"Was Britain Paranoid About German Surface Raiders?" Topic

A question I have asked myself many times is was the British overly concerned about the danger German surface warships posed to our convoy system?

On every occasion a German warship broke out into the North Atlantic, the British response was to send everything that could float, out to try to find the raider. And yet, the net contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic these raiders made was actually almost insignificent compared to the U-boats. The two largest ships to successfully break out and start hunting convoys were Scharnhorst and Gneisenau during Operation Berlin. For all the investment the Kriegsmarine put into this operation, after sixty days the twins managed to sink or capture twenty two ships for a total of 113,690 tons. In the same period, the U-boats claimed ninty three merchant ships for a total of 557,483 tons. I do realise the loss of those twenty two ships was nothing to be treated lightly, but it wasn't really a shattering total when compared to what the much smaller and cheaper U-boats achieved in the same sixty day period.

I'm not saying the Royal Navy could simply afford to ignore German raiders in the Atlantic, but they really do seem to have panicked once news of the presence of a German warship operating or attempting to break out into the Atlantic was discovered.

Obviously there was huge propaganda value up for grabs for both sides when these ships were in the Atlantic, with the Germans able to pour scorn on the idea of Britain controlling the sea, and the massive blow it would be to them whenever one of these ships was successfully brought to action by the RN. But in terms of actual results, they really do seem to have been a bit of a damp squib.

I'll be really interested to see if anyone answers, what you guys who will probably know much more about this than me, will think of all this.

We have the benefit of hindsight though; I think the British fear was that the surface raiders would find one of the large convoys and completely smash it. It didn't happen in practice, but I think the *risk* was real.

The other side off the coin was that every German capital ship sent to the bottom was one less to have to worry about tracking, blockading, and/or chasing around later.

-Will

I'm speaking off the cuff a bit, but commerce raiding seems a good tactic for a weaker power. One may send destroyers and corvettes to deal with the submarine threat, but to pit such vessels against a heavy cruiser or a battleship would be suicide. Therefore, the raider can tie up a lot of surface combatants just by being at sea. Bear in mind that such missions have a pronounced tendency to turn into one-way trips.

Ron

Yes, commerce raiding tends to be the course pursed by the 'lesser fleet', for just the reasons you mention. However, the large surface raider's job got harder and harder as things like radio, aircraft and radar came into play. It became much harder to disappear into the trackless ocean….

-Will

if you leave 2 large raiders out there then the next thing you know there are 4 then 6 then there's a whole fleet of the damn things and you can't get rid of them at all .

and as mentioned the propaganda value gained by sinking the raiders was massive .

also , what else are you going to do with all those capital ships sitting in your ports ? not much point having the world's largest navy if you're not going to use it !

And it gave Douglas Reeman much of his writing career :-)

A battleship weighed the equivalent of over 50 U boats.

Hardly surprising that they got a lot of attention.

A surface raider could sink a very large number of vessels in a convoy, in short order, so no, I don't think they over-reacted.

They, the Allied merchants, would have been better off to sail independently if surface raiders were about, but then would have been more vulnerable to the U-boats.

Battleships cannot sink submarines!

We had a large surface battle fleet that could only fight enemy surface vessels, go figure!

"They, the Allied merchants, would have been better off to sail independently if surface raiders were about, but then would have been more vulnerable to the U-boats."

Convoys would scatter when a surface raider approaches. Made even the token resistance of an AMC rather effective.

You only have to look at PQ17 to see what happens when the fear of a big ship (Tirpitz) makes the convoy scatter.

I just can not imagine the possible loss of one troopship.

The AMC HMS Jervis Bay saved it's convoy against the Admiral Scheer.

hmsjervisbay.com/index.php

PQ17 was caught in a perfect storm once it scattered, being within range of German airbases in Norway and with U-boats in the area.

What would have happened if the convoy hadn't scattered though? As things turned out, I suspect the escort would have fought off the U-boats, at least greatly reducing the number of successful attacks they managed to carry out. The Luftwaffe also wouldn't have had so easy a time going in against the full AA of the escorting cruisers and destroyers.

And what if they hadn't scattered and Tirpitz had attacked? I suspect the escort would have put up enough of a fight to keep the battleship at bay, especially with the KM's doctrine of avoiding damage.

