"Penetration and Tank Damage" Topic

I just finished reading Yeide's book "The Tank Killers: A History of America's World War II Tank Destroyer Force". There were a lot of references to AARs taking place during 1944-45 that talked about the tank destroyers knocking out Panthers in addition to Mk IVs and other vehicles. Given the penetration of the American 3" gun and the armor of the Panther, it seemed like it was happening quite a bit, and perhaps more than it should.

Similarly, Zaloga's "Panther vs Sherman" describes an encounter between Shermans armed with 76mm guns and a platoon of Panthers on Dec 24th, 1944, near Freyneux, Belgium. Based on the description of the fight and a study of the maps of the area (both book and on Google Maps), it looks like the Shermans were facing the front or front quarter of the Panthers. At most, they were maybe 45 degrees to the side. The Shermans knocked out two Panthers and forced the other two to withdraw. Again, not an impossible thing, but still a long shot.

As far as I can tell, there are a couple possibilities here:
1. Everyone got lucky.
2. The vehicles were mis-identified and were Pz IVs instead of Panthers.
3. The Americans were able to get side shots at the Panthers.
4. The Americans used HVAP.

It also makes me think that armored combat is a lot less "binary" that we usually think. In most games, only shots that penetrate do damage, and usually "damage" is either some form of suppression or knock out. Is it possible that tanks can suffer meaningful damage, which I take as enough to cause them to abandon the vehicle, without a penetration?

Is it possible that tanks can suffer meaningful damage, which I take as enough to cause them to abandon the vehicle, without a penetration?

You do not need to penetrate the armour in order to damage the tracks and/or track wheels and immobilise the vehicle. This can make the crew quite nervous, since it makes them a sitting duck that can not seek cover and that can get outflanked. In game terms, maybe a morale check to see if the crew bails out could be appropriate?

Damaging the main gun might make the crew reconsider continuing to fight against an armoured opponent that they can no longer hurt. That said, doing it might require quite a bit of luck.

Other than that, tankies certainly dislike being inside a vehicle where the engine has caught fire (or they think it has caught fire). Stowage catching fire or even a simple smoke grenade on the engine deck (again, easier said than done) might be enough to make them think that the tank might be going up in flames soon.

HVAP is quite likely by Dec 1944. Not for every shot but if they ID'd a Panther they'd sure as sugar break it out.

Factor in that the crews would not be battle hardened veterans in the Panthers and even a few solid hits that did not penetrate and the crew could bail.

Plus Griefbringers points are all very valid.

I think we have a bias in our games towards the big cats and they come out invulnerable when in reality they seldom prevailed against good tactics and when outnumbered.

Much as I get excited about German AFVs it was a bad strategy to build them. More Panzer IVs would probably have been a better way to go. But then our games would lack the asymmetry that makes them interesting.

Bottom line – you need rules for AFV crew reaction and for immobilizing hits and critical hits. And not allow someone to park their 'uberpanzer' in the corner where no-one can hit it's flanks or rear!

Another possible factor is the crappy quality of late-war German armor. Sometime around the end of 1944 they lost their supply of nickel (or chromium or some other alloy, I can't remember which). Whichever it was, the lack of it made their armor very brittle, so that even non-penetrating hits would make large cracks in the armor. Enough cracks and the armor would fall apart, but I suspect the crew would have withdrawn or abandoned the vehicle by then.

Is it possible that tanks can suffer meaningful damage, which I take as enough to cause them to abandon the vehicle, without a penetration?

The Tiger tank at Bovington is a good example of this (from Wiki):

Tiger 131 was hit by three shots from 6-pounders from British Churchill tanks of A Squadron, 4 Troop of the 48th Royal Tank Regiment. A solid shot hit the Tiger's gun barrel and ricocheted into its turret ring, jamming its traverse, wounding the driver and front gunner and destroying the radio. A second shot hit the turret lifting lug, disabling the gun's elevation device. A third shot hit the loader's hatch, deflecting fragments into the turret. The German crew bailed out, taking their wounded with them and leaving the knocked-out but still driveable and largely intact tank behind.

Much as I get excited about German AFVs it was a bad strategy to build them. More Panzer IVs would probably have been a better way to go.

My understanding is that Panzer IV was not exactly optimised for effective mass production. This was not made any easier by having the designs re-vamped rather frequently during the war.

Many other German vehicles also leave room for improvement when it comes to production, reliability and logistics.

Some very good posts here so far! I offer no criticisms, but would like to take a few quotes as opportunities to expand on the details …

HVAP is quite likely by Dec 1944. Not for every shot but if they ID'd a Panther they'd sure as sugar break it out.

HVAP was actually not "quite likely" for US forces in ETO, but rather pretty rare. This was particularly true for tank battalions (a bit more common for TD battalions, but still rare).

