincoln may have lost the election and the Republican the loss of the Senate and/or the House. Although Lincoln may well have pressed the war as a lame-duck President the South would not have been a much stronger position in the fall of 1864 in comparison to what actually happened. Remember, no fall of Atlanta means no March to the Sea or disastrous battle in front of Nashville.

As an aside, it is interesting to take note of several recent revisionist examinations of the struggle for Atlanta. Stephan Davis was one of the first to attempt to defend Hood and point out how close to success his sorties from Atlanta were. In 2013 Stephan Hood's John Bell Hood: The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of a Confederate General was published. Although written by a descendent of Hood, the book argues that Hood is very much misrepresented in history. While the book has its faults, more importantly the author has uncovered Hood's collection of papers which were previously thought to be lost. The impending publication of these papers should be of considerable interest to historians of the western theatre.

The historiography of the Confederate loss of the war is changing. Newton's study clearly illustrates that some of the old conclusions cannot be sustained. He has shifted the focus away from the argument that the Union's resources made its victory inevitable and refocused back on the importance of strategic and operational decisions. Although he only marginally addresses the format of these decisions, he does point out that the Federals were often more successful in the development of managerial structures in their prosecution of the war.

"Win" the war and totally lost their "souls"?

Yes AND yes!

I don't think Newton's study illustrates any such thing.

Cotton was the basis of the Southern Economy. The economy was necessary for winning the war. It is tough to say that if Atlanta didn't fall the South might have won because, of course, Atlanta did fall and it was almost inevitable that it would.

The blockade was the big thing that won the war anyway. Look at Southern cotton production just before and during the war year:

1861: 4.5 million bales
1862: 1.5 million
1863: 500,000
1864: 300,000

They were producing 7% of the cotton towards the end of the war than they were producing at the beginning.

And not all of it was getting out of the country.

The Union was probably getting more revenue from cotton in 1864 than the South was.

Almost all of their strategy, both financially and diplomatically was based on cotton from well before the war started. It was a complete miscalculation.

I think the fact that the South did so well in so many of the campaigns and still lost the war is almost proof that they never could win it.

I find it fascinating that there is so much heated "what if" discussion about all the tenuous ways that the South could have somehow pulled out a Phyric victory after having been bled dry and economically ruined, and yet it is never balanced with a discussion of how the North lost so many opportunities to crush the South in battle and hopefully convince her to sue for an early peace. How much better off would the country have been if Lee had lost his outrageous gamble and the ANV had been destroyed at Antietam, for instance?

Cheers,

Christopher

I think it was probably a good thing that the North didn't win an early victory. The fact that the South was so utterly smashed probably prevented any further attempts at secession. A quick capitulation would have left 95% of the South untouched by the war and a lot of people willing to try again later. The way it happened settled the question for all time.

I always wonder how much of a 180° Washington would have made if Lincoln lost the election. The Copperheads were very loud, but how much they would have forced the Union to make a settlement favourable to the Confederacy remains to be seen.

Oh Lord, not this again!

The South could have won the Civil war only if in 1776 they had freed their slaves and ended slavery OR in 1817 prevented the Erie Canal from being built.

Oh Lord, not this again!

this question shall rise again

Yes, but their last chance was the 1864 election.

> I think the fact that the South did so well in so many of the campaigns and still lost the war is almost proof that they never could win it.

Just want to ditto that. Asking for any more breaks to go the South's way would just about require an asteroid destroying Washington DC on Lincoln's first Inaugural day.

The quote from Newton doesn't tell the most important story for the ANV.

Basic manpower was not the issue, the constantly growing problem was the loss of experienced officers at every level and the decreasing quality of those who replaced them.

Before they even got to Petersburg, A.P. Hill had replaced all of his Brigade commanders at least once and the losses in Regimental offices was even worse.

Don't forget we are not just talking about those killed here but also those forced out of the service through wounds, as well as those taking months to recover.

Could the South have won the war? Well, the North could certainly have lost it – probably either in 1862 or as noted above in 1864

I find it interesting that at this late date, people still concentrate on Lee and the eastern campaigns, as opposed to the west. The Union was winning in the west almost from the beginning. In the face of that, how relevant was Lee in the long run?