Some good comments from you guys! :O)

Tirpitz might have faced the same fate that the other surface raiders who came within range of pursuing fleets – damaged, pursued some more, eventually sunk. Successful surface raiders depended on being able to disguise themselves, pick targets judiciously, "disappear" after an attack, and depend on outsmarting the larger forces of the Allies lest they be caught.

Ba sed on WW1 experience (from Wikipedia -"The German commerce raiders of World War I were those surface vessels used by the Imperial German Navy to pursue its war on Allied commerce, (the Handelskrieg). These comprised regular warships, principally cruisers, stationed in Germany's colonial empire, express liners commissioned as auxiliary cruisers and, later, freighters outfitted as merchant raiders. ") both sides learned lessons but the larger fleet, if it could concentrate versus raiders, had more benefits in WW2 from WW1 lessons learned (and forgotten and re-learned.)

The WW2 raiders had their moments (from an Amazon book description -"The sleek and powerful Admiral Hipper was the much-heralded prototype of one of the most formidable ship classes of World War II. In contrast, the Pinguin, a converted merchantman, was armed with only 5.9 inch guns and operated by a predominately reservist crew. Contrary to all expectations, the amateur warship Pinguin was highly successful and went out in a blaze of glory, while the Admiral Hipper was hard-pressed to make its mark in the war and ended its days in ignominy " but they had a fair amount of success – link – and had an impact that was more than their technical descriptions provide.

Convoys were vital to the UK and surface raiders could not be ignored. The resources needed to defang them was significant. But had they not be stopped from running free in the shipping lanes they might have provided a 'tipping point' in Allied operations even if only psychologically.

But I am not deeply knowledgeable in naval matters so my view may be askew. You get what you pay for and my thoughts come free… and worth every penny…

138SquadronRAF, don't forget the SS Beaverford -

As Admiral Scheer began the search for other prey, the gallant Beaverford took on the role of protecting the convoy. Although, she was even more lightly-armed than Jervis Bay , Beaverford bravely engaged the massive battleship. Somehow, the CPR freighter, armed only with two small guns, managed to hold Admiral Scheer at bay for over four and a half hours! In the end, Admiral Scheer torpedoed Beaverford and Captain Pettigrew and his heroic crew of 76, were all killed. Their sacrifice along with that of HMS Jervis Bay allowed 31 ships in the convoy to escape to Britain with their precious cargoes.

One presumes that in the deepening twilight and darkness (courtesy of HMS Jervis Bay's stand) that the captain of the Admiral Scheer got cautious when confronted with another 15,000 ton ship steaming at the Scheer firing her guns and thought he was facing another AMC with guns that could actually do some serious damage to the Scheer.

That is one action that would be nearly impossible to duplicate on the gaming table…

Yes, "Beaverford" had a cargo of ammunition, and a stern mounted obsolete 4.5" gun, if as big as that, of Japanese design I think. She was able to delay the "Scheer" for long enough for darkness to close in. Her entirely civilian crew managed to delay the "Scheer" for longer than the "Jervis Bay" did.
The RN were indeed obsessed with German surface vessels, as much as anything, I would argue, because defeating and sinking a German surface unit would be regarded, by them, as what they were trained and designed to do. Escorting Merchant Vessels was dull work, hard work, unglamourous, and not easily "seen", as it were, by the public. Engaging and sinking a major German surface unit would have far closer to their own perceptions of their own heroism. Even if unconsciously, they would be far happier taking on the might of the Kreigsmarine in the form of the "Scharnhorst", for example, than endlessly crossing the N.Atlantic escorting a load of slow Merchant Vessels.

I remember reading some place that with all the battleships assigned to D Day, the British wanted a new US battleship, just in case what was left of the German battle fleet showed up. The US politely ignored them.

One might argue German surface ships were paranoid about the British, also. Their orders to avoid action with superior force seemed to magnify any British ships they encountered.

You're missing the point.

The reason the KM's surface raiders were given such consideration has to do with what the RN would have had to deploy to defend the convoy stream. In the face of a potential heavy KM unit, each convoy would have had to have an equally heavy unit escorting it. Just look at what the RN had to do to keep the northern convoys covered, and extend that to the north Atlantic stream. The RN well understood the threat and took all measures to crush it.

