"WW1 - birth of modern tactics?" Topic

Hi all,

I'm no expert on WW1 but I was under the impression that 'modern' fire-and-manoeuvre tactics originated during the conflict on the Western Front, with the emphasis on the section as the basic manoeuvre- and fire-team, and with the integrated support of special teams with suppressive weapons such as rifle-grenades and light machine-guns.

My wife's brother-in-law (ex-British Army NCO) pooh-poohed this, insisting that it was only after the Falklands War that the British Army adopted fire-and-manoeuvre tactics.

Surely he's quite wrong? Or is he pointing to specific post-Falklands tactical developments in the British military that he either doesn't fully understand or didn't explain very well to me?

Any assistance gratefully received!

Cheers,
Redcoat

Have a look at this manual.

PDF link

It talks about training in fire and movement.

I suspect he is talking about the use of balanced fireteams in the section, something which came in with the L85 in the late 1980s. Prior to that fire and movement was practiced either by the section or sometimes by gun and rifle groups.

Yes, they were doing this in WW1, it is how the deadlock of the trenches was broken.

….. I would agree with you. Bruce Gudmundsson's "Stormtroop Tactics" and Paddy Griffith's "Battle Tactics of the Western Front" are good introductory sources on this topic. By my understanding, this advance in tactics derived from the development of portable light machine guns (MG08/15, Lewis, Chauchat) and HE support weapons (Stokes mortar, French portable 37mm, various German light trench mortars and the unsung hero of WW1 – the humble rifle grenade).

B

The concept of fire and manoeuvre was in place before WW1 broke out. It was practised in all of the major armies that were involved on the Western Front for example. It was understand (and practised) that manoeuvre elements needed to be as small as a few men within a section when the assault reached close range for rifles.

WW1 saw an increase in the types and volume of supporting fire, with both more firepower within platoons and more support from other weapons systems including tanks, mortars, artillery barrages, etc. There was a systematic relearning of the pre-war lessons across the fast-growing armies but the tactical principles were not new.

Robert

You might want to look for Rommel's "Infantry Attack". It's based on Rommel's WW I experience in Italy and was publlished between the wars.

Chris

While Rommels book is an entertaining read, sadly it doesn't cover the development of fire and movement tactics in the British Army. It is more the German thing of shooting the rifle platoons forward covered by the fire of heavy weapons, which was their doctrine in WW2 as well.

Still fire and movement, but subtly different.

Rommel was using his infantry the way he later used his tanks. He didn't use the HMGs as a base of fire support. He loaded them up on mules, brought them foward with the infantry who were punching a hole in the enemy lines. Once he broke the hole, then the company spread out and set up their HMGs behind the enemy lines.

Fortunately, this never caught on with the rest of the German army at the time.

Yes, for many of the reasons mentioned here and others, it certainly was the beginning of modern tactics, IMO … But as in the ACW and other conflicts, many times Tactics didn't always keep up with Technology … How quickly armies adopted the Tactics vs. Tech paradigm proved to be a measure of their tactical effectiveness, etc. …

Didn't the latter stages of the Anglo-Boer War, when the British and Imperial troops were learning to combat the tactics of the enemy, see the introduction of "fire-and-movement" and everything after that was reaction to advances in technology/firepower?

By the beginning of WW1, it was already understood that other weapons systems should support an advance against an enemy. Field artillery and machine guns were both used in this role, applying their fire power to suppressing the enemy for as long as possible. In the opening days of the war, you will frequently come across accounts of field artillery being brought forward in a direct fire support role. This might involve only one or two guns, often being manhandled forward.

As the war progressed, there were problems with the application of these tactics. The issue was not so much that the tactics themselves fell behind. The tactics remained the same – an advance would only succeed if sufficient fire power was applied to enable movement. It took at least two years before there was an almost unlimited supply of artillery munitions and guns. Many 'tactical' failures can be traced back to inadequate artillery support. These failures are often viewed as due to lack of understanding on the part of the gunners and the staff. That is definitely not my impression. Put another way, if the same levels of artillery and munitions had been available earlier then would people have known what to do with them? Damn right they would have.

The second issue was the systematic application of lessons throughout whole armies. Again the issue was not about whether the tactics were known at all. It is about the degree to which they systematically known and applied.

The proliferation of new weapons systems shows how the tactical concepts were understood. They were simply variations on the same theme. I believe one of the biggest drivers for fundamental change came about through the thinning of ranks in all armies. As the war dragged on, fewer and fewer units were at anything like full strength. This forced a more inclusive planning process down to much smaller unit levels, as well as a major emphasis on intrinsic firepower to make up for the relative lack of men with rifles. In Australian platoons late-war, for example, men would purloin as many automatic weapons as possible. This included German LMGs too. This approach was not taught as 'tactics' but reflected the growing understanding of what helped achieve success with fewer men.

