"French Ligne/legere operating in 2 rank" Topic

All,
this is discussion for that, other than the recorded occurrances of French depleted units in 1813 ( Liepzic) being ordered to operate in 2 rank in order to increase frontage topics already discussed/documented.

Specifically, this is to other evidence/doctrines indicated that the French either;a) purposely operated in such or b) had removed the 3rd rank to augment skirmish line/to extend frontage and THUS OPERATED IN 2 RANK FORMATION.
This would be periods prior to and after the 1813 occurrences.

My luck in search has struck out and all my sources (which I claim not to be complete with… but book collection is stout) does not mention much… to very little and no specifics.

thanks in advance
MG

Just to be clearer

Times Under Napoleon 1797-1815
MG

Legere regiments would deploy in both two and three ranks, depending on the circumstances. Two ranks made them 'skirmish ready' as they skirmished with two man teams/files.

Ney, in his 1803 instructions specifically calls for the third rank being used for skirmishers.

The French National Guard formed during the Revolution and existing throughout the Napoleonic period always formed in two ranks.

Forming in two ranks was provided for in all the regulations of the period, regardless of the nation. It was just something commanders could do.

So those rules which base infantry at different frontages for 2 and 3 ranks should require players to provide substitute bases when the unit sens out skirmishers?

I think you should focus on the fact that it was the exception and not the rule.
To the best of my knowledge, when Ney was formulating his argument to use third rankers as skirmishers, the formal adoption of the voltigeur company had not taken place, except amongst the legere units. The military debate was whether it made sense to use a single peleton [the voltigeurs], or a collection of men from the third rank. The argument against the voltigeurs was that it ultimately reduced the frontage of the battalion – something that could put a unit at a disadvantage, when an opponent had a wider frontage.
The provision to extend the frontage by adopting two ranks, was a tactical choice typically used when an opportunity to outflank an enemy line occurred.
I am a strong believer that we read about the use of two rank line in memoirs etc, principally because they were the exception and noteworthy.
Regardless of the apparent inefficiency of the third rank in a firefight, it still offered a pool of men available to close files, as casualties occurred, and therefore added to the robustness of the linear formation.

McLaddie,

Yes I have recently heard of that of Ney but not everyone followed his plans or did they? George N's book source of Doctrines (Title?) does not confirm and only briefly mentions this of the other nations (Austria, Prussia etc who are best documented of operating in such)
What would be good is recordings of incidences where the French was employing the 3rd rank out for extended line or skirmish support.
My search has proved empty.
Busaco battle reports, for example, do not indicate any specifics, if that what was going on with all the units skirmishing per reports (which from new sources indicate a lot of skirmishing was going on).
Hoping someone can provide such good evidence of this battle or others!

@ Ligniere
Can't argue that.
But how to handle mounting, when for tactical play the Prussian and Austrian/Russian would be essentially operating in 2 rank in order to have figures pushed forward for the skirmish line/unit. This creates a mounting dilemma.

thanks
MG

My recollection (Davout's instructions of 1812 I think) is that when pelotons were deployed to skirmish (voltigeurs typically) the chain would be composed of pairs drawn from the third rank, while the supports would deploy to the rear in a two rank line.

I also recall reading (though not entirely sure where – may have been Nafziger's Imperial bayonets) that in Revolutionary era there was a lot of flexibility – and it was common for third rank to be deployed separately as kirmishers or otherwise.

I think third rank deployments (and two rank deployments) were much more common than many wargamers assume. It was one of the flexibilities that the three rank system offered. Makes a bit of a nonsense of rules that try to fix units permanently into one or other mode.

One thing to remember about a two rank line is that while the fire is more effective it does suffer from shrinkage. That means as casualties mount the two rank line loses frontage and gaps widen between flanking units, which can be exploited by cavalry.

@ Major Bloodnok,
And that's one reason why the British didn't want to get involved in firefights – the British tactic was to deliver one or two volley's, at close range, then close with the bayonet – no standing around toe-to-toe trading volley's.
They attempted that at Albuera, and it resulted in the destruction of 2nd Division and a portion of the 4th.

@MG,
I think your dilemma could be a result of wanting to maintain a ratio of miniatures to real men. So, I'm guessing, you're attempting to maintain a ratio of 1:20 or 1:30, whether the unit is in two, or three-ranks. This is a quandary of rules that fit that model.

The Russians and Prussians, in the later period of the wars, tended to use, exclusively, jagers and fusiliers as the first line, adopting two-ranks, with the third on the skirmish line, or entirely in two-rank open order by battalion. This retained the heavy infantry for the bayonet shock action, which would provide the decisive moment of any combat. Those heavy infantry [for want of a better term], would be in three-ranks. Could they send out skirmishers – yes – but in reality that was the preserve of the light infantry battalions, the jagers and fusiliers.
The French didn't have that distinction, so much, and all battalions, with inherent voltigeur companies, could, and would provide the skirmish component, whilst the remainder of the battalion would remain in three ranks, either for firefights, or shock action.

Oh. Thought this was a thread for discussing French lingerie.

My mistake.

My impression from reading accounts of the Prussians in 1815 was that it was very common for all battalions to deploy their skirmish platoons, no just the fusiliers. (Reading quotes in English translation, alas I haven't read the accounts directly). That would still leave 8 rank columns in support.

Still I'm sure that Prussian generals would want to have a reserve of battalions without deployed skirmishers ready to deliver a final push.

It is also very clear that in 1815 the French deployed skirmishers from way more than just the voltigeur companies. They would not have been able to deliver their sustained skirmish attacks otherwise. However one brief reference I picked up from Waterloo the French Perspective suggests that this may still have been whole pelotons – and not stripping the third rank from the reserve column.

