"Crimean War - Did all close-order troops form in 2 ranks?" Topic

I'm thinking of starting out on gaming the Crimean War but have realised I am ignorant of the basics. By the time of the conflict were all close-order troops using a 2-rank line or did any nations still form up 3-deep?

Can anyone recommend any good books on organisation and tactics for the period?

The basic formation was internationally the two deep line, but there were variations in usage. The Russians still favoured massive columns almost as deep as they were wide while the British went to the other extreme and asked no more of their infantry than that they 'marched like wall and swung like a gate' with constant halting to dress the lines.

Thanks Artilleryman. Were the Russian columns like Napoleonic columns – really more like a succession of lines a couple of companies wide – or were they dense masses of men (the way columns tend to be depicted on wargames tables)?

The Russian Army in the Crimea –

Infantry, except for rifle battalions (which formed two ranks), were deployed in three ranks. Of the four companies in each battalion, one was a grenadier or carabinier company which was divided into two halves: the first half stood on the battalion's right flank, while the second half was on the left flank. Infantry was armed with smoothbore percussion muskets.

The principal infantry manoeuvres consisted of a variety of close-order formations. Columns were formed by tactical division, platoon, and half-platoon; at full interval, close interval of sub-units for the attack column, or at half interval. Columns could be formed one kind from the other. All of these columns could form into a square, of which there were almost as many kinds as there were columns.

Skirmish order was much less complicated and thus less practiced. Exercises were always done on level ground, and there was no practice in using terrain. All aspects of training which served to develop a soldier's agility, such as gymnastics and fencing, were at this time considered superfluous.

Hope this helps

I did read an account by a British officer at the battle of the Alma who watched advancing Russian columns in large unmanoeuverable masses. When ordered to fire the front rank lowered their muskets and fired straight ahead while the other ranks merely fired in the air as they did not have enough room to level their muskets but yet they obeyed the order to fire. This certainly suggests large dense columns.

Thanks Broglie. It seems as if things in the Russian army were very much as they were in the Napoleonic era (which is good news for me as I was already planning to use my Russian infantry in forage caps and overcoats as stand-ins for the Crimea).

With regard to the firing at the battle of Alma, it sounds like yet another reason why you wouldn't want to be in the front rank. Even if they are firing in the air, having a whole column of men behind you discharging their muskets sounds like a recipe for disaster.

When you read the accounts of the Russians in the Crimea it seems that they were trying to adopt the two rank formation in line but in reality, their officers were 'herding' their troops rather than leading them. In times of stress they tended to 'clump' together and become 'a mass', congregating around their officers and NCOs. The strange manner of the columns firing produced a normal 'danger zone' directly to the front of the formation and a second 'beaten zone' to the rear of the targeted enemy. I have also seen speculation that the Russian soldiers were so used to their deep formations (as wide as deep) they thought that the approach of a British battalion in line was the first ranks of a truly huge unit.

Broglie, Artilleryman, nice detail about the Russians. Do you have equivalent information about the French or the Turks?

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!
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I think the curved trajectory of Minie rifle bullets, the propensity of soldiers to aim high and the deep Russian columns may explain the heavy Russian casualties in the field battles of this war. Stuff going over the first line in the column might easily drop into the second or third company, especially if they are formed at half or full interval.

The French were in two ranks in the field and relied very much on 'dash and elan' rather than fire and movement within the infantry. Fire support came from the small and handy 'batteries of four'. This was based upon their experiences in Algeria etc. In many cases, the French were upon the Russians before they could form up properly. I believe the Turks followed the French as much as they could but not as effectively. With good leadership they could be very stubborn in defence.

ChrisBBB

I do not have as detailed information about the French and I know nothing about the Turks.

The French used their skirmishing Chasseurs a Pied very effectively shooting down the Russian gunners outside canister range. From what I have read it seems that the French infantry could operate equally comfortably in either column or line.

The British operated strictly in line and in no other formation (except passing through narrow points of course).

The French infantry made heavy use of column of divisions in the Italian War of 1859 and in many occasions In the Franco-Prussian war so it is reasonable to assume that they did so in the Crimea.