Robert

Many 'tactical' failures can be traced back to inadequate artillery support. These failures are often viewed as due to lack of understanding on the part of the gunners and the staff. That is definitely not my impression. Put another way, if the same levels of artillery and munitions had been available earlier then would people have known what to do with them? Damn right they would have.

In his book "The Great War Generals on the Western Front" Robin Neillands makes the point that, like the infantry of the New Army, the gunners were also raw recruits, but took much longer to learn their (admittedly much more complex) trade – roughly two years, he suggests. He also points out the shortages of guns and ammunition caused by, inter alia, much manufacturing equipment laying idle for most of the day well into 1915 because of trade union skilled/non-skilled demarcations and refusal to allow more than one shift. Essentially, the artillery arm of the British/Imperial armies went from "nought to sixty" in about two years.

Fair comment would you say?

Again the issue was not about whether the tactics were known at all. It is about the degree to which they systematically known and applied.

And there is the rub …

I thought fire-and-manoeuvre tactics were first encountered at the Siege of Paris during the Franco-Prussian War. 'Modern' fire-and-manoeuvre tactics, by the term, means something much closer to today but what is meant by the term?

From a German perspective, the evolution of fire and manoeuvre is frequently dated back to the Franco-Prussian War. In the debates that followed, the central concern was about the level to which the manoeuvre element could be devolved. There were strong advocates on both sides of the fence: greater devolution of control to the section level versus maintain strong centralised control with larger manoeuvre elements. The latter were deemed to be not smaller than a company in most cases but some advocated larger manoeuvre elements. These same debates were had in the French and British armies too.

The discussions in Germany spilled over into publically accessible journals and books. As an aside, this was one of the drivers for British officers to become familiar with, if not fluent in, the German language. Consequently the German debate influenced what was happening in France and Britain too.

All subsequent conflicts, not just the Boer War, were studied in respect of the concept. The Balkans Wars, for example, were very important in cementing the principles that were applied in training in the lead up to WW1. The devastating effect of Ottoman musketry in stopping the Bulgarian assault on the heights near Istanbul was a case in point. There were French, German, and British observers to these battles, as there were in the Sino-Japanese, Boer and other wars. Sir Ian Hamilton's reports and book on the SJW makes for very interesting reading around the Japanese implementation of the German tactics.

In the context of this thread, 'modern' fire and manoeuvre tactics was defined in the first post as 'emphasis on the section as the basic manoeuvre- and fire-team, and with the integrated support of special teams with suppressive weapons such as rifle-grenades and light machine-guns'. What I have attempted to show is that the principles were in place at the start of the war. Could and, more importantly, did the major combatants carry out the manoeuvre stage with elements as small as or smaller than sections in August 1914? Yes. Were sections or smaller than sections allocated to provide fire support as independent elements within an assault? Yes. It was not commonplace as many firefights and assaults never got to the point where this capability was exercised. But I have quoted several examples in other threads in TMP.

I have also noted that 'special teams' were attached for the purposes of providing additional fire support. In August 1914, these included medium machine gun teams, field artillery teams, and, in the case of the German army, the capability of pioneers to provide additional close support weapons such as Minenwerfer and hand grenades.

As the war progressed, some 'special teams' emerged within the platoon (bombers, rifle grenadier, and automatic rifle teams), whereas at the outset the only 'teams' within a platoon or section were armed with rifles.

Robert

I should have noted that there was no modern concept of 'fire teams' within sections.

Robert

Back in my day, in the Infantry, each Squad had 2 Fire Tms of 5 men each … + the Squad Leader.

I should have noted that there was no modern concept of 'fire teams' within sections.

While true, the modern "fire team" (as I understand it) was a development from the US Marine Raiders in WW2, where each fireteam was a "squad in a pocket". Team leader had a Thompson, there was a BAR gunner, and the third man with a plain Garand had the rifle-grenade adaptor. Basically, the Fireteam had all the support weapons of a full squad, but just enough men to shoot them. 3 fireteams per squad, with a squad leader to run the show.

later developments made a change from 3 men per team to 4.

Fire and movement tactics are relevant to the weaponry used. One might say the Marquis of Montrose developed the first fire and movement tactics! Always changing!

….. I would suggest that the distinction to be made with respect to WW1 is that it was the first conflict in which "supporting arms" (mortars, machine guns, even light portable artillery) could physically advance and participate in an assault under the immediate tactical control of a company level commander.

B