"Soviet BMP: A Vehicle Designed to Fight in a Nuclear War" Topic

"When the Cold War escalated in the 1950s, the United States and its European allies knew that the Warsaw Pact far outnumbered the alliance's own tanks, artillery and infantry.

Should the Soviets launch an invasion of Western Europe, the NATO armies expected — and planned—to use tactical nuclear weapons to make up for their inferior numbers.

This scenario gave rise to the Soviet BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle — a nimble, heavily armed but lightly protected infantry transport…"
Full article here
link

Amicalement
Armand

T01,

Its nothing of the sort – having had the distinct displeasure of traveling in one – its absolute rubbish – took 20 mins just getting in it – and it was so cramped you can't even use the so-called fire ports.

Still, better than walking I suppose.

DB

For your info, getting a squad into BMP (from the order to all hatches closed) should take no more than 13 sec (satisfactory) and required norm was/is 10 sec.
You can add 2 sec in winter time.
The fact that you were getting into it for 20 minutes doesn't make BMP rubbish, you know… ;)
However, it is true that it is cramped, as most of soviet design armour, but I guess having low profile is well worth the trouble…

"Should the Soviets launch an invasion of Western Europe, the NATO armies expected — and planned—to use tactical nuclear weapons to make up for their inferior numbers."

Er, no. Nice bit of spin there, but the Soviets planned to use tactical nuclear weapons right from the word 'go', to crack open the defences and then fight through the nuclear ash…

B1,

Ha! I take your point – perhaps it was the bulky SMG! ;)

But 10 secs – solely for Soviet maskirovka and wargamers.

DB

Thanks for the info!

Amicalement
Armand

I have a video for you, David…;)

vk.com/video43875676_165923819

One of my favourite quotes from M.Gallay, test pilot end 30s to mid 50s…he writes that his trainer in parachute jumping was telling his students that "doing things fast, means doing operations as ususal, but without any interruptions between them…"

"Should the Soviets launch an invasion of Western Europe, the NATO armies expected — and planned—to use tactical nuclear weapons to make up for their inferior numbers."

Er, no. Nice bit of spin there, but the Soviets planned to use tactical nuclear weapons right from the word 'go', to crack open the defences and then fight through the nuclear ash…

Your both right. Both sides especially NATO claimed they would not be to first to use nukes. But they both would have. No saints either side.

It is interesting that many photos in Afg, Chetznya and Ukraine show the troops riding on top rather than inside!

Tally Ho!

You can't see much inside, and you're not really protected as RPG round can still get in. You also have better chances of surviving if the vehicle runs over IED…

B1,

Your absolutely right!

Of course when I did this I actually had some kit, some ammunition, some rations, some extra bits, etc, etc.

But sans any equipment, of course you're correct.

And I think you're final answer should read "can't see anything from inside!" ;) (Still nothing compared to what the turret gunner of a Marder APC equivalent has to endure!)

DB

After Desert Storm was over my unit had a collection of captured Iraqi vehicles for us to look over.

The BMP had been killed by an air-burst artillery round, now the reason everyone adopted the much more expensive fully inclosed AFV (like the M113) was because of the development of air-burst shells. Israel found out the hard way that the old U.S. M3 was a death trap in modern war.

And here the vaunted Soviet Union's main infantry carrier could be killed with ease. And the stupid ZSU-34-4 was not any better, the one I saw had been taken out with machine gun fire! GDW your assault series lied to me.

So to my rambling point, all the Russian stuff was crap.

Oldhans117 – When I was in the military, we were taught that if all else failed, hit the M113s we trained in with close range rifle (G3 7.62mm) or MG3 fire and it'd kill the guys inside.

Most IFV and APC won't stand up to much direct fire.

In Afghanistan, it seems it was pretty popular for soldiers to ride on top of the vehicle. Less chance of getting toasted by an RPG and probably a lot more comfortable to boot.

Yea, from the flanks, BMPs could also be penetrated by machine gun rounds, apparently, from close range.

Yes, as mentioned, most Cold War apcs/ifvs are only good for getting you off your feet for a while, and for protecting from splinter fragments.

