"Study of Civil War Infantry Tactics" Topic

Now this looks promising. This April LSU Press will publish Earl Hess's new book on Civil War infantry tactics.

"For decades, military historians have argued that the introduction of the rifle musket—with a range five times longer than that of the smoothbore musket—made the shoulder-to-shoulder formations of linear tactics obsolete. Author Earl J. Hess challenges this deeply entrenched assumption. He contends that long-range rifle fire did not dominate Civil War battlefields or dramatically alter the course of the conflict because soldiers had neither the training nor the desire to take advantage of the musket rifle's increased range. Drawing on the drill manuals available to officers and a close reading of battle reports, Civil War Infantry Tactics demonstrates that linear tactics provided the best formations and maneuvers to use with the single-shot musket, whether rifle or smoothbore."

See more at:

link

Not a new conclusion, I believe Paddy Griffith but the same theory forward years ago. I'll be curious to see how Hess comes to his conclusion. While I agree that the issue may not have been long range fire, certainly the increased accuracy of the rifled musket increased accuracy even at shorter ranges.

Thanks for bringing this to our attention. I've already pre-ordered the book…looking forward to it.

The conclusions aren't that new as raylev3 points out. Personally, I was not always impressed with Hess's grasp of infantry tactics, evolutions and formations, or willingness to his cherry-pick accounts. For instance, I can provide any number of instances where ACW officers and men made the effort to take advantage of the rifle's increased range both in training and battle. The line was NOT the best formation for maneuvering and ACW miliatary men knew that… which is why troops behind the battleline were often kept in columns, particularly in wooded areas.

For quite some time I have been of the opinion that the real limiting factors of the rifles. rifled muskets and rifle-muskets were not related to technology, but to the terrain fought over and the training received.

These United States don't have a lot of open, flowing terrain suitable for the soldiers to take advantage of the potential range of the new weapons. Everything east of the Mississippi, which is where the war was really fought, is either heavily wooded, built up, or of such a rolling nature that it was nigh impossible for troops to HAVE an effective range beyond 300 yards, and usually only half that. Heck, even over the "open" ground that Pickett's men traversed at Gettysburg, there were enough dips and swells to provide cover for the infantry up until the last 100 yards or so. The federal artillery employed shell and spherical case to burst overhead, because there wasn't enough flat ground to employ solid shot for bounding effects.

And as to training, it was the bare minimum required to provide some sense of relief and security to the officers that the men wouldn't shoot themselves when given live rounds. Even with blanks they could be dangerous. I believe it was an officer of the 124th who, early in the war, was training his men with the use of blank rounds. He was having the individual companies practice loading and firing at some reasonable distance from the long side of a wooden barn, mostly so the men would have SOMETHING to aim at. After the first volley, there was the sound of numerous rammers whizzing through the air and impacting into the wall of the barn.

But I look forward to this new book. Always handy to have a fresh set of eyes on a subject. :)

I'm sure Mr. Hess is right. Look how well those linear tactics worked for the Federals at Fredricksburg!

And all those veterans who would dig in at the first opportunity were just a bunch of ninnies.

Also, during the early stages of the war, wasn't the smoothbore musket the primary weapon?

Griffith's exposition of this idea wasn't very convincing. It'll be interesting to see if Hess can put forward a better case.

I have my doubts.

There's also the question of how we represent things on the model battlefield. When modelling a large action with scores of units engaged we can surely take it 'as read' that regimental and brigade officers make decisions about formation, firing etc without us(in or role as wargame CinC having to depict each and every option with the figures?

As I recall from TMP posts gone by, Griffith committed the major error of not being born in the US and then making pronouncements on the Civil War.

At least Hess will be spared that penetrating critique!

Thaks Ryan. I will definitely take a look at it!

I do not dismiss Griffith by any means, but I think that he overstates his case on the basis of data presented. It has been some years since I read him, but my recollection is that he based his argument on a rather small data sample, and was not terribly scrupulous about specifying the arms carried by the cited regiments or the type of terrain in which they happened to be fighting.

