"First Volley" Topic

Back in the middle 1980's I remember reading somewhere, I can't recall where of course, (I have since started taking notes), that the military thinkers of the muzzleloading era considered that the first volley issued by a unit was the most effective due to the fact that all of the muskets, at least in theory, were loaded correctly and that, as a rule of thumb, it was estimated that the percentage of misfires doubled in each succeeding round issued after the second. As a result they felt that due to the above it was considered desireable for the unit to refrain from firing, if the troops were disciplined enough, until the enemy forces were quite close. Theoretically, this would result in the first fire delivered being the firing unit's most effective and devastating (?) to the enemy receiving it. I wonder if any of the TMP contributors, whose knowledge in these matters constantly impresses me, have any knowledge of this theory, or would care to comment on it. Thanks, John Miller

Look at what Christopher Duffy writes on the subject in his excellent book "The Military Experience in the Age of Reason".

One of the things that has always bugged me about this is that "first volleys" get a bonus in games where one roll of the dice is half an hour's firing. If a turn is two minutes then I'm with you, but otherwise not…

JM – to your comments I would add that the first volley benefited from the absence of any obscuring gun smoke. From my reading, once that first controlled volley was delivered, firing would rapidly degenerate into a chaotic fire at will that was impossible to control and difficult to stop, with the soldiers firing randomly through a pall of gun smoke that largely prevented any clear view of the enemy. DuPicq, Hughes, Griffith and Balck all mention this phenomenon.

B

And perhaps the term is used loosely, meaning not only the initial well loaded volley discharged under good visibility, but also a few subsequent volleys that are discharged before the muskets start to get fouled, and the men start to get a little tired, confused, etc.

As well, the first volley is pretty much the only one in which platoon sergeants have control over the firing line before battlefeuer

One of the things that has always bugged me about this is that "first volleys" get a bonus in games where one roll of the dice is half an hour's firing.

Given this opinion, I am a bit curious why you left the initial volley rule in your recent reissue of On To Richmond.

Re: the original post, as noted there were many factors at play when firing an initial volley. I think an important one is how the target unit reacted to receiving first fire. Obviously an enemy who opens fire at such a distance that little if any damage is done is not going to worry one as much as a unit with the discipline to hold fire until the advancing unit is very close. I can see an advancing unit having an increasing anticipation of receiving fire with the anticipation getting to a point that perhaps the unit stops to fire first even without orders (and there are plenty of examples of this from the Napoleonic Era as well as the ACW). Then there is the shock of advancing and then receiving an effective fire (one that does obvious damage to the unit). If a unit had gotten its dander up (become impetuous for lack of a better word), the anticipation of receiving fire would have been much less so the shock of it finally happening would be greater. So an initial volley modifier may also reflect the morale impact of receiving first fire, especially at a close range.

Another thought is that the "weapons at rest" modifier that is in some rules probably only played a part with the initial volley in helping to get the guns lined up.

Regarding On To Richmond…I was trying to keep the original largely intact. If I were to do a rewrite well….let's just say I'd change a lot more than that modifier.

Besides they are a regimental set disguised as a brigade level set anyhow….

To me, the reason most rules from the black powder period provide bonuses for opening volley is all about the dirty nature of black powder and the rate of fire. For anyone that has ever been involved with reenacting or live firing of black powder weapons, it only takes a few rounds to start impacting ease of loading. This in turn would greatly impact the rate of fire in battle. Couple this with impacts to the firing mechanisms (flint issues with flint locks, as well as priming/touch holes in all black poser weapons). Picking the latter out in combat was never easy.

I have always considered the opening volley as a serious of rounds (due to the time frame in most games, a "volley" is usually more than one round going down range). The best shots and the best rate of fire is delivered early when the weapons are in their best state, not to mention the other factors such as smoke on the field, confusion, mental/physical fatigue and a unit's own casualties.

So yes, I see the opening volley as very important in this period. There is a reason most units waited as long as possible to fire their 1st volley.

I am a fan of the first volley at +1. The reasoning has been given above.

It also has the effect, in the game, of units holding fire until it they have the best conditions. Without it there is no reason not to start firing as soon as the enemy comes into extreme range.

Vince

Ditto what VCarter said… it helps encourage period tactics by making it worthwhile to hold fire until at short range.

