"Prussian artillery at Königgrätz" Topic

Does anyone have information on the proportion of smoothbores to rifled guns at Königgrätz?

I have Nafziger`s OOB which lists 4 and 6 pdrs, but only a few 12`s !

So, are these 4 & 6pdrs in fact C64 and C61`s respectively?

Correct. The 12pdrs are the only ML smoothbores.

Hi MC!

Have not got the Nafziger OOB!, but taking batteries from the Prussian staff history, I think the following are the figures. Horse batteries are all 12pdrs. Totals 48 batteries of 4pdrs, 33 batteries of 6pdrs, 15 foot batteries of 12pdrs, 32 horse batteries of 12pdrs. So 768 guns, of which: Smoothbore 12pdrs 282, rifles 6pdrs 198, rifled 4pdrs 288. And in answer to your question about the 4 and 6pdrs – Yes.

Cheers,

Mollinary

Thanks for the info Mollinary,

Nafziger`s OOB is at:

PDF link

Mike.

I`ve added the Horse artillery`s 12 pdrs to Nafziger`s OOB and so the gun types and models are now complete in that order of battle.

I now find myself wondering how to handle the unreliability of the new rifled 4pdr?

Perhaps the rate of fire for the weapon was reduced because of it`s faults ?

Don't think that works Michael. You have the figures for number of guns. Ammunition expenditure is 19,138 of all types for 4pdr, 7,544 for 6pdr, and 3,530 for 12pdr. What kind of unreliability are you trying to model? Perhaps the biggest problem was for those batteries which had only just been issued with their guns and had had no chance to train with them.

Mollinary

Thanks Mollinary,

Later the C64 was replaced by the C67 and this was due to faults in the closure mechanism (that were made apparent in the 1866 campaign) as well as to lighten the piece to make it more mobile.

That does indeed seem to be a fair ammunition usage for the different calibres though and this tested the guns` material qualities…
But if not that, as you say, a lack of experience with them was perhaps more significant.

Those ammo usage figures are for the campaign, by the way, not just Koniggratz. I think poor performance for the guns during the war is due largely to:
Short range of 12pdrs.
Practice of replenishing ammunition off line.
Difficulty of finding their place in the line of March.
Batteries not attached to divisions or brigades are usually to be found at the rear of the columns, and so come into action late, if at all.

I assume the lightening of the 4pdr would facilitate it replacing the light 12pdrs in the Horse Batteries between 1867 and 1870?

Mollinary.

Re. the faults in the 4 pdr design, I found some reference to this on pages 18-19 of The Battle of Koniggratz: Prussia's Victory Over Austria, 1866 By Gordon A. Craig.

"These…had imperfect breech mechanisms, and five of them exploded during the campaign, which had deleterious effects upon battery morale out of all proportion to the number of incidents of this kind."

This was from a restricted view on google books – but I`ve ordered the book now on Amazon.

Mike.

Mike,

Craig is well worth it, but the bible is Dennis Showalter's Railroads and Rifles, which looks at the influence of technical developments on German Unification. The paperback is currently reprinting, I understand, but if you can find as expand hand copy, grab it – you won't regret it!

Mollinary

Thanks for the recommendation!

Mike.

Of course, that should have been "a second hand copy". Don't you just love auto correct and predict software?

Mollinary

I like the idea of the Prussian artillery going off line in the middle of the battle.

Great help, Thank you Sirs.

Does anyone has the Nafziger OB for the Austrians too?

This might be interesting for you…
link

link

Greetings

Thanks Rudi,

I`ll have a look at these

The Nafziger one is at:

PDF link

Mike.

Hi MC,

I think Nafziger has got his number of battalions wrong. The norm for the Austrians is 3, not 2, per regiment. Bruce Weigle's 1866 has pretty good OOBs.

Mollinary

hi Mollinary,

I don`t have 1866 rules – or is this available as a free download somewhere ?

Mike

Sadly no! But a standard Austrian Brigade is seven battalions. Usually, but not always, with two 3 battalion line regiments and a Jäger battalion. Prochaska's Brigade in 3rd Corps is the most ad hoc, containing a 3 Battalion Grenz Regiment, the fourth, depot, battalions of two line regiments, and two composite jäger battalions put together from the depot companies of a number of other battalions.
The remains of Grivicic' brigade in Gablenz X Corps, were cobbled into 3 small battalions of Baron Airoldi, and one of Kaiser Alexander for Koniggratz, after the brigade was dispersed at Soor/Burkersdorf and lost many prisoners, including Grivicic himself.
Mollinary

Mike,

For the Prussian OOBs the ones listed in the appendcies of the German Staff History of "The Campaign in Germany 1866" are the best in my view. They not only provide the list of units, but laos give the order of march for the various corps and divisions, which gives an insight as to why the Prussian artillery performed so poorly at Konnigratz – they were too far back in the order of march. The Austrians on the other hand were deployed with all their guns forward and in dominating positions so that the Prussian batteries, coming into action piecemeal could not get fire superiority. In the end it was the nimbleness of their infantry and the stupidity of the Austrian commanders that won the day. The more I study the period 1864-1870 the more I am convinced that it was tactical doctrine rather than technology that influenced the outcome of the 1866 and 1870 wars.