In support of his thesis, I would challenge anyone to reliably engage a target over 200 yards distant with a service issue minie rifle and the iron sights of that era from a standing off-hand position. My belief is that the minie rifle did not really materially improve the accuracy of individual fire at long ranges, but rather made it possible for a unit to deliver a better concentrated sheaf of fire ….. when the terrain made it possible to engage targets at such distances. Improvements in the accuracy of individual fire would probably have been confined to the 2-5 pct of soldiers who were actually good marksmen in their own right.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

I've always tended to lean towards the percussion cap as a major factor over rifling, or use (or not) of linear tactics. You can aim as nicely as you'd like, but if your weapon doesn't fire, then rifling, (or laser-sights for that matter), doesn't amount to anything at all.

Though only once in a rare while do you read much on the effects of the cap, and I personally haven't come across any raw data, just reducing the misfire rate by 10-15% (I'm just using these numbers to illustrate my point), will most assuredly increase the mortality rate on a field of battle, when taking into account the vast volume of weapons being fired.

Perhaps it's too humble an item to warrant a book, but my money is on this single definitive advance in technology as a prime motivator for any tactical changes during this time period.

Cheers,
Bob

but if your weapon doesn't fire, then rifling, (or laser-sights for that matter),

I didn't know they had laser siights in the Civil War?

From a wargamers point of view,
I have recently been using Black Powder to wargame the Crimea, the British Army went there with their nice new Enfield rifled musket, still using the firing drill from Waterloo, so we reduce the rang from 24" to 18"(the same range as smoothbore muskets) and doubled the short rang from 6" to 12".
We find this works well.

The Rifle Brigade and the Rifled Jager we left the long rang at 24" and 12" for short.

The Jury is still out on the French

NappyBuff wrote:

Also, during the early stages of the war, wasn't the smoothbore musket the primary weapon?

To a certain extent, though not quite what some folks would have you believe. There were quite a few M1855 rifle muskets, M1855 rifles, and M1841 rifles available in the various federal and state arsenals. In addition, Remington almost immediately got a contract to rifle 10K M1842 muskets.

What strikes me as fascinating is that at Gettysburg, there were more rifle and rifle-musket armed troops in Confederate ranks than in the AoP. Some 40 federal regiments were still armed with the M1816 conversions and M1842 muskets. I remark upon this because the men in those regiments seemed to feel that it was better suited for the types of terrain and engagements they fought, as opposed to the M1855/M1861 and Enfield weapons.

InkBiz:

I agree with your assessment of the percussion cap as what we now refer to as a "force multiplier". It not only made the ignition more reliable overall, but also permitted troops to use their weapons in humid/damp or rainy environments, Before those times, the lock had to be wrapped with a cloth, preferably oilskin, to protect the pan from moisture.

One thing overlooked in this discussion is the use of tompions to keep moisture & dirt out of the bores of the weapons. Each weapon was issued with one, and the men were taught to keep it in the muzzle of the weapon until such time as they were to load and prepare for firing. It was easily slipped into a coat or trouser pocket, or even into the haversack in a hurry.

Here's an image of reproduction tompions. From top to bottom they are English, US M1816/1842 & M1861 & up series, and the bottom is for the M1855 series weapons. The M1841 also used a plain wood like the center one. Other nations also used these, in various designs and complexities.

The percussion cap increasing effective rate of fire is thought to have been a factor in the American victory over Mexico. The Yanks had them and the Mexicans didn't.

Another American advantage in the Mexican War was the American light artillery batteries. Mexican artillery was generally immobile once emplaced, but the American 'flying' batteries maneuvered during the battle to bring concentrated fire to bear on critical points. During the ACW, both sides made very extensive use of light field artillery, which contributed a lot to the infantry casualties.

Most US regiments in Mexico had flintlocks. The new percussion muskets were mostly issued to volunteer units who saw little combat.

The characteristic that rifling gave to Minnie rounds, as opposed to smoothbore muskets, that increased their lethality was not accuracy, but trajectory. The bullet followed a flatter hyperbolic trajectory, I.e It was in the killing zone of enemy targets for a greater part of its flight.. It also retained a higher percentage of its initial energy for a greater part of that trajectory. The initial energy was roughly the same as all weaponry throughout the horse and musket period still used black powder as the propellant.

