"Did divisions travel abreast or in line?" Topic

Hi all,

Just another question here. I'm having a bit of a problem finding information on it.

Obviously one of the key features of the Napoleonic era was independent corps structures that nevertheless moved near enough one another to achieve coordination at the required point.

The purpose of the corps was, in part, to enable more men to arrive at the point of concentration than a whole army would. They could do this because they were using multiple roads. Ok.

So, I have a few questions.

1: Did the mutiple corps usually have different LOC for supply? At which point might these LOC converge? Or was this fluid depending on situation? I'm talking operationally here, not tactically.

2: If the corps moved parrallel with a days march or so between them, was it common for divisions to do the same within the corps structure? In other words, if one division in a corps made contact, would the corps concentrate at the speed allowed by one main LOC, or would the divisions (as a generality) be deployed and maneuvered to act not-unlike miniature corps, if that makes sense. I wouldn't be surprised that they did not, if only because the division, unlike the corps, was not in and of itself a complete combat unit.

thanks!

Obviously, it all depends – but I'd suggest that, generally, the divisions within a corps would be stacked one behind the other on the same line of advance. The corps would also have it's own logistical tail.

I was just reading an account of Sheridan's 1864 Shenandoah Valley campaign, where divisions of a corps typically followed one another in sequence along a main road. It could take quite a while to get all the troops up and deployed. One of the interesting tactical problems for a commander leading such an advance would be whether to attack at once with the first division to arrive, or wait until late in the day for the entire corps to come up and deploy.

The AoP and ANV both tended to follow the Napoleonic example of Corps traveling upon separate road networks, but within supporting distance of eachother. That distance could vary between a few hours and a full day's march.

It wasn't just because of ease of movement, though. It also had a LOT to do with available water for both the troops and the animals. An entire army of, say, 85K men could (and would) suck dry all the wells in a given area in no time, and also overwhelm the dirt roads, churning the earth into powder and choking both men and animals.

During the Gettysburg campaign, the 1st, 3rd & 11th Corps marched as a group, finally coming together at Emittsburg on 30th June, where they expected to bivouac and remain in position for awhile. Obviously that didn't happen.

An interesting description of the 1st Division, 3rd Corp's march to Gettysburg on 1 July was given by a Lt of the 124th NY infantry. He stated that the 9 miles to Gettysburg was the hardest that his regiment made during the entire war. It was spattering rain, which turned to roads to mud. But, amazingly, so many men and animals were on that road headed north that they turned the top layer of mud into a powder which rose up and choked the men, who had to put bandanas over their faces in order to breath. That same dust then mixed with the spattering rain and fell back on the men as dirty drops.

The humidity also caused a great sapping of strength so that by the time the 1st part of 3rd Corps arrived, the men were exhausted.

Years ago I did a statistical abstract of 3rd Corps based upon the 30 June 1863 muster rolls. If the entire corps was placed upon a single road, the infantry & artillery (and cavalry escort, HQ, etc) would take up some 2.5 miles of road. That's just for 10K men. The supporting train, ordnance, QM, Commissary, medical, etc, took up another 17.5 miles. That's 20 miles on the road, in column, for a small corps.

But everything I've read these past 40+ years points to Corps being separated on different roads, with their divisions placed in column, coming up one behind the other.

Keep in mind, too, that on the road, everyone stayed to one side of the road or the other so that staff officers, messengers, etc, could pass by freely. Also, great care was taken by advance parties to clear the roads, and scout for areas where the units could countermarch, if needed. It was easy enough to turn the infantry around, but artillery teams, wagons, etc, needed room to wheel about, so solid ground without ditches, creeks, etc, was needed for that. Fences could be quickly torn down, but rock walls, etc, needed time, so efforts were made for contingency planning all along the route of march, while the various corps were in motion.

One last point. Aside from Sherman's march to the sea, armies rarely marched more than 3 day's distance from railroads. You simply couldn't keep up the kind of logistics needed to support almost 100K men in the field, plus the tens of thousands of animals, with just wagons. Thus, potential railheads & yards were also put into the equation when determining a route of march.

Adding to all of TKindred's obstacles, good maps were rare. It has been pointed out that many of the confederates successes in Virginia at least part were from a better understanding of the local road system. The Yankees were forever hobbled by the necessity of figuring how to get the vast quantities of supplies needed to the men and finding out where any given country road actually went.