For consideration of just how rare, the total production of US HVAP ammunition in 1944 was:
3-inch gun: 14,000 rounds (towed M5 and self-propelled M10 TDs)
76mm gun: 13,000 rounds (self-propelled M18 TDs and M4 76mm tanks)

Keep in mind that those numbers are the numbers produced, not issued to units. The time lag from production to availability in ETO was generally about 2 months. Production for HVAP only began in August, and ramped to the end of the year, so we might assume about 8,000 rounds total (4,000 for each caliber) out of the count were probably not yet issued in ETO by December-end. Still, a flow of a few thousand rounds per month into ETO would have been established by perhaps November…

By comparison, the number of APC rounds produced in 1944 for those guns was:
3-inch gun: 1,489,000
76mm gun: 3,729,000

So for an M10 TD unit, perhaps 1-2% of the AP ammunition they received in the last couple of months of 1944 might have been HVAP. If you were in an M18 TD unit you might have gotten about the same. So you might have received 3 or 4 HVAP rounds for each TD during December. Not 3 or 4 in each TD on the day of a given engagement (as most wargamers want to present), but 3 or 4 total, to be used in all the engagements you might have fought during December. Shoot them off in one action, and you might see many further actions before you got more.

If you were in an M4 tank unit, well, HVAP was a LOT less than 1% of AP rounds. In fact, most armored division tank battalions saw a few rounds, while a lot of independent tank battalions (attached to infantry divisions) never saw a single HVAP round in all of 1944.

The odds that you happened to have some available when you ran into Panthers in December of 1944 were not high. Certainly "possible", but not "quite likely".

That said, it was not necessary for a US 3-inch or 76mm gun to have HVAP in order to damage a Panther tank. APC had about a 1/3rd chance of damaging or destroying the tank if it hit the mantlet. HVAP improved those odds to about 2/3rds, and also provided a reasonable chance of penetrating the lower hull (a difficult target).

Neither round could reliably penetrate the glacis (main front slope). But a hit close to the MG ball or driver's visor might penetrate or cause spalling inside the crew compartment. Also the slope of the ground could be a contributing factor -- the Panther's glacis was not impervious based on the thickness of the armor, but based on the slope of the armor. If fired at from higher ground, or if the Panther happened to have a nose-down attitude (perhaps due to uneven ground, or a broken front tortion bar), then penetration of the glacis become possible.

Another possible factor is the crappy quality of late-war German armor. Sometime around the end of 1944 they lost their supply of nickel (or chromium or some other alloy, I can't remember which). Whichever it was, the lack of it made their armor very brittle, so that even non-penetrating hits would make large cracks in the armor.

Nickel was always in short supply. Germany had no indigenous sources of nickel … all was imported, mostly from Sweden. This was one reason the occupations of Norway and Denmark were so strategically important to Germany -- they safeguarded Germany's access to Swedish ore.

But nickel was not used in most armored alloys. The Tiger's armor was one place where nickel was used … the alloy used in Tiger armor was of unusually high quality. One of the reasons that the Tiger had such a reputation for being so hard to destroy was that the armored plate was not only thick, but of an alloy that was both high-hardness and high-toughness. Allied assessments of the Tigers captured in Tunisia clearly considered this, and concluded (quite correctly) that the Tiger would always be rare as it could never be built in large numbers due to the alloys in the armor.

But Panther (and Tiger II) did not use the same high-nickel alloy. Both were designed for ease / low-cost of production.

The alloying agent used in Panther armor that became difficult to access was Molybdenum. Russian, British and US testing of German armor plates in Panthers (and Tiger IIs by the Russians) traced the decline in Molybdenum over time and production lots. The Germans developed low-Mo alloys, but cracking was observed in test firings by both Russian and US sources. And it was observed in the field as well.

You do not need to penetrate the armour in order to damage the tracks and/or track wheels and immobilise the vehicle. This can make the crew quite nervous…

Damaging the main gun might make the crew reconsider continuing to fight …

Other than that, tankies certainly dislike being inside a vehicle where the engine has caught fire (or they think it has caught fire). Stowage catching fire … might be enough…

All true and appropriate statements. I might add that rounds that strike the target can sometimes do remarkable and unlikely things …the examples provided regarding Tiger 131 at Bovington providing at least one case of examples.

In wargaming we might dismiss these possibilities. If we use 1D6 or even 1D10 for our penetration or damage check, then the 20-to-1 longshot is not considered. But 4 or 5 tanks firing 8 or 10 shots each in an engagement make a 20-to-1 longshot quite possible.

Both British and US after action assessments of tank-vs-tank engagements showed that the side that out-numbered the opponent had a tremendous advantage. The numbers needed for assured success were a little more than 2 to 1 for the allies, and closer to 1.7 to 1 for the Germans. Anything less than that, and other tactical issues were likely to decide the event, the side that spotted and fired first being the most significant.

The differences in tactical proficiency, the advantages in armor and gunpower of the German tanks, the difference between attacking and defending … all of these factors might have contributed to the difference between needing a 2-to-1 vs a 1.7-to-1 edge. But that's about it. Every engagement where the allies had more than a 2-to-1 advantage, they won. Every engagement where the Germans had more than a 1.7-to-1 advantage, the Germans won.

Clearly the path to victory was getting more tanks to more battlefields. If you could achieve that, everything else became background noise.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Clearly the path to victory was getting more tanks to more battlefields. If you could achieve that, everything else became background noise.