In general use, its effective range was not much better than a musket, but within that zone, especially with an improved rate of fire provided by the faster loading minie bullet, and the percussion cap (which also improved reliability with fewer misfires) the minie rifle was more lethal.

However, it's most effective employment in battle was identical to the
musket. The lethality gain is clearly shown in spontaneous going to ground and the use of hasty and developed earthworks. 1870 was to evidence the first drastically changed tactics caused by breach loading rifles with improved cartridges as evidenced by the chassepot and to a lesser extent the needle gun, and the percussion fused Krupps artillery.

Were the percentage of casualties in battles significantly worse in the ACW than the Napoleonic Wars prior to the existence of the rifled musket?

That's the wrong way round.

Minie rifles had a lower velocity and a much lower energy compared to smoothbores. The drop on a rifle was greater. If both had sights set at 100 yards and were 5 feet above the ground (i.e. fired from standing) a Springfield's conical ball would graze (hit the Earth) at 200 yards, and a .69 US smoothbore about 250 yds.

At the muzzle the .69 smoothbore has twice the kinetic energy of the Springfield. Being faster and less aerodynamic it loses energy quicker and around 200 yards both are similar. Thus at actual combat ranges the smoothbore ball has much more energy than a Minie ball. Only about 10% of those hit by a .58 Minie were killed vs about 25% for a .69 smoothbore with ball.

Uh, The muzzle velocity of all black powder weapons is very, very, similar. if anything, because of the tighter seal of the expanding Minieball skirt, the minie round had a slightly higher exiting muzzle velocity not less. The weight of the longer .58 Minie Round and the .69 round were very similar as well. The assembled paper artridge for ball was larger and somewhat heavier. The killing power of the round ball may be attributed to its usual use at very close ranges, and the flattening effect of the round ball upon impact making for a much more extensive wound than the elongated minie, not any added velocity, which would be doubtful. The delivered energy from a slightly higher mass would be marginal, and quickly lost downrange.

I'd like to see a source on the described trajectories, as I believe that, as stated, they are misleading. Especially the issue of drop, as the ball was a far less efficient projectile, and, lacking rifling, had considerably more drag than a minie round and would evidence this rapidly in the trajectory. The actual trajectory of a minie round was a flatter hyperbole, while the round ball has a distinctly higher arc and greater drop. This pattern would evidence itself from 50 yards on out.

To calculate kinetic energy use 1/2 the mass times velocity squared. Black powder velocities were largely fixed and identical, and Mass was the lesser factor and then it was halved! There's only a few grains weight difference in the rounds-halve that and do the formula. Answer= zip difference

We can all discuss trajectory, velocity or any number of technical qualities of the weapon. But the battlefield results speak for themselves. As do how the troops and officers reacted as the war went on. Why should we disagree with their first-hand experience?

this book has sparked a most interesting debate if nothing else!

Hess' "Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat" and Nosworthy's "Bloody Crucible of Courage" (dreadful title) both talk about the low muzzle velocity and curved trajectory of Minie balls.

Low muzzle velocity was due to the friction of the expanded ball taking the rifling.

Pan Marek-Quite right. The actions of the actual participants was to switch to minie rifles as quickly as possible. In the case of the South that was more problematic than the North, but, even they had large switched over by mid-war.

Both the theoretical and emprical evidence is clear.

Vtsao= ALL black powder weapons had a curved trajectory and low muzzle velocity. The issue is the comparative case vis a vis the round ball, smoothbore musket. It's not really possible to argue the superiority of the smoothbore musket over the minie rifle either from ballistics or actual field use during the war. One could argue if either actually changed formal tactics (as opposed to spontaneous reactive practice) of troops, on either side, in the ACW.

My opinion is that it did not change tactics, but that the minie rifle was more effective within the usual fighting ranges that occured between troops. Late in the war the main change was not the tactics of the battlefield, but the growing use of entrenchments, earthworks, and flanking strategies. Frontal attacks of any sort had simply become too lethal.

It was left to the Prussians to envision the new tactics of a modern battlefield which combined looser tactical doctrine (the Zug), heavy accent on breachloading artillery with persussion rounds, and the constant seeking of flanks.

Look at the powder loads.