Billy Yank

There is also the human factor, which is not always easy to guage. As units start fireing, the slodiers get more and more adrinaline flowing, and start getting more excited, or scared or both. And confused as well. All those guns going off right by you do not make for cool deliberation.

All of these things make fpor poor marksmanship. it does no good to have rifles, if you cant keep your soldiers from using them for AA guns. it may well be that the Officers holding fire did not lknow all the reasons a first volley was better, just that it was. really all that matters. or they may have known exactly why, and just didnt bother to write down all the reasons.

owen

Not necessarily the first volley. It would have been a tactical situation where the officers and NCO's have good control over the regt. At times the first volley could be poor, as the regt. is potentially far more nervous and uncertain at the start of combat than after action has commenced.

So, they could equally fire decent volleys say half an hour after their first action if they had time to reorganise or were out of direct combat for any reason.

Just saying the 1st volley of any wargame is the best doesn't always translate accurately.

DB

I think it kind of goes hand-in-hand with the idea that the men are at their best for that day when the battle begins. It's not outside the realm of logic to accept the same for the weapons- best for the first time they are used for the day.

This is where accounting for the effects of the unit's leadership's ability to direct tasks (like maintaining your weapon during lulls in the fighting, making men drink some water, replacing ammo, checking on the men's welfare and tending to wounds, etc) should be considered in unit effectiveness. Not advocating a laundry list of what could be done, but rather, considering the effects of thier activities within the context of regaining unit cohesion and maintaining the unit in the fight.

Having fired blackpowder weapons (both flintlock and percussion cap) for an extended period of time, I can say with certainty that the 'first volley' concept is very solid. The reliability of your weapon starts to plummet as soon as the first round is fired!

-Will

I'd like to add this to the discussion. regardless of what ACW rules writers say, or reenactors say, the manuals of the period discourage volley fire. In fact, Casey, Hardee and others post-Scott all state that the most common form of giving fire is "By files" in each company. This is, in my personal opinion, exactly where the phrase "the rattle of musketry" comes from.

"Fire by File" occurs within each company simultaneously. The first file on the right of the company fires, then the next, then the next, all in order down the line. As soon as each file fires, then the two men (front rank & rear rank) in that file reload and begin to load and fire at will, taking precautions to maintain their positions and distance/intervals.

Thus, each company delivers disciplined, well-aimed shots from right to left, then begins, and continues, loading and firing at will.

The file closers & officers would have no trouble controlling their men, and the command to cease fire, being given by bugle and reinforced by the officers and file closers would have been easily heard.

Once the "Cease Fire" has sounded, then men would automatically reload, if they aren't already loaded, and bring their weapons to shoulder arms.

Though certainly the units on both sides were taught to fire by volley, it was by then an antiquated way of giving fire and the most common "volley" fire was by the company, alternating down the line so that one of every pair of companies was always loaded and able to give fire while the other company was reloading after having given fire.

However, the preferred and most often used method of giving fire was "Fire by Files".

Thanks very much to everyone who responded. This is just the kind of stuff I was looking for. I play Stars n Bars and in those rules a units fire represents more than one "volley" so no "first round" modifier is used, rightly so in my opinion. I especially appreciate all the opinions and details you guys provided. I asked as a matter of historical interest on my part not to fault or credit any rule set out there. TKindred, I am grateful for the "fire by file" explanation, Thanks. John Miller

Respectfully disagree. IMO, many rules, guidelines and dicta detailed in the manuals were reproducible only under carefully controlled conditions on the parade ground and proved impossible to implement under actual battle conditions. The carefully calibrated 28-inch pace, the quick-step, the 24-inch, elbows-touching per man frontage were only possible to execute on a peaceful unobstructed parade ground. In action, any unit able to charge for 300 yards cross country and maintain a semblance of close order was considered to be of the very highest quality. Likewise, fire by file made a certain theoretical sense in terms of maintaining a continuous fire upon the enemy, but attempts to implement it during a stand-up firefight (by my past reading) would inevitably and rapidly degenerate into a disorganized fire at will. I think fire at will would produce a very respectable rattle of musketry of its own.

Others may disagree, of course, but that is my opinion.