"Quantity has a quality all its own" – I. Stalin

My understanding is that Panzer IV was not exactly optimised for effective mass production. This was not made any easier by having the designs re-vamped rather frequently during the war.

M4
M4A1
M4A2
M4A3
M4A4

Those were the major production variants of the Sherman medium tank.

None of those major variants were developed to change or improve the combat capabilities of the Sherman. All of them were variations in design done to expand the total manufacturing capacity that could be devoted to Sherman production.

Add on top of those the upgrading of the gun mantlet, the addition of applique armor plates, the re-design of the front slope, the implementation of wet ammo stowage, the upgrading of the gun, the addition of a commander's cupola, and the upgrading to HVSS suspension with wider tracks. Those upgrades can be compared to what was done for the Pz IV. But the 4 major production variants have no parallel in the German tank effort.

The only design variant of the Pz IV done for production was the J. This was a simplified H, removing some of the more man-hour intensive quirks of the design. It also removed the turret's power traverse, which might have saved cost but also reduced the J's combat efficiency.

The T-34m1940 was a very expensive tank to produce. Only the first upgrade, to the T-34m1941 (often called T-34/76b by German or British sources), was done to improve the combat capabilities of the tank. Four identifiable variants in 1941 through 1943 (called T-34/76c, d, e and f by German or British sources) were done primarily for production efficiency. Only when confronted with German Tigers and Panthers was an upgrade to the combat capabilities implemented, in the T-34-85.

It might be said that, when confronted with the nature of the war being fought, the German response was to focus on better tanks, while the American and Russian responses were to focus on better tank production. It is clear which was a war-winning approach, and which was not.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

"Quantity has a quality all its own" – I. Stalin

This phenomenon is often belittled, but profoundly true.

Pardon me for a brief exploration of the concept, stated in wargaming terms. All wargaming is in fact simplification of war. In this case I provide the grossest simplification even of wargaming, not to prove a point conclusively, but only to illustrate how quantity changes "the numbers".

Let us assume we have Side A, which has tanks that are 3 times more effective than Side B, and Side B, which has 3 times more tanks than Side A.

Would you say this is a fair match up?

I assert that Side B has the decisive advantage.

By way of illustrating …

Assume in our case that every time Side A fires, they kill with 100% of their shots. Every time that Side B fires, they kill with only 33% of their shots. Simplified, for sure, but it provides Side A with a clear 3 to 1 effectiveness advantage.

Side B has 30 tanks. Side A has 10 tanks. So side B has a clear 3 to 1 numerical advantage.

We will give Side A the tactical advantage. They fire first.

1st shot: 10 A tanks shoot, and destroy 10 B tanks. 20 B tanks remain.

2nd shot: 20 B tanks shoot, and destroy 6 A tanks (I have rounded to A's advantage). 4 A tanks remain.

3rd shot: 4 A tanks shoot, and destroy 4 B tanks. 16 B tanks remain.

4th shot: 16 B tanks shoot, and destroy 3 A tanks. 1 A tank remains.

5th shot: 1 A tank shoots and destroys 1 B tank. 15 B tanks remain.

6th shot: 15 B tanks shoot. The 1 remaining A tank is destroyed. Battle over.

Side A had tanks which were clearly 3x more effective in their capabilities. Yet when outnumbered 3 to 1, they achieved only 1.5 to 1 in their results.

If we don't give them the tactical edge, it is of course much worse! If we let Side B shoot first, it goes like this:

1st shot: 30 B tanks shoot, and destroy 10 A tanks. Battle over.

Now, if I were really a leader with this level of comparable numbers vs. capability, I would in fact send out 2 tanks at a time in 4 directions. One of those 2 tank units might be lost to 10 enemy tanks. Then I would send 22 tanks to fight those 10 enemy tanks. I would still win that battle, and 3 other battles where my units of 2 tanks faced no tank opposition. So the enemy would not lose only 1 battle, but 4 battles, even though his tanks were 3x better than mine, and I held only a 3x advantage.

The principle illustrated by this admittedly gross simplification goes far in demonstrating what happened to the Germans from 1943 to 1945. They had tactical skill, and weapons that seemed to convey great tactical advantage. They maintained a positive kill ratio. And yet they lost consistently, losing more battles, more territory, more population base, and more national resources than any army over any 2 year period in history.

They had a positive kill ratio, but no where near the level that the capabilities of their tanks would lead one to expect. Most of their defeats were in battles where allied armor was present and German armor was not, but they also lost most of the battles even when the German armor did show up.

Yes, quantity has a quality all it's own.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Hmmm … wondering if I ought to switch to decaf.

The Balleroy, Isigny and Shoeburyness firing tests are probably relevant to this discussion. I've lost my links to the original documents but I'm sure they are floating around somewhere. There is a summary here:
link

There's also a ton of discussion and theory regarding resistance of Panther glacis, possible flaws and weaknesses, etc, etc in Bird and Livingston's WW2 Ballistics: Armor and Gunnery.

One thing to keep in mind is that only the American tank and TD crews who were good or lucky (or both) survived to write those AARs. We might not be seeing a representative sample.

It is worth remebering that penetration figures even now are variable and exactly where you hiy is alrady a factor. I think figure of a standard deviation for moderen guns is about 4%. That meand the vaiation is quite likely plus or minus 10%. With older guns the deviation would be higher. That is on top of angle side armour etc.