@ Ligniere,
If that model is not followed…this would be more on the lines of GdB rules which seems to have all troops either 6 or 8 man stands regardless of 2 rank doctrine or 3?
Thus also the 2 rank units require more figures in them to also make the frontage wider, as experienced against the opponent?

MG

Again, I wonder if we should be careful about assuming that written accounts reflect the norm, and not the exception.

Rotation of men in the skirmish chain was a necessity, considering one man per pair would fire a round every minute, that would mean the chain could effectively be out of ammo in about an hour. To avoid complete exhaustion of their ammo, this would result in their being rotated probably every thirty minutes or so, and given the numbers deployed to the skirmish chain, on a typical basis, a battalion of jager or fusiliers might be capable of spending many hours in that position. All the companies of those units would be expected to rotate in and out, but that probably wasn't the case with the other 'heavier' infantry.

D'Erlon's infantry at Waterloo, post 3 PM, appear to have devolved into a heavy skirmish line supported by battalion columns. D'Erlon only had one dedicated legere unit, the 13th, and that had been engaged, in part, in the region of the Bois de Paris, on the flank, and ultimately, in the assault and capture of La Haye Sainte. This meant D'Erlon's divisions were particularly low in 'light' troops [apart from the voltigeurs], and as they we engaged for the better part of four hours, opposed to the allies on the ridge, largely in skirmish activities, it wouldn't have taken long for the voltigeur companies to exhaust their ammunition, and required them to be rotated with fusiliers or grenadiers. But, was this the norm, or the exception?

Apologies to the OP for being a little off topic.

@MG,
I use different base widths to distinguish between nationalities that predominantly used either two or three ranks – and I don't distinguish within the same nationality between light troops in two ranks, with third rankers in a skirmish line, and heavy infantry in three ranks. As essentially, for the same number of men, the frontages would have been the same

So, with my own 28 mm figures, I base the two-rankers, with each file of figures on a frontage of 3/4", whilst the three-rankers, I base with each file of figures on a frontage of 5/8". This isn't perfect, but it does offer a slight difference.

Ligniere and MarshalGreg:

I think what can be forgotten is how different armies were during Napoleonic times. There was no 'doctrine' then as we understand it today--the word 'conventions' is closer to it. Army and corps commanders had much wider latitude in how things were done. There were regulations, but they were more of a tool kit ensuring common practices at the battalion/brigade level in maneuver than how things had to be done at the corps level. Corps and even regimental commanders wrote their own "Instructions" on how to do things and they didn't have to match how other corps or regiments did things in many ways. Even when there were efforts, such as the Dundas regulations, to make the army operations more uniform, for very good reasons, it didn't always work that way. Read Grattan and how Wallace trained his 88th regiment vs the required 18 evolutions the inspectors expected to see.

In 1792 Brunswick wrote instructions on how to use the third rank as skirmishers for his Prussian regiment. It was essentially the instructions used in 1792-1795 when he commanded the Prussian forces during the French Revolution and in the 1807/1811 Prussian regulations. In fact Scharnhorst defends the use of the 3rd rank by noting that the Prussians often deployed in two ranks during the French Revolution--to form a reserve and deal with French tirailleurs.

In 1794, Coberg uses the third rank extensively as skirmishers in Austria's fight in Holland.

1803 Hohenlohe writes instructions for his regiment on how to use the 3rd rank.

In 1803 Ney wrote his instructions for his corps.

In 1807/1811 Davout has Morand write Instructions on skirmish practices for his corps. For those instructions, the use of the 3rd rank is debated and rejected.

In 1807, Wellington writes a general order for his army in the Pennisula to always deploy in two ranks.

As late as 1810 Ney, Marmont, St. Cyr and others are debating the question of 2 or 3 ranks, so the benefits and downsides of one deployment over the other was not clear to even the French military.

My points are:
1. We are dealing with 20 years of war. We shouldn't expect the same practices from the French, let alone the other armies, over the entire time.

2. If there had been some basic, universal doctrines for the French or other armies in place, none of the above commanders would have felt the need to write their own instructions. If the French moved to voltigeur companies for all regiments in 1804, why did Davout feel the need to ask and then answer how his corps would handle skirmishing in 1807/1811?

I'm not avocating that people rush out and change their basing because of this, but simply looking at how things were done.

As deploying in two and three ranks were both described in every single nations' regulations as possible [from the SYW to the mid-19th Century], it has to be assumed that such choices were left up to the commanders and circumstances.

If the French moved to voltigeur companies for all regiments in 1804, why did Davout feel the need to ask and then answer how his corps would handle skirmishing in 1807/1811?

That's an easy one – because there would be times when the voltigeurs would be stripped from the parent unit, which meant they had no other option than using a fusilier or grenadier peleton to form the skirmish chain. If they used a whole peleton, that would further reduce the basic unit frontage, if they used elements from the third rank, the frontage would remain the same. Hence the debate.

During the Russian campaign Compan's division of I Corps had no legere regiment, so Compan felt the need to form composite voltigeur battalions to perform the typical advance and rearguard duties [for a period, during the advance, the division was attached to Murat]. That meant the line battalions were devoid of a light company to perform the skirmish chain [and other] duties – so Compan's would have had need of a convention to follow.

There will obviously be examples of every type of formation depth being employed, by the various nations, in some action or other over the length of twenty years – but that doesn't mean we have to attempt to account for those examples and exceptions. All we should really aim to replicate are the norms by nationality, and those, I believe, are relatively clear cut.

The different formation depths, at the simplest level, reflect that a unit of the same strength will be on a narrower frontage, in three-ranks, than the same unit in two. This is why I use different file widths for my figures, so the same number of figures, relatively, occupy different frontages, to reflect the different depths of formation, two or three ranks.