B

I can think of at least two times that a unit fired by file with noticeable precision. The Regular Brigade in the Army of the Cumberland at Shiloh (technically part of the Army of Ohio at the time) and in the cedars at Stone's River (specifically the second time they went in to stall the advance). Both times, as TKindred explained, they began the fire by files, but then went to "fire at will." I don't believe it was MEANT to be organized fire beyond the first or second fire by file.

Correct. After the initial fire, each man began to load and fire at will, and this would actually (normally) be started before the last two files in the company had finished with their disciplined fire.

One note about the "Initial Volley" that I should have mentioned but failed to. By the time of the ACW, the importance of the first, disciplined volley had been subsided by technology. In short, with the advent of the percussion lock, the entire rational behind the "First Volley" was no longer relevant.

With the flintlock system, the real problem with fouling wasn't in the bore, but with the pan, frizzen and touch hole. It was THERE that fouling became an issue.

When the powder in the pan flashed, the residue also started to coat the frizzen, and also the striking edge of the flint. If uncared for, and allowed to build up, it meant that the ability of the flint to make sparks was quickly degraded, and thus misfires became all too common. Fouling within the pan itself wasn't as big an issue, but fouling of the touch hole could quickly render the musket useless as well.

Thus, most infantrymen carried a prick & brush on a small chain with a U-shaped loop in the middle which could attach over a coat button hole. You wouldn't normally see it because the men's cartridge box sling & bayonet sling would cover it up. BUT……. it was needed in order to clean out the touch hole every 10-20 rounds, and brush out the detritus from the pan. The soldier could also use the rag or soft piece of leather he used to wrap his lock with as a means of cleaning the edge of the flint and the strike plate.

With a percussion lock, the cone gets fouling, but the soldier has a cone pick in a small loop inside of his cap pouch. He can use this to help clean out the lock if it fouls, although such fouling usually isn't a problem until 50+ rounds have been fired. Fouling of the bore is a greater problem after 30-40 rounds, which is why the Williams Cleaner round was introduced.

But I digress. If your unit is armed with flintlock muskets, then the initial volley, through the first few rounds is important because after that fouling will begin to cause misfires and impede the strength of your fire (though by then casualties also might be impeding your unit's strength, so go figure).

With percussion weapons, it's largely irrelevant.

TKindred: I have some experience firing flintlock and percussion weapons, (my father had a gun collection), and I understand you reference to fouling and the difference due to the types of ignition systems but what do you think about the issue of incorrectly loaded weapons. I can understand how a flintlock, having loose powder in the pan, flint issues, etc. would produce more misfires, but would not the misfire issue, (due to incorrectly loaded weapns), remain with percussion muskets, not to as great an extent to be sure, due to the excitement and fear generated during the course of the units time in combat. I look forward to you views and thank you and everyone else who was kind enough to respond. Thanks, John Miller

John,

I used to both shoot competition with flintlock & percussion, as well as hunt with my trusty Parker Hale Enfield.

Now, as a rule, misfires due to incorrectly loaded weapons were the exception and, in most cases, it was easy enough for a soldier to pick up another weapon from the field and simply discard his own. Those weapons found on battlefields with multiple rounds loaded are, IMHO, an aberration and commented upon by authors and gamers, reenactors, etc, simply because they are the exception and not the rule. It's like soldier's letters to their families and wives, etc. They rarely write about the daily routine, but instead comment upon the extraordinary stuff they encounter.Same with the newspaper writers, etc. Always looking for that "hook" to get the reader's attention.

Checking a weapon for multiple rounds is easy enough with the rammer. If the rammer is level with the muzzle, the weapon is unloaded. If it sticks up an inch, there's a round (or something) in the breech. For every inch above that you can add another round, or a REALLY long plug…

If there is a single round loaded, and the weapon misfires, the company's Ordnance Sergeant (or any other SGT in the rank of file closers) can help. First off, the soldier himself would simply try another percussion cap to see if that worked (it's one of the reasons a packet of ammunition had 10 rounds and 12 caps) and, if that didn't, then use his cone pick to try and clear out any fouling.

If THAT fails, then he'd ask for help from a SGT, who usually had a musket tool in the implement pouch of his cartridge box. The SGT could use it to remove the cone, then a little powder (just a few grains) were poured down the vent hole, and the cone replaced and tightened. The soldier would return to the ranks and try firing it again. If THAT failed, the the weapon was usually just dropped and replaced with one from one of the wounded, KIA, etc.