I don't think so. The RN wouldn't have had to deploy any more than they already did to defend each convoy if a heavy KM unit was at sea. After the loss of "Jervis Bay" it should have been obvious, even to the Admiralty, that heavy surface raiders were of limited efficacy. They were vulnerable to the slightest damage, had limited provisions and limited ammunition, and even more limited fuel. If the "Gneisenau" had got into the N.Atlantic convoy routes, the Admiralty would simply had to temporarily suspend some slow convoys, and redirect some to a more southerly route. If she got near a convoy they could scatter, and the losses would be limited, as with the "Jervis Bay" convoy. The surface threat was always limited, but the Admiralty never learned that.

Pair up a major surface raider with a wolf pack and you've got the perfect storm. The raider disburses the convoy, the wolf pack picks off the undefended merchant ships at their leisure.

Only it would be virtually impossible to arrange and coordinate! That it happened with PQ17 was unique and only happened through the incompetence of the Admiralty, and Sir Dudley pound himself.

I think there is merit to the view expressed that surface combat was what most of the RN was trained for. If you have a lot of hammers, everyone is ready when you find a nail. ASW, on the other had, was more of a specialists' activity.

That said, there was a real reason to worry more about surface raiders. Submarines, while they could cause attrition, never projected control over an area of the ocean.

PQ-17 is a very good example. This convoy's experience has two key components … first was the casualty rate, which was very high and warranted much concern. But second was that it was just about the only convoy to be turned back. It wasn't the U-boats or the Luftwaffe that caused this … it was the presence of a KM capital ship.

Despite losses, convoys almost always sailed on through the U-boats and wolfpacks. But a capital ship astride their route could turn a convoy back (or disburse it so that the individual captains could decide for themselves to turn back).

Britain relied on convoys for its sustenance. Losses of ships (and crews), tragic though they were, were sustainable. There were only 2 or 3 months in the whole war were merchant shipping losses even approached the level of replacement ship production.

But if the convoys had not gotten through, the problem would not have been how many ships were sunk, but how the British economy (and war effort) would continue.

So yes, even if it is not reflected in the tonnage loss ratios, the KM's major surface units were a more significant threat to Britain.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

I would argue the opposite, that U Boats and U Boat packs could indeed project relative control over vast areas of ocean, whereas even a major surface unit would only be able to "control" the sea as far as it could see, so in the N.Atlantic, about 15-20 miles radius.
The losses of PQ17 were caused by Dudley Pound panicking, not by the presence of the "Tirpitz", but by the fear of "Tirpitz". If the "Tirpitz" had attacked a convoy, then the scattering of the convoy would have been a relatively effective tactic. When the "Scheer" attacked the "Jervis Bay" convoy, losses to the convoy were relatively small, and the "Scheer" had to turn back through concerns about ammunition and fuel usage.

I am obviously going to agree with Chouan.

While seldom do I refer to Churchill over anything military, in this instance I will make an exception and point out that he wrote in his work "The Second World War", that it was only the U-boat he really feared throughout the war.

PQ17 was very unlucky to have been scattered so close to German occupied territory, but I don't think we can assume the same thing would have happened in the N. Atlantic. Certainly according to the evidence, it wouldn't.

Merchant ships sailing alone were easy targets, whether for U-Boats or surface ships. There were never going to be enough escorts to protect solo merchant ships. The only way a merchant could have more protection than their own paltry guns could offer, was to sail in convoys.

As we have already noted, in the case of PQ17 the convoy was ordered to disburse, due to the threat of interception by Tirpitz. As much as we may say the U-Boats or the Luftwaffe sank so many of the ships, it was the threat of the Tirpitz that caused the convoy to be disbursed. And once disbursed, the solo ships were easy targets.

We might say that PQ17 was unlucky, that if the encounter had occurred in the mid-Atlantic that the same would not have occurred. But look at the other cases leading up to PQ17, where German capital ships came into contact with fully formed British convoys:

In the case of HX84, the convoy was also ordered to disburse, due to the attack by Scheer. (This was the convoy escorted by the famed Jarvis Bay, which sacrificed itself to give the convoy ships time to disburse.)

WS5A, a troop convoy, was attacked by Hipper. Hipper was a heavy cruiser, not a battlecruiser or battleship. The KM "Pocket Battleships" might be considered as super-heavy cruisers, so this case might also be examined in a similar light to the attack on HX84 by Scheer. In this case the convoy was escorted by HMS Berwick, also a heavy cruiser, and after exchanging some gunfire Hipper broke off the action and retired to port at Brest.

Hipper later attacked convoy SLS64, an un-escorted convoy, sinking 7 merchants. The convoy disbursed, and 7 of the surviving ships did not continue on, but rather made neutral port in Portugal. 2 others were subsequently sunk by U-boats.

Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sighted convoys HX106 and SL67, but declined to attack as both of these convoys were escorted by RN battleships (Ramilles and Malaya, respectively).

Please correct me if my data is incorrect, but it appears to me that EVERY case in which a German heavy warship (cruiser or above) came into contact with a convoy that was not escorted by RN ships of comparable or superior force, the convoy was disbursed.

That is control of the sea. Even if only for a limited time, over a limited area, that sea was under German control.

Were there any cases of convoys being disbursed in the face of U-boat attacks?

And then you have PQ17.

Was it any wonder that the RN became obsessed with German surface combatants?

U-Boat attacks could be countered by cheap and plentiful corvettes. A 900 ton ship with a single 4 – 5 inch deck gun, one or two 40mm bofors, and some depth charges, that could make 20 knots, was a major threat to a U-Boat. They were produced in the hundreds. Three dozen convoys, each with 2 or 3 corvettes as escort, could simultaneously sail through the U-Boats at 12 knots. With multiple escorts the submarines could not operate on the surface, and no submerged submarine could hope to match convoy speeds (until 1945).

But a Hipper, a Scheer, or a Gneisenau (much less a Tirpitz!) was a very different matter. How many convoys could be escorted by battleships and cruisers at any one time? Those that weren't could not sail through. A German surface warship controlled the sea it sailed on, unless it was matched by RN surface warships. So the RN focused on them.

That's why the German surface warships were such a concern for the RN. U-boats, Q-ships, torpedo boats, capital warships or the Luftwaffe -- any of those resources could sink merchants that sailed solo. So the British sailed in convoys. The U-Boats or the Luftwaffe could pick off one or two merchants out of a convoy, but they couldn't break up the convoys. Capital ships could.

Or so it appears to me.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

On this comment:

"Battleships cannot sink submarines!

We had a large surface battle fleet that could only fight enemy surface vessels, go figure!"

Well, HMS Dreadnought would like a word with you…

link

Of course a heavy KM unit could cause the dispersal of a convoy, but unless there were U-Boat packs around that wouldn't be a disaster. The convoy would have a rendezvous point and an approximate rendezvous time, so, once scattered would eventually reform. If a KM unit sortied the Admiralty would know about it very quckly and it could quickly be countered by the RN's heavy units, like the "Bismark" and "Scharnhorst" both were. However, even if the "Hipper", for example, had been able to sortie again, her impact wouldn't have been that great. She would have had to have been guided to a convoy, which would have to have been spotted. The "Hipper" would have found it very difficult to remain secret as to it's course and position, through the Admiralty's ability to plot radio traffic, and their sources. So convoys would have been diverted, or slow convoys temporarily delayed in their departure, to avoid her. Her fuel would have been limited, so she couldn't cruise the N.Atlantic indefinitely, so the problem would have been small and temporary.

The Germans actually did better with AMC surface raiders than any of the heavy KM units.

Quite. Yet they weren't treated anything like as seriously.

Considering that an AMC as a convoy escort has a much better chance against a converted merchant raider than against a warship (although Thor defeated two AMCs and sank one and of course Kormoran apparently sank the Sydney) warships were a more serious consideration.

AMC escorted convoys with support from cruisers are adequate against converted merchants. Converted merchant raiders were most effective against lone, unescorted targets. They were also slower than cruisers or the converted liners used by the RN as AMCs.

Once you have to deal with capital ships as raiders you need capital ships to counter them. As there were more convoys running than capital ships to escort them they were a serious threat.

But, as has already been pointed out, how easy would it have been to sortie a major KM surface unit, get it into the N.Atlantic, and find a convoy? Once a unit had sortied air reconnaisance would keep tabs on them, convoys would be delayed or re-routed, or scattered if in danger. Merchant Cruisers were far easier to sortie, and could, and did, do far more damage.

Except that air recon wasn't as fully developed in the early years of the war (remember the 'air gap'?). Same could said of SIGINT as well. It wasn't until late '41 on that air recon was significantly strong enough to do what you stated.

But they could spot them on their way out. If Tirpitz sortied from Norway, for example, the Admiralty would know pretty much straight away. The Norwegian resistance also kept a close eye on KM movements. Once a vessel had sortied the admiralty could adjust convoy sailings to suit, as well as send suitable RN units to intercept or shadow.