No.

Again, YES. And Frederick is correct, it would indeed have been a case of the US losing, as much as the Confederacy winning.

The war was primarily political, and military events mattered to the extent they affected political factors such as public opinion and ultimately national will. That is why Lee's successes mattered. Fredericksburg etc MATTERED politically because those victories affected perception.

Imagine a Jefferson David clone as US president -- experienced militarily but prickly and too sure of himself -- and a Lincoln clone as Confederate president -- willing to arrest and imprison political opponents, but also managing a "team of rivals" and keeping powerful governors reasonably happy. Hard to predict what difference it might have made -- but certainly might have changed the outcome.

"The Union was winning in the west almost from the beginning. In the face of that, how relevant was Lee in the long run?"

I agree with this for the most part. The East was more of a side show in some ways. Obviously the North dominated on the Mississippi and that is where the war was won.

However, the South did have the dream that if they won a battle in the North they would get recognition and money from the UK and possibly France.

So Lee is relevant that, despite all of his success, he still wasn't able to pull that off.

The west is the boondocks, fewer newspaper reporters, especially foreign ones. The eyes of the world and the eyes of the nation were on the eastern theater. It's political, not military, that wins or loses wars. Witness the US in Vietnam. Battles and campaigns matter to the extent that they affect the political. Lee kept the Confederacy confident, or from despair, long beyond what a lesser mortal might have been able to do.

If that Wilkes Booths chap had of got a chance earlier?
What I do know the south's boys now fight the north's wars in foreign countries.
Cheers and always OS has the 'correct" answers :) me I'm just a hack : sentimentalist for the cause :) I wish I was in the land of cotton old times there are not forgotten look away, look away, look away

I think it was probably a good thing that the North didn't win an early victory.

I agree. And an early, relatively bloodless return to the union would not necessarily have eliminated slavery. That particular crime needed washing out with blood all around.

What I do know the south's boys now fight the north's wars in foreign countries.

Pretty much. Or at least disproportionately so.

"Lee kept the Confederacy confident, or from despair, long beyond what a lesser mortal might have been able to do."

All the way up until Sherman marched into his backyard in North Carolina. All the reports and attention in Virginia don't mean anything if, in the end, you lose the war in the West and the enemy shows up behind you to win the war.

I think it was a good thing for the North that all eyes (and the majority of the Confederacy's resources) were on Virginia. It let Virginia be the anvil while the Union armies in the west became the hammer that crushed the Confederacy between them.

"I think that the North fought that war with one hand behind its back. At the same time the war was going on, the Homestead act was being passed, all these marvelous inventions were going on… If there had been more Southern victories, and a lot more, the North simply would have brought that other hand out from behind its back. I don't think the South ever had a chance to win that War. "

Shelby Foote

I understand the sentiment behind Foote's quote, but just where were those additional conscripts going to come from in the North, that hadn't already filled the ranks by 1864? Were the wealthy going to suddenly begin giving up their sons? Would roving gangs of provost troops begin grabbing farmers out of their fields? I think the well was getting pretty dry by the fall of 1864 for the North as well.

If the union didn't have Lincoln they probably would have won quicker. His strategic bumbling in 1862 cost them a year or two.

That the ANV was able to maintain 50% or 60% parity for a while was meaningless. They had no reserve were constantly defending a ever smaller shrinking area and facing smear total blockade unable to hold coastal areas and rivers. In a war of attrition they were doomed and they didn't have the resources to force the issue any other way. Rail track miles alone was more important than bodies in the ANV. The south didn't have the trackage to move war materials the way the north did.

The real question is what took the north so long

There was always going to be a disproportionate importance to the East because of Washington, Richmond and the greater proximity to Europe.

The West's strategic importance may have meant something to those involved in the war but a chance that Washington or Richmond was in danger meant a lot more to the rest of the World than Vicksburg or Chattanooga.

If the union didn't have Lincoln they probably would have won quicker. His strategic bumbling in 1862 cost them a year or two.