But more than anything else, the training of the men was usually sufficient to preclude the loading of multiple rounds in all but a VERY small segment, a segment of the numbers engaged that I would consider insignificant.

That's my personal view on the situation. I'd say that with the advent of percussion weapons, that misfires and difficulties due to weather such as rain, mist, humidity, etc, were all but eliminated.

Fr one example, I'd leave you with this: Both armies at Gettysburg remarked upon the severe heat and the number of heat exhaustion/stroke victims on both sides. yet, temperature recordings from Gettysburd itself indicate that the temperatures never exceed 78 degrees F. So why the conundrum?

Humidity. It was brutally humid during the end of June through July of that year, more so than normal. The heaviness of the air, combined with the moisture therein amplified the effects of the heat to make it seem much worse than it was. It caused the men to become dehydrated far quicker than normal and with the added loss of electrolytes, caused lethargy and, in some few cases, death.

Now, I add that because if such oppressive humidity had little impact upon the reliability of the weapons, then our rules should also be wary of including such variables too.

V/R

TKindred: Wow!!! That was fast!!! Thank you for all the information you have provided!!! John Miller

Hi TK – I absolutely agree that the fall-off in performance between initial volley and sustained fire was far greater with flintlock muskets than with percussion muskets from a misfire point of view. As I recall, the mis-fire rate for flintlocks in sustained fire was supposedly about 20-25pct in battle (although that figure arguably might vary depending upon the quality of the soldiers). I have never seen anything remotely resembling that rate of incidence with percussion weapons.

Given troops of similar training and stress levels, I would expect the incidence of loading errors to be approximately equal.

But smoke obscuration after the initial volleys would also be approximately equal and would, to my mind, be the biggest factor causing a fall-off in fire effect.

FWIW / B

On multiply loaded muskets. At Gettysburg no fewer than 27,000 muskets were recovered from the field by the Federals. Of these 6,000 were loaded correctly with one charge, 12,000 were doubly loaded and 6,000 were loaded with 3 or more charges. 3,000 were unloaded.

That's at least 18,000 muskets rendered unservicable by incorrect loading, assuming none were retained by their owners. This puts the number of misloads at around 1% of shots fired (Federals expended 1.3 m musket and rifle musket rounds, and the Confederates ISTR ca. 800,000).

To put it another way, the chances of rendering the weapon U/S is roughly the same as the chance of hitting an enemy.

On why the first volley was most effective. Psychology. The first volley was physically the most destructive for reasons of well loaded muskets, well leveled muskets, good sight pictures and tight control. If thrown away too early it would be ineffective, and would buoy up the morale of the targets, knowing that the worst was ineffetive. If held to effective range it would frequently break formations.

Firing by files was a good theory. At Peach Orchard, Gettysburg, the 114th PA took heavy casualties as its supports were not trained to fire by file, but only by volley, so as part of the 114th obscured the Confederates they could not fire without hitting the 114th PA and so held fire.
Yes +1 first volley but only in rules that reflect a small time frame of a few minutes. In 20min turns etc the first volley is only one of say 40-60 volleys.

Just an observation. It seems that nearly everybody posting above is firmly convinced that effective ACW fire was done a nearly "whites of their eyes" ranges. I have seen a lot of information that there was a significant change in tactics because of the increased range and effectiveness of the rifled, minie ball percusion cap musket. Is all that a bunch of hooie and was ACW musket fire only effective at stone-throwing range…………………………………………….I guess we should go back and correct all that.

1968billsfan:

There are a couple threads here dealing with effective ranges of ACW weapons.

My own observations are that the effective range for anything but muskets is 300 yards. That is a function of iron sights and unaided eyeballs. It's the same effective range for both infantry weapons and cavalry carbines.

having said that, with the rolling terrain in these United States, along with the woodlands, farms, orchards, etc, it is more often the norm that engagements take place at 200 yards or less. That is a function of the terrain and not of the weapons themselves.

Certainly artillery ranges were longer, but batteries has the advantage of both optics (among the officers, who were trained to determine ranges with their binoculars and telescopes) and also of the gunners and their stadia. It was important for them to know the range in order to select the proper ammunition and, if appropriate, cut/set the fuse to the proper time.