Ligniere. My understanding is that "heavy" infantry were often cycled into the skirmish line in prolonged encounters (skirmishes could last for hours). I expect this was the case for all armies, though more confident of the Prussians and French. It did create problems though. The less experienced men tended to clump, and to fire off their ammunition too quickly.

At Waterloo, for example, Barbero (source?) says that some Prussian regiments had used up all their cartridges before even reaching Plancenoit – in the skirmish led combats in the advance. That implies all men cycling into the skirmish line (and burning through their ammunition too quickly). My guess is that these were landwehr regiments.

On the French side it is not uncommon for references to be made to deploying whole battalions in skirmish order. These are not necessarily leger. Neither would it mean that all the men were put into the chain or formed one big cloud. More likely the third ranks would be sent out with supports in two ranks being cycled in. I think normally the French would deploy the third rank at peloton level, but not battalion level – and that is what distinguishes them from the Prussians and Austrians.

In wargames terms I class my French infantry into three groups. Conscripts have no skirmish expertise and tend to use dense formations. Trained infantry tend to restrict their skirmishing activity to the voltigeurs. Veterans are fully skirmish capable. There is a greater tendency for Leger regiments to be classed as veterans, but I don't distinguish between the two classes of infantry otherwise.

That's an easy one – because there would be times when the voltigeurs would be stripped from the parent unit, which meant they had no other option than using a fusilier or grenadier peleton to form the skirmish chain. If they used a whole peleton, that would further reduce the basic unit frontage, if they used elements from the third rank, the frontage would remain the same. Hence the debate.

That's all true, but that wasn't a new issue in 1807. That was an issue in in 1800, 1804, 1805 and 1806. Certainly grenadiers and fusiliers were used in Davout's and other Corps long before his instructions were written. So, why the instructions? The instructions covered how Davout wanted to do it in his corps.

There will obviously be examples of every type of formation depth being employed, by the various nations, in some action or other over the length of twenty years – but that doesn't mean we have to attempt to account for those examples and exceptions. All we should really aim to replicate are the norms by nationality, and those, I believe, are relatively clear cut.

My points were that the 'norm' for all the nations was that:

1.Regulations provided commanders with the option to form in 2 or 3 ranks

2. That both 2 and 3 rank formations were utilized depending on the commander and the situation.

3. How things were done was often different between corps and armies of the same nation.

Bill,
I would agree, Davout wanted it done a particular way. In the same way both Duhesme's and Reille's instructions offered guidance, to the field officers under their command, on how to approach the use and deployment of skirmishers. Oddly, there never was a true 'codification' of this type of deployment for the French. Reille's instructions were written in 1815 for the Waterloo campaign – but that's what commanders did, they issued general orders. Interestingly, given the French predilection for skirmish forces, it was probably the allied powers who offered more formalized direction in this matter.

I also agree that regulations, and other tactical guidance notes [of which there were a plethora], would offer options to form both two and three ranks. Where would the British Army have been without this option? But it became the 'norm' for the British to deploy in two-ranks. I doubt you are suggesting that the British field officers, considered it optional to deploy back into three-ranks, per Dundas, to suit a particular tactical situation – four ranks, maybe, but three…..

Most regulations suggested that light troops adopt two-ranks, as this facilitated the expansion of frontage when open or extended order was required. Essentially it was the intermediate step between close order three-ranks, and open or extended order two-ranks.

Also, regulations and tactical instructions would describe how to adopt two-ranks, from three, to facilitate the extension of close order frontage when attempting to outflank your opponent.

And I agree, some of this is probably reasonable on the wargaming tabletop – but it sure complicates how we base our figures…….

My figures are based following what I consider the 'norms' or 'conventions' of the various nationalities. Close order British [and their allies] fought in two-ranks. Close order French, Prussian, Russian and Austrian forces fought in three-ranks. Open order forces [or generally speaking light troops] from all nations fought in two-ranks. Then, using a different file frontage, for the different depths of formation, I base my units accordingly.

Obviously, these are generalities, as you suggest, but as an attempt to codify a fairly complex issue, it's at least a start.

Hi Nigel. Just wondering. Other than the British, which light troops do you base for two rank frontages. French Legere, Prussian fusiliers, Austrian Prussian and Russian Jaeger…I am currently rebasing my Naps for C&G2.

Thanks.

Michael

Mike
Mounted to represent two ranks currently include German jägers (Bavarians and Wurttembergers) Austrian jägers and Grenzer.
Plan to get to the Russian jägers but probably won't tackle the French.
No Prussians in my collections (unfortunately).

Thanks Nigel. Are you not tackling the French because they are already based or because you view them a little differently? I have read that in later years the legere were used primarily as heavy infantry and there was not much to differentiate them from line other than uniforms…but I am not an expert.

Mike

I doubt you are suggesting that the British field officers, considered it optional to deploy back into three-ranks, per Dundas, to suit a particular tactical situation –four ranks, maybe, but three…..

"optional" is a woofily word here. The British deployed in three ranks in Holland 1795-78--but not always. They deployed in 2 ranks in Egypt in 1800 and Wellington felt it necessary to issue general orders for the 2 rank deployment in 1807, so that 'optional' was still active and 2 ranks weren't the norm. The British units that fought on the Continent fought in three ranks… as they were operating with othe troops that did. When Torrens wrote the 1824 regulations, updating Dundas, 3 ranks were stated as being the 'norm' regardless of the Pennisular history.

That being said, it doesn't mean that after 1824, British troops didn't deploy in 2 ranks. We're looking at 20+ years of war here, so the 'norm' in 1800 doesn't mean it was the norm in 1815. The war was wide and long enough that different tactical situations arose and different 'options' were employed.

I expect this was the case for all armies, though more confident of the Prussians and French. It did create problems though. The less experienced men tended to clump, and to fire off their ammunition too quickly.