Mark. excellent info. What are your sources? especially for ammo production.

Getting there first with the most!

The Balleroy, Isigny and Shoeburyness firing tests are probably relevant to this discussion. I've lost my links to the original documents but I'm sure they are floating around somewhere. There is a summary here:

It is rather well researched and written, isn't it? (blush)

Don't forget Part II, which goes beyond the test results and into the reality of US vs. German armor in ETO.

link

One thing to keep in mind is that only the American tank and TD crews who were good or lucky (or both) survived to write those AARs.

Yes, well the same might be said of German AARs. It is, after all, rather difficult to get AARs from non-survivors.

As to TD crews … it was not a rare or lucky TD crew who survived a combat engagement with German armor. As Harry Yiede points out in his book, US TD formations had exceedingly positive loss/kill ratios versus German armor. They were anti-tank specialists and excelled at their primary job (on the few occasions they were called upon to practice it).

But that said, much of the information described here is not from personal accounts, but from combat results. A battalion commander knows how many of his tanks survived combat, quite regardless of what he may or may not have available in first-hand accounts. And the operational research teams almost never relied on first-hand accounts. Rather, they used unit returns (how many tanks were fit/damaged/lost) to assess allied losses, and surveyed battlefield wrecks to assess enemy losses.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Good Point Mark1 – I should amend 'quite likely' to 'quite possible'(which is more what I was thinking) but thanks for the correction.

I did think they had more HVAP in normal tank units by late 1944. Never a lot to be sure but more than your figures imply.

What are your sources? especially for ammo production.

I fear to admit that I do not have the primary sources for those numbers. I received them from Rich Anderson, a noted historian and author, who was at that time employed by the Dupuy Institute. He had done the primary research on the topic in the National Archives.

I believe Steve Zaloga published similar numbers in his Osprey book on the Sherman 76. I will see if I can find it over the next day or two to double-check my recollection.

I did think they had more HVAP in normal tank units by late 1944.

The Brits managed to produce about 35,000 rounds of APDS for the 17pdr in 1944 (production started in June). Clearly they had a clearer appreciation of the threat posed by German up-armoring.

Production of US 76mm HVAP continued to accelerate in the first half of 1945, with about 2,000 rounds per week coming into ETO by the first quarter of the year. 3-inch HVAP (and all 3-inch ammuntion production) tailed off over that same time. By Korea, HVAP ammunition was the standard AP round for US Army tanks, and APC was the fall-back. But in 1944 it was a fairly rare "silver bullet".

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Didn't Panthers have issues with the quality of the front glacis plate, including quality of the face hardened steel and welds.??

The OR research re the outcomes of battalion sized tank battles in NWE was conducted by the British Army at the time. As Mark indicated, outnumber the enemy 2:1 and you win (barring gross disparities in crew skill, such as seen on the eastern front). Minor technical equipment differences in equipment only have a marginal impact on combat outcomes.

Clausewitz noted the same thing about Napoleonic warfare.

It is a bit more complex than that of course, but irl, flank shots are far more prevalent than in wargames just due to the general confusion and friction of combat, which massively reduces any transitory advantage of the Panthers frontal armour.

As one Churchill commander commented during a particularly desperate battle in Normandy 'The Panthers weren't so bad as you could work to a flank and knock them for six, but the Tigers were a complete sod'.

Although his regiment was largely destroyed during that battle, the Germans still lost.

Lots of interesting answers. Mark's numerical analysis is spot on. In addition, numbers allows you to weather streaks of "bad luck".

I always found it interesting that contemporary troops were more afraid of Tigers than Panthers, when, in pure game terms, Panthers are usually "better" (better gun, better armor, faster). The Soviet analysis mentioned in the World of Tanks article even stated that "Panthers had better mobility than Tigers, but were notably easier to knock-out." I assume that was due to the side armor of the Tiger. That tends to support Martin's point… side shots happened much more often in reality. It also supports the reports from the American TD units… perhaps they did achieve many more side shots than we, as gamers, normally assume.

Well, the whole idea of the SP TD's was maneuverability.

My 1st thought to the OP was spawling. If you've ever hit a window with a B.B. gun you'll see what happens to the opposite side. ( Oops. Sorry about that, Dad) LOL!
Injure or kill the crew and the Tank becomes an empty box.
PS. Decaf would deprive us of all those informative posts, Mark1 !

It might be said that, when confronted with the nature of the war being fought, the German response was to focus on better tanks, while the American and Russian responses were to focus on better tank production. It is clear which was a war-winning approach, and which was not.

After normalizing for air superiority, sea transport, industrial production capability, wealth, GDP, population, natural resources including oil and strategic metals, geography, Hitler's brain and ULTRA every approach would be a war-winning approach.

So in GW1, GW2 and the Arab-Israeli wars how did the approach to have more tanks than the other side work out?

I use side armor for the hit on a tank if the shooter is to the side of a line that goes from corner to corner of the target. My reasoning is that the target's front and side present an equal-sized target along that line and the shooter is going to pick the easier penetration of the side at that point. In this case the longer the tank is the easier it is to outflank it. Many other games I've seen use a 45 degree angle along the front of a vehicle which seems quite generous to me (though easy to measure).

