"New Frontier Conflict Article" Topic

'A Different Mode of War?', is a peer-reviewed academic journal piece by ethnohistorian Raymond Kerkhove, from the University of Queensland, that seeks to establish the case that multiple Aboriginal tribes in southern and central QLD issued a 'declaration of war', or perhaps using a better analogy, went 'on the warpath' from the early 1840s to at least the mid 1850s.

It's a case of an ethnohistorian playing military historian, with some success, but with some significant faults as you'd expect. For one, unlike we who know better, he makes the usual mistake that such writers do of equating casualties to fatalities; Aboriginal weapons had a low level of lethality, so for every settler killed several would be wounded, and the disparity between overall casualty figures between the opposing sides is consequently not as great as it is usually represented as being. This fact seems to go unnoticed by this writer and others of his ilk. He also fails to note the importance of the 'code of the frontier' in suppressing reports and accounts of skirmishes. Also, he compares the Mounted Native Police to the US cavalry during the Indian Wars, which might be reasonable up to a point, but a closer parallel would be the Indian Scouts – particularly the Apache Scouts.

All the same, this is a fascinating and revealing paper insofar as it goes (there's no analysis of combat dynamics or minor tactics such as those I've identified), which will be an eye-opener for many, and is therefore essential reading for anyone seeking to gain a better understanding of frontier conflict in colonial Australia.

The point about missing the significance of the 'code of the frontier' is that Kerkhove has in his assessment undoubtedly underestimated the level of violence.

And here's a link
link

Interesting read. I've avoided the whole Windschuttle v Reynolds debate as they're not about the history but rather the role of ideology in history academia. I endured Australian history for two years at uni back in the very early nineties, so I enjoyed the comeuppance Windschuttle served to some very, very shoddy academic work. However I could never identify any evidence to counter Reynolds etc main assertion that the frontier was an incredibly violent place, and that the Aborigines were royally screwed over.

So Reynolds and friends are bad at the data, and Windschuttle and friends are equally as bad at interpreting the data. I've listened to bigots at wargaming and antique arms shows bang on that because what happened doesn't match the US frontier experience, or doesn't match the experience of post 1945 guerilla warfare therefore there was no resistance, therefore there was no war, therefore there was no aggressive colonial policies towards the aboriginals, therefore we've never oppressed them, therefore I can feel better about dismissing modern indigenous issues relating to historical oppression of aborigines. Which considering the person making these statements, they're actually saying "I don't like black people. They make me uncomfortable when we're standing together in a line together."

I liked the breakdown of "tactics" in table 2. The fact that you could look at a wide range of violent incidents, and see the same patterns across a wide area, it pretty much indicates that there was knowledge sharing amongst the various communities. Starting to think that there's mileage in a thesis that what we experienced was more like ultra modern 4th generation warfare than old school guerilla warfare.

Don't get me started on Windtunnel and his disingenuous obfuscation.

Reynolds work can be regarded as first generational, pioneering the academic territory for the researchers who followed and developed his ideas. He will always hold a place among the most significant contributors.

Bigots will be bigots; their ignorance is only exceeded by their conceit.

Your experience brings to mind the 'They Might Be Giants' song 'Your Racist Friend'.

One more point on the article:

Kerkhove makes a major error in asserting that the only use of firearms by resisting Aborigines occurred when they were wielded by a few, individual 'tame blacks' (contemporary terminology for Aboriginal station hands and others who'd lived or worked with whites and learned their ways)

In fact, guns were fielded in quantity in Victoria and the south-east of South Australia for several years by tribal warriors to whom they'd been supplied by whites to hunt lyre birds for the Melbourne feather trade, and kangaroos, respectively (and trained in their use), and those to whom these men had passed on their knowledge of them. Other guns were stolen, resulting in a mixture of shotguns and muskets.

While all this academic research is worthy and to be applauded for further lifting the veil of historical uncertainty and forming a solid foundation in reality for any skirmish games set in colonial Australia, we shouldn't forget that in the end we are just playing with toy soldiers – so the primary goal has to be fun. If we have to caricature, massage, or bend the reality a little to achieve that aim then so be it. Old West gamers have always preferenced the 'reel west' over the real west and nobody seems to mind.

I don't advocate departing quite as far from the historical truth (which, in any case, is still to some extent fluid), but for example, game balance would be assisted if an Aboriginal faction represents not the average resistance, but the most effective. I think it's also justifiable to add some touches that lie more within the realm of legend than verified fact, and even (as an option) allow for the intrusion of the supernatural.

I also think the best approach is to take a leaf out of the Old West gamers' book and, rather than try to represent events in a particular locale, to generalise the setting and cherry pick features from any historical region that help to add colour and flavour. For example, in the regions that are the subject of Kerkhove's paper Aborigines didn't use the woomera, but would we want to field warriors without this iconic piece of Australian indigenous weaponry in our games? I don't think so: for one it's a significant improvement on unassisted spears, and therefore an aid to game balance, and two, I'm sure that when state-of-the-art warrior figures are being contemplated by a sculptor it would seem unthinkable to him not to incorporate it.

