"Virginia militia in 1781" Topic

Another TMPer asked about this, some of which is widely known, but some less so.

I'm doing this from memory so may have to revise and extend.

First, an important aside on Thomas Jefferson:

I'm a Hamiltonian myself, but TJ gets a bum rap as war governor of VA. He was not a military man at all, but was thoroughly dedicated to VA and a shrewd politician. His extensive orders to George Rogers Clark are masterful, giving clear descriptions of what the objectives were and leaving details up to the man on the spot.(Remember that Clark's Illinois regiment were Virginia State Line, protecting Virginia's western l;and claims.) Jefferson gets the blame for the almost unopposed invasions of VA in 1780 and 1781, but VA had sent massive amounts of aid -- militia battalions but even more its own state line -- into the Carolinas where Continental officers mostly threw it away. And of course TJ's term ended ignominiously as he fled down one slope of Montecello as Tarlington's raiders rode up the opposite slope.

But under TJ the state had established a War Office that did a fine job of balancing needs (i.e. do the leather workers making cartridge boxes and harnesses and saddles for the Continental army get exemptions from their county militia?). A supernumerary Continental colonel, William Davies, was commissioner, and he kept a lot of things working as smoothly as possible.

When TJ left office, he was replaced by Thomas Nelson of Yorktown (he targeted artillery on his own home which was in use by the british as headquarters). Nelson was a n experienced officer and took the field during the Yorktown campaign as commander-in-chief of the Va militia -- which of course he has every right to do. But providing supplies for the Continental and French armies put a huge strain on Virginia's government, and Nelson probably would have been better employed serving as chief executive; the army already had plenty of field commanders.

What made the difference was William Davies' efficiency at the War Office; he took up the slack for Governor Nelson.

As to the Va militia, by 1781 they were maintaining permanent battalions in the field, officered by supernumerary Continentals. (Local militia officers were allowed to partner with the Continental officers, as they were the natural political and social elites of their counties.) The rank and file were in many cases ex-Continental rank-and-file. These battalions were maintained by a draft on the militia, but the militiamen were encouraged to hire a replacement -- a man already serving -- so that the field battalions stayed intact even though the draft was technically for one to three months. I believe these are the "militia grenadiers" mentioned in some accounts. (Remember that EVERY MAN in a county was legally in the militia, except a few exempted categories like ministers and millers. Continental veterans who returned home would be promptly enrolled in the local militia.)

I would rate the Virginia militia in the Yorktown campaign as equivalent to 2nd-rate Continentals. Not "green," as many of them were veterans, but probably not with high esprit de corps.

Jefferson was brought up on charges after he was governor. He pleaded with the people in his district to elect him to go back to the state congress and defend himself. By then, it was almost swept under the rug. Jefferson made them renounce the charges brought against him.

Of the charges brought against him, Jefferson never forgot.

e did more then the state congress during this time. They fled to Roanoke. Michael Kranish's book Flight from Monticello is a good read. Even some info on Arnold.

Second the book Flight From Monticello.

Jefferson did not prepare his state when governor to fight any invasion. He also 'abdicated' his post of governor after running away, leaving the state without a governor until another could be sworn in.

He was not a competent wartime governor of his state and he was not a good president, gutting the US Navy and then launching a naval war against the Barbary States in the Mediterranean.

He also encouraged his protégé, Madison, to prosecute a war against Great Britain and actually believed that the militia was more efficient and combat-worthy than a regular army would be. He wanted the US Navy reduced to gunboats and rely on privateers at sea.

In short, he was one of the worst presidents the US has ever had.

B

No. He did a great deal to prepare the state, but when the Continental cause needed more support from Virginia he sent most of their strength south.

Haven't read FLIGHT but looks like I need to, because I already disagree just from what you have said.

You are correct that he slashed defense spending but fail to mention why: he was determined to get out from under Hamilton's financial plan asap. Militia and gunboats are cheap. You may not agree, but he did have a good reason for his policy.

I'm no fan of TJ but he is very complicated and there is a lot of unjustified criticism (along with some that IS justified) of him.

Concur with Brechtel on this one.

Eric

Jefferson was a controversial figure during his time . The classical American myth glossed over this, but recent scholarship has reminded us of many of these controversies. Jefferson's military policies as president and the War of 1812 probably justify their own threads, so I will stick with the AWI.

One point to remember at the outset is that Virginia governors during the AWI possessed far less actual power than prior royal governors. They could influence policy more than dictate it. This may have been one reason Nelson continued acting as a militia commander after he became governor. As it was there were questions about whether some of Nelson's actions were authorized.