Muzzle velocities are in the ordnance manual: link

The smoothbore fired a slightly lighter ball with a larger charge and hence was much faster (1,500 fps) than a Springfield (963 fps) or an altered (rifled) musket (879 fps).

The muzzle energies are thus:

M1842 smoothbore: 2.8 kJ
M1855 etc. Springfield: 1.4 kJ
Altered musket: 1.7 kJ

Yes, but the spherical projectile had truly terrible aerodynamics, so muzzle velocity is irrelevant. The effect of the sound barrier on the ball is nearly twice what it is on the conical bullet, and in this case, the latter starts out subsonic. And this is exacerbated by the lower sectional density of the ball which means tat it is more affected by drag.

The real limit on battle ranges was the rather denser terrain than was seen in Europe. You can't shoot what you can't see.

Combat was sub-150 yards. As I've calculated here the smoothbore equalises the rifle in energy around 150 yards and both lose energy at about the same rate: link

I would point out that, by and large, less than 1/4 of rounds for the .69 were round ball. The majority (in federal service) were "buck & ball" cartridges, and in CS service, quite a few .69 conical (minie) ball rounds were issued.

Again, this is an area where unit/date comes into play and the percentages of the different types of .69 rounds can (and did) vary by unit, month, year, and theater.

Overall, in breaking it down into wargame mechanics, it's probably not much difference from one type of round to another, or even from one caliber to another. Once hit, unless it is a slight grazing wound, the soldier was gone whether wounded or killed, and of no further use to his unit until some later date, if ever.

Here's a thought: Compare the ranges and the casualties of Bunker Hill to Cold Harbor.

Hess' "Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat" and Nosworthy's "Bloody Crucible of Courage" (dreadful title) both talk about the low muzzle velocity and curved trajectory of Minie balls.

Low muzzle velocity was due to the friction of the expanded ball taking the rifling.

Absolutely not true. The minie "ball" was not a ball but a almost streamlined slug and was much heavier. Rifling slowing down the slug was not any factor.

Actually the rifling did indeed slow the ball down because of friction, but only moderately. The ball from a smoothbore got 25 j/ grain of powder and the ball from the Springfield 23.

BTW "ball" remains the standard nomenclature for a round. I was issued a lot of 5.56 and 7.62 mm "ball" back in the day.

I've always been of the opinion that if Mr Griffith was right and the range for the rifle and smoothbore were essentially the same, then Burnside would have charged in assault columns at Fredricksburg and Lee would have done the same at Gettysburg.

Ah! My favorite hobby horse! :) Dr. Hess is correct and I've been teaching exactly the same conclusions at lectures and seminars and living history events for 25 years. You can make all the arguments you like about the accuracy of the weapons, but the bottom line is that the tactical system in use did work and was used in its by-the-book form from the first day of the war until the last. And beyond. Perhaps the most compelling proof that the system was not obsolete is the fact that Emory Upton's tactics manual introduced in 1866 (1867) retains the two rank, shoulder-to-shoulder line of battle as the primary combat formation.

Dr. Griffith. He had a PhD in military history from Oxford (1975).

At Gettysburg Pickett et al. were able to get within 100 yards before coming under effective fire. At Fredericksburg the cleared field of fire in front of the wall was less than 150 yards, and Confederates report they opened fire at less than 150 yards….

Scott,

Well that's my view on Upton too. Given the fact that he was considered 'cutting edge' in his thinking towards the end of the war it's a bit of an eye opener that when he got to write it all down he went for more of the same!

Post, in his personal account of the Spanish American War, describes firing his converted to breechloader Springfield rifle as "kicking like a mule" and emitting "a cloud of smoke the size of a cow". Newsreel footage of US Volunteers firing converted Springfields in the Philippines in 1898 again show the density of smoke and the rapid buildup of a cloud through which troops are firing blind. A weapon with a vicious kick bruises and after firing a number of times a man is in a world of hurt. That had to affect accuracy. Dense smoke would had to have had a great effect on every aspect of fighting.

Rifled muskets doubled the engagement ranges…

From 25-35 yards to 50-70 yards.

It all depends on your point of view.