We can throw in shielans (mini-forts), swivel guns, fortified dwellings, white men gone native as leaders (a 'legendary' element), warriors with guns (in moderation) and so on. And this is just one compnent of the overall background, which for the classic 'wild colonial boys' era of 1860 to 1880 would also include bushrangers (historical identities and generic), police, trackers, perhaps native police, stockmen, miners (white and Chinese), and civilians.

I reread the article, and noticed something I'd overlooked the first time: Kerkhoven comments on the number of settler fatalities in individual frontier fights, claiming a maximum of five, describing such numbers as 'pitiful', and for comparison mentions an action from the Maori Wars in which more than 1800 settlers were defeated for the loss of 22.

That's a lot of men for that conflict. From what I can recall of my reading on the Maori Wars (a long time ago)I'm not aware of such a large force of settler volunteers participating in an engagement; that would be a big battle even for British regulars. Perhaps someone with more detailed knowledge of the subject can identify the engagement in question.

Skirmishes on the Australian frontier only ever involved a handful of men on the colonial side: 100 or so at most, but that was an extremely rare occurrence. Usually there were far less: perhaps between five and twenty or thereabouts, Proportionally five men killed out of even twenty represents serious losses, whereas 22 out of 1800 is inconsequential – so Kerkhoven's comparison is entirely spurious.

In fact, Jan Pritchett, in 'A Distant Field of Murder', mentions, but gives no details of, a fight involving 25 armed and mounted station hands who incurred five casualties, two of them killed – or 20% losses. Although not stated, in this case they would certainly have fled the scene; civilians had a low tolerance for casualties.

The same doesn't apply to the NMP, which was a specialist force maintained on a full-time basis specifically to serve on the frontier against tribal Aborigines, with the full expectation of the inevitability of casualties. I also suspect that its officers considered troopers expendable.

Uh… that's Kerkhove, not Kerkhoven, of course.

Directly relevant to the above is the Wikipedia entry for 'The Battle of One Tree Hill', or more to the point, the links it contains concerning a contemporary drawing of an incident from the conflict, almost certainly by a participant, that was purchased from his descendants in 2010 by the National Library for $120,000. USD

There are some stupid quotes in some of the other links from newspaper reports and, unfortunately, the senior curator, Marie-Louise Ayres, who, trying to appear an expert on frontier conflict and matters military, merely demonstrates embarrassingly profound ignorance with the assertion that 'numbers are no match for guns'. Considering that the drawing depicts a typical surprise dawn attack on a sleeping camp of men, women and children…

The link entitled 'A Picture Asks a Thousand Questions' gives the background to the picture, but better still, includes at the bottom a large image of the only other known illustration of frontier conflict by a participant: the fight between the Burke and Wills supply party and Aborigines in south-east Queensland.

Elsewhere I found an extract from an account by a participant in this series of fights, in which he describes how his mounted party was climbing a hill in single file along a narrow track when a warrior jumped out in front of them from behind a tree, speared the lead horse, and made off in a hail of bullets. The writer was sufficiently impressed to applaud the attacker's courage.

If you might indulge me a little further, I found another point of contention in Kerkhove's article.

He claims that, in the period in question, the NMP was only ever attacked twice, and includes an extract from a description of one of the two encounters alluded to.

Page 336 of L. E. Skinners' 'Police of the Pastoral Frontier' relates this fight, which took place on the 15th of April, 1858, when a section under the command of Second Lieutenant Williams of the fifth division (this war was bigger than you thought, right? :)), Moreton Bay District, went in pursuit of 'depredators' who'd raided the station of a Mr Griffin, and caught up with them in camp with plentiful evidence of their felonious activity.

The attack was in fact a particularly vigorous defence, in which the tribesmen siezed the initiative, and having disposed of trooper John with nine spears pressed the defence 'in a most furious manner'.

However, there were several genuine attacks on the NMP in this period and later, mostly while they were encamped overnight while on patrol, but also one instance of an attack on a semi-permanent main camp. They usually occurred at night or early in the morning. The latter event took place on the night of 23rd of September, 1855 at the Rannes Station camp. Of the seven troopers attacked while sleeping three died and four were wounded.

This misinterpretation, and the other problems already identified, are really peripheral to Kerkhove's thesis and don't in any way detract from his central proposition.

Just to develop the final point in my 1/11 post above about colonial morale levels, even soldiers weren't always as stoic in the face of Aboriginal attacks as you might expect. Perhaps this isn't so surprising, given that on the Australian frontier they were usually deployed in mere sections under the command of an NCO.

For instance, the party left to defend the base of operations of the 96th Regiment at Charles Driver's station at Pillaworta, near Port Lincoln, South Australia, fled when attacked on the night of the 19th of May, 1842 due to the prospect of their being surrounded; an odd fear, considering that they were defending a fixed position.

Just to develop the final point in my 1/11 post above about colonial morale levels, even soldiers weren't always as stoic in the face of Aboriginal attacks as you might expect. Perhaps this isn't so surprising, given that on the Australian frontier they were usually deployed in mere sections under the command of an NCO.

For instance, the party left to defend the base of operations of the 96th Regiment at Charles Driver's station at Pillaworta, near Port Lincoln, South Australia, fled when attacked on the night of the 19th of May, 1842 due to the prospect of their being surrounded; an odd fear, considering that they were defending a fixed position.