The efforts Virginia made during the earlier years of the AWI could not be sustained during Jefferson's term as governor. A very large portion of the enlistments for Virginia continental troops were expiring, and many would not re-enlist. This may have been caused in part because of the inability of the Continental Congress to meet its obligations to those troops. What continentals that were raised in 1779 to 1781, times when Virginia was being subjected to raids and invasions, were largely sent south. One of the greatest acts of stupidity during the war was the decision to take surplus Virginia continental officers to Charleston in 1780. Of 6 infantry regiments raised during that period, only one was available under Steuben to meet the threat from Arnold and Cornwallis. That regiment and Steuben's other troops was unsuccessfully trying to protect a supply depot on the James when Tarleton's troops raided Virginia's capital of Charlottesville.

Virginia's economic resources also took a hit during 1779 to 1781. When the war moved south, Virginia's ability to sell tobacco and import weapons, powder, uniforms and equipment was restricted. The pace at which Virginia units raised during this period could head south was affected by this. Virginia still produced plenty of food to feed troops, but getting it to those troops became more of a problem.

While Jefferson was not able during his term as governor to turn out Virginia's quota of continentals, militia was repeatedly turned out, and in large numbers.

The Virginia Continental Line was mostly if not completely captured at the surrender of Charleston in 1780.

It had to be reconstituted and two regiments were available and assigned to Greene's southern army in late 1780/early 1781 and fought at Guilford Courthouse in March 1781, performing excellently against British regulars and giving better than they got.

The Virginia militia ran at Camden, along with the North Carolina militia, in August 1780, leaving the Continentals under de Kalb to face the entire British army on the field alone. Virginia General Stevens was mortified and when they formed part of Greene's army at Guilford Courthouse the next year, Stevens formed a skirmish line of 25 picked men in the rear of the Virginia position with orders to shoot anyone who ran.

As it was, the North Carolina militia once again performed dismally, but the Virginia militia stood their ground, fought well, and attrited the British before they came up against the American third line of Continentals.

B

The crisis in the Virginia continental line hit long before Charleston. The 15 regiments of a couple of years before had shrunk to just four veteran regiments by the beginning of 1780. Even if the Virginia 1779 recruits had been used to fill out the old veteran regiments rather than creating three new ones, it is unlikely Virginia would have had more than 8 continental regiments in 1780. Charleston and Waxhaws merely completed the process.

As for Camden, Gates made the same mistake Washington did earlier in the war of trying to use militia as a substitute for continentals. This could be done with select militia units as Morgan did at Cowpens. However if you put them in an open field, unsupported and facing regulars, you risk exactly what happened at Camden. The better performance by Virginia militia at Guilford Courthouse may simply have been due to their smarter use by Greene.

Several points of interest:

In theory, and probably in fact circa 1775, every militiaman had a musket. Men lacking one were fined, unless they could prove indigence, in which case they were provided one purchased from fines.

But disasters such as Camden sharply reduced the supply of arms, as men who ran typically dropped that heavy thing. The state purchased more -- 10,000 iirc, from France, paid for with tobacco -- and issued them, but tried to ensure they were returned by men upon completion of service.

Also, the deserters from Camden were theoretically returned to the army to finish their service, plus additional time as a punishment. My recollection is that many of the Camden runners evaded this, but at least several hundred did not, or maybe were ashamed enough to do it more or less voluntarily.

If one reads the Va Statutes during and just after the war, one sees the legislature adjusting the law to fit new realities. There were successive disasters, to be sure, but there was generally a new policy after each one, trying to fix what went wrong.

Bill is correct that the Va governor was a pretty weak executive.

The Camden deserters -- plus another 800 men who had failed to rendezvous with Gates' army and who were also considered deserters -- were sentenced to eight months additional service. County records are incomplete, but one company from Amherst MAY be typical. They were court-martialed upon return home and sent back to serve under regular officers. "We were accordingly mustered and put under command of Capt. Pamplin, who marched us back to Hillsborough, where Gen Greene's army lay, and we were transferred to the command of Capt. Graves form the county of Culpepper, who was assigned to take command of the men sent back from other counties for the same offense . . .

George Mason's son commanded a company (not deserters) sent to reenforce Greene in early 1781. Mason wrote (with a father's pride): The men are mostly volunteers, who turned out from the battalion at large, without any regard to the divisions to which they belonged. There are among them several soldiers, and three or four sergeants who had served out their time in the Virginia Line on Continental establishment, so that I look upon it to be equal to any militia company in the state."