But in my personal opinion, rules that permit infantry and cavalry to fire at targets beyond 300 yards for anything but absolutely flat, unobstructed terrain, are full of baloney and ought to be ignored.

That's my personal opinion, and nothing more. But you ought to use the search function to bring up the previous threads on effective ranges and read through them.

V/R

Re effective range – Strictly my opinion of course, but I see this as a two-sided issue: there is the accuracy of the weapon and the skill of the shooter. Inside of 50-100 yards there is effectively no ballistic difference between a smoothbore and a rifle. Put smoothbore buck and ball ammunition into the equation, and the smoothbore was arguably superior to the rifle at ranges < 100 yards. Beyond that range, the accuracy superiority of the rifle steadily grows. By the time the range reaches 200 yards the accuracy advantage of the rifle has become decisive. But how many soldiers of the period could reliably hit a selected target with aimed fire beyond 200 yards? At such ranges (IMO) the rifled musket must be viewed as delivering a general cone of fire with the soldiers of a target formation under that cone of fire subject to being randomly hit. The ballistics of the smoothbore made it impossible to deliver an effective cone of fire at those longer ranges. One other factor to keep in mind is that infantry firefights of the ACW very often took place in obstructed or wooded terrain where maximum visibility might easily be less than 200 yards (for example – Wilderness, Chickamauga, parts of Murfreesboro and Chancellorsville).

It's complicated.

B

TK wrote – " rules that permit infantry and cavalry to fire at targets beyond 300 yards for anything but absolutely flat, unobstructed terrain, are full of baloney …"

+1, and we might add canister to that.

B

Blutarsky:

I agree with your assessment of the effective ranges of small arms. Especially, the assertion that buck & ball inside of 100 yards is decisive. Indeed, troops armed with such ammunition put a very large amount of projectiles into the target area, effectively making those units so armed into giant shotguns.

FWIW, at Gettysburg, there were more than 40 federal regiments armed with muskets, including all of the Irish Brigade save the 28th Massachusetts, which carried Enfield rifle-muskets. There is anecdotal evidence in the Brigade's histories and post war talks that they resisted being rearmed with rifled weapons because of the effectiveness of the muskets at the ranges they usually engaged the enemy with.

I agree that most often the usual maximum engagement ranges were limited by terrain and the use of iron sights to 250 yards or less, whereas the roundball smothbore musket was limited by its projectile ballistics to 125 yards or less. Take you favorite even modern rifle and lay iron sights at a 200yard target. A man would be only a fair sized spec the size of your front sight and most soldiers would only be putting down an area fire.

However, I do wonder about the direction of the discussion above, was to have opening volleys limited to classic smoothbore ranges of 40-80 yards.

This begs to ask for opinions on the question: given an open field of 250yards with and a resolute advancing line of enemy presenting themselves, what would the preferred tactic be for opening fire with rifled muskets? I have read many accounts of waiting (al la Bunker Hill) until a close range devestating volley, and also accounts of troops advancing for that 200 yards under continuous fire.

Might a tactical rule set provide options for such engagements?

I have read many accounts of waiting (al la Bunker Hill) until a close range devastating volley, and also accounts of troops advancing for that 200 yards under continuous fire.

Bunker Hill is a good example of how smoke reduced the effectiveness of fire.

Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg.

Federal infantry waited until Pickett's lines emerged from a natural depression that provided cover to open fire. It was about 250 yards from the federal position.

There's the effective range of the weapon, and the effective range of the shooter. With rifles and rifle/muskets, the range of the weapon exceeded the range of the shooter unless he was a skilled sharpshooter. That is, the weapon could kill you at 300 yard or more IF it hit you, but the average shooter couldn't hit even a regiment (in line of battle) at that range, mostly because he was no good at estimating the range, or forgot to set his sights to the correct range. (Anecdotal evidence says most men/units fired too high, probably meaning they over-estimated the range.)

I have to wonder, though, if buck and ball (at least the buckshot part) was effective at more than 50 yards. Anybody have real data?

Once a firefight began, the smoke from both sides plus people falling around you and an excess of adrenalin probably meant that you might as well just point the gun in the general direction of the enemy and hope for the best.