At Waterloo, for example, Barbero (source?) says that some Prussian regiments had used up all their cartridges before even reaching Plancenoit – in the skirmish led combats in the advance. That implies all men cycling into the skirmish line (and burning through their ammunition too quickly). My guess is that these were landwehr regiments.

matthewgreen:

Wargames require a great deal of generalizations. It does require a clear understanding of the particulars to get a meaningful generalization. That's hard with history 200 years old.

The 17th Legere, a veteran unit, fired off all their ammo at Saalfeld 1806 skirmishing and were withdrawn from the battle line. At Jena a week later, they did the same thing, and again were pulled out of the battle line. In both cases we are talking about 2 hours of combat. Burning up ammo was a common occurance in skirmishing regardless of the experience of the troops. That made supports really vital.

On the French side it is not uncommon for references to be made to deploying whole battalions in skirmish order. These are not necessarily leger. Neither would it mean that all the men were put into the chain or formed one big cloud. More likely the third ranks would be sent out with supports in two ranks being cycled in. I think normally the French would deploy the third rank at peloton level, but not battalion level – and that is what distinguishes them from the Prussians and Austrians.

Yes, that use of supports was important. However, the Prussians, Russians, and Austrians did deploy infantry by battalion. Archduke Charles in his instructions of 1796, addressed Coberg's large-scale use of skirmishers in Holland 1794: "This misuse [of entire units as skirmishers] must be opposed because it weakens the impetus of the attack."

A few other Austrian examples:

"(…) I will not refrain from informing Your Royal Higness that 3 battalions Lacy & 2 battalions Von Schröder already have arrived in the encampment left of the road from Ostrach to Foulendorf; the 3rd battalion Von Schröder however, which was used for skirmishing inside the forest, is still dispersed and will arrive late – my quarters are inside the first house in Specht ['Spöck' nowedays]"

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv – Kriegsarchiv, Vienna; Alte Feldakten, Deutschland 1799/3/225;

The Austrian history of the 1809 battle Krieg 1809 is filled with examples of line troops skirmishing. At Znaym 1809:

"The advanced pickets of the Mittrowsky IR10 engaged, and were supported by their battalion, and covered by a 12 pdr position battery, obstructed the enemy's advance, until one battalion of Kollowrath IR11, and two peices of ordnance came up." Later, "a second battalion was detached to the height, and a chain of riflemen formed, to force those of the enemy back into the village."

A later account, by an officer in 3rd battalion IR63 Bianchi , published in Mitteilungen des kuk Heeresmuseum (1902-1907), describes masses deploying skirmishers at Valeggio in February 1814.

"GM Baron Stutterheim rode up and ordered us to form division masses, then to wheel to the left and march off towards the enemy; muskets were to be loaded on the march". The masses were drawn up in a chequer board arrangement with IR63 on the left. "Our masses sent out skirmishers (from IR3 Erzherzog Karl, IR4 Deutchmeister and IR63); the four guns, which were attached to our brigade, unlimbered and took up their firing positions and now the firing was general. The enemy deployed gradually across a longer front and forced us to dissolve the masses into open order skirmish lines."

The Russians did it too. At the Battle of Bautzen, all three battalions of the Pavlov Grenadiers were dispursed as skirmishers to defend a wood for several hours.

So, the Austrians and Russians did use entire battalions--or their equivalents--as skirmishers from time to time throughout the wars, even though there is a history of Austrian and Russian commanders, like Charles, insisting it wasn't necessary.

'To dissolve battalions into skirmish order would … be a mistake.' -Schwarzenberg, 1812

That instruction is only necessary if such actions were contemplated and done… which they were.

There is much evidence for the British use of two deep line throughout this period, so much so that it is difficult to believe that it was not common practice, but there are very few(if any) general orders that state that this is the required formation.

Bill,

I know that we have discussed this several times, but see the points below:

Bill wrote:

The British units that fought on the Continent fought in three ranks

Bill,
Please can you let me know which campaigns you are referring to? Preferably with direct reference to 3 deep being used.

Bill wrote:

Wellington felt it necessary to issue general orders for the 2 rank deployment in 1807

Bill,
Please could you show me the general order from 1807? This would be in Denmark wouldn't it? The general order in Portugal in 1808 did not apply to the whole army (only three brigades), although the evidence seems to show that the army used two deep line anyway. It should be remembered that Wellington was not the commander of the army in 1808 and any general orders issued had no bearing on subsequent campaigns. There are no general orders for 2 deep for the years that he was CinC.

Bill wrote:

When Torrens wrote the 1824 regulations, updating Dundas, 3 ranks were stated as being the 'norm' regardless of the Pennisular history.

Sorry Bill, this is completely wrong. In the 1824 regs the 2 deep line was standard.

MarshalGreg,

The 'third rank sent out to skirmish' was a feature of late 18th Century practice in many armies. As others have said there was much debate on the topic. Since many theorists were of the view that the third rank could not fire effectively but leant greater 'solidity' to the formation, people tried to find some use for them. So you get third rank guys sent out to skirmish in the SYW, and indeed in America where the Brits did it in their one action (Lexington and Concord) before they adopted the 2 deep line and the Hessians did it in the New York campaign the following year. Prussians, Russians, and Austrians stuck with the 3 rank line but all had the practice of sending some portion of it out to skirmish where required. The third rank was also to be used for filling gaps and re-loading.

Concerning the French practice, it was more ambivalent in part because of the early adoption of light infantry companies in the royal army, which served this purpose. The debate went on for decades – 2 ranks or 3. By the time of the 1813 campaign though a number of things had happened – including that the tactical practice of legere regiments had become barely distinguishable from those of the line. In depleted regts, as you say, forming in 2 ranks could make up the frontage. Interestingly in Zhmodikov's work on Russian tactics he says that their regiments also formed in 2 ranks at times during the 1813-14 battles because they were so understrength. In general though the lowering of the training standard of French regiments during the 1812-14 period meant that commanders often preferred the 'solidity' not just of 3 ranks but of 9 – the column of grand divisons.