Gosh and there was me thinking it was Pope, McClellan and Burnside!

Oh Lord, not this again!

Sorry Otto…I just checked TMP…there's no rule that says that "A subject shall only be brought up or discussed once"…

There's also no rule that says that "All subjects have to pass through the approval of Otto…."

Free speech and all that ya know…

"Gosh and there was me thinking it was Pope, McClellan and Burnside!"

Who hired Pope, McClellan and Burnside? And moved 55,000 troops to chase Jackson around the valley? Banks? Fremont? Hooker?

And who would have been held responsible if the troops everyone thought Jackson had, turned up outside Washington one morning?

Yes, Lincoln hired those washouts but can you name someone, based on their track record at the start of 1862, who would presented a better option and have had the rest of a uncooperative cabal of Union Generals actually serve under them?

My OP above originally stemmed from two discussions we had at one of our games- was Confederate defeat inevitable due to Northern numbers and was Gettysburg, or another battle, decisive in winning the war for the Union.

One of Newton's points was that the South was in fact quite successful in balancing the North's strength in numbers. An extraordinary degree of mobilization in 1864 allowed the ANV to maintain its strength enough to create a stalemate between it and the AoP. This also allowed Lee to detach troops to the Valley which, until October 1864, created a stalemate on this front as well. Only in Georgia did the South fail to prevent Northern numbers from becoming increasingly disparate.

Newton therefore argues that it was not Federal numbers that were decisive but instead it was Confederate management of the war that was lacking. Lee was able to create a stalemate in Virginia, even when faced with a General as talented as Grant. The Confederate war effort in the West, saddled with a series of less-than- stellar commanders, went less well.

And a stalemate in late 1864 was the best the South could hope for. In August of '64 Lincoln expected to lose the election because of a summer of huge losses without any commensurate victories. The fall of Atlanta, and then the Union destruction of Early's army in the Valley changed all that.

The second discussion grew out of the often repeated assertion that Gettysburg was the decisive battle of the ACW. Here too Newton came into play with his account of how the ANV was successfully rebuilt after the battle. Again effective Southern manpower mobilization mitigated the effects of the loss of this battle.

The question then arose if there was any ACW battle which could be termed "decisive". Lincoln's fear of losing the 1864 election clearly indicates that the Northern war effort desperately needed a Union victory between August and early November 1864. And the capture of Atlanta and the battle of Cedar Creek provided Lincoln exactly what he needed.

But if Sherman had taken losses at either Peach Tree Creek or Atlanta to the degree that he was forced to either fall back or even prolong the siege of Atlanta it is possible that the Republican administration would not have been re-elected. A Union defeat in the Valley and Price rampaging through Missouri through September and October would also not have helped the situation.

From this one could argue that if any battle was "decisive" it was these two engagements in front of Atlanta. Significantly both of these battles were at least partly lost because of the dismal quality of the Army of Tennessee's command structure. Could the AoT have won either of these battles? It's not likely, and it thankfully did not happen, but these two battles were arguably two that the South had to win. The failure the stop Sherman and the heavy losses the South incurred in the attempt made Sherman's victory here inevitable a month and a half later.

Yes.

Only if the North had been willing to lose it.

Mollinary

No.

I think the Union could have lost it just as I think the Allies could have lost WWII. They had the odds but that wasn't a guarantee.

From the start, in order for the South to win, the North needed to lose the war. It was not a war for the South to win at all, they simply did not have the resources, manpower, or strategic space to make for a possible "win".

Instead, the north had to lose the war through a constant drain on their will to fight. This required, of course, military victories by the South, but more importantly, imo, military failures on the part of the North. No one likes to have their side lose in a conflict and a series of defeats is demoralizing and extremely draining both mentally and emotionally. We, all of us, are probably all familiar with this, already.

I have not yet read Newton (which I will soon rectify), but from your explication of his thesis, I am not convinced that Lee was thwarting Grant from mid-1864, but rather Grant was draining steam from the ANV, allowing events in the West to force the issue.