BTW, "whites of their eyes" is VERY CLOSE range! 10-15 yards maybe, if taken literally.

Pickett's Charge. The reports in the OR of those that reported opening fire range show only two opened fire at 200 yards, the 7th Michigan and 20th Massachusetts. However the officers the 20th Mass puts the range he opened fire at 100 yards or closer, and this is perhaps reflected in Hall attributing the long range fire entirely to the 7th Michigan, his regiment. The 7th Michigan was in reserve behind the 20th Mass, and so if they opened fire they were firing when the enemy was about 100 yards from the front of the 1st line.

See link

and Gottfried's Brigades at Gettysburg for the officers of the 20th Mass placing the range at 100 yards.

Most defenders opened fire at 80-100 yards. The smoothbore armed 12th NJ held fire until 20 yards and then literally blew away the 11th Mississippi with one volley, the bulk of the survivors so stunned that they were taken prisoner.

So essentially the defenders held fire to 100 yards or closer. Hess notes the ranges Pickett's 3 brigades stopped to return fire after receiving a volley was 75, 80 and 100 yards.

Okay, if people held fire until the enemy was under 100 yards, or maybe under 50 yards, then why did the rifled-minne ball musket made such a difference in tactics? I will offer that the rifled musket could keep Napolonic type artillery out of short range.

(I would say that Napoloenic artillery could deploy 150 yards away from a line of infantry and then blow them away, whereas in the ACW, the rifled muskets would shoot down the artillery).

1968billsfan: I am not sure about relating this to Napoleonic artillery capabilities but I remember reading somewhere, (of course I can't remember the book or the writer), that in the ACW an artillerymen's life was worthless when oppossed to rifle musket armed infantry at anything under 500 yards. I am no expert but I believe statements like this are an exaggeration of the actual battlefield effectiveness of the weapon. Just an opinion. Once again thanks to you and everyone who responded to my topic. John Miller

DonLowry wrote – "I have to wonder, though, if buck and ball (at least the buckshot part) was effective at more than 50 yards. Anybody have real data?"

…. The best data I have come across is found in the book "The Rifled Musket" by Claud (sic) E Fuller; Bonanza Books NY, 1958. The title is a bit of a misnomer, as the book discusses a wide range of small arms up to and including early salvo and machine guns. The centerpiece of the book is its reproduction of an extensive series of period Ordnance Board small arms tests which include images of the actual targets with the recorded projectile strikes.

One such series of tests involved firing of .69 caliber smoothbore buck and ball cartridges (1 ball + 3 buckshot) at a range of 100 yards against a 10 x 10 ft target.

Case 1 – 10 men firing by volley: total 50 shots.
36 of 50 balls and 79 of 150 buckshot struck the target.

Case 2 – 10 men firing by file: total 50 shots.
35 of 50 balls and 82 of 150 buckshot struck the target.

Case 3 – 10 men firing as skirmishers: total 50 shots.
31 of 50 balls and 84 of 150 buckshot struck the target.

I'll confine my remarks to saying that the buckshot could definitely reach out to 100 yards. Someone here on the forum with real life shotgun experience should be able to comment as to how wound-effective buckshot would be at that distance. MV probably would have been about 1300-1400 fps.

I really do recommend the book. If you are interested in such topics, you will spend months analyzing the data in these tests (I did!).

B

1968Billsfan wrote – "Okay, if people held fire until the enemy was under 100 yards, or maybe under 50 yards, then why did the rifled-minne ball musket made such a difference in tactics? I will offer that the rifled musket could keep Napolonic type artillery out of short range.

(I would say that Napoloenic artillery could deploy 150 yards away from a line of infantry and then blow them away, whereas in the ACW, the rifled muskets would shoot down the artillery)."

….. One thought I would offer is that the ability of a rifle musket armed formation to put down an effective cone of fire out to 300-400 yards took away arguably the most important offensive tactic of field artillery in the smoothbore horse and musket era, i.e. – the ability to run up, unlimber at 300+ yards and pelt an infantry line with canister with complete impunity. Without this kind of devastating fire support, offensive movements became much more difficult.

I once did the math on this and it is remarkable what a 6 gun ACW field battery had crammed into an 80 x 50 yard area: six guns, six caissons, twelve limbers, seventy-two horses, and upwards of eighty or more men. This assumes that the service and supply echelon and any reserve caissons remained sheltered to the rear. It was a very vulnerable target to concentrated infantry fire.

