redcoat | 16 Dec 2014 3:41 p.m. PST |
Hi all, Friend of mine insists Britain and France could have launched military operations to drive Japan's forces out of Manchuria in 1931-32, acting on behalf of the League of Nations, had they really wanted to. I say, I agree that the main reason they didn't was the lack of real interest in stopping Japan. But, in the event they had wanted to, from where would they have launched their ops? He says, from their main regional bases, in Singapore and Vietnam. I say he's living in fantasy land. Who's right, and why? Cheers all, Redcoat |
zippyfusenet | 16 Dec 2014 4:21 p.m. PST |
According to the 3:5:5 strength ratios mandated by the naval treaties, the Royal Navy, with French support, should have been able to take the Japanese Navy, and that should have won the war. But why would any sane Admiralty have wanted to go nose-to-nose with the Japanese? There would have been a serious price to pay. |
John the OFM | 16 Dec 2014 7:51 p.m. PST |
Who gave a flying fart about Manchuria back then? Besides the MAnchurians, of course, and the Russians who had "interests". |
Skeptic | 16 Dec 2014 8:05 p.m. PST |
Those would have been long supply lines, extending past the Japanese possessions of Taiwan/Formosa, Korea, and Port Arthur… Is this thread really about post-1946…? |
rmaker | 16 Dec 2014 10:06 p.m. PST |
Why Singapore? I would think that Hong Kong would have been better placed. |
Durrati | 17 Dec 2014 7:15 a.m. PST |
Britain and France would have most definitely wanted the Japanese conquest not to have happened – they were just not able to do anything about it. The US were even more committed to the policy of Open Door in China, were far better placed to carry out some kind of military action against Japan and chose not to, why does your friend think Britain and France were in a position to do something that a far more powerful US could or would not? The most humorous thing in all this was not even the Japanese government wanted the conquest of Manchuria to take place but had to accept it as a fait accompli after the fact (like the US, GB and France)….. |
Fatman | 17 Dec 2014 3:36 p.m. PST |
We could have stopped Mussolini from taking Ethiopia; allowed Republican Spain to purchase weapons on the international market and, probably with a show of force, have stopped the German invasion of Czechoslovakia. We didn't. Because we didn't think it was important enough to take the risk. Could we have stopped Japan? Less likely. It was a long way away. In an area we had little interest in. It would have taken co-operation with the French, yeah right. If we wouldn't take a risk on our doorstep why would we so so far away? Fatman |
Fatman | 17 Dec 2014 4:21 p.m. PST |
On the other hand in a straight stand up fight I don't know. Japan hadn't yet honed it's naval air arm into mighty sword it would become. In fact British companies and officers were instrumental in getting the force started. Ship for ship French and British were slightly outclassed but they would probably have had the numbers. Of course the majority of the RN and French navies would have been in the wrong place and I find it hard to believe the Japanese would have sat on their hands and let the allies get all there ducks in a row. I would expect the local bases to get a few short sharp visits from the IJN Don't forget Singapore's big guns didn't go in until 1935. So no I don't think we could really have done it without far too many things going right for us and the Japanese doing noting right. Fatman |
Lion in the Stars | 17 Dec 2014 7:36 p.m. PST |
There might have been a chance to intervene successfully, especially as the Type 93 Long Lance torpedoes were not introduced until 1933. Long Lances were the "long-range" gun of the IJN. |
Fatman | 17 Dec 2014 9:16 p.m. PST |
Doh forgot about the Long Lance, yeah another one of the Japanese force multipliers which were not in place. Fatman |
redcoat | 18 Dec 2014 7:19 a.m. PST |
The US were [far more powerful and] … far better placed [than Britain and France] to carry out some kind of military action against Japan and chose not to. How so more powerful and better placed? The US was in the throes of the Depression and its armed forces were surely piddling compared to the mighty armies and fleets raised for the total-war struggle against the Axis powers a decade later. From where would the US have mounted its ops – Pearl Harbour? Surely the only power that had the smallest chance of success was the USSR – precisely because it shared a land border with Manchuria? |
Durrati | 18 Dec 2014 2:59 p.m. PST |
More powerful because its fleet was as large as GBs but as Japans navy was identified as its main enemy it would have been able to concentrate its entire fleet in the pacific in the event of a war with Japan – especially if GB gave assurances about its attitude. Which GB was more than willing to give. Making friends with the US if at all possible was key to British naval policy between the wars – they quite happily dumped the Japanese alliance because the Americans did not like it. Better placed – because not only the US but the world was in the throes of the depression, so that is the same for everyone. Its army might have been piddling compared to a decade latter – but so was GBs. Base for the ops – yes, Pearl Harbour. The main fleet base for the US fleet. This is far better placed for a war with Japan than Scapa Flow, which was the main fleet base for the Royal Navy. Oh and don't forget the excellent and well defended harbour in Manila. Also, the US fleet had a very clear and worked out operational plan for an attack against Japan. Where as the British Fleet did not, nor of course did the French fleet. So the US fleet, the joint most powerful fleet in the world was concentrated in the pacific, had identified Japan as it main enemy, had access to well placed, developed and defended harbours and a clear well worked out plan of action against Japan. The British Fleet was the joint most powerful fleet in the world but was concentrated in the North Sea, did not envisage Japan as a main threat and would have to have sailed half way around the world to a base (Singapore) that was not yet fully developed and not yet fortified and had no plans in place to be able to do so. So yes I would say the US were far better placed to put military pressure on Japan. The thought that Britain had the capability to have done so is a nonsense to be honest. Pre 1921 the British plan to protect its interest in the Pacific and far East was the Japanese Alliance. When they got rid of this through the Washington Treaties their plan was to hope that the fact there their interests and aims were so closely in line with those of the United States that the US would act if these interests were threatened. As a plan it was a weak one but when you view the size of the Empires commitments against the reality of its power it was probably the best one that could be come up with in the circumstances. |
Durrati | 18 Dec 2014 3:06 p.m. PST |
'Long Lances were the "long-range" gun of the IJN.' This is not true. The "long range" gun of the IJN were in fact its long range guns. The IJNs basic doctrine both pre and post the adoption of the 'long lance' was that victory at sea would be secured by the battle line – with a doctrine of engaging in a gun fight at longer ranges than potential enemies could. The role of light forces with torpedoes was to launch initial night attacks to atrite the enemy's battle fleet before the Battleships moved in to win victory during the day. OK this was probably unrealistic – but the idea of the primacy of the battle line was shared by all the worlds major naval powers throughout the 30s so cant really hold Japan up as an example of backward thinking. |