Grant's position limited Lee's options and unlike the generals preceding him, Grant did not pull up stakes and go home after a reverse; the disaster at Cold Harbor, and the subsequent events lends credence to this, imo.

Yes, Petersburg was a severe check for the Union, but only in so far as the great losses of men due to Union errors (the Crater). Otherwise, it successfully pinned Lee and strategic consumption took care of what actual combat didn't.

I don't see Lee's ANV posing that much of an offensive threat against Grant's troops. You point out that Newton hails the rebuilding of the ANV post-Gettysburg, but my question is to what purpose? All it meant was further delay, but slow suffocation is rarely preferable to an instant death.

Of course, Lincoln's very potential loss of the '64 election loomed large, but had Lincoln lost that election, he still would have been President until 4 March 1865. About six weeks later, Lee surrenders his army.

Again, I am just not convinced that an election loss for Lincoln would have resulted in a Union capitulation or an acceptance of a Southern independence.

I wouldn't argue that Gettysburg was decisive.

The decisive battle, if it can be called that, was Vicksburg.

Otto, we'll revisit this again and again, like "That the Dog returns to his Vomit and the Sow returns to her Mire" as Kipling put it. Why? Here is an explanation:

"For every Southern boy fourteen years old, not once but whenever he wants it, there is the instant when it's still not yet two o'clock on that July afternoon in 1863, the brigades are in position behind the rail fence, the guns are laid and ready in the woods and the furled flags are already loosened to break out and Pickett himself with his long oiled ringlets and his hat in one hand probably and his sword in the other looking up the hill waiting for Longstreet to give the word and it's all in the balance, it hasn't happened yet, it hasn't even begun yet, it not only hasn't begun yet but there is still time for it not to begin against that position and those circumstances which made more men than Garnett and Kemper and Armistead and Wilcox look grave yet it's going to begin, we all know that, we have come too far with too much at stake and that moment doesn't need even a fourteen-year-old boy to think This time. Maybe this time with all this much to lose and all this much to gain: Pennsylvania, Maryland, the world, the golden dome of Washington itself to crown with desperate and unbelievable victory the desperate gamble, the cast made two years ago; or to anyone who ever sailed a skiff under a quilt sail, the moment in 1492 when somebody thought This is it: the absolute edge of no return, to turn back now and make home or sail irrevocably on and either find land or plunge over the world's roaring rim."

William Faulkner, "Intruder in the Dust"

@Pictor's

I would agree with the contention that the fall of Vicksburg was THE decisive event of the war.

Gettysburg was the high water mark of the Confederacy, but a bit lower on the decisiveness scale, imo.

Obviously, a Union loss there would have been tough to endure for the North, but the same can be said of a loss at Antietam. Gettysburg being the high water mark because of the consequences of losing the rest of the Mississippi prevented Lee from ever again being the position to strike hard into the North with the ANV.

Perhaps instead of asking if the South could have won the war we should ask what were the reasons for its defeat? The argument that it was just a matter of resources all to easily provides support for the Lost Cause line of thinking – the South was overwhelmed by northern money and foreign conscripts. But if the South was able to maintain the size its armies almost until the end of the war then its management of the war instead comes into question.

Several other points to address. I agree Lee did not send any troops out to the West in 1864. But the stalemate in front of Petersburg enabled him to move Early into the Valley. The political impact of Early's raid on Washington and then the burning of Chambersburg should not be underestimated. Besides, the last time any forces were dispatched to the West they accomplished very little.

Vicksburg was indeed important, but was it the campaign that the South could not recover from? Almost all of the troops captured at Vicksburg and Port Hudson were back in the ranks by the spring of 1864. After 1862 very few troop were transferred from the Trans-Mississippi even while communications remained open. Likewise again after 1862 very little foodstuffs and no war material was moved eastward. The opening of the Mississippi was more of a vital political issue for the North rather than a strategic military issue for the South.

I will agree, though that it was far more important than Gettysburg; the latter has been far overblown in importance.