US troopers in Vietnam tended to prefer to like to ride on top of their tracks as well, since at least then you might get thrown clear if the vehicle runs over a mine.

I once had the opportunity to talk to a former motor rifles officer whose unit had used both the BMP 1 and 2 in Germany. He described the BMP as 'frankly speaking, a deathtrap' which had fatal uncorrected design faults around ammunition and fuel storage, and disposition of hydraulic lines, which together with over optimistic de-bus procedures made most hits fatal for all occupants. It also had an extremely poor build quality especially regarding the NBC protection- which never functioned properly.
As an aside, this chap became a divisional staff officer and had some astonishing perspectives on the real combat ability of even top line Soviet units in the 1980s.

Seneffe, that sounds interesting. Can you tell us more?

I guess variants seen before in other contexts but struck me as interesting. Few bits from memory.

- Many staff officers were very pessimistic about GSFG's ability to make significant progress towards the Rhine across the North German plain axis without catastrophic losses to the first echelon and casualties to follow on forces sufficient to disable their mission. This was based on a number of factors-

- Actually very poor combat engineering standards, especially regarding bridging (always of course held as a major Sov strength). Frequent bridge failures on exercise.

- Unresponsiveness of Soviet artillery even in the 1980s and especially it's inability to track the reported movements of enemy units in anything like real time. Even when tactical control was devolved more to lower levels, priority opportunity fire mission were in practise always transmitted up through several layers of command/bureaucracy- negating the effect of any theoretical flexibility.

- An even greater lack of faith in the air arms to perform their role over the battlefield, with elementary failures in navigation and target recognition causing serious but unacknowledged (see below) red/red casualties on exercise.

- An pathological obsession at command levels at least into the mid 1980s with phase line and RV timings as the ONLY indicator of offensive success. On exercise this could lead to outcomes which would have created massacres among the attackers- with support units forcing their way into combat formations and crowding junctions and river crossings in 12 hour traffic jams even under known enemy observation. Against the defence that this represented 'exercisitis' was the response that in war the forward imperative would have been even more intense.

- In contrast with the above, a conviction among most combat troops and regimental officers that offensive success could not be achieved without catastrophic losses. Divisional officers believed they would have to spend most of their efforts finding platoons, companies and even battalions who had slipped into cover or off the formation's main access of advance, waiting to hear that others had broken through.

- An increasing pessimism over the survivability of Soviet made combat vehicles from MBTs downwards. Regimental officers admitting to trusted colleagues that they had no intention of even trying to make the kind of offensive progress shown on exercise in the case of real combat.

- An expectation that substantial enemy forces would be bypassed but left un-neutralised behind the assault echelon to counterattack follow on forces on their line of march. There was no practical consideration (still less training on exercise) given to this problem by either first echelon of follow up troops.

These issues were not visible to political leaders and ignored/obscured at general staff level.

- There was systematic collusion among black and red staff officers on exercise to hide attacker failures and magnify defender weaknesses to create unrealistically optimistic outcomes. Black fire fire requests -eg against the traffic jams mentioned above would be inexplicably refused. Officers playing black would accept ignominious defeat by red forces on the basis that the roles would be reversed soon and there was no advantage career wise to be gained from defensive success.

Oh, and everyone believed that the Polish army would be in open mutiny and effectively fighting for NATO within a few days.

Sorry- I mean 'axis of advance'!

seneffe, Very interesting mate, I was on the opposite side in the 70's, Chieftains and we were told to expect to last about 15 mins once the action started, we still fancied our chances being cocky barstewards but we were under no illusions! Very interesting to hear from the 'other side'

Very very, interesting Seneffe, just glad that my time (the next decade to William!) was spent on long exercises or feeding up on schnellies and herforder!!

Tally Ho!

"An expectation that substantial enemy forces would be bypassed but left un-neutralised behind the assault echelon to counterattack follow on forces on their line of march. There was no practical consideration (still less training on exercise) given to this problem by either first echelon of follow up troops"

This was one of our expected scenarios with plenty of By Passed formations still combat effective and capable of offencive action.

Tally Ho!

Good stuff Seneffe, thanks.