Joe Collins

hocklermp5 wrote:

Post, in his personal account of the Spanish American War, describes firing his converted to breechloader Springfield rifle as "kicking like a mule" and emitting "a cloud of smoke the size of a cow". Newsreel footage of US Volunteers firing converted Springfields in the Philippines in 1898 again show the density of smoke and the rapid buildup of a cloud through which troops are firing blind. A weapon with a vicious kick bruises and after firing a number of times a man is in a world of hurt. That had to affect accuracy. Dense smoke would had to have had a great effect on every aspect of fighting.

In "A Soldier of the 71st", the author writes that in South America, he, armed with his Brown Bess, fired more than 100 rounds in a single day but did not notice the pain from the bruising of his shoulder until the next day. Adrenaline and the shock of combat will do that to you. The soldier is so busy fighting, and listening for orders, that he doesn't feel the results of such injuries until later, after he has rested.

As to the smoke being an obstacle, it's mostly dependent upon weather conditions. On a humid or muggy day, the smoke tends to hang around a bit, but if there's any sort of a breeze, it dissipates rather quickly.

Keep in mind that the Regimental commander is on horseback, and will be able to see over any smoke from the weapons. You'd be surprised just how much extra visibility those few feet of elevation give to you. But regardless, it isn't the soldier's job to aim as modern soldiers do. The company was one gog in the regimental machine, and the captains oversaw fire discipline at the behest of their Colonel, who directed the overall fire. It was a machine and the soldier one tooth on the gears of death that made the machine's product. He didn't need to see his target, as it was the mass effect of the fire that was important, not the individual soldier's marksmanship.

V/R

Trajanus,

That's not to say that Upton didn't make a LOT of improvements to the tactics. He drastically streamlined the movements and did away with the ancient rule of arranging the companies by the seniority of the captains. By doing so he slimmed down the tactics manual from three books to one. But even so, the basic battle formation remained the same.

….. If you want to examine the accuracy results of a series of contemporary arsenal tests of nearly all the infantry firearms in Union service, conducted under closely controlled conditions, get a copy of "The Rifled Musket", by Claud E Fuller.

In my opinion, those data are of relatively minor importance compared to the influences of psychological combat stress and physical combat conditions.

B

I am wondering if Mr Hess's new book will say anything substantial that wasn't already covered in his previous book. I found the analyses of Hess and Griffith interesting, but ultimately unconvincing. I don't have the technical knowledge of other contributors to this thread, but I thought that their arguments didn't jell with some of the accounts of combat that I have read and also seemed inconsistent with the push by both sides to arm their men with rifled muskets asap.

An extremely interesting subject and I am fascinated with the level of expertise of those participating. I must admit that I'd never considered percussion caps, bullet trajectory etc, just accepted that the rifle was superior/more accurate and that was that.
Not too long ago I read an opinion (and of course cannot exactly recall where at this time) that the Minnie "ball" was greatly responsible for the carnage in that when it struck, it tended to expand and/or break apart in its target due to its design (hollow back) and the soft metal in use; there would be a brutal tumbling effect leading, when not immediately lethal, to terrible wounding which had a higher degree of incapacitation or subsequent death soon after.
I wondered if any others have heard of this and if so, is it a sound proposition?
Thanks.

Hello Gentlemen,

I am most gratified that the imminent publication of Hess's book was able to stimulate such a great conversation. It can be hoped that in his new study of tactics Hess will tie together his earlier work on fortifications, the experience of battle, and the effectiveness of the rifle-musket. Although he touched on tactics in the latter book he did not deal with the topic in any real depth. It may also be interesting to see if he addresses Fred Ray's examination of the development of sharpshooter battalions in the ANV.

It appears that part of the problem of the rifle-musket is the dichotomy between the potential accuracy of the rifle-musket and its actual usage. Hardee's revision of Scott was prompted by the need to deal with the greater accuracy and range of the rifle-musket. Casey's 1862 manual explicitly states that his work was done to take advantage of "changes in weapons both artillery and infantry". There was clear recognition that the rifle-musket was an important technological change. Thus it should be no surprise that both the Federals and the Confederates strove to equip their armies with these weapons.