ChrisBBB there is that new Partisan Press book on the Ottoman Army in Crimea. Maybe it has info?

Lads -the Turks were armed with smoothbore muskets. At Alma they were packed up with the French. At Balaclava, the British and thereafter nobody wanted them. Darn near everything anybody did was Napoleonic in Nature. I assume they were in columns as well.

The Turks had a zero reputation in the Crimea but they did stop the Russians in the Caucasus after all without any outside help so they can not have been that bad.

Also Stracm – I have never read of any occasion where the French used columns during the Franco Prussian War. I would be genuinely be interested to know of any cases.

Broglie, the standard formation for French infantry, at least at the beginning of the war, was two companies forward in skirmish order, with two companies formed to ther rear in line abreast with two further companies in line abreast to the rear. A formation formally titled column of division at full intervals. There are many examples at Froeschweiller almost all of Raoult's division, and a big part of Ducrot's as well, adopted this formation when they depoyed. The attack against the Germans on Calvary Hill and Marie's Brigade attack being two examples that come to mind immediately. This formation was the standard for the Germans too. Nearly every battalion attack from Spicheren to to Gravelotte was delivered by battalions formed in half battalion columns at either half or full distance.

With the dispersal between successive lines that is barely a column, more like firing line, supports and reserve.

Are there any good books that cover the tactics of the era, for example covering the Crimean War through to the Franco-Prussian War? I've got a couple of books on tactics in the ACW that tangentially mention what went on in Europe but haven't found anything dedicated to the European conflicts.

Stracm

Many thanks for that explanation but rather like Martin Rapier I had not interpreted these formations as columns in the Napoleonic sense.

As far as the Turks are concerned: good tip about the Partizan Press book, I may add that to my library. I already have a few books – it was just easier to ask!

But I have now had a look on the shelves. Essentially I think Nashville is right, their tactics were Napoleonic in nature. The gist of it is that in the two decades leading up to the Crimean War, the Ottoman army was transformed from an Asiatic C18 version into "something approaching a European army of the post-Napoleonic period". (Allen & Muratoff, p58.) Scores of European officers were involved in training the new nizams, including one von Moltke, as well as assorted Brits, Hungarians, Poles etc.

On troop quality, Allen & Muratoff say this about Kurudere (p79): "The Turkish nizams, particularly the Syrian battalions [perhaps a legacy of Moltke's influence?? purely my idle surmise], fought with great courage; the fire of the new Turkish rifle battalions was excellent [these were recently French-trained and French-equipped, so perhaps used current French tactics]; the new regular cavalry units attacked with boldness and a spirit of sacrifice; and the guns were served competently but with a certain lack of mobility".

The initial Turkish contingent in the Crimea comprised second-line esnan and redif levies, most with just 3 months' service, not regular nizams. (Badem, p189, 272, 275.)

Although Turkish troops generally were not very well trained, Turkish inadequacies had a lot to do with the limitations of their higher command. They relied a lot on foreign advisors and soldiers of fortune of varying competence. Turkish generals themselves were poor. The army in the Caucasus was led by Zarif Pasha, an administrator who was appointed despite his protestations of not being qualified. The Turkish force in the Crimea was commanded by Mirliva Suleyman Pasha, who had spent the last 12 years as superindendent of a tannery, and whose major qualification was that he was prepared to accept a job that no other officer wanted.

Plenty more that could be said, but perhaps that's enough for now.

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!
link

References
Allen & Muratoff, "Caucasian Battlefields"
Badem, "The Ottoman Crimean War (1853-1856)"

"Are there any good books that cover the tactics of the era, for example covering the Crimean War through to the Franco-Prussian War?"

It is very difficult because it was a period of enormous change in weaponry and tactics, made even worse by some countries response by reorganising the fight the previous war only to get trounced again and make yet more poor choices.

At the start of the period you essentially have Napoleonics with rifled muskets and at the end you have proto-WW1 tactics with breechloading rifles. They just had't quite invented magazine rifles and QF artillery yet. In the middle, all kind of exciting experiments involving combinations of shock and firepower. Very, very exciting if asked to conduct a storm column assault into a hail of needlegun fire.

