"New WW1 British and Germans" Topic
14 Posts
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Tango01 | 08 Oct 2014 10:43 p.m. PST |
From Mutton Chop.
From main page link Amicalement Armand |
Richard Baber | 09 Oct 2014 4:07 a.m. PST |
If I ever was tempted to do WW1 in 28mm – these would be at the top of my must buy list :-) |
Zargon | 09 Oct 2014 4:52 a.m. PST |
I like them nice sculpting and classical poses, but two small quibbles, but just an observation. The poses could have been just a tad less wooden (Airfix old school looking IMO) and why must the Germans always be depicted sans bayonet fixed? I was of the opinion that they were as likely to have them fixed as the British and Empire. Am I wrong? Or is it a justification for British troops going in hard with the bayonet. I thought the Germans were more likely to go in battalion 'mass' rushs and the 'Old Contemptibles' were inclined to show their prowess with the 'aimed rapid fire' especially at the start of the Great War, any opinions Gents? I'm open to correction. Cheers and they are spiffy figures. |
WarWizard | 09 Oct 2014 10:47 a.m. PST |
I would have liked to seen the Germans with fixed bayonets also. |
monk2002uk | 09 Oct 2014 11:18 a.m. PST |
The Germans were not more likely to go in for battalion 'mass' rushes. This myth is based on inaccurate recollections written after the war. The 'Old Contemptibles' were not better with 'aimed rapid fire' (known as musketry) than well trained French or German counterparts. More to your point though, musketry was seen as a means to the end – an assault with the bayonet when on the offensive. On the defensive, the bayonet was a hindrance to accurate fire. Think Battle of the Aisne (British on the attack; Germans on defence)… ;-) Robert |
Tango01 | 09 Oct 2014 11:37 a.m. PST |
Glad you enjoyed them boys. Amicalement Armand |
Marcus Maximus | 09 Oct 2014 11:48 a.m. PST |
Monk2002uk: Aside the British eye witness accounts both at the time and after there is also the attested German eye witness accounts of the "aimed rapid fire" or better known as the "mad minute" of the "Old Contemptibles" as being the work of many "machine gunners"……..The German attacks at Mons and some at Le Cateau were in close column formation à la battalion "mass rushes". The figures by Mutton Chop are fantastic and lovely addition to the 1914 / 16 period. Does anyone know if Mutton Chop sit nicely alongside the Great War Miniatures range? |
Fanch du Leon | 09 Oct 2014 1:32 p.m. PST |
Mutton's figures are a bit smaller than Great War's but nothing shocking IMHO. The sculpting style is a bit different too (faces), but once again I don't see any serious reason not to mix them. |
monk2002uk | 09 Oct 2014 2:09 p.m. PST |
The reference to the Mad Minute being mistaken for machine gun fire comes from a German source. It was translated into English as 'Ypres 1914'. The original is one of the poorest German official accounts of any battle. If you go back to the regimental and other histories of German units involved in First Ypres, they clearly indicate that German infantry knew the difference between machine gun fire and musketry. Jack Sheldon has provided the systematic evidence for refuting the machine gun claim. Some British anecdotal accounts describe the Germans advancing in close formation at Mons and Le Cateau. These accounts typically appear in post-war regimental histories. There are other British accounts that describe a completely different story. These accounts are found in contemporaneous war diaries' entries for example and conform to the German accounts as well, where the Germans used fire and manoeuvre tactics with smaller and smaller units being involved in the manoeuvre aspect. Robert |
Marcus Maximus | 10 Oct 2014 12:09 a.m. PST |
I have his books. One source aka Jack Sheldon does not make evidence……. |
Marcus Maximus | 10 Oct 2014 2:23 a.m. PST |
I have his excellent books. I'm not saying that the Germans did not mistake mg fire for musketry etc. The point is though the "mad minute" was effective enough for both sides to comment on it: Cpl J Lucy describes the following at Mons: "For us the battle took the form of well-ordered, rapid rifle-fire at close range, as the field-grey human targets appeared, or were struck down. The enemy infantry advanced … in "column of masses", which withered away under the galling fire of the well-trained and coolly led Irishmen. The leading Germans fired standing, "from the hip", as they came on, but their scattered fire was ineffective, and ignored. They crumpled up – mown down as quickly as I tell it – their reinforcing waves and sections coming on bravely and steadily to fall as they reached the first line of slain and wounded … Such tactics amazed us, and after the first shock of seeing men slowly and helplessly falling down as they were hit, gave us a great sense of power and pleasure. It was all so easy." And eye witness accounts from the 4th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, 4th Middlesex, 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, 1st Lincolns, West Kents, 12th Brandenburg Grenadiers (Walter Bloem), 24th Brandeberg Regt, Smith-Dorrien, John French, or how about Der Marnefeldzug 1914 – all support the effectiveness of the "Mad Minute"…. Apologies this is turning into something else. However, for those who are interested there is a talk on this particular point at the Royal Armouries Leeds on the 1st November 2014 :) I echo Zargon and War Wizards points about why can't the Germans have Bayonets? and thank you Fanch du Leon – I'm more than happy to mix figure manufacturers and these would look great alongside Great war Miniatures (but not Renegade though? correct?!) |