However, Hess, among others, has pointed out that in spite if this technological improvement neither side took widespread advantage of it. To do so required training in both fire control and, most importantly, range estimation. Apart from some Federal sharpshooter units in the first half of the war, the ANV sharpshooter battalions in the later war, and to a degree in Cleburne's Division, this was not done. Instead the older and easier taught close range fire methods were kept in place. As for changes in formations and deployments I am hoping that Hess has something new to say.

I believe that the rifled musket had a greater range than smooth bores, but incrementally greater in the hands of average troops instead of the radical difference (400-500 yards) widely claimed for so many years. Grant's experience in Mexico told him smooth bores were useless beyond 75 yards. Rifle muskets could make trouble up to 150 yards or so. Anything beyond that required shooters trained to estimate ranges correctly, something rare in the ACW.

Yes, I know the Minie ball was a conical round. It had a lower muzzle velocity than a smooth bore round and a steeper trajectory. It was much more accurate but not equivalent to a modern rifle bullet.

Hess notes in his book that Union regiments armed with smooth bores preferred rifle muskets for their skirmishers. I consider this proof that the rifle musket had some advantage over the old musket beyond being newer and shinier.

I much prefer Hess' reasoning for extensive field fortifications – multi-day battles – instead of Griffth's – the Yanks were culturally deficient (led by engineers, undisciplined).

….. Re comparative trajectories, elongated projectiles fired from a rifled weapon enjoyed two important advantages.

Despite an initially lower MV, the overall far superior ballistic coefficient (both on a w/cd2 basis and on a coefficient of form basis) of the rifled projectile meant that loss of velocity when travelling downrange was a great deal less than that of the smoothbore ball. The velocity of the minie bullet at some point downrange would be superior to that of the smoothbore ball As elliptical as the trajectory of a minie bullet might appear to modern eyes, it was overall far better than that of a smoothbore bullet.

The rotational spin of the minie bullet gyroscopically stabilized the minie bullet in flight, both keeping it from tumbling and (apart from minor "drift" effect) maintaining a more reliable trajectory. Smoothbore bullets (and cannon balls) could display a "knuckleball" effect within certain lower velocity zones which would materially widen dispersion (particularly lateral dispersion).

B

The problem that people have in understanding the difference between the minie ball and round ball is that the trajectories need more than a single statement to define them.

If you sight them both in for 100 yards and aim at the middle of the chest, they are about the same. Both shoot pretty flat. The roundball is going to have a bigger spread because the round ball does a bit of knuckleballing and curving. The minie ball rifle is a better tool because it is more accurate- but that is a marginal advantage at 100 yards and less. Beyond that, the spread of the roundball and it's drop is hurting the roundball

The roundball is light and is shot with a lot of powder to make it supersonic. Because it is supersonic, there is a lot of air resistance- the air can not get out of the way of such a fast projectile, compresses (taking a lot of energy from the ball to do so) and you hear that sonic boom. It slows down quickly because it has a small mass, the acceleration of gravity takes over and it hits the ground quickly- if you started it out level with ground.

(I think that most people- even scientists don't really have a gut understanding about "acceleration" as in acceleration of gravity. If you have a hunk of lead and fire it level with the surface of the earth off of a cliff, the following happens. During the first second of flight, it drops 32 feet down. (gravity- 32 ft/(sec squared). In the second second, it accelerates 128 ft sec down more in speed. It is now going 160 ft/sec down. The third second it accelerates 288 ft/sec MORE- its now going 448 ft/sec down. This is important for a roundball because it slows down quickly, takes more time to get downrange and falls to the earth INCREASINGLY quickly at long range. )

If you point the barrel up into the air, to get it to fly further you find that, not only does it not go very far, but it is very hard to get the range of a target. A very small difference in the angle of elevation of the muzzle makes it come down in different places.

With the long minie ball, spinning on axis there is a lot more weight to maintain the kinetic energy (hence the velocity) and it is moving in a speed regime, where the air resistance per distance traveled is much less. Therefore it does not slow down as much and has a better velocity downrange. This means that it gets downrange quicker and has done less sinking due to the acceleration of gravity.