McLaddie
- if you have any evidence of the British using 3 deep line in the low countries during 1793-5, I would be most interested to hear it.
- Major Snort is right. The 2 deep line was standard for the British, and the 1824 regs, summing up peninsular experience, are written on that basis,. Indeed drills for forming in 3 and 4 deep line are specifically noted. I have a copy of the 1824 regs and will happily cite page refs if you require.
- some years back the historian Rory Muir posted a query on the Napoleon Series as to whether anybody could find evidence of the British Army forming in 3 ranks at any time during the Napoleonic wars on a field of battle (as opposed to reviews or parades where the Dundas rules were often used). Only one example was found by the learned posters there. If memory serves, it was of an account of the 42nd in Egypt.

yours
EC

MS:

Yes, I know we've had similar discussions. I will get the references to where three ranks were used in the low countries in circa 1795-1795 [Not the 1798-1799 actions] and Germany in 1813.

Yes, it is 1808 and not 1807. My mistake. And regardless of who the general orders were for, they would be completely unnecessary if two ranks were the norm at the time. There is no question that 2 ranks were the norm for Wellington's army for the rest of the war.

As EC mentions "The 2 deep line was standard for the British, and the 1824 regs, summing up peninsular experience, are written on that basis,. Indeed drills for forming in 3 and 4 deep line are specifically noted."

I should have been clearer. You are quite right about the thrust of all the drill in Torren's work. It does indeed show two ranks for most all drill descriptions. When he provides drills for 3 and 4 deep, he mentions that 3 ranks to be the 'norm' on the continent and justifies the inclusion of 3 rank drill on that basis. I will hunt up that reference along with the others above.

EC: actually , I think the account of the 42nd in Egypt was in response to a cavalry threat according to the Nap Series… If I remember right. The action is described in Wilson's History of the British Expedition to Egypt 1800 2 Vols 1803.

However, the few British troops on the Continent fighting with their Allies formed in three ranks. The Revolutionary war examples are harder to come by. I will have to dig them out again.

I am following this wiht interest from the side line. It has been som time since we had any of this good stuff here – I for one am sincerely glad it is back – this is why I come here :-)

Bill,

I am not sure that Torrens comments on the use of 3 deep line by other armies.

It is important to recognise the main reasons that forming 3 deep and 4 deep were present in the 1824 regulations and forming a deeper battle line was NOT one of them.

3 deep was generally formed to allow the troops to move to a flank in a column three men wide, or "sections of 3" as it was sometimes referred to, without the inconvenience of "marching in file" with a 2 man wide column. The formation of threes allowed more space between the ranks and helped prevent the column from extending. The company or battalion was not allowed to extend further than their own frontage when moving to a flank like this, so marching in file 2 men wide was very difficult. Sections of three had been used in the Peninsular.

4 deep was used for the same purpose, or to form a gap between each file to allow a passage of lines, or just prior to forming square from line.

When the battalion formed 3 deep or 4 deep for the above purposes, the frontage of the battalion remained the same as the original 2 deep line. If necessary the files could be closed, but as mentioned above, that was not the main reason for the use of the deeper formations.

Regarding the depth of formation used in 1793 – 95, although this is not a period that I have looked at in any detail, there is the following that appears in the journal of lieutenant Charles Stewart of the 28th Regiment.

29 Nov 1793 Headquarters Portsmouth

All persons belonging to the army are to be on board this day by 3 oclock and no permission to be granted for going on shore by any commg officer of a Transport unless a license for that purpose signed by the Genl of the Brigade be obtained.

During the Service which the troops are now embarked the Regiment are to form two deep with close files.

As this appears in a section of orders issued to the army, this seems to be Charles Stewart's paraphrasing of a order to the entire army.

Regarding Egypt, the only references I have seen are for 2 deep. In particular the very clear statement of Olfermanns who was with Stuart's brigade. With particular regard to the 42nd Regiment, The following account of Alexandria appears in "Sketches of the Character, Manners and Present State of the Highlanders of Scotland". The author, David Stewart, was an eyewitness:

But it is proper to explain, that it was only the rear rank of the left wing that faced about and charged to their rear; the front rank kept their ground to oppose the enemy to their immediate front.

There is no mention of a middle rank which implies the 42nd were only 2 deep.

MS:

Yes, the famous action of the 42nd facing rearward in two ranks is what I remember. I simply remember the Nap Series reference saying at *some time* during the campaign the 42nd was in three ranks because of cavalry… and found in the History I referenced… IIRC.

Torrens, in the 1824 'Field Exercise and Evolutions of the Army.', is replacing the Rules and Regs 1792 and stated that "Improvements, however, have been suggested, by practical experience during the late eventful war; which , although important and essential in the abstract, were partially adopted, without adherence to any general or fixed principle of formation.".

I think the problem here is trying to establish an all or nothing approach to the 2 rank practice throughout the Napoleonic wars, for any nation, even the British--and that doesn't suggest that 2 rank formations weren't the dominate practice. Again, we are talking about twenty+ years here.

So perhaps a timeline of some references would help:

I have 1792 and 1803 editions of the 'Rules and Regulations for the Formations, Field-Exercise and Movements of His Majesty's Forces' and they are identical, and three ranks is presented as the norm.

From the history of the 4th Foot then brigaded at Shorncliffe [1803] under Moore,

"Even in battalion companies he introduced a more open formation than had previously been the custom and he dispensed with much of the rigidity of the line. Inspecting officers, however, did not always share his views and they often insisted on a third rank in the battalion companies. When this was the case the fire of the third rank was kept in reserve…."