B

I agree that in the ACW compared to the Napoleonic times, the tactic of moving up, unlimibering and shooting away at formed infantry by artillery was not going to work.

I'm still interested in what the drill manual and what the actual practice was for the first volley of infantry firing at advancing infantry. Somebody, somewhere must have complied this data. (not trying to be a troll or a wise).

The best way to try and locate any such data would be, IMHO, the OR's. It would be tedious, but made less so with a digital copy with a search function.

In my studies of ranges of opening fire at Antietam and Gettysburg by digitally searching the ORs and plotting the results I found several references to how close artillery could operate from infantry. About 150 yards a battery felt they were suffering too much from "sharpshooters", but batteries operated at 2-300 yards without being suppressed or knocked out.

On another point, one of the reasons gunners hated being too close is the ineffectiveness of their canister. (Pointed out here by Hunt: link ). The caseshot with the minimal fuse (0.75 seconds) was brutally effective down to about 250-300 yards, but then the fuses are too long and one must switch to the much less effective canister round.

The big canister balls used by the Napoleon didn't disperse much. The most recent research shows a 11 ft diameter circle at 100 yards meaning that even shoulder to shoulder only 4 of 5 files will be hit and they'll suffer badly (18-19 of the 27 balls are within the dangerous space if the men are 6 ft tall, and due to the height of the circle the vast majority of these will hit the middle 2 files). Double canistering merely increases the number of balls in the existing dangerous space, and thus doesn't create very many extra casualties.

Also one should note that in Napoleonic times unlimbering close to the enemy usually had the same effect as in the ACW. It worked well once, but that's merely the exception that proves the rule.

My blog posts on the OR ranges:

link

link

67Tigers blogs show Antietam at ~64 yards and Gettysburg at about 100 yards. The second blog

survey of the OR for yards, paces and rods has yielded the following firefight ranges (identified opening fire range):

"The mean is 95 yards and the mode 100 yards, but three distinct peaks are visible. It seems the average open field range of 100 yards is reasonable, with the lower ranges being in restricted terrain.

During Pickett's charge 2 Union regiments (7th MI and 20th MA) opened fire at 200 yards, the rest at 80-100 yards except the 12th NJ who reserved fire to 20 yards. The attacking Confederates stopped to fire around 80 yards and stopped moving forward well clear of the fence. "

I find this quite interesting- there is not a lot of difference between the effective killing range in practice of Napoleonic and ACW infantry fire. This does fly in the face of the repeated assertion in history books that the high ACW casualties was due primarily to the longer range of the minie ball rifled musket.

A few observations:

* At 100 yards a 68" tall man takes up about the same angle as your thumb (2/3") does at arms length- just about a comfortable sight picture to shoot at using iron sights. Is there a pyschological factor about being able to see features of the opponent or being within a charge distance of a single lungful of air? (Olympics run a 100 yard dash and indoor a 60 yard dash).

* Skirmishers were usually used and they bugged out from between the lines at about 100 yards, thereby clearing the path to shoot at an approaching line.http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=279374

* Smoke was a limitation for both ACW and Napoleonic firefights. Although it wouldn't affect the distance of first fire, I wonder if 40 yards of smoke might be issued towards the enemy by both sides and closing would make you a visible target

* The deadliness of the rifled musket might be more due to its ability to fire more rounds before being compromised by mechanical issues. A percusion cap is more reliable than a fouled touch tube. Lead melts at ~ 1000degrees and smoothbore muskets would start to foul with lead and powder after ?10 rounds, whereas the well fitted, expanding minie bullet helped cleaned the barrel with every shot.

I see a number of "experts" who claim that " the smoothbore trajectory was flat for 100 yards, whereas "the rifled musket had a rainbow trajectory". This is BS. Both had high initial muzzle velocities (~1200fps ~950fps) and were practically "flat shooting" over that first 100 yards.
Using the following diameter, BC, weight and MV for minie and roundball, (.57, .286 470 985;;;; .678 .07 486 1200) a ballistic calculator (
link gives (sighted for 100yards) vertical trajectories @ 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 500 yards as follows for the two weapons
+4.4"/+3.7" 50 yards;;;; 0/0 @ 100 yards';;;;;-1.25'/-1.25' 150 yards;;;;-3.5'/-6.7' @200 yards';;;;;;-6.7'/-7.5' @ 250 yards ;;;;;-11'/ -13' @13 yards. Both are similiar in trajectory; however the rifled musket (https://www.iusb.edu/ugr-journal/static/2000/pdf/stanage.pdf) is more accurate due to the spun bullet, so that fairly effective fire could be issued at longer range.