So it is flatter shooting out there and combining that with it not "curveballing", you can hit things reliably at 200 and 300 yards. At that range the roundball would be a blind mortar shot without a baseplate. Some often reproduced diagrams try to show a picture to discredit the minie ball, where they show that if a minie ball rifle is sighted for 300 yards, the minie ball will go over the head of a soldier at 75 yards. Ergo, the argument goes, it can not hit(?)at lesser range and is inferior to the roundball. This is silly- you set the sights for different ranges and they never show the analogous diagram for a roundball.

It is true that you can't hit what you can't see and with iron sights it is difficult to see and hold target on something 300 yards away. However, a big close-order group of troops or an artillery battery is big enough to see. With the roundball weapon, it would be very difficult to drop area fire on that target. With a rifled musket, typical troops could do it. There is your big advantage of the minie ball. The second is that it is a fast reloading rifle and in skilled hands can be accurate against single targets at ranges that a smoothbore are useless at.

Ryan Toews wrote:

Hardee's revision of Scott was prompted by the need to deal with the greater accuracy and range of the rifle-musket.

Actually, that's not true. Hardee wrote his "Rifle & Light Infantry Tactics" because the US Army was preparing to raise and field Light Infantry Battalions, armed with the M1855 rifle, not the rifle-musket. This is why you see all the illustrations done with soldiers in the then-approved Chasseur uniform and with the rifles with sword bayonets. It's why he instructs the men to stack arms using their rammers.

In addition to the Chasseur-style uniforms, the men of the new Light Infantry battalions were to have the M1855 accoutrements, which did away with the catridge box sling and bayonet sling. The new system used a wider waistbelt with a 2-piece brass frame buckle, and two brass loops which slid to each side with rings on top to take the "J" hooks of the knapsack, and thus relieve the soldier of some of the weight and shifting of it while on the march.

The cartridge box slid onto the belt, and this is why Hardee instructs the men to slide the box towards the front, making it in effect a belly box, which helps speed loading of the rifle. Anyone who tried to do this with a box suspended on a sling knows it can't be done and usually ended up wondering why that instruction was in the manual.

This is also where those slightly-larger shield-front cap boxes came from, as they were needed with larger loops to be able to be fitted onto the belt. The belt also had a fixed frog designed to hold the sword bayonet and it's scabbard.

Hardee's manual was to complement Scott's which would maintain the heavy infantry battalions, with the light battalions doing the skirmish and other such duties, similar to the British 95th Rifles.

But, the war intervened and the manual was used to help the new volunteer units, since it was easier to form and train a single 10-company regiment, than one of the Regular regiments of 2-3 battalions each. Hardee's manual worked then, but was quickly replaced in the north by Casey's, which is basically Hardee's for rifle-muskey armed troops. After all, Hardee threw his lot in with the Confederacy, so it wouldn't do to have HIS manual being used in federal service.

Here's an image of an original M1855 Rifleman's set, sans cartridge box.

1968billsfan, your kinematic equations are wrong.

The appropriate equation is:

d = vi * t + 0.5 *a * t^2

The drop of a perfectly level musket is thus 16 feet in the first second, because that is the average downwards velocity during that second.

A M1842 smoothbores ball reaches 100 yards in 0.245 s with a residual velocity of 1,046 fps and a drop of 10.3 inches.

It reaches 300 yds in 0.936 s with a residual velocity of 750 fps and a drop of 136.46 inches = 10 ft 4.

The M1855 etc. Springfield reaches 100 yards in 0.328 s with a residual velocity of 872 fps and a drop of 20.09 inches.

At 300 yds it takes 1.078 s for the ball to reach there with a residual velocity of 739 fps and a drop of 205.85 inches = just over 17 feet.

The rifle-musket is slower and drops more at realistic battle ranges. Whilst the round ball is indeed supersonic and has more drag due to a shockwave in the first 100 yards, this is one reason for its combat effectiveness and lethality – the supersonic round is far more destructive.

The magnus effect also affects the Minie ball, but in a more predictable fashion. The bullets yaw into the spin and displace left or right depending on the rifling. A perfectly aimed smoothbore would drop to only hitting 50% of the time around 150-200 yards, whereas the Springfield drops to 50% around 350 yards (and for a modern 5.56mm rifle this figure is ca. 600 yards). However, within 100 yards (i.e. battle range) a perfectly aimed smoothbore or rifle would always hit…..