The chances of the Confederacy winning a straight up military victory against the United States goverment during the American Civil War was slim to none, not impossible, however very very unlikely (the scientific term I believe is "highly improbable") . The Union's overwhelming superiority in population, industrial capacity, education, transportation, economy power and access to natural resources.

However, that does not mean that the South did not have any chance of winning the Civil War, they best hope for achieved a political victory, by destroying political will of the Union's population to continue the fight. As a result the only real option available to the South for victory would be to drag the war out long enough so that the majority of the population in the north would demand that the government come to some sort agreement with the rebels to stop the bloodshed.

Someone in a earlier reply mentioned the Vietnam war as an example of a political victory over a militarily and economically superior nation (United States). The Vietnam War example, however is of limited value, when to the American Civil War, since the internal and international political situation were vastly different during time of the Vietnam war, then during the Civil War.

Most Americans during the sixties and seventies, did not view the Vietnam conflict as strategically or politically important to the United States, as a result the political will of the population, for a long and costly conflict in terms of treasure and human lives was very small.

However, during the American Civil War the most of Northern population viewed the preservation of the union, as critically important to their political, economic and personal well-being. As a result, Northern political will to fight and protect the union was much stronger, then the American population of the 1960's and 1970's (or Confederates population during the Civil War for that matter), to pay the price in blood and treasure to keep the war going.

@Ryan

You are certainly correct as to the men and materials, but control of the Mississippi was critical to the South because auch control denied it to the Union. True, the Union held the northern and Southern ends of that mighty river, but holding Vicksburg denied the central portion of the east bank to the Army of the Tennessee, at least for any sustained operations.

Grant took a big risk in facing Pemberton's forces on the eastern side of the river, especially when extending his vulnerable line of communications out to Jackson before heading back to Vicksburg.

Jefferson Davis's letter to Pemberton about the action and P's failure is quite telling as to hope important that city was to the South, probably second only to Atlanta or tertiary to Atlanta and Richmond in that order.

I doubt the Army of the Tennessee would have been able to pull off what it did around Chattanooga and then move on into Georgia (and then its march to the sea) without securing the entirety of the Mississippi. The capable Southern generals in the region would have punished them for ventuing such a risk.

Fwiw, I consider the South maintaining its relative troop strength as a successful act of desparation and not so much an achivement of military and logistical prowess.

Always an intersting subjext to ponder.

I think Lee was ultimately right, that the only chance for the South to win was to defeat the AoP in series of battles. He did not want to drag out the war, and only followed this path once his preferred strategy was blocked.

His problem was that he did not have the resources to fight a battle of annihilation by encirclement (or maybe the concept was not that clear to american generals). In another name, he could beat up the AoP but never destroy it. I fully think that if he destroyed (as opposed to defeat) the AoP the South could had gotten a negotiated settlement (the form of which is open to debate). Just defeating or checking the AoP was not enough.

So for me at least it all boils down to one simple question

Did Lee ever have a serious chance of fighting and winning a battle of annihilation against the AoP. Maybe the Peninsular was the closet because of the smaller disparity in numbers, but he was new and his command not set.

Gosh and there was me thinking it was Pope, McClellan and Burnside!

Don't knock the 1862 Dream Team!

"Yes, Lincoln hired those washouts but can you name someone, based on their track record at the start of 1862, who would presented a better option and have had the rest of a uncooperative cabal of Union Generals actually serve under them?"

Personally I think if he had given McCllelan the troops he had agreed and not diverted them all over the place the would have been in Richmond by 1863

But to answer you directly I think if they had followed Scott's "Anaconda" plan they would have won by slowly squeezing the South to death with a lot less bloodshed

As a Southerner from Alabama, I would say no. The best would have been a negotiated peace after CSA victories in 1862. By 1863 the USA had invested too much blood to settle on a negotiated peace.

The South lack the industrial capability for a long war. Limited manpower and no navy.

Sorry but McClellan would never have had enough troops. Even in the Peninsular, on the odd occasion he had a winning position, he talked himself out it.

If fact to return to the original question. Yes the South could have won, if Lee had the command structure and experience that the ANV had at the end of 1862, at the beginning of it, McClellan's army would have never made it off the Peninsular!