A very general survey is something like Glovers 'Warfare from Waterloo to Mons', otherwise you are going to have to delve into specifics of indvidual campaigns and armies. The French Army of 1870 was very different to that of 1859, and different again to 1853.

By the late 1870s most people had figured out how to do stuff properly with breechloading weapons, the Russo-Turkish War actually looked quite modern. The fact the British Army chose to wear picklehaubes gives a clue as to who everyone copied.

A fairly accessible source of information on organisation and tactics are the support notes for Bruce Weigle's fine rules '1859', '1866' and '1870'.

Otherwise, the usual recommendations of general reading on the Crimea, Wars of Italian Liberation, Wars of German Unification and FPW.

Interesting observations of what it was actually like on the ground, as well as the behaviour of units in combat are to be found in Ardent du Picqs 'Battle Studies'. Somewhat shorter than it might be as he was killed in the FPW. Available for free on a Kindle or PDF reader near you now:)

Nearly every battalion attack from Spicheren to to Gravelotte was delivered by battalions formed in half battalion columns at either half or full distance.

Any details on how the half-battalion columns were formed? Thank you for the info. I have seen plenty of diagrams of the Prussian company columns but nothing on French formations. This is a great thread.

@Martin Rapier

Thanks Martin. I've just started doing some general reading on the Crimean War so I will work my way forward from there. I'm surprised no one has done an overview of the tactical developments during the 19th century – it seems like fertile ground for a military historian.

Azar Gat, "The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century".
link

I haven't looked at my copy in years so I can't tell you how much tactical detail it gives, but I do remember it's well worth reading.

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!
link

Thanks Chris. I'll see if I can get hold of a copy.

Broglie, I suppose the point here is that all columns are nothing more than a series of supporting lines – company lines for column of companies or pairs of companies in the case of column of divisions. What defines the density of the column is the distance between the company lines. In all drill from the Napoleonic times to well past 1870 battalions would commonly form in company column at either full, half, quarter or no intervals (the latter often being referred to as close column). In theory the full interval was equal to the frontage of the company, half interval was half the company frontage and so on. In the heat of battle defining that interval must have been very difficult.

The distance between the company lines was at the discretion of the battalion commander and it would be reasonable to say that the further away from the point of action the greater the gap would be, but as the moment of collision became closer, the column would close up. A close column was very difficult to control other than to move directly forward – it could be likened to a large crowd leaving a football match through the gates of the ground…men just bunch up and it all gets very confused very quickly. Maintaining the gap between the company lines was vital.

The fact remains that the French went to war in 1870 with a mixed tactical doctrine. On one hand they had adopted a defensive doctrine that made the best use of the Chassepôt rifle. On the other hand was what to do once the enemy advance faltered, and the answer was drawn straight from the manuals of the 1850s – at them with the bayonet as fast as possible sometimes in Napoleonic type columns. This is not to say that the tactic was successful, in fact quite the opposite – each attempt invariably ended in a bloody mess.

Thanks Stracm.

As is mentioned in other posts above, there is a need for some good books on the tactics of this period.

Regards

Broglie, I have a book on the FPW that I have been working on for a long time covering the battles of Wissembourg, Spicheren and Froeschweiller. While this is not a study of tactics it is a tactical study – down to company level where applicable. It is almost finished – just needs a few maps to be redrawn and some of the statistical tables to be completed. I would like to think that it will be ready for publishing in the middle of 2015.

Starcm,

This is very interesting. How will the book be published – will it be available also as pdf download, on kindle, or similar perhaps?

Mike.

Mike, it will be published through Amazon Create Space in paper and Kindke formats.

If you read French, some some of the reglement manoeuvre d'infanteire are on Google scholar.

Stracm

I hope you will post here when the book is released.

Regards

Mark,

Please drop me a line at:
contact@grandmanoeuvre.co.uk
perhaps I can help you out a little here?

Have a great Christmas btw !

Regards,

Mike.