monk2002uk | 10 Oct 2014 6:43 a.m. PST |
Walter Bloem's account is the one detailed German source from the list that you quoted. His unit suffered very heavily during the Battle of Mons. But not because it attacked in 'column of masses'. If you read the detail of his account, Bloem's company broke the advance down into shorter and shorter bounds by smaller and smaller units in each bound. Eventually only a few men or a section at most would bound for a short distance. Unlike German units in the centre and left of the attack, Bloem's company did not have the advantage of suppressing fire from artillery or machine guns. The BEF fire slackened off but not because the BEF riflemen were suppressed. Bloem's company then ran into close range musketry but not as a column of masses. The effects were devastating nonetheless. Note that individual British marksmen could put more than 15 rounds of aimed fire into a target on the firing ground. Musketry was a completely different concept. If every soldier fired off 20 rounds a minute then the unit would run out of ammunition after 6 mins (12 mins if carrying 240 rounds per man). Rapid massed rifle fire tended to be around 5-10 rounds a minute – about the same as the French and German infantry could achieve. Very high rates of fire were rarely used. Note also that the other reports of 'column of masses' or equivalent refer to a mistaken interpretation of German units taking rapid cover when first coming under fire. Aside from Bloem's unit, most German units involved in Mons suffered light casualties. Which page of 'Die Marnefeldzug 1914' are you referring to? Robert |
Tango01 | 10 Oct 2014 12:51 p.m. PST |
Quite interesting thread my friends. Thanks for share. Amicalement Armand |
monk2002uk | 17 Oct 2014 11:15 p.m. PST |
Here is a snippet from Colonel Gibbs' account. He was the Officer Commanding the BEF's 2nd Battalion, Duke of Wellington's Regiment. The DoWR defended a sector of the Condé Canal close to where Walter Bloem's regiment attacked in the Battle of Mons: "I went to where "B" Company was in fairly good cover behind some banks just beyond the sheds and from which we could get a fairly good view with glasses. Occasional glimpses of Germans creeping along hedge rows at from 400 to possibly 700 yards, were now to be had, but Carter had warned his men not to fire till a really good target offered itself so as not to give their position away. When they did begin [firing], I think it fairly staggered the enemy who went to ground at once. Shrapnel was soon opened on the buildings along the canal, but luckily without any serious effects to our men." Gibbs went on to summarise the German method of infantry attacks, as observed by him: "German tactics in attack appeared very like our own, in principle. They seemed to make deliberate preparation before launching an attack, bringing up guns and infantry on the ground. The artillery preparation then began more or less simultaneously along the front of the attack, and where it was thought sufficient effect had been produced the infantry came on with all available machine guns. If the infantry attack did not succeed it was at once abandoned and more preparation commenced." The abandonment of an unsuccessful attack involved the men going to ground. They were trained to create scrapes in the earth or to use other natural cover. This behaviour was often interpreted, incorrectly, as evidence of mass casualties by British infantry. Another possibility is that anecdotal memories became somewhat embellished in their re-telling. The following is from Brigadier General Bird, who was the Officer Commanding the 2nd Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles Regiment in the Battle of Mons. His battalion was defending the sector around Harmignies: "The German attack developed on the lines usually practised in 1914. Owing to the contour of the ground the enemy attacking the bluff were invisible from about 1500 yards until they closed to 300 yards, where they were checked." It should not noted that the British did not practice attacks in massed waves prior to the outbreak of WW1. Bird's account references his experience in that respect. Robert |
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