Both are curved, but the smoothbore less so due to much higher MV. link

1968billfan wrote:

* Smoke was a limitation for both ACW and Napoleonic firefights. Although it wouldn't affect the distance of first fire, I wonder if 40 yards of smoke might be issued towards the enemy by both sides and closing would make you a visible target

This COULD be true on any battlefield, however it wasn't as great a difficulty as might be imagined because the common field would have some slight breeze blowing which would tend to quickly dissipate any powder smoke.

The only times that smoke was really a hindrance was in damp weather, where a slight (VERY slight) drizzle tended to keep the smoke down towards the earth rather than letting it rise, and a similar situation which occurs in very humid conditions.

Besides, when two lines of infantry came within 100 yards, it was a rare occasion when they stood and slugged it out. Invariably, one side or the other would either break quickly, or charge forward to try and close the distance and end the affair with the bayonet & clubbed musket. In that light, the effects of the powder smoke would also be negligible.

V/R

"Besides, when two lines of infantry came within 100 yards, it was a rare occasion when they stood and slugged it out. Invariably, one side or the other would either break quickly, or charge forward to try and close the distance and end the affair with the bayonet & clubbed musket. In that light, the effects of the powder smoke would also be negligible."

In the ACW the very opposite is true. The troops advanced to within 100 yards and then lined up and traded volleys. It was the very root of the indecision of ACW combat.

link

Also lets not forget that after you start receiving fire there are not as many of your fellows there to fire back.
So your first volley is probably when you also have the most guns firing too!

1968billsfan: I have been reading of the effectiveness of the rifle musket since the 1950's I believe, and I don't buy it. You mention an interesting point. If there was indeed an increase in the battlefield effectiveness of the rifle musket could it be more a result of the percussion cap ignition system than the rifling? I don't think I personally ever got more than seven or eight rounds from a flintlock before having a misfire, (I believe substantially less was my usual), and I was not standing in a line of battle surrounded by noise and chaos. Just a thought. Thanks for you comments. John Miller

In the ACW the very opposite is true. The troops advanced to within 100 yards and then lined up and traded volleys. It was the very root of the indecision of ACW combat.

As a rule, I refuse to speak ill of the dead. I Paddy's case, I am more than happy to make an exception. If anyone was foolish enough to purchase his poor excuse for historical research then they ought to either remain quiet or send it back for a refund.

It is easier to count what Paddy got right than what he got wrong. There was a civil war fought in these United States. It was fought between the years of 1861-1865. It involved to sides referred to as the United States, and the Confederate States.

Beyond that, it's pretty much worthless. In fact, you shouldn't even consider lining a birdage with it's pages, because that would be redundant.

The OR's are full of accounts where one side or the other quickly broke, or one side stood it's ground while the other attempted to close to bayonet range. In fact, similar to the earlier wars, it was more often the willingness to use the bayonet, and it's actual use which decided an issue more so than artillery or infantry firepower.

Historians have beclowned themselves with the concept they continue to put out that the bayonet was rarely used in combat. They base their work(s) on a misreading/misunderstanding of reports from the "The Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion, 1861-65" which listed wounds treated in federal hospitals during the war. In those charts, bayonet wounds only account for some 950+ wounds treated.

While the chart is correct, it only lists "wounds". Rarely did burial details list the cause of death, and bayonet wounds were, unlike many other types of injuries, almost always fatal. Of all the injuries treated during the war, fewer than 1000 were by bayonet. The rest never made it to the hospital.

That supports the numerous letters & diaries which speak of "setting into them with bayonets & clubbed muskets".

Brawner's Farm was far more the exception than the rule.

I will state for the record that I am no fan of Paddy Griffith. His book has done more to perpetuate myth than anything short of ACW veteran's reunions and hard liquor.