Many, if not most of the dead Panthers I've seen in photos were penetrated from the sides. Granted, that is anecdotal evidence from just a small number of pics, but it probably is a good representation of how they were destroyed.

Mark's thought experiment with good and less-good tanks is known in naval warfare circles as Lanchester's Laws.

link

Over-simply put these maintain that effectiveness is exponentially related to relative numbers. So if a fleet of 10 ships fights one of 5 ships, the result will not be that both lose 5 ships. It will be that the weaker side loses all five and the stronger loses maybe 2. They are often wheeled out to explain why the IJN's super-battleships were a bad idea, but it works for tanks too. Quality differentials would alter the relative losses but unless very acute not the outcome.

It rather suggests the Warsaw Pact would have beaten NATO, disturbingly.

Mark's thought experiment with good and less-good tanks is known in naval warfare circles as Lanchester's Laws.

Thank you, 4th Cuirassier!!!! That "thought experiment" has held my attention for years. It defies my intuition and expectations. I have never been able to explain it, even as I have explored 5 or 6 different versions of the scenario. Now I have some of the mathematics behind the phenom!

From the Wiki link:

So a two to one advantage in units will quadruple the firepower and inflict four times the punishment, three times as many units will have nine times the combat ability and so on.

This is exactly the result my "thought experiment" produces!

Basically the greater the numerical superiority that one side has the greater the damage he can inflict on the other side and the smaller the cost to himself.

I really appreciate the link. A genuine "a ha!" moment for me!

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

After normalizing for air superiority, sea transport, industrial production capability, wealth, GDP, population, natural resources including oil and strategic metals, geography, Hitler's brain and ULTRA every approach would be a war-winning approach.

Ah, Mobius my friend, I fear you assume too much from the clarity of 20/20 hindsight.

First … the disadvantage of "Hitler's brain" : There is little reason to presume, a priori, that "Hitler's brain" would be any more of a disadvantage to the Germans than Stalin's brain would be to the Soviets. Or even than Churchill's brain would be to the Brits. In the cases of Stalin and Churchill, there were many major gaffes early in the war, many cases of the top leadership issuing directives that made no sense to the reality of the front lines, and many cases of the top leadership "dabbling" in the details, interfering with local command. The difference is that as times got worse, Stalin and Churchill learned to trust subordinates and let go of the details, while as times got worse for the Germans, Hitler became ever more distrustful, and ever more involved in the details. That said, I think the ultimate path of the war was set before those transitions.

It is the GDP/industrial capacity/population question that decided the war, but not so much what those totals were, but how they were applied. Here is the fascinating part, for me, on this particular topic. In 1942 Germany had access to MORE GDP/industrial capacity/population than Russia and Great Britain combined (with the exclusion of India, which while a large population was not at all industrialized nor called upon for large numbers of troops). The Germans understood tactics well, and practiced excellent operational doctrines (even though they had little understanding of what drove their success). But they had no practical understanding of the true nature of warfare in the industrial age. They worked at the micro level, not the macro level.

It was this difference in perspective in 1940/41/42 that drove the results of 1943/44/45. The Germans just didn't understand warfare the way the Soviets, Brits and Americans did. For all their pronouncements of "Totaler Krieg", they had no real idea what it meant.

I mention this because I so often see people making statements that just assume that Germany would be totally out-produced no matter what. That's simply not true. Germany was out-produced because of specific decisions made by the Soviets and the Americans to out-produce them, and specific decisions made (or not made) by the Germans to not out-produce the Soviets or Americans.

Yes, Germany could not have created more total industrial output than the US. But given the enormous resources needed by the US to build the largest navy and the largest merchant marine fleet that world has ever seen, requirements that the Germans did not face, there is little reason to conclude that Germany could not have produced more tanks or more bombers than the US. But when one looks at the Sherman production programs in detail, it is STUNNING how much clarity of purpose was present at all levels of political, military and industrial leadership, how many different decisions were made in so many places at so many levels by so many people, that allowed the US to out-produce the Germans.

There is no reason to assume that it was the natural order of things that Germany was out-produced in tanks. By the way this is also true of long-range bombers or fighters. The fact that Germany was overwhelmed by the production of these weapons of war was an intentional, deliberate and thoughtful result, not pre-ordained.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Great discussion but I would be careful to draw to sharp a conclusion re the 2:1 rule. Out numbered German tanks often won in North Africa as did occasionally out numbered US tanks in the Lorraine. Crew quality, manuver and luck can make a hash of such mathmatical formulas.

Another issue is flank shots and angles. Sure there were hits on the flank armor from the front quarter but generally at such a steep angle as to often improve protection. To be effective a flank shot must be a "true" flank. Even the "normal" (and actually hard to measure) 45 degrees is too generous to be a real flank shot (even a 30 degree angle increase effective armor thickness by 1.5; 60 degrees doubles protection).

