"U.S. Marine Corps defends the need of next..." Topic

… generation amphibious armored vehicle ACV 1.1

"The Marine Corps' top combat gear developer defended the service's next-generation amphibious vehicle on Capitol Hill Wednesday, march 12, 2015. The Advanced Combat Vehicle 1.1 is critical to the service's ability to execute its traditional mission in the years ahead and is now the service's "No. 1 priority" after amphibious modernization took a back seat during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Kenneth Glueck, Marine Corps Combat Development Command's commanding general, told the members of the Senate Subcommittee on Seapower.

The demand for expeditionary missions requiring amphibious capabilities will only increase in the years to come, he added. The ACV 1.1 will be at the heart of that mission, although some question the vehicle's inability to quickly cross long distances.

Multiple companies are now vying for the final ACV 1.1 contract with prototypes being tested in Nevada and California. But, it will likely be an eight-wheeled vehicle capable of swimming short shore-to-shore distances while providing Marines better protection than legacy vehicles…"

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Armand

Marines do need Amtracks … it's part of their mission to land on beaches …

IIRC, this is supposed to be more like an ocean-amphibious battle taxi than the AAV7. Problem is that it only holds 8 or 9 instead of a full squad of 13 (Marine squads have 3 fireteams).

The AAV7 held 26 Marines from ship to shore and longer if needed, though cramped conditions existed. I know for longer distances they dropped this to 13 but losing 50% capability up front does not make sense.

Stuffing 26 personnel into a Gator is beyond "cramped conditions". A real-world, 21st century capacity with all Marines equipped for combat is closer to 17-18.

I'll agree that any transportation that splits up the infantry squad is a reflexive No-Go. That's an additional source of friction when disembarking.

We should've gone with General Dynamics' suggestion of cutting the complex high-speed hydroplaning from the EFV and worked the rest of the bugs out of the platform.

But the bigger problem is that the Navy-Marine Corps team hasn't established future-proof operational theory and tactics to address the challenges of conducting contested amphibious landings in the 21st century.

But the bigger problem is that the Navy-Marine Corps team hasn't established future-proof operational theory and tactics to address the challenges of conducting contested amphibious landings in the 21st century.

It doesn't help that the EFV took 20 years to develop, during which ground-based antiship missiles got vastly longer-ranged and more capable, putting the 'phibs back in the crosshairs that the EFV was supposed to keep them away from.

But the bigger problem is that the Navy-Marine Corps team hasn't established future-proof operational theory and tactics to address the challenges of conducting contested amphibious landings in the 21st century.

Let's hope forced entry ops will never or very rarely happen in the future. I'm a big advocate of landing where the enemy isn't or very weak. Like MacArthur advocated and executed in WWII PTO and Inchon later. That being said, you still have to be prepared for any and all options … Even the bad ones … Like landing in a hot LZ/DZ … it worked in WWII. And Gen. Gavin advocated it. As you would take losses regardless, so you may as well jump/land on the OBJ as opposed to next to it. [Remember Arnhem] It made sense then … but not so much today …