The Duke of York issued 'General Orders and Observations on the Movements and Field Exercise of the Infantry', Whitehall, 'in further Explanation' of the 1792 Regulations, and directed that 'the strictest conformity thereto be observed in every particular of execution'.

The wording of the Duke of York's reminder, authorized in September of 1804, and simply one of 47 numbered paragraphs, was:

"34. It is ever to be remembered that the established order of formation for the infantry is in three ranks, which is not to be departed from except in light infantry battalions, or in small detached corps acting as such, without the especial permission of the Commanding or Reviewing General."

General Orders and Observations on the Movements and Field Exercise of the Infantry' dated 1807, which is a shortened version of the 1792 regs, which doesn't go beyond battalion, for use of NCOs still only recognises three ranks as the norm.

With this in mind, it isn't surprising that Wellington would issue General Orders for two rank formations in 1808.

Finally, Smirke's 'Review of a Battalion of Infantry', 1810 edition, a quasi-official document, also retains three ranks as the norm.

In other words, 2 and 3 rank formations were still both viewed as 'the norm' depending on who you read and what is considered 'the norm', regardless of what Wellington and others had been or were doing in the Pennisula and elsewhere at the time. That has been my only point.

Even the phrasing of a regimental order you quote for 1794 implies more than one view of this:
29 Nov 1793 Headquarters Portsmouth

During the Service which the troops are now embarked the Regiment are to form two deep with close files.

I came across all this while hunting up those 1793-75 and 1813 references… which I am still looking for.

Great Discussions.
I am afraid it has moved much to the British.
To refocus the concern is with the French/ French Allies.
What conclusions can be made now?
-French stay in 3 rank formation with the narrower frontage from loss of troops used from skirmish?
-All others have a slightly larger frontage to indicate maintenance of frontage from use of 3rd rank or troops who mostly functioned in 2 rank close order(British, Jager etc)?
What is the general consensus here ( if rules are left out of the equation)for determining ideal mounting for the formation difference?

MG

I agree with McL's assertion that there was a great deal of flexibility in French tactical command, which meant that they could on occasion order their troops to operate in two ranks, or deploy the third rank as skirmishers. Variation in practice is probably wider in the pre-revolutionary period, before the development of dedicated voltigeur companies.

Having said that, and based on what people have brought to this discussion, I don't think that you will go far wrong in basing the French in three ranks as standard, with the skirmish screens being provided by the deployment of whole pelotons. Once a peloton is deployed into skirmish, it adopts two rank formation for the support line – though wargamers rarely bother representing this.

That's my take, but going forward I will scour any French accounts I read for further evidence that supports or contradicts this. I am particularly interested in what happened when the voltigeur company had burnt out its ammunition – what did French officers do then?

That's my take, but going forward I will scour any French accounts I read for further evidence that supports or contradicts this. I am particularly interested in what happened when the voltigeur company had burnt out its ammunition – what did French officers do then?

They took them out of the battleline and/or replenished their ammo. It was one reason to have supports… to circulate men with ammo into the skirmish line.

I gave the example of the 17th Leger at Saalfeld and Jena.

Thanks McL. Do you mean that the voligeurs were pulled out and replaced by another company, and so on? That would make most sense. More sense than trying to strip out third ranks from the supports.

My sense from battles such as Quatre Bras that the skirmish attack was so intense and prolonged that more than the voltigeur companies must have been sent forward.

For the 17th Leger in 1806 it sounds as if the whole regiment was burnt out.

I'm trying to break out of the common wargamer's stereotype that only voltigeurs did the skirmishing.

Though that's straying off the topic!

Yes, it was the entire 17th Leger in 1806, but then the entire regiment was committed to combat.

It was common practice, both the French and all the Allied nations to send in the specialists first if they were available, but they were more often than not reinforced by center companies and/or the grenadiers.

That isn't to say that the center companies of either the Allies or French were always or even usually as good as the light troops, but they were used on a regular basis when the need arose.

Which means that leger, voltiguers, jagers, light, rifles and fusiliers would be used first, and that could be enough, but that all depended on the enemy.

would those operate in two ranks?

Most likley yes – as ws the usual practise – but then – the usual 3 rank battle order had to be reduced firstly into two ranks, than you would deploy some of them into the skirmish line and keep some as reserve.

So any unit French or Foe, in in close prox of the enemy/battle and had skirmishers forward the main support would be in 2 rank?
My impression from evidence and discussion is:
a) Skirmish line
b) Then direct support -2 rank open order ( these would be represented by the figure stand(s)
c) main line in:
French Fr Allies- remaining in 3 rank formation).
The Allies in closed order 2 ranks for the the main line since the third rank was sent out.

If so, the issue remains on how to mount/address frontage difference?
If it could be said the French would be reduced to mostly 2 rank since the 3rd got stripped off to relieve the Volt Co- then all are mounted equally?
Indication so far is another peleton would be sent.
I still do not thing this has been confirmed.

MG

The frontage would still be the same. The Troops deployed in three ranks would retain the same frontage if the third rank was sent out as skirmishers. It could also be held back as a reserve or flank protection.

The British and various light troops would fully deploy in two ranks, making their line 1/3 longer than the same number of troops deployed in three ranks. Those would be the only ones to really concern yourself with regarding frontages.

The French went from a variety of methods at the beginning of the wars to basically one with some variations after 1804, and that is reinforcing the voltigeurs by company. Art Pendragon could speak to the various methods, but it wasn't using the third rank, either the ligne or the legere regiments.

Here is a description of deployment and skirmishers from 1795 the Instructions to the Army of Italy:

From J. Hake. The Tactics and the Discipline in the Armies of the Revolution. Correspondence of the General Schauenbourg. Paris, 1902.

