"The French forces at Quatre Bras" Topic

Osprey Publishing have just posted the fourth and final article I have written to coincide with the release of Waterloo 1815 (1) Quatre Bras. This article contains information on the French forces which some of you may find interesting.

You can read the article by following the link to the Osprey website: link

John

very interesting, I have a feel that the higher the function of the officers reports – like Flahaut – they more they cover up for their superiors and find excuses for their mistakes – Flahaut exculpating Napoleon for blaming Grouchy (again) and Ney (not a surprise) and so on.
Refreshing are really only the reports as that of the 15 year old trumpeter Charonnet who clearly report what he thinks he witnessed – mistaking kilted highlanders as cantiniers.

@von Winterfeldt

I couldn't agree more. Flahaut's account, which was written many years after events, is typical of the French memoires of Waterloo. This is why it is so difficult to rely on them for historical accuracy. They are almost all coloured by motive (see Heymès's defense of Ney as another example).

John

@John Franklin

"s typical of the French memoires of Waterloo. This is why it is so difficult to rely on them for historical accuracy. They are almost all coloured by motive (see Heymès's defense of Ney as another example)."

I agree absolutly – for that reason it is so important to find information from officers of the "lower" echelon, NCOs and soldiers and take into account other sources to at least try to cut through the densly woven web of half truths.

It makes a difference to read that Bülow was surprised that the Prussian approach to Plancenoit of his units were unmolested and to find the story of a Prussian officer who led a cavalry control – confirming just that, and others was well.

For that reason, to put ones mind into the correct perspective I like Bernard Coppens : Waterloo – Les Mesonges so much – which makes you realize how and why the campaign is still seen as it is.

Lies is in my view the wrong word though, half truth whould be much better, there those are far more dangerous to history and much more difficult to expose than lies.

Well done John, thanks for this series!

If you'd like me to do something similar for the Ligny book, i.e. to produce a couple of articles with accounts from the French and Prussians, please post a comment on the Osprey Blog, as I have been told by the publisher that they do not want me to produce articles to coincide with the release of the second volume, Ligny, because other Osprey authors (obviously Napoleonic) are jealous of the amount of coverage the articles have received!

John

Simply fantastic reading! This Osprey just became a must have for me!
Thanks!
Larry

Just ordered a copy! ;-)

John, well done! Too bad a Ligny series will not be available in a similar manner due to apparent discord in the "ranks" of Osprey Napoleonic authors. I will add a supporting comment as suggested on the Osprey blog. Thanks again for your valuable contributions.

It would be really good to know why Grouchy pursued the way he did.
Also, as to why the Prussians were not pressured in a way as to prevent as much as 3 full korps being made available for Waterloo, when the Prussian stopped retreating as they did by position of Wavre.
Was this Grouchy's doing or poor direction of how he was to proceed….?

MG

John, I commented following the French article. Is that where you wanted the comments? I really appreciate these articles that are adding extra material, not to mention the obvious fact that a lot of the material in the four articles are not generally available to most of us. So thanks for sharing.

@Michael Westman

That's great! Many thanks for your generous comments. I'm sure that Osprey would like to generate further interest in the different volumes, and I am happy to produce other work for publication, outside of the books themselves. So with any luck I'll be 'permitted' to produce something on Ligny, Mont St. Jean and Wavre in due course.

John

It would be really good to know why Grouchy pursued the way he did.

One possible reason: some 12,000 Prussian recruits headed east, back towards home after the defeat. French scouts reported this movement and Grouchy permitted himself to believe this was the main Prussian army going where he wanted it to go. It was only late on the 17th that reports came in of large Prussian forces to the north.

One comment I've seen mentioned is that Grouchy's aggressive cavalry commander (Pajol) was in the direction of the Prussians heading east while his less aggressive cavalry commander (Exelmans) was following the Prussians heading north.

@Michael Westman

The various reports written by Comtes Pajol and Exelmans (sent to Imperial headquarters) answer your question in relation to one being more aggressive than the other. In terms of an answer to marshalGreg's question why Grouchy pursued the way he did, that's simply: poor and wishful intelligence.

John

Pierre de Wit's website has a good read of the situation –

PDF link

One observation is that Napoleon thought that the Prussians would either retreat to Namur or to Maastricht to join with Wellington, and that Wellington would probably retreat to Brussels to keep in contact with Blucher. So there was no urgency late on the 16th or early 17th.

a good no nonesense discussion of de Witt

I received my copy yesterday.
Thanks John, for your acknowledgement and adding me in your bibliography.

Unfortunately, I will not be providing a series of articles to coincide with the release of the second volume on Ligny. This book, which is due for publication in February 2015, has been written with the intention of not only being a stand-alone book on the fighting in the villages around Sombreffe, but also a companion to the first volume on Quatre Bras which has just been released. More information on the second volume is available on the Osprey website: link