Willing men under veteran sergeants sounds like a big reason Guilford went differently, although Greene's use of Morgan's tactics was undoubtedly crucial.

So the Guilford militia included some of the same men, but better officered, and probably a good bit more motivated.

An excellent reference for Guilford Courthouse is Long, Obstinate and Bloody by Lawrence Babits and Josh Howard.

They go into some depth on the makeup of the North Carolina and Virginia militias.

B

And TJ had to deal with Steuben!

I am of the opposite side. TJ one of the best Presidents. Namely, Louisiana Purchase doubled the country size and not one once of blood was shed. Of course he didn't approve it until it was signed in France, but eh. He could of given it back.

Jefferson was a great man, but not particularly a great president.

Hamilton, it has been said, was a great man but not a great American!

Not a great American?

Who said that?

He fought for the country in the War of the Revoution and was one of the authors of the Federalist Papers in support of the Constitution.

Jefferson, on the other hand, did not support the adoption Constitution…

B

Hamilton was deeply in love with the British system. But he was an illegitimate colonist who could not rise within it, so he worked brilliantly to make the USA as much like Britain as possible.

TJ probably DID support ratification. He was in France so played no role. But he assured Madison (his close friend and life-long ally) that he loved the Constitution, although it needed a Bill of Rights. TJ MIGHT have joined George Mason (father of the Bill of Rts) as an anti-federalist in the Va ratifying convention, but probably not, as he was bitter enemy to Patrick Henry who led the anti-fed opposition.

Jefferson was in opposition to the Constitution because he opposed a strong central government which the Constitution established. Yet, he was the first president to expand the powers of the executive with the Louisiana Purchase.

Mason was an anti-Federalist and he would not sign the Constitution.

James Madison, who would become Jefferson's protégé, was the author of the Bill of Rights, and shares with Mason the 'title' of 'father of the Bill of Rights.'

B

Mason wrote the Virginia Bill of Rights in 1776, much of which was taken word-for-word into the US Bill.

Madison was a federalist in 1788 when the issue was, should the central government be stronger? Jefferson agreed, if we are to believe the letter he sent to Madison.

Both became Democratic Republicans (founding the party) in the early-mid 1790s when the issue had changed to "HOW strong should the US government be, in relation to the states?"

The season admitting only of operations in the Cabinet, and these being in a great measure secret , I have little to fill a letter. I will therefore make up the deficiency by adding a few words on the Constitution proposed by our Convention. I like much the general idea of framing a government which should go on of itself peaceably, without needing continual recurrence to the state legislatures. I like the organization of the government into Legislative, Judiciary & Executive. I like the power given the Legislature to levy taxes, and for that reason solely approve of the greater house being chosen by the people directly. For tho' I think a house chosen by them will be very illy qualified to legislate for the Union, for foreign nations &c. yet this evil does not weigh against the good of preserving inviolate the fundamental principle that the people are not to be taxed but by representatives chosen immediately by themselves. I am captivated by the compromise of the opposite claims of the great & little states, of the latter to equal, and the former to proportional influence. I am much pleased too with the substitution of the method of voting by persons, instead of that of voting by states: and I like the negative given to the Executive with a third of either house, though I should have liked it better had the Judiciary been associated for that purpose, or invested with a similar and separate power.

There are other good things of less moment. I will now add what I do not like. First the omission of a bill of rights providing clearly & without the aid of sophisms for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, restriction against monopolies, the eternal & unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws, and trials by jury in all matters of fact triable by the laws of the land & not by the law of nations. To say, as Mr. Wilson does that a bill of rights was not necessary because all is reserved in the case of the general government which is not given, while in the particular ones all is given which is not reserved, might do for the audience to whom it was addressed, but is surely a gratis dictum, opposed by strong inferences from the body of the instrument, as well as from the omission of the clause of our present confederation which had declared that in express terms. It was a hard conclusion to say because there has been no uniformity among the states as to the cases triable by jury, because some have been so incautious as to abandon this mode of trial, therefore the more prudent states shall be reduced to the same level of calamity. It would have been much more just & wise to have concluded the other way that as most of the states had judiciously preserved this palladium, those who had wandered should be brought back to it, and to have established general right instead of general wrong. Let me add that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, & what no just government should refuse, or rest on inferences. The second feature I dislike, and greatly dislike, is the abandonment in every instance of the necessity of rotation in office, and most particularly in the case of the President. Experience concurs with reason in concluding that the first magistrate will always be re-elected if the Constitution permits it. He is then an officer for life. This once observed, it becomes of so much consequence to certain nations to have a friend or a foe at the head of our affairs that they will interfere with money & with arms.