In the last days of the year 1795, Barthélémy Louis Joseph Schérer, general in chief of the Army of Italy, published an instruction for his army, because the theater of the war was going to change in the Italian plain:

Line infantry will always be formed on three ranks except the case where a troop would have to defend a retranchement or a height, an escarpement or a ditch, that would reduce it purely to the defensive role. […] The legere infantry habitually will be formed on two ranks, because this troop principally being destined to fight by its fire. [It is] to move nimblely, sometimes even without order and éparpillée, to worry the enemy on its flanks and its rear, it is natural that his formation be habitually less deep order than the one of the line infantry, which is destined to act principally by his impulse, and to fight with the bayonet. […]

Most of the Italy troops never having fought in plain, and never having been in in the situation to support a cavalry force, it suits the genius of our nation and to the bravery of the troops to prescribe them a manner to attack that favors their courage and their impétuosité, that rids them difficulties of marching forward to observe a battle line and that removes all fear from them to be reversed by a cavalry force. I will suppose that a divison composed from 4 line demi-brigades and a light demi-brigade charged with attacking enemy line ahead of the division;…

@McLaddie

I cannot find :

J. Hake. The Tactics and the Discipline in the Armies of the Revolution.

Do you have a link or more details?

von Winterfeldt:

Don't you just love google books? Links come and go. Try this:

La tactique et la discipline dans les armées de la Révolution: correspondance du Général Schauenbourg du 4 avril au 2 août1793 by General Alexis Balthasar Henri Antoine de Schauenbourg (1748-1831); Preface and edited by Jean Lambert Alphonse Colin (1864-1917 ). 1902.

NOTE: The 1990 BN ‘edition' is in fact a microfiche: Shelf mark MFICHE 8-LH3-348. A copy of the microfiche can be ordered from the BN.

I finally found one of the references to three rank British formations in Holland 1793-75. I was rifling through my primary sources and it ended up being a reference in Gates:

‘At the Battle of Hondschoote in 1793…one formation of the Duke of York's army, deployed in the usual three-deep lines, had suddenly come under attack from numerous ‘Tirailleur-haufen' who, using hedges and ditches for shelter, poured a lethal fire into the exposed, serried ranks of their adversaries. In keeping with the principles outlined abovce, the Hanoverian general in command of the allied corps ordered his troops to advance with the bayonet. This they did, only to see their opponents retire, firing all the time, to a second line of covered positions. Eventually, the decimated allies retreated to their riginal position, at which the French skirmishers moved forward to harass them once more. This pattern of events was repeated several times until the allied contingent finally retreated altogether. The French tirailleurs sustained very few casualties in the action; the allies'total loss, on the
other hand, was some 2650 rank and file, 100 officers, and three cannon.'

-David Gates, The British Light Infantry Arm 1790-1815, 52.

This use of the three rank formation could be because York's army was made up of more than just British troops.

Bill,

Without reference to a primary source, that is just Gates' assumption.

In 1793, although they had been written, the Dundas regulations had not yet been widely adopted and prior to their adoption, from the available evidence including Dundas' own comments, the usual formation was 2 deep.

MS:
The paragraph detailing the action in Gates is footnoted:

73: See M.J.C. von Ditfurth, Die Hessen in den Feldzugen, 1793, 1794 und 1795 in Flandrn, Bradant, Holland und Wetphalen (Kassel, 1839) 1, pp. 112-124.

I don't think it is Gates assumption. From my reading of German, such as it is, the 3 rank formation is stated directly.

It's available from Worldcat. And yes, it's in German.

According to Gates, the 1792 regulations based on Dundas' Principles were distributed to the units leaving for Holland, which called for 3 ranks.

And Dundas does not say the 'usual' formation is 2 deep. What he does say is that:

It is our misfortune that no line of conduct has been laid down: the good order of regiments has been left dependent on the rules of service, than on the accidental efforts of individuals, and on the fashion of the day, equally as that changing: Where zeal or science has been wanting, the consequences are all too apparent."

page 11 Principles of Military Movements

A paragraph later he concludes:

Our ranks are so thin, our files so open, and such intervals permitted between companies of the same battalion when in line, that all idea of solidarity is lost.--We have begun at the wrong end and have endeavored to deduce the useful movements of the line from the showy and review ones of the battalion.

same page.

Gates notes that after the American Revolution, when the army was reduced to 40,000 some men, that the trappings, dress and formations of the light infantry became a fad, which included the 2 rank formation. See page 13 of Dundas' Principles where he describes this. It wasn't the 'norm.' As Dundas notes individual regiments seemed to 'do their own thing' with no uniformity--which was the overriding issue with the publication of the regulations.

Parade maneuvers were in two ranks, even earlier. To argue that Dundas is saying that 2 ranks were the 'usual' and the 'norm' for the British in the early 1790s, you also have to argue that open files, extended line, and large gaps in intervals were also the norm.

Then you have to explain, as Dundas worked to correct all of those things he deemed as errors with the regulations, along with York and a good many other military men, why some errors were completely erraticated and some weren't at all, even when Dundas was present on the battlefield.

I have never suggested that the British didn't use 2 ranks, only that over that twenty year period, it was A. a transition to exclusive use of 2 ranks, and B. throughout, it remained a matter of what was seen at the time as the benefits and downsides of 2 and 3 rank formations, or 3 and 4 rank formations for that matter.

Bill,

A German source – how valid is that for the fine details of British practice?

Gates plays fast and loose with quotes in this book.

I know what Dundas wrote and what other serving officers considered to be the normal formation.

I would only be convinced if you could show me a direct account from a British eyewitness who was present stating that the troops were formed 3 deep.

A German source – how valid is that for the fine details of British practice?