Hi Mike, I largely agree with what you say, but think the distinction in your final statement is a bit artificial. Prussian tactical doctrine evolved in the way it did to maximise the advantages conferred by the Needle Gun, and minimise its disadvantages. Prussian doctrine with a standard muzzle loading rifled musket would not have worked. The fire discipline imposed by NCOs and junior officers dealt with the fear that a breech loader would lead to soldiers firing off all their ammunition in the first few minutes of a fight. The knowledge that their weapon allowed them to fire off four or five shots, or occasionally more, in the last 200yards of an enemy's advance gave them the confidence to apply the tactical doctrine of loose firing lines. I am not sure you can separate tactical doctrine and technology when it comes to the Prussian infantry.

Mollinary

Thanks Mark,

The best I could do was to bookmark the read online file. Being in the UK (I think) I can`t access a lot of google books` pdfs – I don`t suppose you could mail me a copy perhaps ?

Mollinary,

Mark will probably answer your post on technology v. tactical doctrine later ;-)

Thanks for your help gentlemen!

Regards,

Mike.

Mollinary I totally agree with you about the Prussian infantry. The ground breaking fire tactics the used would have been utterly impossible without the development of the breech loading rifle and against the densely packed Austrian columns they were devastating. The tactics were less effective against some of the Austrian allies that did not subscribe to "Stosstaktik". The Saxons gave as good as they got at Koniggratz, inflicting 1,590 casualties while suffering 1,075 themselves (disregarding prisoners in both cases). At Kissingen the Bavarians inflicted more killed and wounded on the Prussians than they suffered themselves (similar results occurred in other actions in the western campaign). Indeed there were occasions where Austrian Jägers held their own against the Prussians. I think there is a reasonable argument here that a flawed doctrine on the Austrian part contributed every bit as much to the Prussian success as did the technology change.

However, in the case of the artillery technology failed to deliver a winning edge. There can be no doubt that the Krupp gun was a superb weapon for the day, but breech loading technology for artillery could not provide the game changer without three still to be developed techniques or technologies. First was the technique of indirect fire. Second was the development of a proper recoil system. Third, and most critically of all, was the replacement of black powder with a more powerful and smokeless propellant. Without those three revolutionary changes, all that technology really offered the artillery was a series of incremental improvements over Napoleonic weaponry.

The Prussians recognised the failure of their artillery in 1866 and corrected the faults in time for 1870. Apart from improvements to the breech mechanism, those corrections were purely doctrinal – keep the batteries forward in the order of march, allow them to operate outside the constraints of the infantry commanders and in masses that suited the situation. The result was that in most of the actions in 1870, almost from the moment the action was joined, the Germans were able to bring greater quantities of guns to bear on the weaker French artillery formations and either drive them from the field or silence them.

Mike

For more information on the structure if the different armies in 1866, this work provides some interesting information.

link

For detail on the Austrian North Army, look in the appendix, page 59 onwards (PDF page 282 onwards)

Stracm,

Great posts. Can't fault your analysis at all. And agree it was the combination of Austrian and Prussian doctrine that procured such an explosive result. All your artillery points are spot on. I am sure that the largest factor in success during the FPW was concentration and superior number of guns rather than their technological superiority. Good find, OK on the net. my hard copy cost me an arm and a leg!

Mollinary

Yes, thanks for the link Mark !

To answer your original question Michael, the proportion of smooth to rifled was six sixteenths. The breech mechanism on the 4pdr was – according to craig (need to check HIS reference) – faulty; there was also a problem with the sight which moved each time the gun was fired; also rectified. The other problems already identified were more significant; unfamiliarity with the weapon and poor doctrine.

Hi Ramming,

Unfamiliarity with the new weapons may have been a big factor, but looking to Konnigratz in particular, the Austrians had previously been able to "mark" the ranges there somehow (it`d be nice to know how they did this).

The choice of position was not that bad after all, as the shorter ranges were more favourable to the Austrians – or rather the fields of fire chosen did not favour the Prussian pieces.
So, the Prussians had to deploy under fire; within range of the Austrian guns… that`s not quite an example of poor Prussian doctrine – and whether their guns were at the front or back of their columns, or whether they were army or corps resources, they had no choice but to do this ?

Marking ranges; pacing distances from battery position to prominent landmarks and marking up your map accordingly; also 'barking' trees ie stripping the bark from the aspect of a big tree facing the battery whose distance you have calculated etc.

The choice of position was good, the Austrians had used this area for manoeuvres in the past so the more senior officers and NCOs would be familiar with the ground. Also the Austrian's chief gunner hadn't been idle (unlike his superior) in the two days they occupied the Koniggratz position and had done a thorough recce; the Austrian artillery used the ground to excellent effect.