"First Bull Run scenario" Topic

I ran a game of First Bull Run last week using the Bloody Big Battles (BBB) rules. TMP link
The rules shone, my scenario less so. The scale of the scenario is each base = 500 troops or 12 guns. An inch on the table represents about 100 yards.

I went and read the account of 1st Bull Run in "America's First Battles", an analysis of the first battles in various US wars.

I came up with a variety of issues.

With the exception of Joe Johnston and Tyler, all senior officers reverted to being colonels and went around leading individual regiments into action. Johnston Stayed back from the front line and dispatched arriving reinforcements to the front, acting like a general. Tyler did nothing at all. Based on that McDowell and Beauregard will be removed from the OB, leaving only Johnston.

In typical early war Union fashion Palmer's US cavalry was dispersed into a variety of escort detachments and was a cipher in the battle. I'm thinking of removing Palmer from the Order of Battle and just bumping a weak Federal infantry brigade by that number of troops.

Likewise, the Confederate cavalry attached to Beauregard's army don't seem to have done much and I am considering subsuming them into weak CSA infantry brigades.

In last week's game the cavalry had some effect on play. I'm looking to simulate just how lame the two armies were. A surfeit of effective cavalry would work against that goal.

I'll leave JEB Stuart's cavalry intact because they actually did something as a regiment during the battle. That would make one base of cavalry on the table instead of 1 Union and 3 Confederate in the last game.

And now on to the thorniest problem. The only reason the Confederates made their first stand on Matthew Hill is because Tyler was so inept that Evans figured out he wasn't moving and left the stone Bridge over Bull Run guarded by 4 companies. Evans went off and started the fight over Matthew Hill. You do that in a game and the Union side will say, hey the stone bridge is held by a corporal's guard. They will roll over the bridge and take the Matthew Hill line in the rear.

I could restrict the movement of Tyler's division so that only Sherman is allowed to go over the ford north of Matthew Hill. Otherwise Tyler has to wait until Union forces south of Bull Run clear the bridge (and the obstructions on it) before they can cross. Or I can make Tyler roll a very high number to activate each turn. This smacks of heavy handed restrictions. But I don't see another way to get the game started resembling actual events.

Your views are welcome.

Hi Vincent,

As you know, I'm putting together a scenario for V&B at the moment – different rules, but the same scale, so I think much will translate.

I would completely disregard all cavalry except Jackson, not even adding them to the infantry brigades. As for Jackson, his 300 troopers were actually split into two wings on either flank of the Confederate line around Henry Hill – in other words, he was so weak (especially at an army level game) that his saber strength really has no effect, BUT he obviously did have a tactical effect. You could almost represent him as a random special event: "Jackson strikes! One frontal CSA frontal attack against a target with a free flank is treated as a flank attack." What I'm going to do is allow Jackson to charge his full distance (24" in V&B) without LOS … which might simulate his sneaking around in the woods looking for a flank.

As for the Stone Bridge, one of the things that made the Confederate defense possible was that there was a small rise right across the south end – just enough to shelter the CSA troops from artillery fire and prying eyes, but close enough that they could hammer anyone crossing the bridge. Give any troops deployed there cover from fire, and perhaps allow them to deploy hidden. Tyler was assumedly waiting for the flanking attack to develop, which he may have thought meant seeing Union troops east of Mathews Hill – you could always issue him those orders, or apply a negative modifier to activating before that happens. However, Grant found the ford pretty quickly after he arrived, around 11:00, which levered the Confederates off Mathews Hill – but his artillery couldn't cross the ford, so take that into account.

It's a pain to model as a scenario! Hopefully it will give a good game. We're also going to try a mini-campaign out of "free deployment" of both armies.

Cheers,

Christopher

Add hidden troops/ limited LOS option to keep the union off guard. Now small force can present a big problem until they learn the strength or push forward with a large force.

my 2 cents

MG

Yep – the lines of sight are pretty easy to implement as hidden movement for the Confederates. Until the Union crests the Mathews Hill / Sunny Ridge line, they basically can't see anything east of that line. After that, they can see the Lewis/Henry/Bald Hill line, but not east of that. Once they crest that line of three hills, I would just move everything on the tabletop, although there still are some limited lines of sight to the east.

I agree with marshalGreg. Allow Evans enough troops to leave full strength forces at the bridge when he marches away and the Union doesn't find out those troops are minimal strength unless they approach them.

(Not knowing the battle that well myself) would it work simply to rate a portion of the Union army as Passive?

And conversely, to galvanise the Confederate reinforcements into action, you could say that they are considered to be reinforcements (and therefore also counting as in command radius, and entitled to a minimum of a half move regardless of what they roll) unless and until they change formation out of column of march?

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!
link

Yeah, basically you need to model (by Passive or FOW) the Union confusion suffered at FBR because of inexperienced commanders and poor command structures. Otherwise of course they should take Henry Hill every time – in fact, one would expect, with perfect Federal command organization, the real battle to take place either further down the road/into the woods, or even towards Bonham's position.

Chris, I decided to treat the Confederate reinforcements just as you suggest. I have more dire plans for Tyler's division, don't think passive is enough… If Thursday's snow storm doesn't keep the Fencibles away it will be tried again.

Yeah, basically you need to model (by Passive or FOW) the Union confusion suffered at FBR because of inexperienced commanders and poor command structures.

And undisciplined green troops weary from ordinary marches. They were brave but oh so green.

I think this battle might well have formed Moltke's opinion of armed mobs, nothing to learn here. He (and others) would have done well to pay attention to how things were being done in 1864-65, especially by the Union cavalry.

On that tangent – that seems like a really valuable thing to bear in mind for scenario design (and even rules design) in general when dealing with ACW…command and staff experience and structures were so vastly superior in 1865 to 1861 that the comparison is nearly unfair. Say in Fire and Fury terms – how does one usually dish out Exceptional (and Poltroon if you use it) ratings? Every divisional commander in 1865, even in the Confederate Trans-Mississippi, had experienced staff officers and well-trained reactions to specific situations. Won't necessarily have made them any cleverer or braver; but it will make them several grades better than the equivalent commander at FBR.

(I also think that general commander quality had hit its peak in 1865 for both sides, notwithstanding the deaths of so many excellent commanders – especially at the level of Confederate army command. Lee, Johnston, Taylor, and Kirby Smith seems to me to be easily the best line-up their ever produced. Corps command is perhaps more questionable, but then the final version of the Army of Tennessee had the pretty solid line-up of Hardee, Stewart, and Lee, Taylor had the excellent Forrest and the competent Maury, and Kirby Smith had Buckner, J.G. Walker, and Magruder…)