Hanoverian source. von Ditfurth was using eyewitness sources. It is no less valid than the British describing French details. However, it is probably more valid because the eyewitnesses, while being German, were fighting with the British. I would think you would consider the source with the same critical view regardless of the nationality or ethnicity of the author.

I would only be convinced if you could show me a direct account from a British eyewitness who was present stating that the troops were formed 3 deep.

Ah. You should have said so. However, I did:

From the history of the 4th Foot then brigaded at Shorncliffe [1803] under Moore,

"Even in battalion companies he [Moore] introduced a more open formation than had previously been the custom and he dispensed with much of the rigidity of the line. Inspecting officers, however, did not always share his views and they often insisted on a third rank in the battalion companies. When this was the case the fire of the third rank was kept in reserve…."

[Italics mine] And remember, this was for light infantry training where two ranks would have been more 'normal'…

I am still looking askance at your use of the word 'normal'. Perhaps you can provide British sources that used that term?

The German source is describing the deployment of German (Hanoverian and Hessian)troops.

I am referring to the use of three deep used in action, not on a parade ground. The quote from the regimental history does not help here, as there are many accounts of inspecting officers reminding officers on home service about the use of three deep line.

Regarding what was considered normal prior to the adoption of the 1792 regulations, Dundas on p50 of Principles of Military Movements wrote:

The method ALMOST UNIVERSALLY adopted in our infantry, and in ours only, of forming two deep, and at open files, deserves the most serious consideration.

Colonel Colin Lindsay in the introduction to his 1793 translation of Templehoffe's history of the Seven Years War wrote

The drawing up of troops two deep is peculiar to the British service; but there is now every reason to hope that this practice will be discontinued.

His hope lay in the adoption of Dundas' regulations.

In 1794 Robert Abercrombie, C in C in India, adopted Dundas' regulations with the following exception:

as the only deviation from the Regulations now to be adopted, that the army in India CONTINUE to form two deep.

It seems that the use of 2 deep was pretty well engrained within the British army prior to 1792

The method ALMOST UNIVERSALLY adopted in our infantry, and in ours only, of forming two deep, and at open files, deserves the most serious consideration.

MS:
Thank you for the quotes. I can only accept that 'normal' is an accurate description of the British use of the 2 rank formation before 1792 and after.

I have been arguing for that 'almost': that there were British units [however few] which did use 3 rank formation.

The German source is describing the deployment of German (Hanoverian and Hessian)troops.

That's what you got from it? British troops were involved…apart from the Hanoverian. That is the reason the
author bothers to note they formed up in three ranks. If they Hessian and Hanoverian troops were always doing it, why bother mentioning it???

I am referring to the use of three deep used in action, not on a parade ground. The quote from the regimental history does not help here, as there are many accounts of inspecting officers reminding officers on home service about the use of three deep line.

Considering that the British were using 2 ranks on the parade ground, neither was I. Are you suggesting that Moore at Shorncliffe was carrying parade ground training? You aren't suggesting that firing practice [the third rank abstaining from fire] is a parade ground activity? And what was done on the parade ground was, with few exceptions, the kind of maneuvers employed on the battlefield in any case.

Moore was going to open files, the very thing that ten years before, Dundas and Lindsey and others had decried.

So, you have the regulations tightening formations, which is acknowledged in the 4th Regiment quote, and the effort to have battalion companies [presumably center companies] form in three ranks, the formation in which they then practiced firing.

And in 1808, just as Abercrombie felt the need to state in 1794, Wellington feels the need to issue a GO to the same effect. IF 2 ranks was so completely a 'universal' practice, there would have been no reason to issue the general order to anybody.

Can we agree on that? Or are you asking me to accept that Wellington is spending time issuing GOs fourteen years after Abercrombie that are totally unnecessary?

From the Napoleon Series:

Document found on:
PDF link

Capt. Eyre Coote's 37th Light Infantry Company Order Book, 1778 – 1781 Eyre Coote Papers, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan Transcribed and Edited by Paul L. Pace, June 15, 2011 (1778 account tables transcribed by Don Hagist)

It is of interest to those who like to know about small things and battle tactics (2 or 3 or 4 ranks).

For example, the order for the 4th of April 1781 by Major General Phillips gives the following (the spelling is not corrected in the transcription, nor by me):

That the troops Inder his Command may Practice firing from two, to three And to four Deep, And that they Should be Accoustomed to Charge in all those Orders, in the latter Order of 3 – &4 deep the files Will of Course be Closer, So as to Render a Charge of the Greatest force.

The The Majr. Genl. also Recomends to Regts. the practice of Devideing the Bettlions by Wings or otherways, So that one line may Support the other, When an Attack is Supposed; And when a Retreat is Supposed that the first line may retreat through the Intervals of the Second, the Second Dubling Up its Divisions for that purpose; And forming them Up again in Ordr to Chak the enemy Who may, be
Supposed to have pressed the first line –

The Majr. Genl. Would aprove also of one division of a Bettlion Attacking in the Common open Order of 2 Deep, to be Supported by the other division as a Second line, in the Charging Order of 3 or 4 deep be ganing the flank of a supposed Enemy by the Quick Movement of a division in Common open Order, while the Compact division advances to a Charge, And to Such other evoloutions as may lead the Regts to a Custom of depending on, And mutaly Suporting each
other So that Should one part be pressd or broken it May be accoustomed to form again without Confution [confusion] Under the protection of a Second line Orany [or any]
Reagular formed Division – The Majr. Genl. is assured that the Captains of Companies Upon whom the mannovers of a Bettlion in so meterial a Degree depend Will pay the greatest attention to the orders of the Field Officers; in whos activity and zeal the Majr. Genl. places the greatest Confidence.

Note too that this is for a light infantry company.