"Bergen-op-Zoom 1814" Topic

I have just finished reading Andrew Bamford's book on this: a Bold and Ambitious Exercise (reviewed on my blog here: link

I find this an intriguing battle. The British got into the fortifications at three points, achieved numerical superiority then lost the plot, resulting in disaster. It has been largely written out of history as a result.

Has anybody attempted this as a wargame? It would be hard work – from recreating the terrain to simulating the fog of war. But it looks a nicely balanced and exciting scenario.

Found this online link

Thanks. Interesting Bamford would challenge some of this – especially the diversionary attack starting too early (the Guards were late…).

I suspect a bit of rewriting of accounts to protect the reputations of certain well-connected officers!

Other points are fairer, and the maps are clearer than the book.

link doesn't work

Some comments on the Battlefield Review article I posted:

It notes that Graham's expedition was conceived and sent to capture Antwerp before the Prussians. Then it complains that Bulow leaves them in the lurch. If one side is making moves based on post-war political considerations then the author should not be surprised when the Prussians do the same. Also, Blucher had taken a pounding from Napoleon and needed reinforcements badly.

The article notes the British expedition has no artillery. I assume they mean siege artillery since it goes on to state that the British have two batteries of field artillery, about right for 4500 infantry. Later the article says Graham has 6000 troops, which confuses me. But I posted the link…

I assume the timing problems had to do with the inferior timepieces of 1814. Synchronizing watches is something I think that starts on the Western Front of the Great War a century later.

Game ideas: have 4 or 5 places where the British can attack. Have the French player assign defenders and write them down. Have the British do likewise. Then have the British roll dice to see when each column jumps off. There should be a 1 in 4 chance of a column falling into panic and delaying for up to an hour. Each unit within a column should dice to jump off. The die roll to activate the unit should be penalized if the column commander is down. All column COs should lead their attacks. That's off the top of my head, based on the article.

You could play with the historical attack and also with Graham bringing up his other division before the attack. Would the British Guards also count as poorly trained?

And more: 1 in 4 chance that one of the moats won't be frozen over, discovered only when the storming party tries to cross under fire.

Sorry about the failed link. Try this:
link

Note to self: test links while you can still correct them.

I hadn't read the article closely, so missed those points. Quite fair about Bulow – he'd been quite open that his strategic interests lay elsewhere, and it was something that he helped an attack on Antwerp at all.

And the point about artillery just isn't true. Graham did have artillery, including siege guns, available. He chose not to use them, since he felt that the best way to gain entry was a swift escalation of the walls, for which surprise was of the essence. This judgement proved sound.

I get suspicious of any account that concludes failure occurred because of bad leadership at all levels. Such conclusions usually arise from a failure to judge the evidence critically enough. Graham made some bad calls, but came quite close to success. If he'd succeeded he would have been judged a hero.

Interesting thoughts on how to set up a game. For players that want to have 17th-18th century fortifications at the centre of a game this would be an interesting one – and on a more playable scale than most sieges.

Graham had little if any resources. If you look at the pitiful siege train then that gives you a reason enough for the escalade. It was only the first attempt and a month later, Graham with better resources would have succeeded.

The quality of the regiments were poor. They were the scrapings of the scrapings. Most were 2nd battalions and the Guard battalions was raised from the depot bns.

I am currently finishing a book looking at the Light Infantry during the campaign as the second volume of the Shorncliffe Lectures. The 2/52nd had very little to do with the escalade. The 95th were not present.

Andrew Bamford has been very helpful to us sorting out the confusion in the OOB for the other part of the campaigns.
Stephen

Graham probably did have the resources if he'd been able to mobilise them. His men were scrapings but contained a core of veterans – they had fought well enough at Merxem (though different regiments mainly, to be fair). The French did not exactly have the pick of the bunch either!

I think more to the point was that the plan was too hastily put together. An extra day, even, to pre-position the forces and brief the officers would have helped. The attack plan was underdeveloped. They seemed to assume that the French would give in as soon as the fortress was penetrated. Why didn't the Guards fight through to the Antwerp gate and let reinforcements in? Or even themselves out. Cooke and Proby did not seem to be up to the situation.

Why didn't the Guards fight through to the Antwerp gate and let reinforcements in? Or even themselves out. Cooke and Proby did not seem to be up to the situation.

IIRC (read the book last year) the Guards got in, but instead of pushing into the town immediately they waited for dawn. This was due to pressure applied on the commander by another Guards officer who out-ranked him socially (not militarily). The concern was that the Guards were too precious to waste and the confusion that night might have led to mishaps.

also try google books for

British Minor Expeditions 1746 to 1814, volume 2

Dear Mathew
Graham had neither the resources, men or leadership to be successful against a resolute garrison. Less then 3000 were part of the escalade against a garrison 1.5 times the size. The artillery supplied were mainly old Dutch pieces that they did not have the ammunition for. Most of the mortars after a days firing were out of service.
Stephen

Dear Stephen
I will agree that the attack was foolish without more troops to hand. But your sources seem to disagree with Andrew Bamford's analysis.

According to him the storming parties were 4,000 in total – 3,000 were lost but the others managed to get out. In addition further units were brought up during the night and could have been sent in, especially if the Antwerp Gate had been taken. The French had about 2,700 men.

As for ordnance, these weren't part of the plan. In the attack on Antwerp the British had 12 siege pieces, plus 13 supplied by the Dutch, most of which (the exception 3 Gomer mortars) was of little use, as you say. More artillery may have become available after this, but most of the reinforcements couldn't be landed because of ice at the time of the attack.

My personal opinion is that more vigorous leadership from Cooke and Proby, who led the Guards, would have secured victory, though at a high cost.

In future wargames I will downgrade the initiative of British Guards formations!

Matthew