Tango01 | 12 Oct 2014 4:01 p.m. PST |
"John Bell Hood's Army of Tennessee was in fine spirits. Though there had been a setback at Allatoona a few days previous, they had been tearing up General Sherman's railroad north of Atlanta, gutting at least twenty-five miles of it before the Federals shooed them away. For the Southerners, it was nice to give Sherman a helping of his own medicine. It had, more than anything, the appearance of a raid. So when Hood had to pull back thirty miles to Cedartown in order to avoid Sherman's sword, morale hardly dipped it was all just part of the raid. But when Hood set out upon this new campaign, the plan wasn't just to destroy track and Federal supplies. It was to move north of Atlanta and offer Sherman battle on ground that Hood had chosen for such a brawl. He would defeat Sherman and reclaim everything lost by the army over the past year…"
full article here linkDid he? Amicalement Armand |
John the Greater | 13 Oct 2014 7:10 a.m. PST |
I never got the impression that Hood's campaign into Tennessee was ever well thought out. This article seems to be along that line. Certainly Sherman's decision to leave Hood to Thomas worked out well, though there were some close calls before it did work out. |
OSchmidt | 13 Oct 2014 7:44 a.m. PST |
Hood had the same problem as all his predecessors in command of the Army of Tennessee. Basically, a bunch of subordinates who considered following orders a purely nominal and optional thing. The corps commanders of the Army simply would not consistently obey ANY commander and this included even when it was one of themselves. Not only that it fought over and defended territory it was not allowed to draw recruits or supplies from (all of it earmarked for the Army of Northern Virgina. So the Army of Tennessee starved first and ran out of its clothing and shoes first. I really think that Hood moved north out of frustration with his army and its commanders and hoped to get the latter killed. More realistically, he moved north because it was obvious that he could not defeat Sherman or prevent him from going wherever he wished, and he would not be able to defeat any other army the Union had, so he might as go north and destroy things, it was about all he could really expect to do. Too bad he destroyed his own army. |
John the OFM | 13 Oct 2014 9:42 a.m. PST |
It was to move north of Atlanta and offer Sherman battle on ground that Hood had chosen for such a brawl. A good general can accomplish that. A poor general against a very good one cannot. Poor generals very seldom KNOW that they are poor. My impression was that Hood thought he was setting very clever traps and Sherman ignored him. "He's gone? Good." |
John the Greater | 13 Oct 2014 1:55 p.m. PST |
Poor generals very seldom KNOW that they are poor And poor generals who survive the war write memoirs proving that they were right all along. |
donlowry | 14 Oct 2014 9:32 a.m. PST |
Sherman said of Hood: "I cannot guess his movements as I could those of Johnston, who was a sensible man and only did sensible things." Now, you would think that being able to do things your opponent cannot anticipate would be a good thing, but I guess the operable word in that quote is "sensible." Doing the unexpected is only useful if what you do is "sensible," i.e. helpful to your situation. |
49mountain | 14 Oct 2014 10:02 a.m. PST |
What ground could Hood choose that Sherman would not have outflanked? It is lke a punch drunk fighter who is still swinging after the bell has sounded. |
GoodOldRebel | 14 Oct 2014 4:31 p.m. PST |
I get the impression hood …ever the gambler, was making it up as he went along? striking at targets of opportunity? |
EJNashIII | 14 Oct 2014 8:07 p.m. PST |
Hood did about all he could. He started the hand with no useful cards, nor cash to bet. Johnston had already lost it all. the Last real chance ended after the retreat from Kennesaw Mountain. If Sherman bit and followed him, then things could have improved. Otherwise, he could do nothing other than watch his army melt away from attrition while following the march to the sea. Might as well use it on a long shot while he still had it to use. |
donlowry | 17 Oct 2014 9:36 a.m. PST |
There were really only 3 things wrong with Hood's Nashville campaign: Spring Hill, Franklin, and winter. |
OSchmidt | 17 Oct 2014 12:19 p.m. PST |
Dear donlowry Four- you forgot Hood. Otto |
OSchmidt | 17 Oct 2014 12:23 p.m. PST |
But let's be fair. When Davis asked Lee's opinion of hood, he got a statement which , knowing Lee's manner, was equivalent to saying "Whaddaryounutz!" The man is a maniac. He said "If you want a man who will attack- Hood will attack!" And he did. The man who could have rescued the West in 1862 to 1864 was Joe Johnstone, that is, Joe Johnstone plus 60,000 MORE men. The problem was those 60,000 men. As Sherman was quoted. Johnstone was a sensible person. He just didn't have enough men to do much more than strict defence. |
GoodOldRebel | 18 Oct 2014 2:32 a.m. PST |
joe Johnston lacked a Jackson …a corps commander capable of supplying the offensive edge he lacked. Hood tried and failed to be that commander ….maybe if Cleburne had been elevated to corp command he would have made the difference in 1864? |
donlowry | 18 Oct 2014 9:45 a.m. PST |
Hood's basic idea wasn't all that bad and might have worked against a less competent Union commander. But he was up against the 1st team. |
Tango01 | 19 Oct 2014 10:45 p.m. PST |
In Serious Thought and Perplexity' Hood Decides to Slip Away (And That's About It) "In the thinking of John Bell Hood (or at least in Hood's post-war surmisings), his mission was complete. Though he had lost Atlanta, and though that same city was still under Federal control, he had managed to pull William Tecumseh Sherman's massive army back to the same position it held in May. This was quite a feat, especially if one ignores the fact that, save the temporary occupation of Dalton and the destruction of several lengths of railroad, Sherman's Federals still controlled everything from Chattanooga to Atlanta. Still, it was an impressive and bold move, wrought perhaps from desperation, though no less effective than reacting to whatever Sherman might do next. Hood's only regret was that it did not happen sooner, say, Spring of 1864 when James Longstreet had suggested such a move that would take a gigantic Rebel army to the banks of the Ohio. But her he was, nearly 100 miles north of Atlanta, and but forty from the Tennessee line. Sherman, however, was closing in mostly from the north. Hood's way, it seemed, was blocked. According to his original plan, this wasn't such an event. He was to draw out Sherman, which he had already done (and then some), select ground over which the Federals must attack, and defeat them. Now, by the plan's schedule, was time for battle. With Sherman moving toward him, the hour was incredibly neigh…" full article here link Amicalement Armand |