TJ to Madison December 1787 from Paris

Virginia militia serving in the Carolinas in 1780-81 was different than the type of militia that fought at Concord and Lexington. These were ad hoc formations of men drafted from the regular militia (or were hired substitutes or volunteers) to serve for short terms, usually 90 days. Commentators have remarked on differences between those drafted for militia or continental service in this era to those who volunteered for continental service at the beginning of the war. This suggests that the draft was administered to send those the community felt it could most easily spare.

Raising ad hoc units for 90 day service rather than turning out the militia units have two different impacts. At the outset the units would likely have less cohesion than normal as the troops and their commanders could be strangers to each other. As time went on though the units would have gotten better due to continuous service together. Many of these experienced militia might then serve as cadres for the next militia call up, improving the quality of the militia companies over time.

Interesting comment on the Camden militia Doc. In reviewing pension records I have not run across this. Perhaps the program was administered locally so that the result was inconsistent. Perhaps the pension applicants just neglected to mention why they returned for more service when they made their pension applications.

The Continentals referred to the militia as 'long faces' because they weren't too happy to be called up.

Too many times they showed up without arms or equipment, were issued that from Continental stores, and then took it home with them.

There are definite reasons why Washington referred to them as a 'broken reed.'

B

Washington referred to them as a 'broken reed' because he kept trying to use them as ersatz regulars.

He didn't have much choice too often. The militia and the state lines, or the state regulars, recruited with higher bounties than the Continentals which drained potential recruits away from the Continental regiments.

And some militia units did stand, as one regiment of them did at Camden in 1780, fighting alongside the Maryland and Delaware regiments against the British onslaught.

The militia overall was not reliable either showing up or staying when needed. Too many of them would wander off and go home, leaving the Continentals holding the proverbial bag.

It took another war for the powers that be to figure out that the greater majority of the militia were not up to the challenge. The Continentals bore the burden, suffered most of the casualties, and without them the US would have lost. The militia overall were more a hindrance than a help.

B

Jefferson was a fantasist who couldn't even live by his own fantasy. Hamilton admired the parts of the British system that worked best. War and the military made Hamilton , the Revolution, Whiskey a Rebellion, Quasi War, but war only revealed Jeffersons flaws. Anybody, with the exception of perhaps John Randolph and John Taylor, would have taken Louisiana so no personal glory should rest there.

@NYI-It must bother you that Hamilton's political manipulations probably resulted in Jefferson being elected Vice President in 1796, and resulted in him being elected President in 1801.

@Brechtel-One of the things I have noticed over the years is when continentals failed, pro-professional commentators will look for a specific reason for the failure. When militia fail it is chalked up to them being militia.

Militia did on occassion perform well fighting in a manner of regulars. Ideally that wasn't how militia should be used. Washington marched out of Valley Forge with probably as good a regular army as he ever had. It was too small of an army though to hold the colonies in the face of available British, provincial, Canadian and Indian forces, and with Britain controlling the sea. Further Washington's army was too expensive for the U.S. to afford to maintain and replenish. Militia provided a low cost way to fill the gap. One problem with part time troops is that they are not always around. That same part time role though is what makes them inexpensive.

When talking about the difficulties in recruiting continentals in the face of competition, I think you need to be colony and time specific. In Virginia in 1779-81 a draft had been set up to raise continental as well as militia units. Continental service wasn't popular at this time, so there were draft riots as well as problems with desertion.

The bigger problem in Virginia late in the war was outfitting continentals. Of the three units raised by Scott in 1779, 2 were delayed in moving south by the difficulties in obtaining uniforms and equipment. Two more units were raised in 1780, but when the first and better equipped unit joined Greene, he requested the second be held until it could be better equipped. Something similar also happened to another unit raised in 1781. It seems that Virginia was responsible for uniforming and equipping these troops and did not have the means to do so. Some of this is revealled in various pension applications from this period.

Another complication in Virginia is that at the same time units are being raised for service to the south, the colony itself was being raided and invaded.

I have read something similar happened in North Carolina. Regular units raised in 1781 apparently had to supply their own weapons and clothing because neither NC or Greene was in a position to supply them.

It bothers me not a whit, as it did not. The Federalists were well split over the Adams administration and the anti Adams faction had already moved beyond Hamilton's control, Sedition Act being the biggest example. In any case, Jefferson was elected to a great degree because the 3/5 clause gave the South greater voting power than it deserved.