Better technique is to reduce a tanks overall "armor" rating for weaker side armor. A Panther had only 40mm on the flank so a steep angled shot would be only 80mm effective armor (about M4 level). But a Tiger 1 with 70mm would double to 140mm – better than its front armor. For these reasons "effective" armor for Tiger I and Panthers should be similar.

I would be careful with Yielde's numbers they seem to be drawn exclusively from US sources (no double checking actual German loses).

TomT

So in GW1, GW2 and the Arab-Israeli wars how did the approach to have more tanks than the other side work out?

Out numbered German tanks often won in North Africa as did occasionally out numbered US tanks in the Lorraine. Crew quality, manuver and luck can make a hash of such mathmatical formulas.

More than just GW1, GW2, AIWs and North Africa, I would also look at France in 1940, and Barbarossa in 1941!

The "out numbered" often win. So how do we explain this?

The key word is "maneuver".

As the US Army came to emphasize in the Airland Battle doctrine, one of the keys to effective maneuver is the concentration of combat power in space and time.

Having a 3-to-1 advantage over the enemy's overall numbers does not help you if your enemy manages to maneuver such that he fights you with his own 2-to-1 advantage in 6 separate battles.

Take my grossly simplified model above, and break the side B force into 6 forces of 5 tanks, while the side A force fights with all 10 tanks in 6 separate battles. See the result!

This was key to the German Blitzkrieg era successes. The Germans concentrated their armor, the French and Russians did not.

The French did not concentrate due to their own doctrine of tanks as infantry support weapons. The closest the French had to a tank division was the DCR, which was by doctrine a higher echelon reserve formation intended to be applied in support of infantry divisions in the assault of German fortifications. Yeah, that didn't quite happen …

The Russians had enough tanks to both provide infantry support and operate large tank-heavy mech formations, but the combination of formations with vehicles of mixed mobility levels, and poor maintenance and C&C, meant that large tank formations almost never maneuvered and fought as coherent forces. So a Panzer Regiment might face 2 or 3 Soviet Tank Divisions in combat over 2 days, but it would occur as separate engagements against half a battalion at a time.

In the Western Desert, the whole "Desert Fox" mystique derived from Rommel's ability to concentrate his armor to strike disparate British units in succession one after the other, while avoiding combat when British forces were combined and superior in number.

The concentration of forces in space and time was one key emphasis of the Soviet "Operational Art" developed in 1943/44/45. German accounts of "endless Russian hordes" do not result from overall Red Army numerical advantages. Rather, they result from the Red Army's focus on massing overwhelming forces on the principal axis of advance by ruthlessly stripping forces from other parts of the front and masking their re-deployment to the axis of advance. This would have been a very dangerous practice if they did not retain a firm and un-broken hold on the initiative from mid-1943 onwards … having long and dangerously thin defensive lines is generally a bad idea unless you happen to be the one who chooses where the next battle will take place.

The Israeli and US forces in AIWs and GW1 & 2 can be seen as succeeding more due to force multipliers, rather than just effective concentration in space and time. Yes, both US and Israeli doctrines and practice concentrated forces effectively, but the more telling difference over their opponents were their use of tactics playing to the technical advantages of their equipment and training. For Israelis (depending on which engagement) this was often fighting long-range sniping duals from hull-down positions. For the US in GW1 it was often fighting in low-visibility conditions. When playing to the advantages of their equipment and training, in both cases they kept more of their forces effectively engaged while only a fraction of the opponent's force could effectively counter. Its not how many tanks you have on the table, but how many are shooting (or being shot at) that counts!

For both, there was also a very strong high level of tempo-of-operations doctrine involved, such that enemy forces often routed due to adverse morale rather than combat results. This is actually the greater contributor to the disproportionate ratios of the results for German achievements in France and in Barbarossa, for Israeli results in 1956 and 67, and US results in GW1 and 2. It is less of a contributor to the Western Dessert, or AIWs since 1972.

It rather suggests the Warsaw Pact would have beaten NATO, disturbingly.

If the Soviets had managed to "play their game" against NATO, particularly in the 1960s / early 1970s, I fear for what the results might have been. I believe they had the forces and the doctrine to give NATO a thrashing.

However, without the crucible of 1 or 2 years of war to purify the Red Army command echelons, the likelyhood of the Red Army actually succeeding in "playing their game" effectively and broadly was not very great. Looking at the actual performance of Soviet forces (and most critically Red Army commanders) in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan and Chechnya show some pockets of effectiveness, but overall uneven and rather low competence for the kind of game they would have sought to play.

Anecdotal assessments I have heard/read seem to suggest that British, French and German army forces were rather well trained and competent in those same periods. US Army forces … well perhaps I hear more criticisms because I know more US vets (what soldier doesn't like to complain?). But I am not a fan of US Army (or NATO) battle doctrine in the 1950s/60s. Attritional defensive combat relying on firepower superiority and delaying from successive positions, was not the way to beat the Warsaw Pact in Europe … IF the Warsaw Pact forces were "on their game".

Or so it appears to me. Could be wrong. Been known to happen. Always willing to learn where/when I am.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

And by the 1970s there were a lot more things that could kill tanks.

"So in GW1, GW2 and the Arab-Israeli wars how did the approach to have more tanks than the other side work out?"