In the French army a division usally was in coulmn behind each other in a travel distance of one hour or one laegue – for a corps, see for example Davout at Auerstedt

March dispersed and concentrate to fight seems to have been the doctrine.

I suggest Des Marches dans les armee's de Napoleon (not sure if there is an english translation )

Also read Foucart on the campaign of 1806 as it mostly comprises orders and reports on a day by day basis. The campaign is mostly about movement with the occasional battle. pp424 and 425 describe setting up ovens in Bamberg and supplying flour in order to issue the sucessive corps with bread.

Whilst the majority of time the divisions may "follow the leader" there are plenty of examples of one division in three taking a different road especially when the intention is to concentrate at a location for battle.

vW I would respectfully say that Auerstadt is not a great example as Davout's corps was forced onto one road due to crossing the single bridge at Kosen and climbing the heights by the single road available.

Any "operational" level game needs to consider the effect of defiles such as bridges and passes and roads on hillsides on forcing the marching column onto a single road. You then need to calculate how long it will take for a corps to pass the defile before the next formation can use the same defile.

There is a very old adage that is square in the black: "Amateurs discuss tactics. Professionals discuss logistics."

Certainly tactics is important. However, the army is only good for 3 days at a time without a reasonably effective supply system. Trying to graze your way across the land is almost impossible because villages, towns and even cities aren't prepared to feed and shelter armies of the size that fought in both the Napoleonic and American Civil Wars.

One example: The Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg. Going by the June 30th 1863 muster rolls, the army has just around 85,000 men. Each of those men is authorized, and expects to have, 1lb of hard bread (hardtack) per day. There's around 12 crackers to a pound, for those so interested in these things.

Rations were issued for 3 days at a time, primarily because it allowed the army to maneuver somewhat away from it's trains if needs be, and also because it took that long to resupply the troops.

So, figure 3lbs/man (3 days rations) at 85K men, comes to 255,000 lbs of hardtack to be delivered for issue every three days. Considering that the average load per wagon was 2K pounds (1 ton) that gives us 128 wagons of hardbread every 3 days. PLUS, while those are heading IN to the army, the wagons which just delivered theirs are headed back to refill and return. Rinse and repeat.

Now add in meat, coffee, sugar, etc and you begin to see why armies tend to follow railroads and/or rivers. PLUS, you have to have feed for the animals pulling the wagons. That's 12+ lbs of grain/animal/day and whatever other forage you can provide them when the wagons park for the evening. 128 wagons, at 6 mules/wagon, comes to 768 mules. at 16lbs/animal/day, you need to come up with 73,728lbs grain ( 6 day's supply. 3 out, and 3 back). So there's another 37 wagons to haul the feed for the mules (plus their own 6-mule teams, etc).

As you can see, it takes a lot of planning and juggling to keep not just the soldiers fed, but the teams & teamsters of the trains which provide the soldiers with their marching rations.

This is just for basic marching rations on campaign. It's easier in winter quarters or a large camp, because you can preposition commissary goods and set up a depot and field kitchens, etc.

Anyway, just some stuff to think about.

V/R

In the Gettysburg campaign the AoP had 7 corps (plus cavalry and artillery reserve), too many to give a separate road for each, so Meade grouped them in temporary wings that marched along the same road or roads. Lee had only 3 corps (plus cavalry), with the 2nd Corps at first well forward and using a different road for each division. Most of the 1st and 3rd Corps and 1 division of the 2nd all used the road through Cashtown to reach Gettysburg. Of course, the 1st Corps didn't arrive in time to participate in the 1st day's fight, and Pickett's Division not until the 3rd day.

As corps and divisions neared the enemy, they would normally get their wagons out of the way and let all the combat troops have the road. For instance, as Grant closed in on Pemberton for the battle of Champion's Hill, he had to order some 13th Corps wagons off the road to make way for the 17th Corps to catch up with the leading division. At that time he had 1 division of 13th Corps and 2 of the 17th using 1 road, 2 more divisions of the 13th Corps using another road, and a 4th division of the 13th Corps and a division of the 15th Corps using yet another road. But all 3 roads converged on the battlefield. (2 more divisions of the 15th Corps were on the 1st road mentioned, but far back, and neither arrived in time for the battle.)