As I said in my qualification, it is somewhat more complex than that, but given broadly comparable levels of of training and doctrine, numbers will win.

When those factors are not comparable, you get extremely asymmetric kill ratios such as seen in the Six Day War or in 1942/43 on the Eastern Front.

Stephen Biddles 'Military Power' examines on some detail the impact of tactical doctrine on combat outcomes, along with force ratios, force to space ratios etc and his analysis of Operation Goodwood and 73 Easting in particular are very penetrating.

Doctrine does of course influence the ability to achieve tactical superiority, but Lanchesters model is very flawed when it comes to determining the relative loss ratios from a particular engagement as it takes no account of target density. Lanchester does model the outcomes for many wargames rules well though, when one 'thing' shoots at another 'thing'. Bizarrely Clausewitzs description of tactical combat is closer to reality than Lanchesters.

More-tanks can defeat better-tanks, provided the more-tanks are at least somewhat competitive. I don't think WW2 would have gone quite so easily for the Allies if they had only been using Stuarts and T-70s against Panthers or even PzIVs.

The concentration of forces in space and time was one key emphasis of the Soviet "Operational Art" developed in 1943/44/45. German accounts of "endless Russian hordes" do not result from overall Red Army numerical advantages. Rather is was because the Soviets were able to concentrate a far greater amount of troops and supplies because a single implement – trucks. The Soviets forces were able to move much faster and greater quantities of men and supplies. This might of looked like Operational genius to some.

Back to the original reason of the thread. Yes, tank combat is less binary. There are a few places, though small, even supposedly impervious tanks can be damaged or destroyed. That is where the 'Law of Large Numbers' comes into play. They have to be hit a number of times to have a chance to find one of these places. Even Tiger IIs can be knocked out from the front by 75mm or 76mm guns. In one incident in France a few M10s hit and bounced off the front of a Tiger II 18 times. One shot hit on the ball mount MG such that fragments entered the tank and mortally wounded the hull gunner. The crew bailed out.

link
From above link:
Study of German war production data as well as interrogation of those who were in charge of rearmament at the time, leaves no doubt that until the defeat at Moscow German industry was incompletely mobilized and that in fact Germany did not foresee the need for full economic mobilization. German arms production during 1940 and 1941 was generally below that of Britain. When the full meaning of the reverses at Moscow became apparent the German leaders called for all-out production.

By September 1941 Hitler was so confident that he had succeeded in Russia that he ordered large scale cut-backs in war production.

After the defeat at Moscow early in 1942, armament production increased rapidly. However, such increase was more the result of improvements in industrial efficiency than of general economic mobilization. Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry and the average work week was below British standards.

Attritional defensive combat relying on firepower superiority and delaying from successive positions, was not the way to beat the Warsaw Pact in Europe

True, but that was all we trained to do….never once did an exercise my unit was involved in center on offensive operations. It all seemed to be 'hold on for long enough to get reinforcements from the US, then hope a tactical nuke or three stops them'

But back to the original post: way to much emphasis placed on penetration – it seems to be a wargamer's obsession (and a psychiatrist's). Fact is you do not need to pierce the armor to knock out a tank; spalling which maims and kills crew has been mentioned, vision blocks and radio antennas destroyed leaves it blind and deaf. And the biggest, baddest 70 monster runs on tracks held together with steel pins and washers that break for a past time even out of battle on a road march!

German industry was on a single shift basis……. and the average work week was below British standards.

Ah, but does that figure count the endless British tea breaks? :)

on the nice billiard tablewe play one tanks can mostly drive straight ahead. Even on tables with a lot of terrain it is still large features, because we cant make our tables at 1-1 with the minatures we use. Real armored vehicles shed tracks at the drop of a hat. So they stear around things that may make that happen. They also bog down pretty easy, so again the real drivers avoid ground that can cause that.

So a real tank looks more like a snake moving back and forth than the nice stright lines many love to see. Also why a lack of an opertunety fire mechanic can cause odd things to happenm. If you have little chance of penetrating the front, wait for a flank shot, you know one will be along in a minute.

Owen

Mark 1 do you know how those limited number of silver bullets where handed out? I imagine a real commander is not going to lret just every dummy get one. instead they are going to concentrate the limited number they have with the few best shots in the unit. So a company may only have 3-4, but they are all one the best gunner in the company.

And no, i have no WWII source to prove that., only that is how the US Army at least normaly operates, and I have a hard time believing they where taht much different in WWII. I have talked to enough vets over the years that i know many thingds then and now are the same.

owen

badger22: Makes sense, but it probably was up to each company or battalion commander to decide how to distribute his HVAP.

This has been a very interesting discussion. To me, it sounds like there are probably two main things at work here: side shots were somewhat common and significant damage can occur without penetration.

I have a few more questions, but I'll put them in a separate thread.

I did an analysis of the Panther frontal armor aspect to see the percentage of area covered by different armor and locations. I put a scale drawing into MS Paint and measured pixels length and width and put the numbers into a spreadsheet. The mantlet at 7.23% does not include the top or bottom part of the mantlet that is steep enough to bounce the round nor the area the gun covers. The Panther stores its ammo in the side sponsoons that can be hit from the glacis plate. The glacis plate % does not include the hull mg and ammo sponsoon locations. According to these figures a round has about a 12% chance to hit a surface steep enough to bounce a round with about 3% to bounce it off the mantlet bottom into the driver compartment. The areas that can bounce are the roof, turret sides that stick out, mantlet top and bottom and cupola.

I think this really shows the nuances of armored warfare and the unexpected things that can happen however remote. Unfortunately, it's pretty hard to have an accurate and playable system to simulate this.

Realistically the round will not hit in a 100% random area unless at long range. It will land somewhere around the aim point so generating a random number for hit location would not be realistic either.

I posted an image of the spreadsheet here:
link

I didn't have anyone to double check my figures so there could be some errors.

Wolfhag

Why is the glacis sponsons counted differently than just glacis?

Interesting data, Wolfhag.

The odds of a track hit are also quite high (~27.5%), but in practice I assume its a bit lower, maybe 15-20%. Still, that's high enough that its worth considering. Also, there are a number of vulnerable locations (turret ring, MG, mantlet bounce, sponson) that add up to almost 15%. I assume that hits in any of those areas can cause noticeable damage.

Speaking of damage, I re-read the section in "Brazen Chariots" where Crisp's Honey was hit by the PaK 38 (50mm ATG) on day 10. The vehicle took four hits at point blank range. Two shots hit stowage, which can arguably be called misses, although they certainly affected the crew. One shot bounced. One shot was a clean penetration in the turret that lightly wounded the gunner. (Mild spoiler) The tank survived and escaped. Albeit anecdotal, this is an interesting example that shows that a penetration doesn't necessarily result in a kill.

Mobius,
I measured it different because the part of the glacis that protects the sponsons is where the Panther stores ammo and it's an increased lethality location if penetrated. At least that's how I understand it from looking at exploded diagrams. The total glacis area is the hull mg, both locations of glacis protecting the sponsoon area and the rest of the glacis for about 29% total glacis area.

Regarding the area of the treads. It looks like about 1/3 of the total tread area would be taken up by the drive sprocket which is a pretty vulnerable part because of light protection.

Not all hits on the cupola would bounce off. Regarding outside storage. The drawings of the Panther shows some storage on the sides of the hull that could potentially be hit from the direct front but I did not include them in the measurements.

I've been playing a game design that allows you to aim at a scaled image of a tanks aspect and have the round drift from the aim point to see exactly where it lands without needing a hit location roll. We've had some pretty interesting things happen like the Fogemort's description of the Honey.

Wolfhag

I re-read the section in "Brazen Chariots" where Crisp's Honey … took four hits at point blank range. … The tank survived and escaped. Albeit anecdotal, this is an interesting example that shows that a penetration doesn't necessarily result in a kill.

Actually there are three observations, which I carry away from Crisp's account of that action, that might affect wargaming.

As I recall his description of the encounter, his tank was hit 4 times in rapid succession (meaning at least 4 rounds were fired … probably more), he was not able to spot where the enemy fire was coming from, and he directed his driver to advance, leading him to drive off of the edge of an escarpment, permanently disabling the tank.

Compare this to most miniatures wargaming.

1. Penetration = kill (not for Crisp)
2. Firing ATGs are auto-spotted, particularly at close range (not for Crisp)
3. Tanks go where you want them to go, never voluntarily driving into/over impassable terrain (not for Crisp)

I have seen all three of these issues appear in other first-hand accounts, although seldom so well clustered into one sequence of events. They may not be common, but I do not consider them to be at all extraordinary.

The odds of a track hit are also quite high (~27.5%), but in practice I assume its a bit lower, maybe 15-20%.

Hits against both the tracks and the lower hull front (often called the "nose") become less likely at ranges of more than a few hundred yards/meters if the terrain is at all uneven. This occurs either because the terrain rises between the shooter and the target, in effect"shadowing" these areas, or because in those cases where it does not, the target is on the downhill slope of a rise, shifting the target aspect % in favor of upper hull and turret areas.

Almost all tank designers take this into account. There is a reason that nose armor almost never offers anything near to the protection of glacis armor.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

I've read that in NW Europe it was rare to get a line of sight over 500 yards/meters.

According to "Data on World War II Tank Engagements Involving the U.S. Third and Fourth Armored Divisions", the average engagement range was about 900 yards. It varied from 500 yards in some areas to 1200 yards near Arracourt.

The report contains some interesting data. The side firing first has a significant advantage, which generally dominates other considerations. Numbers matter as well, although to a lesser extent. There is a mathematical model that estimates losses for both sides based on number, quality, and who shoots first. One interesting side effect is that having greater numbers means that you will both inflict and suffer more losses.

Yes, there is a non linear relationship between losses received and suffered as numerical superiority increases. Evidently the optimum ratio is two to one after which losses rise disproportionately compared to the increase in killing power.

These relationships are very, very hard to model using traditional war games combat mechanisms unless you use a crt.

Here is a link to a paper Frank Chadwick wrote that addresses armor values and penetration in a pretty fair, accurate and playable system. He also tells you where the fudge factors and abstractions are that he uses.
Link: PDF link

Wolfhag